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This study evaluates the current position of Sri Lanka in terms of Newly Industrialized 
Country (NIC) status, and explores the lessons which it can learn from the successful East 
Asian economies. Accordingly, it develops a policy strategy to enable Sri Lanka to converge 
into a more dynamic growth path leading towards the NIC status in the foreseeable future. 
This exercise was deemed useful because Sri Lanka had a superior position over many less 
developed countries (LDCs) including the East Asian NICs four decades ago, but having 
attempted various economic policy regimes over this period, it still remains a LDC.  
 
The study undertook a lengthy literature review of various economic policy regimes which 
can be used to achieve economic development.  East Asian NICs are distinguished by their 
use of competitive industry policy (CIP)- a mixture of trade policy and industry policy. To 
examine the relation between CIP and economic development, two case studies were carried 
out on Taiwan and South Korea.  While different processes and policy timing occurred in 
these countries, both emphasized the importance of outward orientation in their economic 
activities. Their experience is distinguished by the flexibility, coherence, and consistence of 
policy making with the state undertaking a role of a ‘developmental state.’ The study 
considered the importance of identifying the key elements of their policy approach and the 
institutional context in which those elements have interacted when learning from their 
experience.   
 
Based on the literature review and the two country studies, the study developed an analytical 
framework highlighting a growth path to the NIC status.  Under the framework, two types of 
economic policies were identified as useful for rapid growth: trade policy, and industry 
policy.  It also emphasized two necessary conditions for its success: macroeconomic stability; 
and a developmental state. A statistical test was used to examine how the two types of 
policies have worked in Sri Lanka after the 1977 reforms. It was found that Sri Lanka has not 
used appropriate competitive industry policy measures as did by the East Asian NICs in the 




The study compared Sri Lanka’s post-1977 policy performance with those of South Korea 
and Taiwan in detail.  The main thrust of the rapid industrialization and growth in these 
countries was identified as originating from the CIP strategy they used. Their superiority over 
other LDCs including Sri Lanka was attributed to the way they used policies such as sector 
targeting, directed credit, foreign investment, export processing zones, infrastructure 
development, human resource development, and R&D along with trade reforms.  It was noted 
that Sri Lanka has shown some progress in implementing more or less similar policies, yet 
there is still an unfinished agenda for it to reach their level of achievement.    
 
The study identified the areas where Sri Lanka needs improvements to achieve the NIC status.  
First, it discussed a course of actions in order to create a developmental state and a stable 
macroeconomic environment.  Secondly, it identified a few key industries to be targeted by 
using CIP measures such as credit allocation, FDI, R&D, and EPZs for rapid industrialization 
and growth. Other CIP measures such as human resource development, infrastructure 
development, trade and exchange rate policies can also be used to improve resource allocation 
in all sectors in the economy including the specific industries selected. It is assumed that the 
targeted industries would generate competitive advantage within a short period of time and, 
thereby, enhance economic growth though increased exports.     
 
While previous studies have examined the applicability of the East Asian model for other 
LDCs, few have attempted to assess its relevance to Sri Lanka.  Besides filling a gap in the 
trade and industry policy literature, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
development approach whereby Sri Lanka can become a NIC. It believes that given Sri 
Lanka’s superior position in terms of human development indicators compared to other 
LDCs, Sri Lanka is in a better position to become a NIC than many other LDCs in the 
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1.1 Background to the Study 
Economic development has been a major problem for developing countries such as Sri 
Lanka in the post-war period. Economic development includes changes in a society 
associated with “improved standard of living” including “less poverty,” “better health,” and 
“improved education;” a necessary condition to achieving these changes in poorer countries 
is economic growth (Stiglitz, 1998a, p.3).  There is however, no universally accepted 
development strategy to achieve a higher economic growth rate.  
 
The causality between different policy strategies and economic growth has been long 
debated in the economic literature.  There is a well-established view that a country can 
achieve a higher growth rate through industrial development (Kuznets, 1956; Chenery and 
Syrquin, 1975; William et al., 1989).  The importance of industrialization in economic 
development for developing countries was recognized especially after World War II.   
Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) in his ‘Big Push’ model emphasized the importance of 
industrialization for less-developed countries (LDCs).1  According to Meier (1995, p.327) 
“industrialization offers substantial dynamic benefits that are important for changing the 
traditional structure of the less developed economy.”  The proponents of this view advocate 
that industrialization gives redress to LDCs who confront the problem of a lagging export 
demand while facing the impossible task of providing employment for a rapidly increasing 
labour force. As they believe, it enables LDCs to experience a structural transformation over 
time from a low-income, agrarian economy to a high-income urban economy where there is 
the added advantage of agglomeration.   
 
                                                          
1 Rosenstein-Rodan argued that the low investment is the major obstacle to development in these countries, and a ‘big push’ by way of a 
high minimum amount of investment in the industrial sector can help them overcome this obstacle.  
 
 2 
Historically, countries have used different strategies to achieve economic development. 
Economic theory is used to explain various methods of achieving development.  According 
to neo-classical theory, free trade is one such strategy, which acts as the engine of growth by 
directing resources to their best uses. It establishes a presumption in favour of the non-
interventionist state based on the ability of free markets to achieve economic objectives in a 
manner prescribed by Pareto efficiency.2  The resultant efficiency gains can be expected to 
enable the economy to achieve a higher level of income and living standards. In recent 
years, most developing countries have included free trade as a major component of their 
development strategies.  However, this was not the orthodoxy when these countries were 
decolonized. 
 
After World War II, many developing countries realized the importance of promoting 
manufacturing industries to reconstruct their economies following a rapid deterioration of 
their terms of trade for agricultural products.  Achieving self-sufficiency in manufactured 
goods was accepted at the political level to be the only way out of their predicament. A 
theoretical explanation for this was found in the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis3 of the late 
1940s, which supported import substitution (IS) as an effective strategy for rapid growth 
and development.  The fundamental argument of this strategy was that special 
characteristics in developing countries, such as high dependence on primary exports, lack of 
resources, small markets, unskilled man power, and low levels of savings prevented them 
from reaping the benefits of free trade.  The aim of this strategy was to replace imports of 
consumer goods in the domestic market.  
 
Having followed IS policies for several decades however, many LDCs found that it was not 
helping them achieve development.  Instead, they faced a host of other chronic problems 
such as slow growth, unemployment, balance of payments difficulties and foreign 
                                                          
2 As Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) defines, an increase in total welfare occurs “in those conditions in which some people are better off as a 
result of the change, without at the same time any body being worse off” (Bannock et al., 1992, p.322). As Wade (1990, p.10) explains: “ 
In neo-classical view, the engine of development is not so much capital formation as efficient resource allocation.  Once institutional 
arrangements are in place to generate an efficient allocation of resources investment can be left take care of itself.  Whatever investment is 
generated by these arrangements constitute- with some small exceptions- the social optimum.  The necessary institutional arrangements 
for generating efficient resource use are competitive markets, particularly domestic markets integrated with international markets.”  
3 Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) argued that the declining terms of trade phenomenon resulted in a long-term transfer of resources 
from developing countries to developed countries. Hence, they advocated LDCs to develop their domestic industrial sector by protective 
measures while restricting the expansion of primary export sector.  
 
 3 
indebtedness, in addition to the persistence of unfavorable terms of trade. Furthermore, they 
also experienced severe structural distortions and deficiencies in their economies.   These 
countries realized that import substitution was a self-limiting process caused by the small 
size of their domestic market, and thus began to seek alternative strategies for development. 
Export promotion came into wider acceptance after the late 1960s as a means of stimulating 
growth (Tyler, 1981), but only a few, mainly East Asian,4 economies followed this path. 
 
With the emergence of a new growth theory related to international trade which positively 
links economic growth to factors such as increasing returns to scale, learning by doing, and 
externalities (Romer, 1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1990), the superiority of free trade was 
questioned in mainstream economic literature.  According to this school of thought, in 
conditions of increasing returns to scale and imperfect world markets, a country’s growth 
can be faster if it restricts trade to some degree.  As Krugman (1986, p.15) points out: “The 
idealized theoretical model on which the classical case for free trade is based will not serve 
us any more. The world is more complex than that, and there is no question the complexities 
do open, in principle, the possibility of successful activist trade or industrial policy.”  The 
new growth theory has thus added a new dimension to the prospects of economic strategies. 
 
The phenomenal growth of the Newly-Industrialized Countries (NICs)5 of East Asia in the 
1970s and after has renewed the debate over economic development strategies.  While the 
proponents of conventional economic analysis attribute the success of East Asian NICs to 
efficiency gains of export-led growth under freer trade regimes (Balassa, 1982 & 1988; 
Bhagawati, 1988; Westphal, 1978; World Bank, 1982 & 1993), there is growing literature 
supporting the view that the governments of those countries have played a decisive role in 
achieving this success (Amsden, 1989, 1994; Auty, 1994, 1994a; Evans, 1995; Ohno and 
Imoaka 1987; Stiglitz, 2002; Wade, 1990; Weiss, 1995). According to this latter group, the 
higher industrial development of the East Asian NICs is mainly an outcome of their use of 
competitive industry policy6 (Auty, 1994, 1994a; Ohno and Imoaka, 1987). As they 
                                                          
4 Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are among them, which are also known as four tigers.    
5 The OECD used the term "Newly-Industrialized Countries" for the following countries who were high achievers in manufacturing 
exports in 1970s and 1980s:  South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia 
(OECD, 1979 p.18-22). 
6 Competitive industry policy (CIP) includes a wide range of government policies to promote markets and industries using trade and 
industry policy in a stable macroeconomic environment (see Chapter Two for more details). 
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emphasize, the superiority of East Asian economic performance is due mainly to high levels 
of government commitment to industrial development, faster transfer of new techniques into 
actual production, higher investment in certain industries than otherwise would have 
occurred in the absence of government intervention, and exposure of domestic industries to 
international competition.  There are numerous studies supporting the view that 
governments of these countries, especially Taiwan and South Korea, played an active role in 
their development process (Amsden, 1985; Pack and Westphal, 1986; Stiglitz, 1996; White, 
1999). Following this approach, this study examines whether a competitive industry policy 
can help Sri Lanka achieve a higher growth rate and become a NIC. 
 
First, it is useful to be specific about the term ‘Newly Industrialized Country (NIC).7  
Although this term is widely used in the current economic literature, there is no universally 
accepted definition.  According to the Penguin Dictionary of Economics, NIC is “a country 
that is not a developing country but has not yet achieved the status of the advanced 
countries” (Bannock et al, 2003, p.277).  As the Oxford Dictionary of Economics (New 
Second Edition, 2002) defines it, NIC is “a country which has recently increased the 
proportion of industrial production in its national income and of industrial exports in its 
trade”  (Black, 2002, p.321).  However, both these definitions are too general and are of 
little use for the purpose of this thesis.   
 
A more elaborate definition is found in the Wikipedia Encyclopaedia:8 “NICs are countries 
that are not quite yet at the status of a full-fledged capitalist liberal democracy, but still 
more advanced than countries in the third world or in the category of least developed 
countries.”   As it specifies, NICs have the following common features:  
(a) A recent industrialization (a switch from agricultural to industrial economies); 
(b) Recent reforms allowing for greater political liberalization and democracy; 
(c) Increased social freedoms and civil rights; 
(d) An increasingly open economy allowing for freer trade with its neighbours.  
 
                                                          
7 Some scholars call them as Newly Industrializing Economies (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993, p.2). 
8 For details see http:/en.wikipedia.org (05.01.2004) 
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The OECD9 (1979) used this term first to identify the fastest growing developing countries 
in the 1970s (as quoted in Chowdhury and Islam (1993, p.3).  It used the following criteria: 
(a) Fast growth in both the absolute level of industrial employment and the share of 
industrial employment in total employment;  
(b) A rising share of world exports of manufactures;  
(c) A rapid increase in Gross domestic Product (GDP) per capita narrowing the gap with 
advanced industrialized economies.  
 
Balassa (1980) defined NICs as those developing countries with a per capita income in 
excess of US $1,100 in 1978 and a share of manufacturing sector in the GDP 20 per cent or 
higher (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993, p.3).  Emphasizing the need to suit the current 
requirement further, Chowdhury and Islam used the following minimum criteria for a 
country to be considered as a NIC (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993, p.4):  
(a) A real GDP per capita of US$ 1000;10  
(b) A saving ratio equal to 15 per cent;  
(c) A share of manufacturing in GDP and employment equal to 20 per cent; and  
(d) Human Development Index (HDI) equal to 0.75.  
 
For the purpose of this study, this definition appears to be relevant as it uses several 
quantitative criteria to measure NIC status.  It is assumed here that all the criteria except (a) 
above are valid for today’s use.  The criterion (a) should be adjusted for inflation over the 
intervening years. 
 
Sri Lanka has experimented with various economic policy regimes since independence in 
1948.  At independence it was basically an open economy with an economic structure based 
on comparative advantage evolved in line with the prevailing structure of the world trade 
(Snodgrass, 1966).  In terms of economic and social development indicators, it had a unique 
place among developing nations during this early period.11  Sri Lanka was well ahead of 
Taiwan and South Korea in terms of basic social indicators.  As shown in Chapter Three, Sri 
                                                          
9 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
10 They identified 22 countries as NICs using 1988 GNP per capita.   
11 See Table 3.1 in Chapter Three for details. 
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Lanka followed import substitution policies for a considerably longer period than many 
other Asian countries albeit with some partial liberalization attempts during the 1965-1970 
period.   The new government in 1977 changed the development strategy with some drastic 
measures to liberalize the economy and integrate it into the world economy (Ministry of 
Finance, 1977).  There were several reasons behind this policy change (Karunarathna, 2000, 
p.176): (a) “popular discontent” against the hither to prevailed inward-oriented policy 
regime; (b) the “demonstration effects of the Asian economic miracle;” and (c) 
conditionalities attached to the stabilization funding by the World Bank and related donor 
agencies.  Since then, measures have gradually been taken to enhance the role of market 
mechanisms.  It is more than two decades now since the reforms were implemented. 
However, Sri Lanka still remains a developing country,12 whereas South Korea and Taiwan 
together with some other contemporary LDCs achieved NIC status by 1980.  It is 
worthwhile therefore to find reasons for Sri Lanka’s failure to become a NIC, and examine 
what lessons it can learn from the development experience of East Asian NICs, particularly, 
Taiwan and South Korea.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
As mentioned above, at independence Sri Lanka had a superior place among developing 
countries in terms of economic and social indicators.   As with many other LDCs, it 
followed an inward-looking strategy during the 1960-1977 period, but with little 
improvement in its industrial structure.  During this period, its annual growth was very low 
although other social indicators were remarkably high.  In 1977, somewhat later than the 
East Asian NICs, it introduced drastic reforms in order to integrate its economy into the 
world economy.  Since then its major objective has been rapid industrialization and, to 
achieve this objective, it has taken necessary steps to promote market mechanisms.  As can 
be seen in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, there are similarities in contemporary economic 
policies and economic, social, and political factors between Sri Lanka and some East Asian 
countries such as Taiwan and South Korea.   However, Sri Lanka’s past annual growth rates 
are far below those of the above countries (Appendix Tables A-1 and B-6).  There have 
                                                          
12 Only in 1996 it reached the per capita income level of US$ 760 which was the threshold to becoming a Middle Income Developing 
Country (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 1996, p.23). 
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been no East-Asian type changes in the structure of the Sri Lankan economy despite the two 
decades of outward-oriented policy regime (Appendix Table A-2). Accordingly, this thesis 
considers that it is worthwhile to investigate the following two problems: Why has Sri 
Lanka still not achieved NIC status despite early reforms and policy changes? To what 
extent would the East Asian model be relevant to Sri Lanka to achieve industrialization in 
the future? This thesis attempts to find answers to these questions as part of exploration of 
the development problem in Sri Lanka. 
 
1.3 Objectives  
The study will examine how far the East Asian development model, especially that used by 
South Korea and Taiwan, is applicable to economic development of Sri Lanka.  In order to 
do this, it undertakes a detailed analysis of past economic policies of Sri Lanka and the 
above two economies as case studies.  In this process, the thesis is expected to achieve five 
objectives: 
• To review the policy evolution in Sri Lanka since independence, and identify the 
associated changes in growth in real GDP, and other major macroeconomic variables; 
• To investigate whether there has been any structural change in the economy after the 
1977 economic reforms; 
• To estimate a regression equation incorporating both trade policy and industry policy 
variables to identify the major sources of growth for Sri Lanka during the post-1977 
period; 
• To analyze Sri Lanka’s trade and industry policy performance during the post-1977 
period with a view to see how far it is on the path to NIC status; and 
• To recommend a policy strategy based on the experience of above two East Asian NICs, 
which will improve the development path to NIC status for Sri Lanka. 
 
1.4 Methodology and Data 
This study reviews the different economic theoretical approaches to the impact of trade and 
industry policies on national economic growth in order to identify key economic variables 
to include in the analysis of growth factors.  It also reviews the policies and practices used 
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in South Korea and Taiwan to identify the role of political and social variables in their 
economic development, which can be useful for policy development in Sri Lanka.  
 
In order to emphasize the role of trade and industry policy on industrialization and growth 
in Sri Lanka, this study develops a conceptual framework based on the experience of the 
above two East Asian NICs.  The model formulated here is expected to facilitate our 
understanding of the causal relationships between different policy variables and economic 
growth.   Based on this model, the study develops several research propositions to facilitate 
the subsequent analytical work. 
 
Within this framework, the study uses both quantitative as well as conceptual approaches to 
achieve the objectives specified in Section 1.3 above.  A regression equation is estimated to 
identify past sources of growth for Sri Lanka in Chapter Six.   By attempting to relate the 
results to identifiable policy variables, that chapter makes an assessment of the Sri Lanka’s 
positions in terms of the NIC standard.  While providing explanations to the related 
propositions, this exercise is used as the basis for subsequent policy analysis in Chapter 
Seven, and a policy strategy for NIC status in Chapter Eight.  
 
Apart from the quantitative analysis in Chapter Six, the study mainly relies on conceptual 
analysis. For these analyses, it extensively uses secondary data, as well as findings of 
previous studies where available.  The study uses data tables, figures and diagrams, where 
necessary, to support arguments and clarify facts.  The major sources of data used in this 
study are the two annual publications by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka: The Annual Report, 
and The Review of the Economy (various issues). In addition, international publications such 
as those of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN) are the 
other useful sources of data of this study. 
 
 9 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
There are many studies on Sri Lanka in the field of trade policy and growth.13  However, 
few studies address the relevance or applicability of East Asian model of economic 
development to Sri Lanka.  Indeed, only a small number of studies have examined the 
applicability of the East Asian Model emphasizing the role of government to other countries 
at all (Auty, 1994; Edwards, 1995; Agrawal et al., 2000).  As such, this study not only 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the development approach Sri Lanka needs to follow 
to become a NIC, but also fills a gap in the trade and industry policy literature.  The 
outcome of this research can be useful in providing a framework for future policy 
developments in Sri Lanka as well as in other developing nations with similar socio-
economic conditions. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
This study consists of eight chapters, each chapter fulfilling a specific objective (see Figure 
1.1 below which illustrates the interrelationship between chapters). This chapter provides 
the introduction to the study by presenting basic information underlying this study such as 
background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives, methodology, and the 
organization of the study.  
 
Chapter Two presents an in depth survey of the economic literature in the related fields. It 
covers a broader area of subjects such as growth theory, macroeconomic policy, infant 
industry debate, import substitution, foreign investment, strategic trade policy, free trade 
policy, and competitive trade policy.  It also includes most of the recent theoretical and 
empirical studies on trade reforms and related policy changes in various countries 
emphasizing the various dimensions of their impacts on development. This chapter thus 
provides the theoretical inputs for the conceptual framework in Chapter Five.   
 
Chapter Three provides a detailed overview of the Sri Lankan economy.  In doing so, it 
reviews the policy evolution in Sri Lanka since independence, and identifies associated 
changes in major macroeconomic variables, which was also one of the objectives of this 
                                                          
13 See Chapter Three, Sri Lankan Economy: An Overview, for other research work on Sri Lanka in the related field. 
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thesis. Considerable attention is paid to the evolution of various economic strategies in the 
past, and to the background of the 1977 economic reforms.  This overview will provide the 
background information useful for the analytical work in latter chapters, particularly in 
Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight.  
 
Chapter Four undertakes a detailed analysis of the development experience of two East 
Asian NICs, Taiwan and South Korea. It examines in detail policies they adopted both 
before and after they became NICs, and identifies their relevant aspects to the Sri Lankan 
context. This analysis, along with the literature review in Chapter Two, provides inputs into 
the conceptual framework in Chapter Five. 
 
Chapter Five develops the conceptual framework for this study mainly on the basis of the 
theoretical discussion made in Chapter Two, and the empirical evidence derived form two 
case studies in Chapter Four.  While providing a theoretical perspective to the study, it 
proposes a process through which a country can achieve NIC status. It also formulates 
appropriate research propositions in order to facilitate the subsequent analytical work in 
relation to research objectives.      
 
While exploring methodologies used in similar studies in the past, Chapter Six undertakes a 
statistical analysis to see the pattern of economic growth during the last four decades, and 
whether there has been a structural change in the Sri Lankan economy after 1977.  It also 
develops a statistical model to examine the past sources of growth in Sri Lanka after 1977.  
This statistical analysis is treated as a diagnostic test for the policy analysis to follow.  This 
exercise also provides arguments for some of the research propositions made in Chapter 
Five. 
 
Chapter Seven assesses Sri Lanka’s position in terms of NIC status.  It evaluates the nature 
and extent of Sri Lanka’s policy experience during the post-1977 period in comparison with 
that of South Korea and Taiwan during their pre-NIC period.   In the process, it provides 
arguments for the research propositions made in Chapter Five.  This analysis also serves as 
the basis for the policy recommendations in Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter Eight first provides the conclusion of the thesis by summarizing its major findings.  
In the second part, it discusses a policy strategy for Sri Lanka to achieve NIC status in the 
foreseeable future. The chapter concludes the study by giving indications on prospects for 
further studies in the subject area, and some directions for policy makers in LDCs, who 
would be interested in using this development approach.   
 
 
                                                              Figure 1.1 
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DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 




The aim of this chapter is to discuss the main economic policy strategies that have been 
used by countries in the past to achieve rapid growth and development as a prerequisite to 
developing a policy model for Sri Lanka.  The economic literature contains many 
strategies for growth, which have been subject to detailed discussions over the years.  
This chapter first discusses the literature on economic growth, and the theoretical debate 
on development strategies with special reference to the following areas of policy: free 
trade; import substitution; infant industry protection; strategic trade theory; foreign 
investment; and competitive industry policy.  It will also review briefly the literature on 
the role of macroeconomic policy in economic development.  This will be followed by 
empirical evidence especially with regard to trade, industrialization and growth.  The 
development approach based on competitive industry policy evolved through the above 
strategies.  This literature coverage is therefore useful for the development of the 
conceptual framework for this study and the subsequent policy analysis in chapters to 
follow.      
 
2.2 Economic Growth: Sources and Processes 
Economic development can be defined as the “process whereby the real per capita 
income of a country increases over a long period of time” (Meier, 1995, p.7). For this to 
occur, the rate of growth of the economy should exceed the rate of growth of population 
over time.  Therefore, economic growth can be regarded as the major determinant of   
development. It is normally measured by the increase in the real volume of goods and 
services produced within an economy over time.   It is determined by either an increase in 
quantity of factors of production or an increase in efficiency of use of factors of 
production (Castley, 1997). The former, known as extensive growth, depends on 
increments to the quantity of factors of production such as land, labour, and capital or 
improvement of managerial skills, while the latter, known as intensive growth, depends 
on economies of scale, improvement in quality of factors of production such as training, 
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R&D, and improved production processes and organizational changes to make each unit 
of capital more efficient (Castley, 1997, p.22).  The extensive growth of the economy 
depends on demand conditions, especially for exports.  The growth of income generated 
by the export sector and the subsequent re-investment leads to an increase in the supply 
of factors of production that in turn leads to an increase in aggregate income.  The export 
sector is thus responsible for increasing economies of scale and, thereby, speeding up 
extensive growth.  Thus, if the objective is rapid growth and industrialization, then a 
competitive industry policy can be used to accelerate both extensive growth as well as 
intensive growth.  
 
The World Bank (1993) forwarded a functional approach to explaining the high growth 
rates of the East Asian NICs.  According to this approach, the East Asian NICs used two 
types of policy choices: maintaining of economic fundamentals as reflected by stable 
macroeconomy, high and growing rate of human capital, limited price distortions, and 
openness to foreign technology; and selective intervention by way of generous incentives 
for export push, financial repression, directed credit, and selective promotion.  This was 
assisted by institutional support in two ways: creating an efficient civil service, and 
reducing incentives for ‘rent seeking’ behaviour or corruption.  These factors made way 
for growth in the East Asian NICs in three ways: accumulation effect (due to high savings 
and investment, and increasing in human capital), allocation effect (high returns on 
investment, and effective use of human capital), and productivity change (rapid 
technological change). 
 
Emphasizing the causality between policy sources and economic growth, Kim (1995, 
p.90) explained South Korea’s industrialization process using a framework which he 
named as Korea’s ‘neomercantilist model’ (Figure 2.1).  According to this model, there is 
a “link between world demand and domestic output for a small, open economy” (Kim, 
1995, p.89).  The productivity of the industrial sector depends on the level of output 
given the presence of scale economies in industries.  “[T]he initial level of exports 
determines the country’s international competitiveness which in turn influences the rate 
of growth in world demand” (Kim, 1995, p.89). This becomes a virtuous circle.  If the 
world demand declines, however, the economy can loose its export competitiveness. To 
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remedy this, two types of policy can be used: trade policy to increase world demand; or 
industry policy to enhance international competitiveness.  
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Figure 2.1 Korea’s Neomercantilist Model 
 
 
The above two models address the sources and processes of growth especially in the 
context of a small, open economy.  However, the study of East Asian growth process is 
incomplete without highlighting the role of their governments in coordinating and 
implementing theses process.  This will be discussed at length later in this chapter and 
also in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.1 
 
 
2.3.  Development Strategies/Approaches: The Theoretical Debate 
There are several policy strategies available for policy makers in developing countries to 
achieve higher economic growth. However, there is no agreement among economists as 
to their relative merits. Their success or otherwise may depend on such factors as 
country-specific situations, role of government, and the external environment.  In broad 
terms however, development strategies based on trade and industry policies fall into two 
main groups, ‘outward-oriented’ and ‘inward-oriented.’   An outward-oriented strategy is 
one in which trade policies do not discriminate between production for the domestic 
market and exports, nor between purchases of domestic goods and foreign goods.2  In 
contrast, an inward-oriented strategy is based on import substitution in manufacturing 
which is carried out behind high protective barriers.  This strategy was adopted by many 
                                                          
1 The study develops a conceptual framework in Chapter Five based on this Chapter, and the two case studies made in Chapter Four.  
2 Since it does not discriminate with regard to international trade it is also called ‘export promotion’ strategy (World Bank, 1987). 
  Productivity 
 15 
LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s to attain high rates of economic growth especially during 
the initial period when imports of non-durable consumer goods and the intermediate 
goods used in their manufacture were replaced by domestic production.  Unlike outward-
oriented strategy, the policies under this strategy are biased towards production for 
domestic rather than export markets.  In between the above two extremes are other 
strategies relating to international trade, which have drawn the attention of development 
planners.  They include the infant industry protection, strategic trade policy, competitive 
industry policy, policies concerning foreign direct investment.  This section will discuss 
in detail the theoretical debate on these different policy strategies. 
  
2.3.1 Free Trade Theory 
There are many studies suggesting the presence of a strong association between a 
country's trade strategy and its economic growth rate (Balassa, 1978; Bhagawati, 1988; 
Edwards, 1991; Krueger, 1980, 2002).  One main argument is that trade based on 
comparative advantage leads to industrialization that then provides a major impetus for 
growth.  Their findings support the view that trade acts as the ‘engine of growth’ for an 
economy. 
 
One of the earliest views on trade among nations was from David Hume in his Political 
Discourses in 1752 (Viner, 1937). According to Hume, under free trade, imports and 
exports affect domestic money supply, and prices adjust accordingly. However, Hume’s 
ideas were of little use for the subsequent development of trade theory.3  A more 
accepted theory of international trade was presented by Adam Smith in his famous 
Wealth of Nations.   Using the principle of division of labour Smith explained how 
countries could specialize in certain economic activities.  Having demonstrated the 
advantages of specializing within a country, he further showed how similar gains could 
be derived from division of labour among nations (Smith, 1776, p. 423):  
It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at 
home what it will cost him more to make than buy.   The tailor does not attempt 
to make his own shoes, but buys them from shoemaker.  The shoemaker does not 
attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a tailor.   The farmer attempts to 
make neither the one nor the other, but employs those different artificers.  All of 
them find it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which 
                                                          
3 He argued that given a free market in bullion, and internal price flexibility, any attempt by a country to build up a long-term 
favourable balance of trade would be a failure.   
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they have some advantages over their neighbours, and to purchase with a part of 
its produce, or what is the same thing, with the price of part of it, whatever else 
they have occasion for.  …If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity 
cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy off them with some part of the 
produce of own industry, employed in a way we have some advantage.  
 
Smith’s main argument was that barriers to free trade were undesirable and, through free 
trade all countries can gain from specialization. Accordingly, the proper international 
division of labour would be where countries specialize in the production of goods in 
which they have an absolute advantage.  Thus, rather than producing everything, a 
country should produce only goods for which it has absolute advantage. The problem is 
what will persuade workers in each country to produce according to these absolute 
advantages.   According to Smith, market forces do this.   However, Smith failed to show 
how should free trade take place if one country has absolute advantage in all goods.  
 
Smith’s free trade theory was further developed by David Ricardo in his Principles of 
Political Economy (1817), which showed the existence of gains even when one country is 
better than its partner at producing all products. Accordingly, a country should specialize 
where it has its greatest absolute advantage (if it has absolute advantage in all goods) or 
in its least absolute disadvantage (if it has absolute disadvantage in all goods).  This rule 
is widely known as the ‘law of comparative advantage’ (Wells, 1969, p.29).  Using the 
principle of comparative cost, Ricardo contributed to the growth of trade theory by 
displaying how nations can have ‘gains from trade.’ 4  
 
The theory of comparative advantage however rested upon the relative immobility of 
factors of production between countries, and their relative mobility within a country.  For 
example, if one country is more efficient than another in everything, then labour and 
capital freely move into that country resulting in all production ultimately being 
concentrated there.  However, since such inputs are not freely mobile between countries 
in reality, differences in costs can exist.  Thus, under Ricardian analysis, once trade opens 
up, each country is led to specialize completely in the production of its export product, 
and to produce none of its imported good.  This is because with only one factor of 
production, there cannot be any diminishing returns.   
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The classical trade theory based on comparative advantage was a static model which 
demonstrated basically how nations would gain from trade when production possibilities 
differ between countries.  This theory was further developed by Ohlin (1935) who 
explained why production possibilities differ among countries.   Ohlin’s analysis was 
based on a previous work of Heckscher (1919) who had emphasized the difference in 
factor endowments of countries as a prerequisite for international trade.  Ohlin thus 
provided a more complete explanation to the pattern of international trade.  This model 
which is now famous as ’Hecksher-Ohilin factor endowment theory’ (H-O theory) 
provided a strong basis for describing the effect of economic growth on trade and vice 
versa. 
 
According to this theory, trade between nations is profitable as it enables them to take 
advantage of their differing factor endowments.   Thus, it differs from the traditional 
approach to trade in two ways: (a) It takes into account all the factors of production 
available in the economy; and (b) It emphasizes differences in relative quantities of 
factors. International trade occurs not necessarily because of differences in factor 
productivity for different goods between different countries, but because countries have 
different factor endowments.5 According to this theory, countries where labour is cheap 
can have a relative cost advantage over countries where labour is expensive in activities 
which require abundant use of labour.6  Those countries can gain through trade by 
exporting labour intensive products and importing capital-intensive goods.7  It is this H-O 
theory which has strengthened the validity of traditional trade theory as a development 
strategy. 
 
It is worthwhile to discuss various views on the validity of this theory. A major 
contribution in this regard came from MacDogugal (1951) who tested the H-O theory 
using trade data to discover whether US exports were relatively more capital intensive 
than those of the UK.  The results did not support the a priori expectation under the H-O 
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 Ricardo used his famous example of trade between Portugal and England to show how warfare of both nations can be increased 
through trade if they specialize in the production of the good in which they have comparative advantage and then exchanging some 
of this production for the good in which they have comparative disadvantage. This leads to foreign trade.  
5 It is argued that given different factor supplies, relative factor prices will differ, and so will be the different domestic commodity 
price ratios and factor combinations. 
6 For example activities such as clothing and textiles, which normally require abundant use of labour. 
7  The reverse is applicable for the countries with cheap capital. 
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model, and hence cast some doubt on the validity of the H-O approach.   In another study 
in the USA, Leontief (1953) computed the amount of direct and indirect capital and 
labour required to produce a planned amount of output in some selected industries, while 
assuming that the economy transfers the inputs previously engaged in the export sector to 
import industries.  If the economy is more capital-intensive than its trading partners, then 
theoretically any contraction in export industries should release relatively more capital 
and less labour than the import substitution industries absorb.  The ratio of capital to 
labour would be lower in the import-substitution industries than in the export industries.  
The results however did not prove this.  It showed that the ratio of capital to labour is 
higher in import-substitution industries than in the export industries.  As he concluded:  
American participation in the international division of labour is based on its 
specialization in labour intensive rather than capital-intensive lines of production.  
In other words, this country resorts to foreign trade in order to economize its 
capital and dispose of its surplus labour, rather than vice-versa (Leontief, 1953, 
p.25).  
 
Leontief’s above findings however were criticized by Ellsworth (1954) on the ground that 
the capital intensity of US import substitution industries is irrelevant to the comparison.   
Instead, a comparison of capital intensity of US exports with that in countries which 
produce US imports would have been meaningful.  It was argued that the USA, as a 
capital rich country, has a natural tendency to use capital intensive methods of 
production, and as such, import replacements would naturally use relatively more capital 
to produce similar goods than the countries supplying them to the USA.  
 
Another criticism to the H-O theory was that the main determinant of trade between 
nations is the supply elasticity within trading countries rather than their relative factor 
endowments (Kravis, 1965, p.45).  As such, the trade in the real world depends mainly on 
controls and interventions, rather than on relative factor endowments.   
 
Balassa (1977) provided a more dynamic version of the H-O theory by arguing that a 
country’s comparative advantage will change over time in response to the accumulation 
of physical and human capital. As a result, the developed nations will loose their 
comparative advantage over the years in products where they need cheap and/or unskilled 
labour.  This compels them to shift to new products which require more capital and skills, 
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leaving the former areas to LDCs.  He justifies this theory by using the post-war 
development of Japan, and the subsequent progress of other East Asian economies.   
 
There are studies which hesitate to accept the view that free trade is so vital for 
development (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Farrell, 1987; Stiglitz, 1998, 2002). They are 
critical of the free market ideology on the ground that in reality information is imperfect 
and markets are incomplete.  Contributing to the theory of ‘new market imperfections,’ 
they argue that whenever information is imperfect and costly, and markets are 
incomplete, the invisible hand works most imperfectly.  Stiglitz (2002) is confident that 
this can be remedied by good policy which can identify such imperfections and 
ameliorate them through non-market institutions.   
 
Providing a general framework for analyzing industrial development and policy, Lall 
(1991, p.150) suggests that “industrial development cannot be explained by a few 
selected variables, such as out-ward orientation or laissez-faire but only by a combination 
of several forces that interact with each other in complex ways.”  These forces include 
incentives, capabilities, and institutions. These forces work at different intensities at firms 
level and national level.  Given inherent differences between these factors among nations, 
there is no strong reason to “ recommend uniform, low rates of protection as a standard 
measure,” or justify “some currently common policy descriptions” (Lall, 1991, p.152). 
   
According to Krugman (1994), the neoclassical view that a country’s “international 
competitiveness is the most important factor in its economy” is only a theoretical 
prophecy.  Taking the U.S economy which is almost 90 per cent self-contained8 as an 
example, he asserts that even “the world’s leading nations” are not, “to any important 
degree, in economic competition with one another.” Krugman (1994, p.24) further 
asserted, “economic productivity is more crucial than foreign trade in determining a 
country’s economic health.”  
 
Rodrik (1999, p.13) is adamant that openness per se is not a  “reliable mechanism to 
generate sustained economic growth.” It can not only cause wider income disparities 
                                                          
8 According to Stiglitz (2002), the U.S exports represent only 10 per cent of the GNP.  This means about 90 per cent of its output is 
for domestic use.  
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within countries, but also expose them to unfavourable effects of external shocks and 
thereby leading them to socio-political unrests (Rodrik, 1999, p.14). 
 
Summary 
Trade which arises because countries are endowed with different factor supplies can be a 
catalyst of growth for LDCs.  According to trade theory, countries such as Sri Lanka 
which have an abundant supply of low cost labour will have a relative cost and price 
advantage over other countries with relatively expensive labour in commodities which 
make abundant use of labour.9  They can gain through trade by exporting labour intensive 
products and importing capital-intensive goods.  However, to maximize these gains there 
should be fewer imperfections in the market. As seen above, whenever information is 
imperfect and markets are incomplete, market outcomes become inefficient. As Stiglitz 
(2002) points out, this can be remedied through desirable government interventions. The 
insight gained here is that trade policy alone is not sufficient for LDCs such as Sri Lanka 
to achieve rapid growth.  They can explore other policy strategies to be used, preferably, 
in conjunction with trade policy to suit their needs.  
 
2.3.2 Import Substitution   
Import substitution occurs when a government imposes deliberate protective measures 
such as tariffs and quotas with a view to increasing its domestic share of total supply at a 
higher rate than would otherwise take place without such measures.  According to 
Helleiner (1972, p.96), “import substitution occurs in an economy when the share of total 
supply of a particular commodity or a group of commodities which is obtained through 
imports rather than through domestic production has declined.”   
 
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) is an inward-looking development strategy, 
which was popular among LDCs especially in Latin America and Asia during the early 
post-war period. The gloomy prospects for exports of commodities, the desire for rapid 
industrialization, and the pressure of balance of payment difficulties were the main 
reasons for these countries to resort to this strategy at that time.  
 
                                                          
9 For example industries such as clothing and textiles, which are labour-intensive.    
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Import substitution normally takes place in two ways: (a) as a natural outcome in the 
process of economic growth; and (b) as a result of deliberate government policy (Morton 
and Tulloch, 1977).  The ‘natural’ IS occurs when domestic producers become more 
competitive in the market as their income expands. Over time, they gradually replace or 
supplement goods which were previously imported because domestic demand was too 
small to support  “competitive local production” (Morton and Tulloch,  p.23). 
 
‘Deliberate’ IS on the other hand, can occur due to two reasons (Morton and Tulloch. 
p.23).  One is the inability of domestic producers to compete with the efficient foreign 
suppliers due to such reasons as the “backwardness of supportive services,”10 and internal 
problems relating to “management and innovation”. It is argued therefore that domestic 
producers should be protected until they become ‘established’ by overcoming their 
disadvantages vis-a-vis foreign suppliers.  The other argument is based on ‘export 
pessimism’ (Morton and Tulloch, p.23).   Because the limitation on export earnings itself 
limits the growth of imports needed for development, there are grounds for attempting to 
replace non-essential imports through import substitution.  In fact, it was this export 
pessimism that led many LDCs to resort to import substitution policies during the post-
war period.   
 
The proponents of the export pessimism were of the view that LDCs specializing in 
primary exports to developed nations experienced a gradual deterioration in their 
commodity terms of trade especially during the post-war years in the late 1940s and 50s. 
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). They argued that the terms of trade between world 
agriculture and manufacturing shifted to the advantage of manufacturing, and because of 
the monopolistic position in both product and factor markets, the developed countries 
received the benefits of their technological progress by way of increased factor incomes. 
In contrast, any productivity gains in LDCs which were basically primary producers were 
transferred by way of price reductions.  Moreover, the LDCs remained trapped in a 
‘vicious circle of low productivity and low savings.’ Unlike in industrial countries, this 
caused a secular deterioration in their terms of trade. To counteract, those LDCs needed 
tariffs on industrial imports (Prebisch, 1959, p.251). 
                                                          




Prebisch identified the low level of savings as the root cause of poverty in LDCs.  
Prebisch’s ISI recipe anticipated foreign exchange savings through restricting imports 
especially those which were not essential for economic development. It was believed that 
IS could be used to increase labour productivity as a whole, and allow a transfer to highly 
productive employment of those who engaged in low-yield employment. 
 
There was a realization among LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s that free trade retarded their 
economic development while benefiting the developed nations.  Myrdal (1956, p. 280) in 
his ‘Balanced Growth Theory’, showed four special reasons for industrial protection in 
the LDCs:  (a) the difficulty to match demand to new supply; (b) the existence of surplus 
labour; (c) the large rewards of individual investments in creating external economies, 
and, (d) the lopsided internal price structure disfavouring domestic industries.  
 
According to Marcelo et. al  (1996), the IS policies in the post war period was crucial for 
the Industrialization in Brazil.  However, after 1960s there was an adverse impact on 
growth due to the lack of capital goods. Irwin (2002) who examined the association 
between import tariffs and economic growth of 17 ‘core’ countries and 10 ‘periphery’ 
countries in the late nineteenth century found that tariffs have played a crucial role in 
promoting growth especially during the early nineteenth century. As for the late 
nineteenth century growth performance, they were not crucial factors, as “the effects on 
tariff policies are complex and vary greatly across countries in ways depending strongly 
on resources, institutions, and government strategies (Irwin, 2002, p.22). 
 
Criticisms 
ISI has been subject to severe criticism over the years.  Meier (1968) is one of the 
pioneers in rejecting the view that the terms of trade between world agriculture and 
manufacturing shifted to the advantage of manufacturing because of monopolistic 
elements in their product and factor markets. As he points out, “it is an open question 
whether trade unions and firms actually possessed and exercised sufficient monopoly 
powers”(Meier, 1968, p.62).  Even if they did, “the existence of such monopoly elements 
would at most explain movements in the absolute domestic price level and not change in 
relative world prices of manufactures and primary products” (Meier, 1968, p.62).   He 
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asserts that world prices depend on world demand and supply conditions, and a country 
with  high domestic prices will find it difficult to face competition unless it make some 
adjustment in domestic prices or exchange rate. 
 
Meier (1968) further argues that even if the commodity terms of trade did deteriorate in 
poor countries, the question is whether it is a significant obstacle to development. This 
could be the case only if the deterioration had entailed a negative production effect in the 
sense that the input of factors per unit of exports has increased.  According to him, the 
past or anticipated deteriorations in the terms of trade should not be a reason to impose 
import restrictions as trends in the past cannot simply be extrapolated into future.  He is 
optimistic that in the future the terms of trade can improve in primary producing 
countries as the world supply of primary products becomes relatively more scarce 
because of rising population, diminishing possibilities for extending primary production 
in the new areas of settlement, the growth of new industries in the rich countries, and the 
movement of labour out of agriculture.  As he concludes, IS would not be a viable option 
for development as it adversely affects agriculture and foreign trade. What is important 
for LDCs is to promote domestic conditions, especially the political, social, and 
institutional framework of the economy, as it enables foreign trade to play the role of 
engine of growth.  
 
It is also argued that only the ‘optimum tariff’ provides an economic justification for 
protection, and all other measures amount to subsidies which may or may not increase the 
real income of LDCs depending on their technological and other circumstances (Johnson, 
1968).  LDCs which pursued the ISI strategy did find it difficult to expand supply of 
primary commodities. This is because a policy of high protective tariffs aimed at 
encouraging industrial development can discourage the growth of exports by heavily 
taxing the primary sector. ISI strategy can sometimes bring about unexpected outcomes.  
For example, protection to promote locally-owned and operated enterprises can instead 
encourage the emergence of subsidiaries or affiliates of foreign enterprises.   
 
Sometimes, the method of operation of protected industries, irrespective of the 
ownership, may not suit the development objectives of the home country due to following 
reasons (Johnson, 1968, p.371): (a) duplication of market structure and/or marketing 
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methods of the advanced countries,11 (b) non-suitability of techniques for the relative 
factor availability of the domestic economy; (c) failure to develop export markets; and (d) 
extensive use of imported parts and machinery. 
 
Accordingly, import substitution can do more harm than good to the domestic economy 
as Johnson concludes (1968, p.375): “A policy of progressive import substitution which 
seeks continually to expand the size of the import competing sector by granting 
protection to more and more industries such as has been pursued in several Latin 
American countries, may involve substantially slimmer prospects for economic growth, 
or nullify the prospect altogether.” 
 
Little et. al. (1970, p.65) reject the ISI strategy as a development strategy in view of its  
following adverse effects: (a) corruption, uncertainty, and delays which hamper private 
initiatives due to excessive bureaucratisation associated with government regulation; (b) 
under-utilization of capacity due to lower tariffs on capital goods, and cheaper credits for 
installing machinery; (c) under-utilization of labour due to relatively cheaper capital 
goods; (d) higher import dependence;  (e) bias against exports due to overvalued of 
exchange rates;  (f)  bias against agriculture because of the relative price advantage for 
manufactured goods; and (g) limited scope for further expansion as LDCs run out of 
imports substitution possibilities soon. 
 
While accepting the theoretical validity of Prebisch’s model, Marco (1972, p.10) goes 
one step further to show how an injection of foreign capital into a capital-short LDC will 
make that country even worse-off than under Prebisch’s line of argument:   
Suppose that foreign aid is obtained in the form of capital goods, which is to be 
used to rationalize the production of some agricultural good, hither to almost 
labour-intensive.   Because of the new capital-intensive technique, less labour 
input is needed, and total employment of industry drops (and thus productivity 
rises).  What will happen to workers who have lost their jobs?  As it is assumed 
that they are relatively unskilled, the possibilities of new job opportunities are 
scanty.  All this implies that, in order to get new jobs, they will have to accept 
lower salaries, or even worse, bid existing wages down so as to get a secure job.  
The real implication of this is that industrial wages will fall, hence causing a 
                                                          
11 i.e. policies such as excessive advertising, and rapid product changes. 
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further transfer of real income from the periphery to the centre in the form of 
lower prices. 
 
According to this argument, a capital transfers from developed countries to LDCs which 
are in a vicious circle of poverty due to poor savings will do them more harm than good. 
 
Venable and Puga (1998) studied the role of ISI and unilateral trade liberalization in 
industrial development in some selected countries.  They found that while both strategies 
are successful in attracting industries, trade liberalization yield a higher level of welfare. 
 
Although ISI has been subject to a growing amount of criticism over the last few decades, 
Rodrik (in Sirinivasan and Bhagawati, 1999, p.5) has different views.  According to him, 
“IS policies followed in much of the developing world until 1980’s were quite successful 
in some regards and their costs have been vastly exaggerated” (Rodrik, 1999, p.64).  
 
If IS policies were so unfavourable to the economic development of LDCs, how could so 
many economists get it wrong during the post war period?  Baldwin (2000) provides two 
explanations to this. One is to do with the knowledge acquisition by the protected 
industry. An import duty does not guarantee that “individual entrepreneurs will undertake 
additional investment in knowledge acquisition,” as it will make it “worthwhile for firms 
to incur costs of acquiring the knowledge discovered by other firms faster and also to 
move into production more rapidly at high output levels” (Baldwin 2000, pp. 7-8).   He 
suggests that what could have done here was a subsidy to the initial producer to 
encourage the discovery of new production techniques.  The second point is about their 
lack of concern for macroeconomic implications of the IS policies. It was the resultant 
macroeconomic crisis associated with “unsustainable import deficits”, “unmanageable 
government budget deficits”, and “runaway inflation”, which have caused these countries 
to abandoned IS policies, rather than “a realization of the serious resource allocation 




ISI was a popular development strategy among LDCs during the post-war reconstruction 
period. The East Asian NICs used such policies extensively to promote certain industries 
along with outward-oriented policies in the early period of their policy evolution (Todaro, 
1997). As many LDCs began to adopt a more outward-oriented policy strategy following 
the success of some East Asian countries during the last few decades, ISI as a 
development strategy is now considered as less relevant. The foregoing debate saw 
overwhelming evidence supporting this view.  Therefore, this study will consider that IS 
policies are less relevant to LDCs such as Sri Lanka. 
 
2.3.3 Strategic Trade Policy 
Strategic trade policy can be defined as the government policy that attempts to shift the 
excess profits in international oligopolistic markets towards domestic firms. As seen 
under free trade policy in this chapter, trade between nations is profitable when countries 
produce and export goods that make intensive use of their relatively abundant factors as 
prescribed by the H-O theory.  However, trade theory has failed to explain the rapid 
growth of intra-industry trade in the past since World War II (Brander, 1987). The main 
features of such intra-industry trade include: (a) exchange of highly differentiated 
products among countries with similar factor endowments; (b) oligopolistically organized 
firms; and (c) the emergence of technical innovation as the driving force for trade 
replacing relative endowment of factors of production.  In these circumstances, the 




According to strategic trade policy, markets are not perfectly competitive and there is 
often the potential for economies of scale.  It is argued that in oligopolistic industries the 
government can, through subsidies or tariffs, increase the competitiveness of domestic 
firms and allow them to capture the excess rent which would otherwise go to foreign 
competitors. This strategy is expected to work effectively for industries where it is 
difficult for competitors to enter the market due to such factors as lack of technological 
knowledge or the need for large capital outlays.  
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Proponents of these new trade theories have increasingly realized that neo-classical trade 
theory ‘leaves out the strategic aspect of trade’ (Matthews and Ravenhill, 1994, p.32).   
Since the markets in reality operate in an imperfectly competitive environment with 
sufficient economies of scale, a firm’s profitability in the market largely depends on what 
its rival firms do.  This compels them to act strategically.  They do this by shaping the 
choices available to their rivals.12  The profit of such an oligopolistic market may depend 
on such factors as “who moves first, who takes the most credible commitment, and who 
is able to deter rival firms from entering the field” (Matthews and Ravenhill, 1994, p.33). 
 
The traditional trade theory is not capable of explaining the strategic behaviour of firms 
under oligopolistic market situations.  It is a recent phenomenon that nations specialize in 
products not necessarily because of relative factor endowment advantages, but due to 
advantages enjoyed by the established firms through being first to operate in that 
industry.  These advantages can be by way of economies of scale, learning by doing 
effects, or a well-established brand name that differentiates its product from those of 
competing firms. Those advantages together with the need to incur large capital outlays 
for such activities work as strong deterrents to keep the newcomers away.  The existing 
firm can thus enjoy abnormal profits even in the medium to long term (Matthews and 
Ravenhill, 1994, p.33).    
 
Models of strategic trade policy attempt to formalize the popular notion that a 
government can enhance national welfare by promoting domestic industries that create 
substantial factor rents of external benefits.   Through government assistance measures  
such as tariffs and subsidies, government intervention enables the firms to make 
commitments and to undertake other strategic moves that would otherwise not work as a 
credible deterrent to potential rivals (Stegemann, 1989).  
 
A more formal theory of strategic trade policy for oligopolies was first developed by 
Brander and Spencer (1985) with special focus on strategies that might shift monopoly 
profits from a foreign to a domestic producer. In their model, they assumed an industry 
consisting of one local firm and one foreign firm, making a homogeneous product.  Using 
                                                          
12 An example of strategic behaviour given by Helpman and Krugman (1989) (in Matthews and Ravenhill, 1994, p.32) is that a firm 
can investment in excess capacity which it does not intend to use, and that the very presence of it can deter potential competitors 
from entering the market.    
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output of each firm as its action parameters, both are assumed to behave like Cournot 
duopolists.13  With no government intervention, the equilibrium output corresponds to 
the Cournot solution.  An export or production subsidy to the domestic firm by the 
government can alter this strategic game as it gives a cost advantage to the domestic firm 
enabling it to increase its output and acquire a larger market share than its rival. It will 
also deter foreign firms from competing for that market in the domestic market.14  In this 
asymmetrical duopoly situation, the total volume of sales increases due to intervention, 
and the local firm’s share of the market increases because the follower makes the room 
for the leader.  This is how the government can alter the strategic game played by 
domestic and foreign firms by offering a subsidy to the domestic firm.  An export or 
production subsidy enables the domestic firm to expand production and gain a larger 
market share at the expense of its foreign rivals.  
 
 The assumption that the government can make a ‘credible commitment’ to maintaining a 
leadership position unlike a firm is the only reason that Brander and Spencer need 
government intervention in this model.  Even without intervention, each duopolist would 
have an incentive to become a Stackelberg leader if its rival would like to be the follower.  
However moving from a Cournot equilibrium to a leadership position is not considered a 
credible choice for either firm acting on its own, because the other firm cannot be 
expected to reduce its output.  Without government intervention, both firms face a similar 
market situation.  An export subsidy for the domestic firm will change this situation 
against the foreign rival. Expansion of the subsidized firm’s output is  now regarded as a 
credible choice by the rival because an expansion would take place even if the rival does 
not reduce its output.  Brander (1992, p.29) describes how a subsidy to a domestic firm 
can achieve this:  
The key is to think carefully about the example of lower cost again.  Just as in that 
case, there are two effects of the subsidy.  One effect is the apparent cost saving, 
which is really a transfer.  There is however, a second effect to consider.  Because 
the subsidized costs make it credible or believable (to the rival) that the domestic 
firm will expand, the rival’s best response is to contract, and this increases itself 
the domestic firm’s profit by an additional amount.  This second effect is some 
times called the “strategic effect” because it owes its existence to the nature of the 
strategic game played by firms.  It implies that the profit to the domestic firm rise 
                                                          
13 i.e., each chooses its quantity supplied on the assumption that the other firm’s quantity of supply is given.  
14 In this situation, the local firm becomes a “Stackelberg leader” while the foreign firm acts as a “Stackelberg follower.” 
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by more than the amount of subsidy.  The benefit to the firm exceeds the cost to 
the taxpayers. 
 
Thus, the basic point of the above model is that government action can alter the strategic 
game played by foreign and domestic firms.  In profitable markets, domestic firms are 
made better off if foreign firms can be induced to contract their production.  Firms 
themselves act strategically to expand their individual output levels even without 
government support.  However, when the government uses tools such as subsidies to 
assist domestic firms, the rival firms are further deterred.  Thus, as they point out, such 
policies can lead to national advantage. 
 
Strategic trade policy can also be used to protect domestic firms in the export markets as 
shown by Krugman (1984).  As he argued, if the domestic firm can also earn extra profits 
by exporting, then such protection is in the national interest. He also assumed that the 
industry is characterized by economies of scale whereby unit costs of production fall as 
output increases.  With no protection, both firms (domestic and foreign) can operate in all 
markets even if they produce identical products.  With protection, the local producer will 
enjoy longer production runs than would otherwise be the case and achieve economies of 
scales. The domestic firm will be able to expand its output and therefore its share in the 
foreign market rises.   
 
Another advantage of such protection according to Krugman (1984) is the learning by 
doing effect on output.  As output expands, the firm learns   how to undertake further 
production more efficiently. This will allow the domestic firm to compete more 
successfully and earn higher profits in export markets.  Moreover, such protection also 
encourages the firm to invest in R&D by ensuring the ‘private appropriability of total 
effects of innovations’ (Krugman, 1992a, p.86).  
 
Venables (1984) supports the view that strategic trade policy can change the firm’s 
behaviour improving national welfare. Instead of Krugman’s single firm case, he assumes 
that the market has a few firms with free entry, which will result in only normal profits 
for them, and the firms have constant marginal cost with substantial fixed costs.  The 
important property of the cost structure is that average cost is falling as output rises.  
Each firm has a downward facing demand curve for its product, and equilibrium occurs 
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when each firm is maximizing profit with respect to its own output level, given the 
output level produced by the rest of the market. As Venables argued, a tariff not only 
raises revenue but also make the price of the foreign firms operating in the domestic 
market relatively higher compelling them to lower their share in the market.  Each 
domestic firm however, expands both domestic and total output and moves down its 
average cost curve.  Since domestic firms now have relatively lower average cost than 
before, the net effect will be to cause domestic prices to fall and consumer welfare to rise.  
Since entry is free, there is only normal profit for firms leaving a net welfare benefit to 
the domestic economy.  In the foreign country on the other hand, firms now earn less 
from export market and are forced to charge a higher price at home, as they move up in 
their average cost curve. The effectiveness of this policy depends on the transport cost 
between foreign and domestic markets. 
 
As discussed above, rents created through trade and industry policies enable local firms 
to behave strategically and compete with foreign competitors effectively.  However, there 
are views that the existence of externalities associated with such policies play an 
important role determining the strategic behaviour of firms (Baldwin, 1992; Krugman, 
1992).  As Baldwin (1992, p.42) sees it: “recent empirical evidence indicates that 
knowledge spillovers associated with research and development efforts seem to be more 
significant than most traditional trade economists thought.”  He studied the effects of 
government support for the production of commuter aircraft in Brazil and found that a 
subsidy caused a net welfare loss in that industry when analyzed using traditional trade 
theory.  However, when the knowledge spillovers associated with that industry were 
included, the study showed a net welfare gain.  Thus, he concluded,  “the participants in a 
high-tech project are likely to acquire skills that are beneficial to the economy and outlive 
the project itself” (Baldwin, 1992, p.209).  He asserted that the training and experience 
gained through the project should be treated as an investment as they extend beyond the 
project itself benefiting the national economy.    
 
Emphasizing the importance of considering the externalities in maximizing national 
welfare Krugman (1992, p.438): 
What the new theory tells us is that meaningful externalities occur not only when 
there are direct technological spillovers, but in any situation in which there are 
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increasing returns and market size matters.   That means almost everywhere.  In 
other words, the marginal social benefits of a dollar’s worth of resources is not, as 
conventional theory would have it, equal in all activities except for a few 
exceptions.  Divergence between social rates of returns are pervasive.  There are 
good industries and bad, good jobs and bad, and the optimal policy is to subsidize 
the good and tax the bad. 
 
Should a welfare maximizing government use strategic trade intervention at all or should 
it commit only to free trade? As Grossman and Maggi (1997, p.19) reveal, former 
provides domestic firms an opportunity to “manipulate the government’s choice of the 
level of intervention.”  They do this by over-investing in “physical and knowledge 
capital… in order to influence the government’s choice of subsidy”.  They found that 
strategic trade policy “generates  national benefits when the cost of investment is either 
large or small, whereas a commitment to free trade is likely to be preferable for 
intermediate values of this cost parameter.” On the other hand, “the presence of 
asymmetric information between the government and the domestic firms tends to 
strengthen the case for commitment to free trade”  (Grossman and Maggi, 1997, p.19).    
 
Criticisms 
There are studies which show some reservations about the effectiveness of strategic trade 
policies (Pomfret, 1995; Guerrieri and Padoan, 1996).  According to Pomfret (1995), 
reasons for the East Asian success (‘and lessons for would-be-imitators’) remain 
inconclusive (Pomfret, 1995, p.207). He is hesitant to accept the industrial policies used 
in East Asian NICs such as South Korea and Taiwan as strategic trade policies.  As he 
further argues, “there is no evidence that such policies have been successfully pursued 
anywhere, and it seems especially unlikely that they would be relevant to developing 
countries whose firms are unlikely to be competing in international duopolies or 
tripolies” (Pomfret, 1995, p.208). Theoretically, the success of this strategy declines as 
‘the number of firms in the industry increases’ and the ‘monopoly rent available for 
redistribution becomes smaller’ (Pomfret, 1995, p.208).  Guerrieri and Padoan (1996) 
argue that even if the world is not perfectly competitive, free trade still remains the best 
rule of thumb policy for any nation to achieve development.  
 
According to some critics, one main flaw of this strategy is that it does not introduce any 
thing new (Guerrieri and Padoan, 1996). Another view is that such protection can damage 
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‘the very groups that lobbied for and obtained such protection’ (Grossman and Helpman, 
1992). And also, insufficient information and the complexity involved in negotiation and 
decision-making can result in market distortions (Guerrieri and Padoan,15 1996). 
 
Summary 
Strategic trade policy is an important tool which has considerably modified the standard 
way of thinking about trade policy.  Unlike traditional trade theorists, the proponents of 
this new trade theory believe that the real world markets are closer to oligopolies and 
emphasize the importance of incorporating the factors such as economies of scale, 
learning by doing effects, and externalities in any model analyzing market behaviour. 
Strategic trade models can be used to analyze the strategic behaviour of real world firms 
and, to formalize the popular view that government can enhance national welfare by 
promoting domestic industries that create substantial externalities.  Compared with the 
two policy regimes discussed earlier, this approach seems to be more relevant given the 
fact that markets today are imperfectly competitive.  In fact, there are views that some 
East Asian NICs such as South Korea used strategic trade policies at the early period of 
their industrialization (Krugman, 1992), before embarking an export-oriented strategy. 
 
2.3.4  Infant Industry Argument 
The infant industry argument is one of the most acceptable justifications for interference 
with free trade.  This argument is based on the premise that “a country might have a 
potential comparative cost advantage in the development of a certain industry, but simply 
because of an earlier start the industry has been developed in another country to a point 
where it would be impossible for a newly established industry to compete with it” (Wells, 
1969, p.99). In such a case, a tariff can assist a country to establish this industry by 
creating a potential cost advantage.  Without a tariff, such an industry will never be 
established due to following reasons (Wells, 1969, p.99): (a) inability to achieve scale 
economies while imports are present;  (b) inability of the domestic labour force to 
develop potential skills required for the industry within a short time;  (c) need for time to 
establish other support services which are likely to generate external economies if the 
protected industry is sufficiently large; and (d) to assist industries other than those 
directly protected if the expansion of the protected industry benefits them.  
                                                          
15 They cite Leidy and Hoekman (1992). 
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It is worthwhile to discuss the history of the infant industry argument briefly here.  The 
earliest available evidence in this regard could be found in Alexander Hamilton’s  Report 
on Manufactures in 1790 in the USA (Haberler, 1936, p.278).  It was further developed 
by Friedrich List in his “National System of Political Economy” in Germany where it 
proved to be highly acceptable as a policy justification  (Haberler, 1936, p.278).  List, 
although an advocate of free trade, strongly supported the view that “every suitable nation 
can reap an advantage at a certain stage in its cultural and economic development by 
fostering manufacturing until it reaches large proportions, through protective tariffs” 
(Haberler, 1936, p.278).  However, he emphasized that tariffs should be only temporary.  
They should be removed once the industry is able to stand upon its own feet.   
 
The essence of the infant industry argument is that it enables an industry that is not 
currently competitive to achieve comparative advantage through dynamic learning effects 
after a temporary period of protection.  And, there are certain necessary conditions for 
this (Meier, 1964, p. 475):  (a) The protection is limited in time; (b) technological 
externalities are generated that are non-capturable by the protected industry; and (c) the 
protection allows the industry to generate a sufficient decrease in cost so that initial 
excess costs of the industry will be repaid with an economic rate of return equal to that 
earned on other investment.  
 
Protection is justified not because the losses are only until the infant industry grows up, 
but because of the externalities associated with the learning process (Meier, 1964).  As 
the latter condition stipulates, the expected benefits should to be sufficiently great to 
offset the cost of the policy required to produce those benefits.  However, if trade is not 
optimal due to the presence of externalities or some other reasons, the best policy is a 
production subsidy aimed at the source of distortion rather than a tariff.   
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Another major justification for protection is the famous ‘terms of trade argument’, that a 
suitable tariff can have a favourable effect upon the terms of trade of the country 
imposing the duty.   The case for tariffs has been supported by early writers such as J.S. 
Mill, Torrens, and Sidgvicks (Corden, 1974, p.159). Bickerdike (1906) introduced the 
concept of ‘optimal degree of trade restriction’ which can be attained by either a tariff or 
an export tax.  This theory was further refined and developed by scholars in the 1930s and 
1940s (Kaldor, 1940; Lerner, 1944; Scitovsky, 1941; Graaff, 1949). 
  
To justify the terms of trade argument for protection, there are certain necessary 
conditions which need to be met (Viner, 1953, p.40): (a) the “reciprocal demand” of 
outside world as a whole vis-a-vis that country has a low elasticity; (b) its own reciprocal 
demand vis-a-vis the outside world has a high elasticity; (c) there will be no retaliatory 
action by countries with whom it has important trade relations; and (d) the country is able 
to administer protection if adopted, with high degree of skills and integrity. Because of 
these conditions, however, the scope a country has for nationally profitable long-run 
protection is practically very limited.  
 
Factor market imperfections are another reason for intervention policies. According to 
economic theory, for overall economic welfare both goods and factor markets should 
perform competitively.  In reality however, factor markets are not so competitive 
especially in LDCs. Factor prices therefore do not reflect their true opportunity cost of 
being used in production. Normally the manufacturing sector pays higher wages, and 
protection might offset some of the non-optimal resource allocations resulting from 
distorted wages (Krueger, 1984). 
 
According to Wignaraja (1998, p.39, who also cites Pack and Westphal, 1986; Stewart 
and Ghani, 1992; OECD, 1992; and Lall, 1993)  “the risk of market failure in investing in 
technological development” is the case for infant industry protection.  “[T]here are four 
kinds of market failure related to the learning process of a manufacturing firm” 
(Wignaraja, 1998, p.39): i.e., capital market imperfections; exceptional risk aversion and 
uncertainty; externalities in the process of investment in human capital; and externalities 




Infant industry protection has attracted some strong criticisms. One of them is regarding 
the government’s ability to identify an industry that requires infant industry protection. 
Powelson (1964, p. 198) sees it as a difficult task: “the search for an industry that has a 
potential comparative advantage requires the skill of the engineer, the brain of the 
economist and audacity of entrepreneur.”  Using the U.S woollen-worsted industry16 as an 
example of bad selection, he warns that mistakes in this tend to become irreversible and 
costly.  
 
Why an infant industry requires protection to get started is a puzzle to some as “many 
new enterprises are able to compete with well-entrenched older enterprises within a 
country under the condition of free trade” (Root, 1973, p.316).  If such new firms can 
displace the less dynamic older firms using such strategies as better management, product 
innovation and quick response to market opportunities, there is no reason why they can’t 
face international competition.  Moreover, even if an industry requires protection, a tariff 
may not be the best way to promote that industry.  Sometimes a direct subsidy is more 
advantageous than a tariff as subsidies are “less likely to end up as permanent protection 
because they are dependent on annual appropriations” (Root, 1974, p.317). Although 
protectionists oppose subsidies for this reason, the genuine entrepreneurs who seek only 
infant industry protection should have no objection to them.  “[T]he mistakes made by 
some developing countries in granting infant industry protection to supposedly strategic 
industries such as steel, chemical and automobiles testify to the perils of policy in this 
area” (Root, 1974, p.318).  
 
Another justification for protection is the need to favour a new industry which can be at a 
disadvantage as against the existing firms due to lack of reputation.   However, any 
“temporary tariff protection to promote entry generally lowers domestic 
welfare”(Grossman and Horn, 1987, p.22). Therefore, it is a good idea to reward firms 
                                                          
16  This industry started as an infant industry and is still receive protection showing no signs of overcoming its comparative 
disadvantage. 
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who invest in their reputation instead of encouraging entry into the market through 
protection. 
   
Summary 
What insight could be drawn from the foregoing discussion to the development of a 
policy strategy for Sri Lanka? As discussed so far, there are various views on infant 
industry protection.  The infant industry promotion was a major reason for protection 
during the post-war years. However, with the global trend to gradually dismantle trade 
barriers since about 1980s, there is little support for this strategy now. Although there is 
now a wider acceptance that import protection leads to economic inefficiency, still this 
policy remains an option to cover industries of national interest from foreign competition.  
While this study assumes that infant industry promotion is not advisable as a long-term 
strategy, it can still be useful in promoting certain areas of the economy on a short-term 
basis. 
 
2.3.5  Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be simply defined as an international capital 
movement; and “it differs from other kinds of capital movement in that it is accompanied 
by varying degrees of control, plus technology and management” (Kindleberger, 1974, 
p.268).  FDI can also be viewed as “an investment in which the investor acquires a 
substantial controlling interest in a foreign firm or sets up a subsidiary in a foreign 
country (Markusen, et al., 1995, p.395). Companies that engage in FDI are usually called 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) or multinational corporations (MNCs).  Since World 
War II, economists have been emphasizing the importance of the study of MNEs as the 
major source of the capital flow.   
 
There are various views on MNEs and their investment behaviour.  However, there is still 
no complete theory that can explain the phenomenon of FDI satisfactorily (Chen, 1984). 
A theory could be developed using conventional trade theory, or by borrowing from other 
branches of economics such as microeconomics of the firm, industrial organization 
theories, and capital theories.  In all these cases,  “only partial equilibrium models are 
constructed for the purpose of explaining foreign direct investment” (Chen, 1984, p.16). 
Chen (quoting Erdilek, 1976) further maintains that MNEs do not satisfy the basic 
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assumptions of general equilibrium analysis because they are unlikely to operate under 
perfectly competitive market conditions.  However, he asserts “any satisfactory theory of 
foreign direct investment should be able to explain the following” (Chen, 1984, p.17): (a) 
why MNEs invest abroad? or most importantly, why they prefer direct investment to 
licensing and exporting?  (b) the country and industry patterns of foreign direct 
investment; and (c) the two-way flow of foreign investment between countries. 
 
First, we discuss why FDI takes place. In a perfectly competitive world, international 
capital flow will occur when the rate of return to capital is different between countries.  
Thus, under free capital mobility, capital will always move from the country where the 
rate of return is low to the country where it is high. This will equalize the rates of return 
and marginal productivities of capital between countries (MacDougall, 1960).  
 
One of the major analyses on FDI was from Vernon (1966) who examined the MNE 
using his ‘product life cycle theory.’ It deals with the location of production of one 
product by a firm under a monopolistic or oligopolistic environment.  According to this 
theory, a product passes three stages. In the first stage (new product stage), the firm is an 
innovation-based oligopolist and the production is located at home due to the uncertainty 
of the market.  The demand for the product is only at home.  In the second stage 
(maturing product stage), the market for the product has been stabilized, and the demand 
becomes more price-elastic.  The firm maintains its oligopolistic position because of the 
barriers to entry, economies of scale, and marketing connections. Because of the 
difficulties at home, the firms will find it necessary to invest aboard. During the third 
stage (standardized product stage), the competition will be higher in the host country and 
the firm has to look for new markets in other host countries. As a result, the firm creates 
subsidiaries in these countries to undertake production. In most cases, production at this 
stage is not for the local market.  It will be exported to home country or to other 
countries.  By this stage, the firm loses the superiority it had earlier in innovation and 
scale factors and therefore, attempts to maximize profit through a network of subsidiaries 
set up all over the world.  
 
 The above theory is considered as a dynamic theory in the sense that it takes into 
accounts the changes over time.  It explains to a larger extent the pattern of foreign direct 
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investment during the post-war period up to the 1970s (Wells, 1972).  However, it also 
has been subject to several criticisms.  One argument is that it fails to explain foreign 
direct investment that is not export substituting or direct investment in products with 
special designs for overseas markets. Another view is that although the theory considers 
the three stages to be independent, they are in fact interdependent.  
 
Kindleberger (1974, p.274) summarizes the nature of the monopolistic advantages which 
produce direct investment as follows: (a) departures from perfect competition in goods 
markets including product differentiation, special marketing skills, and administered 
pricing; (b) departures from perfect competition in factor markets including the existence 
of patented or unavailable technology, of discrimination in access to capital; (c) internal 
and external economies of scale; and (d) government limitations on entry or output. 
 
Another explanation for FDI can be given from the theory of industrial organization. The 
firm can earn a higher profit abroad than at home if it undertakes the risks and overcomes 
the costs of operating in a different political and legal environment (Hymer, 1960). 
However, in a world of perfect competition for goods and factors, direct investment 
cannot take place.  For a foreign firm to operate, there must be some imperfection in 
markets for both goods and factors. The MNE can maximize benefits using a strategy 
such as international vertical and horizontal integration. The most important reason for 
FDI is the ability to maximize returns from the firm’s ownership specific advantages 
under an oligopolistic market structure. Supporting this industrial economics approach to 
FDI, Caves (1971) argues that FDI occurs mainly in industries characterized by certain 
market structures in both the home and the host countries. For example, if the industry is 
characterized by product differentiation and oligopoly then horizontal direct investment 
will occur.  Vertical direct investment on the other hand takes place to avoid oligopolistic 
uncertainty and to create barriers to entry for the new rivals.   
 
The above observations of Caves were further analyzed by Krugman (1983) under the 
theory of industrial organization using two simple theoretical models to represent two 
types of FDI: horizontal investment associated with product differentiation; and vertical 
investment associated with backward integration into raw materials.  The first model 
explains horizontal MNEs as a response to product differentiation. They acquire the 
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ability to manufacture different products by R&D; they export this technology either 
directly by establishing foreign subsidiaries or indirectly by   embodying the technology 
in goods (Krugman, 1983, p.57).  The method depends on the incentives they have.  The 
second model explains the process of vertical integration. He showed how a 
monopsonistic “down-stream” firm keeps the prices of its raw material down, and 
thereby distorts the production decisions of its overseas supplier, leading them to produce 
too little.  By being a MNE and integrating backward, the firm “can eliminate the 
distortion and appropriate the efficiency gains” (Krugman, 1983, p.72). 
 
Using the industrial organization approach Shapiro (1983) examined the advantages and 
disadvantages MNEs have with regard to barriers to entry and exit. The study found that 
MNEs are more mobile and therefore they have advantages over domestic firms in 
overcoming both barriers. 
 
The MNE’s ownership-specific advantages can be exploited abroad, Chen (1983, p.23) 
by setting up subsidiaries instead of exporting and licensing.  The subsidiaries falls into 4 
categories: (a) Technology; (b) Supplies of inputs; (c) Scale and diversification of risks; 
and (d) Capital.  One of the main reasons for FDI, according to Chen, is the MNE’s 
desire to exploit technological superiority in the host countries not only by way of new 
products, machinery, and processes, but also through management and marketing skills.  
The main insight of this study is that while the MNE’s exclusive control over natural 
resources, or other inputs such as finance, and information, is not a sufficient condition 
for FDI, the supply of input is. 
 
Economists agree that there are numerous inherent disadvantages of setting up MNEs 
abroad relative to their host-country competitors (Aliber, 1970; Markusen et al., 1995). 
Among them are: (a) maintaining a business in a foreign country requires costs in 
communications and transportation not faced by domestic firms; (b) language and 
cultural differences between the host country and the home country advantages a source 
country;  (c) unfamiliarity with the host countries’ business community, tax laws and 
other government procedures; (d) extra risks involving with exchange rate movements, 
expropriation or other policy changes of government; and (e) high wages and other 
remuneration payable to the staff to live abroad.   Because of these disadvantages, MNEs 
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operate in a foreign market only if they have some compensating advantages over local 
firms.  The MNEs invest abroad only if these advantages can outweigh disadvantages. 
 
Another approach to FDI comes from internalization theory which was first introduced by 
Kaldor (1934), developed by Coase (1937), and further expanded by Penrose (1961).  
According to this theory, it is profitable for those firms who have ownership-specific 
advantages such as technology, and supply of inputs, to be outward looking.   It asserts 
that the motivation of the foreign direct investment is the internalization of the imperfect 
market.  When markets are internalized across national boundaries, MNCs will be created 
which will be able to avoid those imperfections. 
 
A more comprehensive approach to FDI is provided by Dunning (1981) in his famous 
eclectic theory (also known as OLI framework).  It stipulates three conditions for a MNE 
to undertake direct investment (Dunning, 1981, p.80):  (a) possession of an ownership 
advantage over other firms;17  (b) availability of a location advantage which make it more 
profitable to produce abroad than to produce at home country and export to the host 
country;18 and (c) ability to acquire internalization  advantages.19  He has shown 
circumstances under which internalization becomes advantageous for a firm.   The Table 
2.1 summarizes his eclectic theory: 
     Table 2.1 
Conditions for MNEs to Undertake FDI 
 
Route of Servicing Market 
 Advantage  
Ownership Internalization Foreign location 
Foreign direct investment Yes Yes Yes 
Exports Yes Yes No 
Contractual resource transfers * Yes No No 
*They include licensing, contracts etc. 
Source: (Dunning, 1981,p.111) 
                            
Accordingly, if the MNC possesses only ownership-specific advantages, then all the 
routes of servicing the host market (i.e., FDI, exports and contractual resource transfers) 
are equally viable for the firm.  However, if the firm can profitably internalize its 
ownership advantages, then the firm will prefer FDI and exports to contractual resources 
transfers.  However, if ownership advantageous can profitably be internalized across 
                                                          
17 e.g. patent, blueprint or trade secret, trademark, goodwill, or quality of products. 
18 This depends on factors such as tariffs/quotas, transport costs, input prices, and customer access. 
19 i.e. how well the MNE can internalize its ownership-specific advantages. 
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national boundaries because of the location specific factors of a foreign location, then the 
firm will select FDI over exporting, licensing, or contracts etc. 
 
Summary 
This section covered some of the major theoretical explanations of the FDI behaviour of 
MNEs.  Of them, Hymer’s industrial economics approach is of importance for two 
reasons:  first, the oligopolistic models explaining MNEs began with his work; and 
second, this approach became the basis for other comprehensive models such as those of 
Caves and Dunning.  Dunning’s eclectic theory is also important because it has a very 
strong explanatory power in analyzing FDI activities by MNEs in developing countries.  
It has received this power from the fact that it embraces almost all the other theories of 
FDI.  Given the fact that the determinants of FDI are necessarily complex, his theory 
remains a useful tool for the study FDI.  The role of FDI in the economic development of 
two East Asian NICs, South Korea and Taiwan, will be further discussed in Chapter 
Four.  This knowledge will be useful in the development of a FDI strategy for Sri Lanka 
in the latter chapters. 
 
2.3.6  Competitive Industry Policy 
There is no common agreement among economists on the link between international 
trade and economic growth.  Proponents of orthodox trade theory stress the benefits of 
neutral incentives between production for the domestic market and production for 
exports.  It is argued that with neutral incentives, resources would flow to sectors that are 
internationally competitive (Corden, 1971).   A more competitive environment in turn, 
results in technical efficiency (Nishimizu, 1991).  However, there are studies arguing that 
departures from neutral incentive regimes may improve economic performance, 
especially where market power, economies of scale, learning by doing, or externalities 
are significant (Krugman, 1986). Interestingly, proponents of both of these views very 
often cite the records of the high performing East Asian economies (also know as East 
Asian NICs) as evidence in supporting their views. 
 
The advocates of neoclassical trade theory show foreign trade as the most important 
factor for the success of the Asian NICs (Krueger, 1985; Tsiang, 1984; World Bank, 
1993; Balassa, 1981). They argue that during the 1950s most of these countries used 
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import substitution policies and ended up experiencing a range of other problems such as 
balance of payment difficulties, unemployment, and sluggish growth.   In early 1960s, 
they adopted outward-oriented policies relying heavily on the export sector as the engine 
of growth.20  This export orientation led them to specialize according to comparative 
advantage, resulting in rising incomes, investment, savings, and productivity. 
 
Advocates of trade interventions on the other hand claim that these economies performed 
so well mainly because their governments successfully intervened in the market to change 
the comparative advantage (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995).  This group 
believes in the role of trade and industry policy in shifting the industrial structures 
towards newer and more modern sectors in order to capture dynamic scale economies.  
 
The term competitive industry policy (CIP) has widely been used in the empirical work to 
describe the type of policies primarily used by the high performing East Asian economies 
during the last three decades to shape their economies within the free trade framework 
(Ohno and Imaoka, 1987; Auty, 1994; Auty, 1997).   Distinguishing it from other more 
‘autarkic industrial policy’21 (AIP) favoured by many LDCs after the World War II, Auty 
(1997, p.446) describes CIP as “the East Asian variant of industry policy...because it 
seeks to secure the rapid maturation of the protected sectors.”  Highlighting how CIP 
differs from AIP, Auty (1994) further explains that AIP stresses economic self-
sufficiency over the efficient allocation of resources while CIP anticipates emerging 
comparative advantage.   His detailed description of CIP is as follows:  
A competitive industry policy (CIP) creates a positive relationship between 
structural change and macro policy, as Korea and Taiwan illustrate below. CIP is 
market-conforming because it repeals competition only temporarily. It is 
sometimes called dualistic (Ohno and Imaoka, 1987) because it simultaneously 
maintains the competitiveness of established industrial sectors, while encouraging 
sectors of emerging comparative advantage.  CIP provides a package of market 
information, assistance with technology acquisition, subsidized credits, tax 
breaks, and trade incentives for new entrants to set up infant industries.  But it 
demands that favoured firms rapidly achieve economic and technological maturity 
(Auty 1994, p.15).  
 
                                                          
20 They included unification of exchange rates, devaluation of currency, and reduction in tariffs. 
21  The term Autarky refers to ‘national self sufficiency pursued as a policy by means of tariffs, exchange controls and other devices 
of the planned economy as was in Fascist Germany and Italy in the 1930s’ (Bannock and Baxter, 1992, p.20). 
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Thus, as the foregoing discussion indicates, CIP is similar to the traditional industry 
policy measures such as subsidized credits, tax breaks, trade policy incentives (for infant 
industries), assisting with market information and technology acquisition, R&D 
incentives.  The difference seems to be only in its emphasis, weighting, and timing, i.e. 
• it is market conforming; 
• it is temporary and anticipates emerging comparative advantage form the protected 
sector; and 
• it anticipates the rapid maturity of the favoured industries. 
 
As the main aim of this study is to derive a development strategy for Sri Lanka based 
mainly on the East Asian experience, it is worthwhile reviewing the recent literature in 
this area. A common feature of most recent studies is that they tend to criticize the 
orthodox view of the East-Asian miracle for undermining the important role that the 
governments of these countries played in steering the economy through the appropriate 
allocation of resources.   Two forerunners, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990), argue that 
governments in these countries had clear industrial priorities and that they did not hesitate 
to intervene to reshape the comparative advantage in the desired direction.  These 
governments used subsidies, trade restrictions, administrative guidance, public 
enterprises, and credit allocations along with trade policies.  Wade explains the 
contributory effect of direct government intervention on economic growth in terms of 
externalities, economies of scale, and learning-curve economies, as these are major 
sources of technological advance and productivity growth. 
 
In an analysis of industrial performance of two East Asian (South Korea and Taiwan) and 
three Latin American (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) newly industrializing countries; 
Jenkins (1991) found that the better performance in East Asia is not due simply to 
differences in trade orientation or the degree of state intervention, but rather to the 
effectiveness of intervention.  As he emphasized it:  “Effective industrial policies in East 
Asia are characterized by four key features which contrast sharply to the situation in Latin 
America:  flexibility, selectivity, coherence, and an emphasis on promotion rather than 
regulation” (Jenkins, 1991, p.199).   
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It is useful to investigate briefly the importance of the above four factors for the 
performance of those economies. According to Jenkins (1991), East Asian economies 
were flexible in the sense that the governments were prepared to change policies 
whenever the desired results were not achieved.22   They selected policies to favour 
industries, which were considered as vital for economic growth, which is in contrast to 
the indiscriminate protection given to consumer goods in Latin America (Jenkins, 1991, 
p.200). The coherence of the policies pursued by the East Asian NICs reflected the fact 
that not only were they in broad agreement with overall economic goals, but also they 
were properly coordinated to achieve them.  This was again in contrast to the inconsistent 
and contradictory policies of Latin America.   As for Jenkins’ last factor above, trade and 
industry policies in East Asian NICs were mainly directed towards the promotion, rather 
than the regulation, of private enterprises, which was in sharp contrast with the state 
intervention in Latin America where private enterprises were regulated under political 
pressure.  
 
While outward-orientation is superior to inward-orientation, there is a strong case for 
policy intervention because industrial development depends on a combination of several 
forces that interact with each other in complex ways.  These forces include incentives, 
capabilities, and institutions (Lall, 1991), and work at different intensities at firms level 
and national level.  Therefore, “a large role remains for government policies in promoting 
each of the three determinants of industrialization,” and the success of this role of the 
government depends on “availability of administrative skills, the nature of political 
ideology and the play of political forces in each specific case” (Lall, 1991, p.155).   
 
Even the supporters of the neo-classical approach to development seem to accept the 
important role of the governments in East Asia in their success (Chowdhury and Islam, 
1993; World Bank, 1993). Chowdhury and Islam (1993) in their study of the East Asian 
NICs examined,23 among others things, the extent to which governments in these 
countries have picked ‘industrial winners’.  They worked out indices of structural change 
in industries and found that active restructuring programs have played an important role 
in shifting manufacturing towards more sophisticated activities (Chowdhury and Islam 
                                                          
22 For example, they were not hesitant to withdraw support given to industries, if they were found to be economically inefficient and 
costly. 
23 They analyzed the industry policy of the four East Asian NIEs, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea in detail. 
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1993, p.93).  The study points out that in 1973, South Korea launched a new phase of 
industrialization shifting the emphasis to the development of heavy and chemical 
industries.  As a result, these activities grew at an accelerated rate, while the growth of 
textiles and apparel slowed down substantially.  Emphasizing the important role played 
by the South Korean government to increase the competitiveness of the targeted 
industries they point out: 
While the methods of direct intervention remained the same in the 1970s, the 
Korean government supplemented its industrial restructuring policy with active R 
& D and human resource development (HRD) programs, given that without such 
programs it is impossible to move up the technology ladder and upgrade industrial 
activities.  OECD notes that Korea has moved very fast in increasing its 
R&D/GNP ratio and that it has made spectacular progress in expanding 
engineering education and the government played a important role in augmenting 
R&D activity (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993, p. 96). 
 
While praising the East Asian NICs for their concerted effort in ‘macroeconomic stability 
and export growth,’24 the World Bank (1993) has emphasized the importance of policy 
intervention in their success.  The study defined industrial policies as “government efforts 
to alter industrial structure to promote productivity based growth” (Chowdhury and Islam 
1993, p.304).  It summarized the nature and the degree of industry policies used in the 
NICs to enhance the competitiveness (Chowdhury and Islam 1993, p.308).  For instance, 
the South Korean government promoted individual firms more often to rectify perceived 
entrepreneurial and skill deficiencies using export performance to determine whether 
firms deserved continued promotion.  It also encouraged industrial growth and exports by 
making direct and indirect inputs to export industries available at world prices.  The 
selectively promoted industries were the heavy and chemical industries (HCI) such as 
iron and steel, metal products, machinery, electronics, and industrial chemicals.  The 
motivation for this was on both strategic grounds such as increased defence capability, 
and economic reasons such as shifting to capital and technology-intensive sectors in 
anticipation of a loss of competitive advantage in the labour intensive sector.  The 
government’s role in the manufacturing sector in Taiwan was similar to that of South 
Korea, but “less important quantitatively” (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993, p.308).   
 
                                                          
24 The study mainly attribute their success to the pragmatic orthodoxy in macroeconomic management as reflected in low inflation, 
low budget deficit, low price distortions, realistic exchange rates, and ability to absorb external shocks, and the export push (World 
Bank, 1993, pp. 107-157).  
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While rejecting the standard story that the export orientation played an important role in 
East Asian growth performance, Rodrik (1995, p.57) argues that a much more plausible 
explanation for the economic take-off of these economies was the sharp increase in 
investment demand that took place in the early 1960s: 
In the early 1960s and thereafter the Korean and Taiwanese government managed 
to engineer a significant increase in the private return to capital.   They did so not 
only by removing a number of impediments to investment and establishing a 
sound investment climate, but also more importantly by alleviating a coordination 
failure that had blocked economic take-off.  The latter required a range of 
strategic interventions- including investment subsidies, administrative guidance 
and the use of public enterprise- which went considerably beyond those discussed 
in the standard account.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 In a study of the post-war industrial policies of South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, India, and 
China, who adopted an autarkic industry policy in the 1950s, Auty (1994) found a 
transfer of comparative advantage in heavy and chemical industries (HCI) towards newly 
industrializing countries over the years.   The policies adopted to accelerate the process 
have been disappointing in most cases, and their premature imposition has been highly 
burdensome for most of the countries except South Korea.  This is because unlike other 
countries, South Korea’s competitive industry policy enabled the HCI sector to mature 
within a short period.  
 
Summary 
There is growing literature on the East Asian development experience during the last few 
decades.  This section discussed only some major studies that were deemed useful to 
address the main issue under discussion in this thesis.   As seen there, the success of East 
Asia is mainly attributable to the ability of their governments to manipulate trade and 
industry policy to govern the markets to achieve the desired outcome, while promoting 
private initiatives and market efficiency. As Leipsziger and Thomas (1997, p.4) 
emphasized it, “East Asia makes a case neither for laissez-faire approach to economic 
policy making, nor for placing a heavy hand on the tiller. The crucial factor was the way 
that governments supported markets in helping to unleash entrepreneurship.”  As a 
development strategy, this has drawn an increased global attention, particularly of 
developing countries in recent years.  Macroeconomic environment and other 
institutional arrangements are also important for the success of this strategy.   
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It is emphasized that this strategy is more relevant to Sri Lanka than the other 
development approaches discussed above.  As this strategy consists of both trade policy 
and industry policy tools, most of the theoretical inputs discussed so far in this Chapter 
are of direct relevance to this study. A further discussion on this approach will be made in 
the conceptual framework in Chapter Five. 
 
2.4 Macroeconomic Policy and NIC Status 
It is widely believed that the macroeconomic policy stance of a country plays a significant 
role in economic development (Bleaney, 1996; Fischer, 1993, 1996; Bahri, 2002; Solans, 
2002). The macroeconomic stability is viewed as the fundamental cause of the East Asian 
success (World Bank, 1993).  None of these countries pursued an “excessively easy 
macroeconomic policy” or tolerated “double-digit inflation” while most had “small 
governments” and “small budget deficits” (Fischer, 1996, p.1).   There are studies 
showing that growth is negatively related to inflation, fiscal deficits, and foreign 
exchange distortions (Fischer, 1993).  
 
Macroeconomic stability in the economy is vital for the growth of exports.  The key 
determinant of a country’s international competitiveness in exports is its real exchange 
rate (Edwards, 1989).  An over-valued real exchange gives incentives for producers to 
shift from tradable sector to non-tradable sector and therefore can distort resource 
allocation in the economy (Agarawal et. al, 2000).   Real exchange rate variability 
associated with inflation can not only hamper exporting activities, but also discourage 
growth-enhancing capital investment due to uncertainty of future movements in relative 
prices (Grober, 1993; De Long and Summers, 1991).    
 
The price stability can be achieved by using either fiscal policy or monetary policy or a 
combination of both.  A main factor to be careful of is public deficit which, coupled with 
public debt, can exert a negative impact on market interest rate by creating inflationary 
expectations.  It “could crowd out private investment and consumption, and hamper 
economic growth” (Solans, 2002, p.1).  Price stability is an essential part of sustainable 
economic growth. It ensures the efficient allocation of resources through “an informative 
price mechanism, competitiveness, lower interest rate risk premium, and appropriate 
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conditions for investment."  While “all these factors are preconditions for economic 
growth,” no other factor is “more damaging to economic growth than inflation” (Solans, 
2002, p.2). 
 
 Bleaney (1996) tested the view that macroeconomic policies promote growth via 
increased investment for a cross-section of LDCs during the 1980-90 period.  The results 
showed a link between good macroeconomic management and faster growth for a given 
rate of investment.  In a similar study for a sample of 70 countries, Maxwell (1998) also 
found similar results. In contrast, Garrison, et. al (1995) in a similar study for the 1960-87 
period found no evidence for the view that weak macroeconomic policies which lead to 
higher budget deficits, and high inflation are associated with a lower growth rate. 
 
Some scholars see a strong interdependence among macroeconomic policy and industrial 
strategy. As Arestis and Sawyer (1998) argue, while macroeconomic performance can be 
improved by appropriate industry policy, inappropriate macroeconomic policy can 
damage industrial performance.  Policies to contain inflation normally depress investment 
and thereby retard industrial growth.  It is a necessary condition for an economy to have a 
macroeconomic environment that is conducive to investment and R&D.  
 
East Asian experience provides us with a political economy explanation as to how they 
managed to adopt a sound macroeconomic policy during their growing years (Rodrik, 
1996, as quoted in Agrawal et. al, 2000, p.40).  Accordingly, the fairness in income 
distribution and the high educational levels of the population in these countries, 
especially in Korea and Taiwan insulated the policymaking and implementation from 
“pressure-group politics” (Rodrik, 1996, p.20).  It helped the policy makers to implement 
policies targeting growth without unmanageable fiscal constraints. Unlike in other 
countries, the homogeneity in population in East Asia enabled these governments to 
implement stabilization programmes that are normally unpopular in other LDCs 
(Agrawal et. al, 2000, p.40).  Relatively more stable political regimes, and the public 
awareness of the hardships associated with hyperinflations in the past are the other 
contributory factors for sound macroeconomic environment prevailed in these countries.   
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2.5 Development Strategies and Growth: Some Evidence 
There are numerous studies analyzing the relationship between trade and industry 
policies, export performance, and industrialization and growth.  This section will 
investigate some major studies on the related area. 
 
Most of the studies highlight the positive effects of trade policy on economic growth. In a 
sample of 41 developing countries, Michaely (1977) found a strong relationship between 
per capita income growth and growth in the ratio of exports to GNP. While this 
relationship was very strong for the 23 most developed countries in his sample, he found 
no relationship for the poorest countries. He concluded that growth was affected by 
export performance only once a country achieves a minimum level of development.  
Using a variant of the methodology used by Michaely in the above study, Balassa (1978) 
examined the link between exports and growth for a sample of 11 more homogeneous 
and semi industrialized countries and confirmed the above results. However, unlike 
Michaely, he found a high correlation coefficient in his test. Agalewatte (1991) examined 
the relationship between GDP growth and export growth for Sri Lanka using time series 
data for the period 1970-87.  The result indicated that there was no strong association 
between export growth and GDP growth.  However, when a dummy variable to capture 
the effect of economic reforms after 1977 was used, not only the association improved, 
but also showed evidence of structural change after 1977. 
 
There are also studies testing this relationship under different external conditions. Singer 
and Gray (1988) analyzed the correlation between export orientation and growth 
performance for two periods: 1967-73 (when world market conditions were normal); and 
1973-77 (when world market conditions were unfavourable) using a sample of 52 
developing countries.   Their findings indicated that when world market conditions are 
favourable, there is a strong positive correlation between export orientation and growth.   
Under unfavourable world market situations, the correlation was weaker. Thus, the 
results implied that when external demand was weak, gains from openness were offset by 
negative effects and when world demand was strong, the benefits from openness were 
outweighed by other factors.  They concluded that the world demand factor was generally 
stronger than the trade policy factor and, therefore, countries achieved higher growth 
rates of exports only when world demand was strong. They also concluded that industry-
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oriented economies performed better with regard to export earnings under such a 
situation than do primary oriented economies.  
  
The World Bank (1987) examined the performance of 41 developing countries with 
different levels of trade-orientation in two periods, 1963-73 and 1973-85.  The study 
emphasized that the economic performance of outward-oriented countries were superior 
to that of inward oriented economies in almost all respects.  It showed that for the 
strongly outward-oriented group, annual average growth rate was more than double the 
rate achieved by the strongly inward oriented group for the 1963-67 period. Moreover, 
despite the global economic downturn during the period 1973-85, per capita income of 
the former grew by an annual average of 6 percent whereas the latter experienced an 
annual average fall of 0.1 percent. As regards industrial performance, the survey shows 
that the annual average growth in manufacturing value-added was highest in the strongly 
outward oriented group and lowest in the strongly inward-oriented group25. The survey 
concludes that outward-oriented economies perform better than inward oriented 
economies, even under unfavourable market condition and asserts that there is a strong 
association between export promotion and various indicators of growth and development.   
 
Dollars (1992) examined the relationship between growth and outward-orientation which 
he measured using an index taking into consideration trade distortions, exchange rate 
volatility and the rate of investment in the economy for 95 countries during the 1976-85 
period.  The results showed that the higher the trade distortions and the greater the 
exchange rate variability, the lower the rate of growth in per capita income.    
 
Most studies on trade and growth emphasize the relationship between openness and total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth (Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2000; Edwards, 1998; 
Krueger, 2002; Lawrence, 1999). Edwards (1998) estimated a regression equation using 
panel data for 1960-90 in a sample of 93 developed and developing countries, and found 
that more open countries experienced faster productivity growth.   Lawrence (1999) in his 
study in the US found that trade restrictions tend to reduce productivity and output 
growth, while import competition stimulate it.   Krueger (2002, p.19) is adamant that 
openness greatly contributes to higher productivity and income per capita, and thereby to 
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eradicate poverty, as it provides “powerful channels for feedback on the effect of various 
policies on productivity and growth.”  Krueger rejects the argument that an absence of 
adequate institutional reforms can retard the gains from openness as “there is strong 
evidence that openness may encourage institutional reform and, in particular, reduce 
corruption” (Krueger, 2002, p.19).  
 
There are studies that hesitate to accept a link between liberal trade policies and growth. 
Diaz Alejandro and Helleiner (1982) and Taylor (1981), for example argue that 
stabilization programs with conditions set by the IMF will not solve the problems of 
LDCs. The ability to acquire the long-run advantages of reforms depends on the capacity 
of the political authority to sustain the short-term costs of adjustment. 
 
Helleiner (1986) found that for low-income developing countries, there is no evidence to 
support the proposition that the degree of export-orientation is associated with growth 
either in African countries or in poor countries in general. However, there is support, 
especially powerful in Africa, for the view that greater import volume instability is 
associated with slower growth. 
 
Jha (1987) criticizes the World Bank’s above (1987) findings maintaining that most of 
the poorest countries are better off with inward-oriented policies than outward-oriented 
policies.  He demonstrated this using data for countries like Bangladesh, India, and 
Pakistan and compared their performance with newly industrialized small countries like 
South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. He asserts that when comparing performance 
between countries, country-specific situations such as annual population growth, should 
be considered. 
 
In a study examining the factors behind structural changes in 16 transitional economies 
(which included both NICs and next-tier NICs) Bradford (1987) questioned the 
association between low price distortions and higher growth.26  The evidence showed that 
a significant factor behind the success of the NICs was the lower cost of their investment 
                                                                                                                                                                            
25  15.6 percent and 5.3 percent during 1963-75 versus 10 percent and 3.1 percent during 1973-85, respectively. 
26 Bradford used an index for structural change in manufacturing and compared it with average growth in manufacturing value-added 
for the countries in the sample. He observed other important factors such as changing factor intensities, capital formation, and the 
relation of national price structure to the international price structure. 
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goods (Bradford, 1987, p.307). Thus, rejecting the conventional export-led growth 
explanations of the emergence of the NICs, he attributed the NICs’ growth and export 
performance to their public policies which stimulated capital formation in economy. 
 
Beason and Weinstein (1996) observed the relationship between protection and 
productivity growth within various industries in Japan, and found there was no positive 
association between the two.  Stiglitz (1998) shows that the success (or otherwise) of 
trade liberalization depends on country-specific situations.  It normally works well for 
developed nations with full employment, but not so for LDCs with a high level of 
unemployment.  
 
Empirical studies linking lower trade barriers to economic growth may not always give 
realistic results due to methodological problems (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). For 
example, “the indicators of openness used by researchers are poor measures of trade 
barriers or highly correlated with other sources of bad economic performance” 
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000, p.2).  They reiterate the need to be cautious when relating 
free trade policies to economic growth.  Baldwin (2000, p.15) also holds a similar view 
that “not only the search for the relationship between trade barriers and growth seems 
futile, but it does not seem to make much sense in view of the complex interrelationships 
between trade policy and other government policies and various macroeconomic 
variables.” He therefore warns that care should be taken “in attributing any single 
economic policy such as the lowering of trade barriers, as being a sufficient government 
action for accelerating the rate of economic growth” (Baldwin, 2000, p.16). 
 
Summary 
There are numerous studies in the trade and development literature linking trade regimes 
to economic performance. As discussed above, the nature and the extent of economic 
development depend on the type of policy used. Trade theory maintains that through 
openness, a country can achieve certain efficiency gains which are fundamental for 
development.  Most studies indicate that a more outward orientation leads, in particular, 
to economic growth and, in general, to gains in productivity, efficiency, and  economies 
of scale in industries. More importantly, if the macroeconomic policies are conducive, 
trade reforms improve the external balance. The impact on employment, redistribution, 
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and living standard on the other hand, is not so clear.  There is also evidence that the 
outward-orientation itself does not guarantee economic success.  It depends on such 
factors as country-specific conditions, capital formation, interrelationships between trade 
policy and government policies, and macroeconomic environment, among other things. If 
they are conducive, economic reforms can bring about a sustainable growth rate which is 
vital for economic take-off for developing countries, as Rostow27 has explained. 
 
2.6  Concluding  Remarks 
This chapter reviewed the literature on development strategies pursued by various 
countries in the past.  Free trade policy as a development strategy has a strong theoretical 
background.  In a perfect market with no intervention, the price mechanism plays a 
leading role in allocating resources.  In such a system, trade plays the role of the engine of 
growth.  However, in reality, markets are imperfect and the price mechanism fails to 
achieve the most efficient outcomes.  As such, free trade policy alone is not sufficient for 
an economy to achieve growth.  Import substitution, on the other hand, is an inward-
looking strategy that has been widely used as an alternative strategy by many LDCs in the 
past.  Under this strategy, government has an active role in promoting domestic industries 
through tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  As a development strategy, it is now considered as 
obsolete as it creates other problems such as rent seeking, inefficiency, and foreign 
exchange difficulties. 
 
In between the above two extremes are various other strategies that developing nations 
can use.  One such strategy is strategic trade policy.  It assumes that markets are not 
competitive, and therefore, through subsidies or protective measures, government can 
increase the competitiveness of domestic industries enabling them to capture the excess 
rent, which would otherwise be reaped by foreign competitors.  The industries in which 
this strategy is likely to succeed are those where it is difficult for foreign competitors to 
enter due to factors such as lack of technology or which require a large amount of capital. 
This suggests that industries, which should be assisted, should be new, and potentially 
large.   As will be seen in Chapter Four, this policy was used by South Korea during the 
1970s to promote large conglomerates.  Factors such as strong political leadership, 
                                                          
27 Rostow (1960) in his  “stages of growth theory” showed how a poor country (traditional society) could take off into a self-
sustaining economic growth by generating sufficient investment made possible through the mobilization of domestic and foreign 
saving. 
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availability of local investors with sound entrepreneurial skills, availability of capital are 
also vital for the success of this strategy. As a development strategy, this appears to be 
more suitable for developed economies than for prospective NICs such as Sri Lanka.   
 
It is argued that the East Asian NICs achieved remarkable growth performance by using a 
competitive industry policy.  Under a competitive industry policy, the government has an 
active role in enhancing market efficiency.  Theoretically, this strategy can change the 
comparative advantage shifting the industrial structure towards newer and more modern 
sectors by capturing dynamic scale economies.  Unlike import substitution or infant 
industry policies, a competitive industry policy anticipates emerging comparative 
advantage in the sector (or sectors) assisted, and therefore is used only as a temporary 
strategy.   
 
The knowledge of different policy regimes discussed above is of importance for policy 
makers of developing countries in order to develop strategies based on a competitive 
industry policy.  However, trade and industry policy may not work successfully without 
the support of appropriate macroeconomic policy and institutional arrangements. With 
the insight gained in this chapter, this study will develop an analytical framework in 













The purpose of this chapter is to provide the background information about the Sri 
Lankan economy, which is useful for the formulation of a development model for Sri 
Lanka and the associated analytical work in the chapters to follow. A considerable part 
of this chapter will be used to examine the evolution of various policy regimes in Sri 
Lanka since independence, and their contribution to its macroeconomic performance in 
the light of the knowledge gained from the previous literature review.  Accordingly, this 
chapter will cover the following major items which are of importance for the subsequent 
analysis: general information; socio-economic conditions; historical background; 
evolution of economic policy regimes and associated outcomes from independence up to 
1977; policy developments since 1977 and their effects on growth; and an assessment of 
Sri Lanka’s policy reforms. 
 
3.2 General Information 
Sri Lanka 1 is an island of 65,610 square kilometers located in the Indian Ocean. The 
mid-year population in 2000 was estimated at 19.4 million, which grew at an annual rate 
of 1.7 per cent over the previous year (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2000).   About 80 per 
cent of the people live in the rural areas which include the plantations.   The population 
consists of several ethnic groups: Sinhalese, being the majority account for 74 per cent 
of the population, while Tamils, Muslims, and other groups account for 18.1 per cent, 
7.1 per cent and 0.8 per cent respectively. There are four main religious groupings: 
Buddhists (69.3 per cent), Hindus (15.5 per cent), Christians (7.5 per cent), and Muslims 









3.3  Current Socio-economic Condition 
Sri Lanka, which hitherto remained a ‘Low-income developing country,’ reached the per 
capita GDP of US$ 760 (Rs. 41,984) in 1996, which is the threshold to be a ‘Middle-
income developing country’ in that year according to the World Bank Classification.2  
Its infant mortality rate has been recorded as 16 per 1000 live births, which is 
significantly below the average level for developing countries, and life expectancy at 
birth was 72 years, which is among the highest of the low-income developing countries 
(Table 3.1).  The Human Development Indicator (HDI) which is used to measure the 
overall level of socio-economic development among nations was recorded as 0.73 for 
Sri Lanka, which is the highest among SAARC3 countries, and higher than some East 
Asian countries such as Indonesia (United Nations, 2001). However, income 
distribution as measured by Gini coefficient has somewhat worsened over the years.4 
 
Table 3.1 
 Development Indicators of Sri Lanka and Some Asian Countries: Selected Years 
Country Per capita 




At Birth (years) 
Infant Mortality 
(Per 1000 births) 
1960 1997 1960 1995 1960 1997 1960 1996 
Korea 140 9509 71 98 52 69 78 10 
Malaysia 280 4309 23 84 52 70 72 10 
Thailand 95 2463 68 94 51 66 103 35 
Philippines 254 1184 72 95 51 67 106 38 
India 73 379 24 52 43 62 165 75 
Pakistan n.a 447 16 38 44 61 162 78 
Sri Lanka 152 760 61 92 62 71 71 16 
 Source:  The World Bank, The World Development Report (Various issues); Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1999, 
               Sri   Lanka Socio Economic Data 1999, Vol. XXII.   
 
The Sri Lanka was predominantly an agricultural economy. Its share in the GNP was 
about one half in the early 1950s.  However, this has since declined to 33 per cent in 
1974, and 21 per cent in 2000 (Table 3.2).  This sector not only catered for more than 50 
per cent of the total employment in the economy (Table 3.3), but also was until recently 
the largest export earner in the economy. It comprises both plantations and food crops.  
Tea, rubber, and coconuts are the three major plantation crops. Rice, the major food 
crop, covers the largest acreage under any single crop.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 It was known as Ceylon until 1972 in which year it became a republic and its official name became Sri Lanka (Ponnambalam, 
1980, p.4).  
2 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1996, Annual Report, Colombo, (p.23). 
3 South Asian Association of Regional Conference is made of the seven South Asian countries: Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives. 






Sectoral Contribution to GNP of Sri Lanka: Selected Years 
(At constant factor cost prices) 
 
Sector 
1953a 1963b 1974b 2000c 
Rs Mn % Rs Mn % Rs Mn % Rs Mn % 
Agriculture 2275.0 49.9 2846.0 41.3 3558.3 33.2 175317 20.9 
Mining & quarrying 4.1 0.1 29.5 0.4 190.9 1.8 14921 1.8 
Manufacturing 392.2 4.8 853.0 12.4 1359.4 12.7 149115 17.7 
Construction 392.2 8.6 271.8 3.9 552.8 5.2 59815 7.1 
Services 3063.5 37.5 2950.3 42.7 5094 47.3 457867 54.5 
GDP 4594.8 100.8 6950.6 100.7 10755.4 100.2 857035 102.0 
Net foreign factor income -37.8 -0.8 -50.9 -0.7 -24.9 -0.2 -16750 -2.0 
GNP 4557.0 100.0 6899.7 100.0 10730.5 100.0 840285 100.0 
 (a) at 1953 prices; (b) at 1959 prices; (c) at 1996 prices. 
 Source: Balakrishnan, N., and Gunasekara, H.M., 1977, “Statistical Appendix”, in K.M. De Silva (ed.) Sri Lanka:  
       A Survey, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu. p. 260; Central Bank of Sri Lanka,  Annual Report 2000. 
 
     Table 3.3 
   Sectoral Distribution of Gainfully Employed Persons: Selected Years 
 
Sector 

















Agriculture 1381612 52.5 1693430 53.0 1824000 50.4 2267000 35.7 
Mining/quarrying 9086 0.4 10360 0.3 15300 0.4 61000 0.9 
Manufacturing 259799 9.8 312900 9.8 347400 9.6 1046000 16.5 
Construction n.a n.a 86030 2.6 122400 3.1 349000 5.5 
Services 681698 27.1 926839 29.0 1014800 28.3 2619000 41.4 
Not classified 279329 10.5 170170 5.3 298300 8.2 - - 
Total  2611524 100.0 3199730 100.0 3622200 100.0 6343000 100.0 
Source: Balakrishnan, N., and H.M. Gunasekara, 1977, “Statistical Appendix”, in K.M. De Silva (ed.) Sri Lanka: 
        A Survey, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu. p.260; Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2000. 
 
Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sector was relatively small at independence in 1948.  This 
sector’s share in total output has grown since then from 5 per cent of GNP in 1953 to 
17.7 per cent by 2000 (Table 3.2). As shown in Table 3.4 below, this sector has been 
dominated by textiles, apparel and leather products, followed by food, beverages and 
tobacco products in recent years.  The services sector on the other hand, has been the 
largest contributor to the GDP since early 1960s.5 It has also become the second largest 
provider of the employment opportunities in the economy since independence.  
                                                          
5 This sector includes utilities, transport and communication, banking, insurance and real estate, public administration, external and 





       Table 3.4 
Value and Composition of Industrial Production in Sri Lanka: Selected Years 
 
Category 
1965 1977 2000 
Rs. Mn. % Rs. Mn. % RS. Mn. % 
Food Beverage & Tobacco 415.5 49.0 2294 32.7 105671 22.8 
Textile, Apparel & leather products 171.5 20.2 698 9.9 215686 46.6 
Wood & Wood Products 5.2 0.61 127 1.8 3084 0.7 
Paper & paper products 29.3 3.4 270 3.8 6516 1.4 
Chemical, petroleum, rubber & plastic products 125.3 14.7 2469 35.2 74670 16.1 
Non metallic mineral products 40.2 4.7 411 5.8 28198 6.1 
Basic metal products - - 132 1.8 3378 0.7 
Fabricated metal, machinery & transport equipment 58.7 6.9 571 8.1 15678 3.4 
Products not elsewhere specified 1.3 0.15 34 0.9 9839 2.1 
Total 847 100 7006 100 462720 100 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report (Various Issues) 
  
3.4 Historical Background 
Sri Lanka obtained independence in 1948 from the British who ruled the island for 
nearly 150 years since 1815.6  During its pre-colonial history, the major economic 
activity was cultivation of rice. The British introduced tea, rubber, and coconut, which 
made up its plantation agriculture providing a sound basis for its export-dependent 
economy.7  The traditional agriculture, which has been at subsistence level, has survived 
along with plantation agriculture.  While Sri Lanka was highly dependent on agriculture 
for its export earnings in this early period, its imports, on the other hand, were more 
diversified and included a significant proportion of manufactured goods (Gunasekara, 
1977).8  Accordingly, at independence, the inherited economy was heavily dependent on 
foreign trade.   
 
As seen in Table 3.1 above, since this early period Sri Lanka has been showing a 
significant achievement in terms of development indicators compared to other Asian 
countries including South Korea.  This can be mainly attributed to the high level 
commitment to social welfare measures by successive governments. These measures 
                                                          
6 Prior to British, it was controlled by two other successive foreign powers: The Portuguese from 1505 to 1655; and the Dutch from 
1656 to 1795.  They had only a limited authority in the maritime provinces. The British took control of the maritime provinces after 
1796, and gradually dominated the whole country in 1815.  
7 At independence, 95 % of export earnings came from the above three plantation crops, of which tea alone accounted for 60 per 
cent.  The agricultural sector’s contribution to GDP was almost 40 per cent, and plantation crops alone accounted for more than 
half of GDP (Ponnambalam, 1980). 
8 Almost half of imports in the 1950-53 period consisted of rice, wheat flour, and sugar, which are basic necessities in the 
consumption pattern of Sri Lankans.  There was no developed manufacturing sector, as its share of total merchandise exports was 





included a food subsidy, free education, health, and a subsidized public transport, 
designed mainly to assist the society's lowest income groups. The social welfare 
expenditure amounted to a substantial proportion of GDP for a developing country 
(Table 3.5). 
 
       Table 3.5 
Government Expenditure of Sri Lanka: Selected Years  (as a % of GDP)   
 1956/57 1961/62 1966/67 1973 1996 2000 
1. Social services 6.0 6.6 7.9 7.4 9.1 7.5 
 O/w, Education n.a 3.6 4.8 4.4 2.7 2.5 
          Health n.a 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.5 1.6 
2. Economic services 8.0 4.7 5.8 5.2 5.2 5.3 
3. Transfer payments 8.5 5.5 7.8 13.9 6.0 4.2 
    O/w households 5.5 1.0 3.6 5.6 4.4 3.3 
Total Govt. Expenditure 25.7 24.5 28.5 30.4 28.8 26.7 
Source:  Lal, D., and Rajapathirana, S., 1989, Impediments to Trade liberalization in Sri Lanka, Gower, England 
(p.3);   Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2000. 
 
3.5 Evolution of Development Policy: The Pre-1977 Period 
At independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was a relatively an open economy (Lal and 
Rajapathirana, 1989).  It was seen as an example of a classical dual export economy.  
There were relatively very low import duties.  Most duties were imposed mainly for 
revenue reasons and applied to a wide range of goods (Presidential Tariff Commission, 
1991).  There were a few quantitative barriers coming down from the wartime, but they 
were relaxed gradually subsequently. After independence, Sri Lanka began to face 
problems relating to economic development. These problems mainly centred around the 
vulnerability of the economy due to openness and substantial dependence on a narrow 
range of primary products (Balakrishnan, 1977). Thus, its trade policy has ever since 
fluctuated between greater or lesser degrees of control on foreign trade (Weiss and 
Jayanthakumaran, 1995). It also reflected the ideological differences between the two 
main political parties that governed the country from time to time, the United National 
Party (UNP), and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).9  The rest of this section will 
undertake a brief review of Sri Lanka’s policy development under each government 
since independence.   
                                                          
9 With regard to policy differences, the UNP was famous for its  centre-right stance and more outward oriented policies while SLFP 
was center-left and famous for its inward looking policies.  UNP was in power during the following periods: 1948-56; 1965-70, and 





3.5.1 Export-led Growth: 1948-56  
During this period, Sri Lanka began to experience the effects of the fluctuation of export 
prices in the world market. The International Bank for Reconstruction & Development 
(IBRD, 1952) emphasized the importance of developing domestic agriculture, 
expanding the basic infrastructure, and encouraging private sector for small-scale 
industrialization. The government’s Six-Year Program of Investment (1954-60) 
emphasized the need for the government to shift from large-scale industries to small-
scale industries, and assigned a role as a promoter not a sole entrepreneur (Planning 
Secretariat, 1955, p.245).10 Apart from that, there were no significant changes in 
government’s economic policy during this period.  This was the time the Singer-
Prebisch ideology began to influence the primary producing LDCs to diversify their 
economies through industrialization. However, Sri Lankan remained more or less as an 
open economy throughout the period, mainly because the export boom due to the 
Korean War in the early 1950s insulated Sri Lanka from experiencing the adverse terms 
of trade effects as predicted by Singer and Prebisch (Karunaratne, 2000, p.174).      
 
3.5.2 A  Period of Transition: 1956-60 
This was the period when Sri Lanka began to feel the effects of a deterioration of its 
terms of trade, especially of its primary commodities.  The leading plantation sector was  
therefore unable to stimulate the rest of the economy any more (Karunaratne, 2000, 
p.172). With the new centre-left government coming to power in 1956, a drastic change 
of Sri Lanka’s industrial policy occurred during this period. The government stressed 
the importance of industrialization, and assigned itself an active role in economic 
development.  One justification for this was the growing unemployment in the economy 
following the rapid population growth during the post-war period.  As Appendix Table 
A-6 shows, during 1950 and 1960 the population grew rapidly at an annual average rate 
of 2.7 per cent due to a drastic decline in the annual death rate.11  The export sector on 
the other hand began to suffer due to the deterioration in the terms of trade especially in 
the late 1950s.  Food self-sufficiency and industrialization thus emerged as priorities in 
all economic planning programs. 
                                                          
10 The government initiated moves to transfer government undertakings to private enterprise under the provisions of the State 
Sponsored Corporation Act of 1955, but this was not materialized because of change of government in 1956 (Balakrishnan, 1977, 
p.193-94). 
11 This improvement is largely attributed to the successful malaria eradication program, and improved medical and health facilities 





In 1957 the government categorized all the industries into three groups: (a) basic heavy 
industries-iron, steel, chemicals, cement, fertilizer, mineral sands, and salt- which were 
to be exclusively under the public sector; (b) other heavy industries- textiles, tyres and 
tubes, ceramic, vegetable oil refinery, and glass-found in both government and private 
sector; and (c) light consumer goods in the private sector (Balakrishnan, 1977).  The 
State Industrial Corporation Act No. 49 of 1957 intensified the government’s 
involvement in the first two groups. The Ten Year Plan (1959-68)12 prepared in 1958 
indicated the need to further diversify the economy through industrial development: The 
Plan emphasized that import substitution based on protection was the only strategy to be 
used to achieve this goal (National Planning Council (NPC), 1959, p.32).   
 
Starting with the 1957/58 budget, policy emphasis on import duty gradually turned from 
revenue raising towards protection of infant industries and correcting economy’s 
external imbalance. (Snodgrass, 1966). The budget cut import duties on capital 
equipment and raw material, and at the same time brought some consumer luxuries 
under a 100 per cent duty rate.  In 1959, there were further duty reductions for raw 
materials, some increases to protect domestic industries, and further duty increases for 
many imported items including cars, gasoline, and watches (Snodgrass, 1966, p.216).  
 
Thus, the Ten-Year Plan of 1958 aimed at making the country self-sufficient in all 
consumer goods and using the resulting foreign exchange savings to finance imports of 
capital goods for industrial development.  This was deemed vital in view of the rapidly 
declining Sri Lanka’s foreign assets situation after 1957 (Table 3.6). It became the 
starting point of the inward-looking development strategy to be followed during the next 
two decades. 
                                                          
12 This was drawn up by the National Planning Council under the Prime Minister as the Chairman. Internationally renounced 
economists such as John Robinson, Gunnar Myrdal, J.R. Hicks, and Nicholas Kaldor joined as consultants in the preparation of the 






Table 3. 6   





Assets in Terms of 
Months  of Imports 
1950 1132.9 11.6 
1951 1216.8 9.5 
1952 873.8 6.1 
1953 640.4 4.7 
1954 944.3 8.2 
1955 1228.8 9.2 
1956 1275.7 9.7 
1957 1061.9 7.2 
1958 933.2 6.5 
1959 734.0 4.5 
1960 541.3 3.2 
Source: Snodgrass, D. R., 1966, Ceylon: An Export Economy in Transition,     
            Richard D Irwin Inc, Illinois (p.213) 
 
There were many reasons for the above policy direction (Ponnambalam, 1980, p.39): (a) 
the involvement of the ‘internationally renowned economists’ such as  Joan Robinson, 
Gunnar Myrdal, J.R.Hicks, and Nicholas Kaldor  as consultants for the Plan; (b) 
imitation of the western countries where the state ownership had been a dominant 
phenomenon after the Second World War and,  (c) the Mahalanobis strategy for India’s 
Second Five-Year Plan of 1957 which emphasized the importance of concentrating on 
heavy industry, after successful completion of its First Five Year Plan which accorded 
high priority to agriculture.  
 
Thus, this transitional period saw the end of Sri Lanka’s classical export economy. As 
will be seen in the next chapter, Sri Lanka’s above move towards a state-led 
industrialization during this period is quite comparable with the experience of 
contemporary LDCs such as South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
3.5.3 First Phase of Import Substitution: 1960-65 
The SLFP-led coalition government, which was re-elected in 1960, continued its 
development strategy based on economic controls during this period. Its inward-looking 
development approach became more pronounced and included severe quantitative 
restrictions on imports, stringent exchange controls, and a greater degree of state 
intervention in resource allocation in the economy. During this period, many LDCs 





Sri Lanka was no exception to that trend.  The above thesis contained a formula for 
chronic economic problems such as foreign exchange difficulties, unemployment, and 
lower growth.  Thus, the government entered into an era of strict controls and public 
ownership. 
 
The main reason for the increased controls was the unfavourable balance of payments 
situation after 1957 (Appendix Table A-4).   The overall deficit of this account during 
this period was mainly a result of an adverse trade balance. During the first few years 
after 1955, this was due to poor domestic production of exports and unfavourable 
international prices (Appendix Table A-5). After 1961, however it was mainly due to the 
fall in prices, which continued until the early 1970s.  
 
The other reason for increased controls was the rise in imports (Appendix Table A-5) 
due to increased import demand as indicated by the rising quantity index (while price 
index remained stable) particularly between 1955 and 1961. This increase in imports 
was due to two main reasons: (a) increased domestic income resulted from the two 
export booms- a rubber boom in 1950-51, and a tea boom in 1955; and (b) the increased 
public expenditure (Table 3.7 below).   During this period population growth also was 
very high (Appendix Table A-6).  The increased domestic consumption demand further 
increased imports. Thus, the increase of import demand and the unfavourable terms of 
trade for exports exerted extra pressure on foreign exchange. 
 
Table 3.7 
Government Finance of Sri Lanka: 1954-2000 (Rs. Billion) 
 1954/55 1958/59 1964/65 1970/71 1977 1990 2000 
Revenue 































Net Cash Deficit/ Surplus 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -2.1 -31.8 -124.5 
Social Welfare Outlays 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.5 n.a 27.4 93.5 
O/w, Education 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 9.5 31.0 
         Health 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 4.8 20.7 
         Food subsidy 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.4 - - 
a/ Figures before 1970 are percentages of GNP 
Source: Lal, D., and Rajapathirana, S., 1989, Impediments to Trade Liberalization in Sri Lanka, Gower, 






The major policies used to overcome the foreign exchange difficulties included foreign 
exchange controls,13 high tariffs on luxury items,14 QRs15 and bans16 (Balakrishnan, 
1977). By 1965, all items except essential foodstuffs, and intermediary inputs were 
subject to import licensing procedures. Table 3.8 below reflects how imports fell over 
time as a result.  To ease the foreign exchange crisis, for the first time the government 
opted for foreign borrowing from the IMF in 1962 (Ponnambalam, 1980). 
Table 3.8 
Composition of Sri Lanka’s Imports 1959-64 at 1959 Prices (Rs Million) 
 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Consumer goods 













Intermediate goods 396 397 383 409 372 410 
Investment goods 389 355 339 337 324 305 
Unclassified  17 13 9 8 13 10 
Total 2005 1960 1703 1733 1628 1897 
Source: Ponnambalam, S., 1980, Dependent Capitalism in Crisis: The Sri Lankan Economy 1948-1980, London, p.47.  
 
 
It is worthwhile to discuss the socio-economic implications of this first episode of 
import substitution. In line with the theory, the inward-looking policies not only led to 
scarcities and price hikes, but also created ‘near monopoly conditions’ for local 
industries allowing them to exploit the consumer market by making unconscionable 
profits17(Ponnambalam, 1980, p. 47). However, despite such negative effects, it 
“provided a strong stimulus for the beginning of basic structural changes in the 
traditional export economy” (Athukorala, 1980, p.8). 
 
Table 3.9 below shows that during the first 5 years of the IS strategy, the manufacturing 
sector grew at an average rate of 5.4 per cent annually. It also shows that the share of 
manufacturing increased from 4.8 per cent in 1953 to 12.4 per cent by 1965 (see also 
Table 3.2).  The average annual growth of the economy during this period was 4.2 per 
cent. 
                    
                                                          
13 Foreign travel, study abroad and capital transfers were the first to come under control. 
14 They included items such as motor vehicles, petroleum products, textiles, tobacco, cigarettes, liquor and watches. 
15 Semi-essential consumer goods were brought under QRs. 
16 The import of cars, watches and clocks, radios and high priced textiles were banned. 
17 Major items so produced locally included: perfumes and toilet goods, canned fruits and jams, pickles, chocolates, detergents, 





               Table 3.9 
Sri Lanka’s Manufacturing and GNP Growth*: 1960-70  
 
Year 
Manufacturing GNP Manufacturing as 










1960 728 6.7 6289 6.7 11.5 
1961 746 2.5 6425 2.2 11.5 
1962 798 6.8 6710 4.4 11.7 
1963 853 6.9 6900 2.8 12.3 
1964 901 5.6 7363 6.7 12.2 
1965 937 3.9 7551 2.6 12.4 
1966 1008 7.6 7818 3.5 12.9 
1967 1052 4.4 8210 5.0 12.8 
1968 1154 9.7 8901 8.4 12.9 
1969 1261 9.3 9301 4.5 13.5 
1970 1332 5.6 9686 4.8 13.7 
 *(at constant (1959) prices) 
Source: Ponnambalam, S., 1980, Dependent Capitalism in Crisis: The Sri Lankan Economy 1948-1980, 
London, p. 202. 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, IS strategy is one approach to achieve industrialization.  It 
appears that it was useful for the Sri Lankan planners to manage the economy during the 
first five years of a difficult period.   Most of the arguments for IS discussed in the 
literature review were applicable to Sri Lanka.18  
 
3.5.4 Partial Liberalization: 1965-70 
With the change of government in July 1965, there was a change in policy direction 
especially during the later part of the 1966-70 period.  The major problem it faced was 
the adverse foreign exchange situation (Corea, 1971, p.8). As a result of increased 
foreign borrowing,  Sri Lanka’s debt service ratio drastically increased from 3.5 per cent 
in 1965 to 20 per cent by 1970 (Table 3.10 below). The White Paper issued in 1966 
introduced new criteria for remitting dividends and profits by the foreign investors, and 
the Foreign Investment Advisory Committee (FIAC) was set up in 1967 to approve and 
monitor FDI (Lal and Rajapathirana, 1989).  The objective of these policies was to 
overcome the problems associated with foreign exchange difficulties. 
 
                                                          
18 For example, unfavourable terms of trade (Prebisch and Singer, 1950); secular deterioration of terms of trade (Myrdal, 1956); and 






Debt Service Payments of Sri Lanka: 1965-77  
 
Year 




Ratio Amortization Interest Total 
1965 52 22 74 2108 3.5 
1966 84 25 109 1878 5.8 
1967 84 33 117 1860 6.2 
1968 174 42 216 2223 9.7 
1969 214 68 282 2163 13.0 
1970 354 100 454 2253 20.1 
1971 387 104 491 2244 21.9 
1972 379 102 481 2206 21.8 
1973 522 108 630 2733 23.0 
1974 549 134 683 3844 17.8 
1975 862 162 1024 4478 22.9 
1976 883 190 1073 5350 20.1 
1977 967 245 1212 7563 16.0 
 (Rupee values are at current prices) 
 Source: Ponnambalam, S., 1980, Dependent Capitalism in Crisis: The Sri Lankan Economy 1948-1980, London, p. 54. 
 
To remedy the above situation, the currency (Rupee) was devalued by 20 per cent, 
followed by significant reforms in the exchange rate regime with the introduction of 
Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate Scheme (FEECS)19 in 1967. The FEECS 
system introduced a dual exchange rate regime: (a) The official exchange rate for 
essential imports and traditional exports; (b) the FEECs rate for imports of non-essential 
consumer goods, as well as intermediate and investment goods. (Karunaratne, 2002).  
 
Apart from that, as the market prospects for exports were gloomy, and industrial growth 
was constrained due to foreign exchange shortage, the government considered import 
substitution in agriculture (Athukorala, 1980).  Thus, the 1966 Agricultural 
Development Plan was established aiming at 70 per cent self-sufficiency in rice 
production by 1970.  The new government also managed to receive increased financial 
support from the Aid Ceylon Group20 established in 1965 in view of its more liberal 
policy regime (Cuthbertson, 1991).  
 
                                                          
19 The FEECs system provided non-traditional exporters with an additional cash incentive through a higher rate of exchange, and 
imposed an additional rupee cost on imports. 
20 The Aid-Ceylon Group was formed by the World Bank in 1965 as an emergency operation to provide commodity loans to Sri 
Lanka to relieve it from adverse effects associated with import restrictions of the previous government.  It included Canada, 





The change of policy has shown positive outcomes.  During 1968-69, manufacturing 
output in real terms showed an average annual increase of 9.3 per cent, the highest on 
record (Table 3.9 above). The same year recorded Sri Lanka’s highest ever GNP growth 
rate.  During the 1966-70 period, GNP grew at an annual average rate of 5.2 per cent 
compared to 4.2 per cent recorded during the 1960-65 period. Increased capacity 
utilization in the overall industrial sector due to increased availability of raw materials 
was the main casual factor (Balakrishnan, 1977). Thus, the economy had responded 
positively to the partial liberalization and the agricultural revival during this period. 
However, the new policies failed to address two other vital economic problems: the 
higher inflation associated with expansionary fiscal policy,21 and the acute 
unemployment.22 In summary, the above results indicate that the partial departure from 
the inward-looking development strategy has somewhat improved the state of the 
economy.   
 
 
3.5.5 Second Phase of IS Strategy: 1970-77 
A marked reversal of IS policy was seen during the 1970-77 period with the SLFP-led 
Coalition being elected to power in 1970. From the outset it made the industrial 
development a priority as a means to solve acute unemployment.23  This was further 
emphasized by The Five Year Plan 1972-76 in its main objectives: (a) development of 
basic and heavy industries within public sector; (b) employment creation; (c) location of 
industries in less developed regions; (d) maximum use of domestic resources in 
industries; (e) maximum support for export-oriented industries; and (f) development of 
technology consistent with basic factor endowments (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 
1971).  It anticipated an annual average growth rate of 6 per cent. The state committed 
itself to large-scale, basic, and capital good industries while assigning a secondary role 
to private sector in small and medium-scale ventures.  Priorities were assigned to 
industries using local raw materials, those with export potential and those using labour-
                                                          
21 See Appendix Table A-7 for detail. 
22 According to the Socio-Economic Survey, 1969-70, conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo the 
unemployment rate rose to 14 per cent by 1970 from 8 per cent in 1963. 
23 In 1971 there was a youth insurgency made by  the Janatha Vimukkiti Peramuna (JVP) (People’s Liberation Front),  which 





intensive production techniques. It indicated the importance of moving away from IS 
industrialization, and developing a new export sector based on non-traditional products.  
 
Achieving the above objectives was significantly hampered by the world oil crisis of 
1973, followed by world food and fertilizer crises, which resulted in severe foreign 
exchange difficulties24 as price of oil, food, and raw material sharply escalated 
(Gunawardana and Somarathne, 2000).  With already depressed export earnings, this 
resulted in a further fall in the terms of trade.25  Debt service ratio rose to 23 per cent 
from 20.1 per cent in 1970 (Table 3.10 above).  Sri Lanka needed drastic measures to 
increase employment opportunities. Accordingly, during the period from 1973 to 1977, 
state controls and intervention increased at an unprecedented rate. The pressure from the 
leftist partners of the Coalition was another reason for such interventions.26    
 
 
Major Policy Changes 
The major policy changes were in the foreign trade sector. Imports hitherto under ‘the 
open general license’ (OGL) scheme were abolished and brought under import 
licensing.  However, the FEECS scheme continued to operate and was aimed at 
reducing foreign exchange difficulties by offering preferential treatment to certain 
industries. High tariffs on non-essential and luxury items were allowed to continue.  In 
addition, several fiscal incentives were introduced to industries under the closed 
economic policy.27 Export-oriented industries were offered tax holidays and rebates. For 
manufacturing exports, in addition to tax holidays and duty rebates, there was priority in 
exchange allocation for imports of raw material, and FEECs entitlement.  
 
During this period, a number of public corporations were set up to engage in almost 
every field of economic activity on a commercial basis. Nationalisation took place under 
the Business Undertaking (Acquisition) Act of 1970.28 The Sri Lanka State Trading 
                                                          
24 The current account deficit increased by more than 100 per cent from $350 million to $ 907 million between 1970 and 1974. 
(See Appendix Table A-4). 
25 Import price index rose from 150 in 1970 to 370 in 1974 which resulted in a 30 per cent fall in the Terms of Trade from 84 to 58 
(Appendix Table A-5).  
26 The two leftist parties in the coalition were Lanka Sama Samaja Party and the Sri Lanka Communist Party.   They had some 
important portfolios in the Cabinet, including the Ministry of Finance Planning & Economic Affairs from 1970 to 1974. 
27 They included tax relief, depreciation allowances, a development rebate on plant and machinery. 
28 The government took over all private business with more than 100 employees. It also acquired the plantation industry creating 
two corporations-Janatha Estate Development board (JEBD) and State Plantation Corporation (SPC) becoming the largest exporter 






Corporation Act of 1970 intended to control the import of essential raw materials. Thus, 
government became the largest industrial entrepreneur in the economy. The government 
increased capital transfers to public corporations over the years (Table 3.11).   
       Table 3.11 
   Government’s Capital Transfers to Public Corporations: 1969-77 
Year Capital Transfers 
(Rs. Mn) 
% of  Total Capital 
Expenditure 
1969 282.8 32.0 
1970 281.4 35.1 
1971 322.6 28.2 
1973 384.4 33.1 
1974 378.3 30.4 
1975 769.8 38.7 
1976 963.2 36.0 
1977 868.2 39.5 
    Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1978 Annual Report Various Issues) 
 
Except for an initial spurt in manufactured output growth, industrial performance during 
this IS regime was disappointing (Table 3.12). The economy grew at an annual average 
rate of 3 per cent during this period.  Sri Lanka’s unemployment rate hovered around 20 
per cent by the latter part of this regime after reaching a peak of 24 per cent in 1973, 
which was Sri Lanka’s highest unemployment rate ever recorded (Appendix Table A-9).  
The rate of inflation, as measured by Colombo Consumer Price Index (CCPI) increased 
at an average rate of around 6 per cent per annum during the period (Appendix Table A-
7). However, the external balance recovered from the 1973 oil shock and earlier 
unfavourable commodity prices. The rise in tea prices in 1977 resulted in a trade surplus 
for the first time after 1956.  Apart from that, the stringent controls in operation, and the 
increased remittances and receipts from tourism (Appendix Table A-4) were also partly 
responsible for this recovery.  
Table 3.12 
Growth of Manufacturing and GNP of Sri Lanka:  1970-77 




Value (Rs Mn) Annual Growth % Value (Rs Mn) Annual Growth % 
1970 2197 - 12967 - 
1971 2279 3.7 13034 0.5 
1972 2321 1.8 13474 3.4 
1973 2266 -2.4 14016 4.0 
1974 2163 -4.5 14505 3.5 
1975 2263 4.6 14896 2.7 
1976 2371 4.8 15345 3.0 
1977 2357 -0.6 15999 4.3 





The inward-looking policy could not deal with Sri Lanka’s growing economic problems. 
The situation further deteriorated by the growing population and adverse external 
factors. Although the share of manufacturing in the GNP has increased, the IS strategy 
failed to maintain a satisfactory growth rate or solve unemployment.  It also failed to 
address the problem of under utilization of capacity in industries.  The average annual 
rate of capacity utilization of overall industry during the 1974-77 period was around 55 
per cent which was significantly lower than the value for the period after 1977 
(Appendix Table A-10).  As discussed in the literature review, another inevitable 
outcome of IS strategy is the high level of import dependence of domestic industries.  
Sri Lanka’s manufacturing industries, especially those related to IS industrialization, had 
a very high level of import dependence (Athukorala, 1980). 
 
Thus, IS has failed to achieve industrialization or solve the acute unemployment 
problem in the economy as expected.  There was no significant progress in the 
manufacturing sector that was dependent on imports.  Under this dependence, any 
decline in export earnings hampered domestic industries due to under utilization of 
capacity if it was not compensated by foreign capital inflow. These outcomes indicate 
that IS has not been a useful development strategy for Sri Lanka. 
 
3.6 Outward-Oriented Development Policy: Since 1977  
The UNP government elected to office in 1977 introduced sweeping policy reforms 
based on an outward-oriented development strategy. There have been extensive studies 
over the nature, extent, and the outcomes of the drastic policy changes that have taken 
place in Sri Lanka’s development policy since 1977.29  Therefore, this section will 
briefly outline the major policy changes in 1977, and discuss the policy development 
since then.   
 
                                                          





3.6.1 Major Initial Reforms 
Trade Liberalization  
Most quantitative restrictions in the form of licensing and quotas were replaced by 
tariffs, while a few items remained under specific licensing for administrative, health or 
security reasons in 1977. A simplified tariff structure of six rate bands, with provisions 
to give reasonable effective protection to local industry was introduced.30  In order to 
look into various anomalies resulting from the revised tariff regime, the Tariff Review 
Committee (TRC) was set up in 1978.   A few items were again subjected to licensing in 
1979 because free importation had a damaging impact on public enterprises. The main 
purpose of the existing licensing scheme was monitoring imports. Public sector 
monopoly on imports and distribution was abolished except for food, grain, and 
petroleum products. The functions of the TRC were later taken over by the Presidential 
Tariff Commission (PTC) set up in 1980 (Cuthbertson, 1997). Its main function was to 
revise the overall tariff structure with a view to reduce the overall level of protection 
while ensuring neutrality in protection across various industries.   The import tariff 
structure was kept under continuous review by the PTC with further revisions over the 
years (Presidential Tariff Commission, 1991).   
 
Exchange Rate Regime 
The dual exchange rate system which was discriminatory against certain external 
transactions was unified with an initial depreciation of 46 per cent against the official 
(non-FEECS) rate. Subsequently, the exchange rate was allowed to float along with the 
basic exchange market developments and the government's balance of payments 
objectives. The US Dollar became the intervention currency and the Central Bank 
intervened only if there would be erratic fluctuations in the exchange rate (Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka, Annual Reports). The major objective of these changes was to encourage a 
shift from consumption to investment and exports and discourage imports for luxury 
consumption.  On the whole, there was no reversal of the liberalization measures during 
the period. 
                                                          
30 The tariffs rates were as follows (Ministry of Finance, 1978,  p. 58):  
 (a) Essential consumer goods – nil;  (b) Raw materials, parts & machinery – 5%;  (c) Intermediate goods-.5% -25%;  (d) Non-





Financial Market Reforms  
Reforms were introduced in the financial sector by removing past policies of financial 
repression, and allowing market forces to determine interest rates. As a major change, 
the bank rate was increased from 8.5 per cent to 10 per cent with effective from August 
31, 1977 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 1978). Following the reforms, 
commercial banks freely determined their deposit rates using the Treasury bill rate of the 
Central Bank as the lower limit and the deposit rate of the National Savings Bank as the 
upper limit. As a significant step, foreign banks were allowed to open branches in Sri 
Lanka ending the decades of domination in the financial market by the state-owned 
banks and financial institutions.31  Moreover, they were also given tax concessions on 
their business profits on offshore operations and some specific on-shore operations.  The 
main objective of these financial reforms was to expand credit facilities for the private 
sector.  
Public Enterprises Reforms  
The new policy made it clear that “the public sector will concentrate on essential areas 
not attractive to the private entrepreneur either because the investment involved was too 
large or because the financial rate of return was not attractive” (Ministry of Finance, 
1978, p.30).  Policies used to enhance the efficiency and commercial viability of public 
enterprises included: (a) setting up of minimum standards of financial viability of public 
enterprises, (b) Privatization or closing down of uneconomical businesses, (c) enhancing 
the professional skills of top management and, (d) need to compete with the private 
sector on equal and non-discriminatory footing (Athukorala, 1986). 
 
Removal of Price Distortions 
Prices of food, which were under controls for a long period, were allowed to reflect 
world prices. Except for a few essential consumer goods, price controls which had 
existed since the 1960s covering a wide range of goods were removed. While removing 
the price ceiling on rice, a floor price for paddy was introduced to assist farmers.  The 
rationale behind this was to ensure the efficient functioning of the market by making 
                                                          






profits more responsive to efficiency and market signals rather than to administrative 
decisions of the government (Agalewatte, 1991).  
 
Labour Market Reforms 
The policy makers in the new government realized that flexibility in the labour market is 
an essential element for successful industrialization. To attract foreign investment, the 
elaborate system of regulations relating to industrial relations was simplified. The new 
regulations were introduced giving the Commissioner of Labour power to take decision 
on matters such as retrenchment under The Termination of Employment of Workmen 
(Special Provision) Act of 1971. Another step was the creation of the Wages Boards to 
keep minimum wages flexible, and any wage increases at a moderate rate. The Wages 
Boards were also expected to reduce the wage differentials within private sector 
occupations as well as between classes and grades within government services (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Reports). 
Investment Promotion 
With the above reforms, steps were taken to create a favourable environment for 
investment. As a prerequisite to assist the private sector’s contribution to the economy, a 
massive infrastructure development program was launched.  Government capital outlays 
on infrastructure development increased substantially after 1977.  Apart from that, in 
order to increase private investment the following specific measures were taken. 
 
A free trade zone was created and a new statutory body called the Greater Colombo 
Economic Corporation (GCEC) was set up to attract and promote foreign investment 
within the zone which was named as Katunayaka Investment Promotion Zone.   This 
was considered to be the main agency in the government to encourage export led 
growth. Its objective was to promote export oriented investment creating employment 
opportunities and export earnings (GCEC, 1979). The firms operating under its 
authority were bound to export their total output.    
 
In pursuit of the above objectives, the GCEC was empowered to grant a wide range of 
incentives including a seven-year tax holiday which could be extended to ten years with 





income tax was made applicable for 15 years after the expiry of tax holidays.  There 
were also tax concessions on the repatriation of royalties and dividends. There was no 
limitation on the equity level of foreign investors and incentives were given for foreign 
investment.   
 
Foreign investment outside the IPZ was subjected to approval by the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Committee (FIAC), which operated under the Ministry of Finance and 
Planning. These investments took the form of joint ventures with at least 51 per cent Sri 
Lankan equity participation. However, the minimum local participation was made 75 
per cent for investment where no significant transfer of technology was involved. They 
did not have any export obligations nor they were provided with special export 
incentives (Ministry of Finance & Planning, 1986). 
 
In order to assist local investment, the Local Investment Advisory Committee (LIAC) 
was created, and it was represented by three line Ministries, the Industries and Scientific 
Affairs, the Fisheries, and the Textile Industries. Its role was to evaluate and approve the 
domestic investment with no involvement of foreign investment. Criteria used to 
approve projects included labour intensity, location in rural areas, use of local inputs, 
and intensification of technological capacity and foreign exchange savings. The export 
orientation was not considered. The projects approved by LIAC received a wide range of 
industrial incentives (Ministry of Finance & Planning, 1986).  
 
Export Promotion 
The main objective of the economic reforms was to restore the role of trade as an engine 
of growth.  In order to accelerate export-led growth, The Export Development Act No. 40 
of 1979 was enacted, and under its legal framework, the Export Development Board 
(EDB) was created in 1980. Among its main functions were assisting export ventures in 
product development, export marketing, monitoring of the implementation, and 
coordination of the activities of various government bodies dealing with various aspects 
of the export development drive. The specific export development policy package 
included direct cash subsidies, import duty rebates, manufacture-in-bond, and various 





Another institution created to assist exporters was the Sri Lanka Export Credit Insurance 
Corporation (SELCIC). The aim of this was to conduct a wide range of commercial 
insurance and guarantees including holding performance guarantees on bank-financed 
trade transactions for local exporters, and both pre and post shipment credit guarantees 
on commercial Letters of Credit.   
 
3.6.2 Major Policy Changes after 1977 
After the initial reforms in 1977, there were no reversals attempted by the successive 
governments. The PTC became the major body to rationalize import trade.  It submitted 
its first report in 1985.  It also recommended the preparation of a phased tariff program 
in which import duties would be fixed so that the tariff assistance available to an 
industry from various sources would result in a uniform protection, and an overall tax 
structure under which all industries are equally treated. The government implemented its 
recommendations with the 1986 budget. 
 
In the 1988 budget, government announced the need to adopt a 4-band tariff structure.32   
It eliminated the wide dispersion of tariff from 0 per cent to 250 per cent. In the same 
year, Sri Lanka accepted the convention of the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System involving 7000 tariff items including 2000 national sub-headings.  This 
system was implemented in July 1989 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1990). A significant 
change in tariff reforms took place when 4-band tariff structure was implemented in 
1990.  Over 200 items with duty of over 50 per cent was reduced to 50 per cent.    Sri 
Lanka continued a steady program of reducing trade barriers and simplifying the 
administration of such barriers.   
 
In 1992, the Board of Investment (BOI) was formed by amalgamating the agencies that 
were hither to responsible for administering export processing zones, the GCEC, and the 
FIAC.33 This new institution enjoyed substantial power to set sector specific incentives 
for foreign investment such as income tax holidays, duty free treatment to all imports for 
specific sectors.  
 
                                                          
32 The four bands are: 5%, 15%, 30% and 50%.  





The government continued to provide infrastructure facilities to industries, and four 
investment promotion zones were set up at different locations during this period.  It also 
initiated a program of establishing industrial estates/parks in various regions of the 
country in collaboration with local and foreign investors.  To promote science and 
technology in the industrial sector, the Science and Technology Development Act was 
passed in May 1994 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1996).    
 
Although the government changed in August 1994 with the SLFP led People’s Alliance 
(PA) being elected to office after 17 years of UNP rule, there was no reversal of the 
outward-oriented policy started in 1977.  The policy of the new government was to 
continue the reforms by eliminating market distortions further, and reducing and 
progressively harmonizing tariffs towards a single low rate over the medium term.  
 
Displaying its strong commitment towards the restoration of market efficiency lost since 
early 1960s, the Public Enterprises Reform Commission (PERC) was established in 
1996.34  Its main functions are to advise the government on public enterprise reforms, to 
upgrade production and services with access to international markets, to acquire new 
technology and expertise, and to develop the capital market and mobilize long-term 
private savings (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1996).  
 
Another major step under the new government was the introduction of Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) in the 1998, replacing the old business turnover tax and many other 
similar indirect taxes.  The idea of this transformation was to rationalize the indirect tax 
system by removing so-called ‘cascade effects’ from prices and simplify procedures. 
 
Regarding the changes in exchange rate management, in 1982 the Central Bank limited 
its daily quotations only to the US dollar, the intervening currency, enabling the 
commercial banks to determine the cross rates for other currencies.  In 1994, it removed 
all restrictions on current external transactions. Also, most of the restrictions on capital 
account transactions were removed ‘except for restrictions on investment abroad and 
borrowing abroad by residents, and investment in domestic debt instruments by non-





liberalization of foreign exchange regime, in 2001, the commercial banks were allowed 
to determine the exchange rate freely. This is an indication of the greater degree of 
maturity of the domestic financial market at the beginning of the new millennium.  
 
3.6.3 Macroeconomic Performance Since  1977 
In this section an overall performance of the Sri Lankan economy during the post 1977 
period in comparison to pre-1977 period35 will be undertaken.  
 
GDP  
Following economic reforms in 1977 and thereafter, the economy grew at a higher rate 
than that it recorded in the period prior to 1977.  The average annual growth rate of 
GDP was 5 per cent during the 1978-99 period which is remarkably high in comparison 
with the 2.9 per cent during the 1971-77 period (Table 3.13).  During the first 8 years 
after the reforms, this was 5.8 per cent which is more pronounced compared to 4.3 per 
cent during the second 10 years from 1987-96.  The slower growth rates of the economy 
between 1987-91 are due to escalated civil disturbances coupled with unfavourable 
external factors that prevailed during those years.36  Even in the period after 1992, when 
there was a general slow down of the economy due to prolonged civil disturbances, the 
growth rate averaged around 5 per cent per annum.  A noteworthy outcome during this 
period was Sri Lanka’s transition from ‘low-income developing country’ status to 
‘middle-income developing country’ status in 1996 by reaching the per capita GDP level 
of US$ 760 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual report 1996).  
 
As seen in Table 3.2 earlier, the composition of GNP has changed significantly since 
independence. The share of agriculture has declined from 33.2 per cent in 1974 to 18.8 
percent by 1996, while that of manufacturing has increased from 12.7 percent to 21.4 
percent.  Services sector’s share in the GNP has increased from 47.3 per cent in 1974 to 
52.1 by 1996 maintaining its upward trend since independence.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
34 The Public Enterprises Reform Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No 1 of 1996. 
35 A detailed analysis of Sri Lanka’s economic performance during the post 1977 period will be undertaken in Chapter Six. 
36 In July 1983, there was an upsurge of communal disturbances in Sri Lanka especially in the North.   This turned into an on-going 
civil unrest since then hampering economic activities such as tourism, agriculture and fisheries in the northern and eastern Sri 
Lanka. In 1987-89 period there was another youth uprising disturbed the economy.  As a result, government’s defence expenditure 






     Table 3.13 
GDP, Investment and Exports of Sri Lanka: 1960 –1999 
            (Period Average Real Growth Rates %)  
Period GDP Exports Investment* 
1960-65 3.8 2.9 -1.0 
1966-70 5.3 0.4 5.8 
1971-77 2.9 -2.2 5.3 
1978-85 5.8 14.0 15.2 
1986-99 4.5 6.7 11.6 
1960-99 4.5 5.3 8.9 
1960-77 3.8 0.0 3.7 
1978-99 5.0 9.4 12.9 
           * Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
         Source: Computed by Author using figures in the Annual Reports,  Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
 
Exports 
Table 3.13 reveals that the average annual growth of export in the 1971-77 period is 
negative compared to 9.4 percent for the 1978-99 period.  The highest annual average 
growth rate of 14 per cent was recorded during the 1978-85 period, immediately after 
the reforms, followed by 6.7 per cent during the 1986-99 period.  Export growth was 
hampered during the 1981-85 period, due mainly to escalated civil disturbances and 
poor weather which prevailed during that period.  In recent years, the rate of growth has 
been somewhat slower due to political uncertainty, adverse economic factors, and 
unfavourable external factors (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Reports).   
 
Employment 
Unemployment rate, which reached a peak of 24 per cent in 1974, has taken a 
downward trend since then declining to 15.3 per cent in 1980, and 9.7 per cent by 1998 
(Appendix Table A-9).  Although this trend is in line with the growth performance of 
the economy, the question is why it took so long to come down to a single-digit figure 
despite a freer policy regime.  It is evident that the reforms have not been able to address 
the unemployment problem in the economy satisfactorily. 
 
It is also useful to see the sectoral distribution of employed people after reforms.  As 
Table 3.3 reveals, agriculture is still the largest employer accounting for 36 per cent of 
the total employment in 2000.  Its share has declined by 14 per cent from the pre-reform 





16.5 per cent in 2000 by 6.5 per cent.  The services sector’s share of employment, on the 
other hand, has increased from 28.3 per cent in 1971 to nearly 41 per cent accounting for 





Inflation has been a major concern for Sri Lanka throughout the entire post-1977 period 
(Appendix Table A-7). It was not a problem for the Sri Lankan economy during the 
post-war period until about mid-1960s (Table 3.14).  The first noteworthy inflation in 
the Sri Lankan economy was recorded in the late 1960s which coincides with the first 
liberalization attempt by the then government. Since then, its upward trend has never 
been disturbed.  The average annual inflation after the reforms in 1977 and thereafter, 
has amounted to 12.3 per cent.  The corresponding figure for the first seven years after 
1977 is as high as 15.5 per cent.  This reflects (as was the case in the late 1960s) the 
pressure of the increased aggregate demand due to expansionary fiscal policy and  
increased inflow of foreign capital after the reforms.  The high inflation during the 
1988-93 period reflected the increased defence outlays of the government due to the 
escalation of civil disturbances.   
 
Table 3.14 
        Annual Average CPI Growth Rates of Sri Lanka: 1953-98 






           Source: Computed by the Author using Annual Reports, Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
   
Investment  
Appendix Table A-3 shows a very unstable trend in gross domestic capital formation 
(GDCF) in the economy during the last four decades ranging from -17 per cent in 1973 
to 50 per cent in 1978, with an average annual growth rate of 7.3 per cent. The average 
annual growth of capital during the 1960-77 was 3.7 percent compared to 13 percent for 
the post 1977 period (Table 3.13).  The highest annual average growth rate of 





reforms, followed by 8.7 per cent during the 1991-95 period.  Similar to exports, capital 
growth has also been hampered during the 1981-85 period, due mainly to the worsening 
civil unrest and poor weather which prevailed during that period.  In recent years, the 
rate of growth has been somewhat slower due to political uncertainty, adverse economic 





The debt service ratio, which reached a peak level of 23 per cent in 1975 under the 
inward oriented development strategy, declined to 15 per cent in 1978 (Tables 3.10 and 
3.15).  This reflected faster growth of earnings from merchandise exports and services 
relative to debt repayment during the early years under reforms.  However, it reached a 
new peak level of 28.6 per cent in 1988, which reflected the repayment obligations of 
heavy long-term borrowings for the massive public investment projects launched soon 
after the reforms.   By 1998 however, with increased earnings from the exports and 
services the ratio declined to 13 per cent. 
 
Table 3.15 
Debt Service Payments: 1978-96  (Rs Million) 
 1978 1988 1992 1994 1998 
Debt Service Payment 
   (a)Amortization 
















Gross Export Earnings 15148 60082 138111 195347 365316 
Debt service Ratio 15.5 28.6 17.1 13.6 13.3   
    Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Reports 
 
Summary  
Economic performance during the post-reform period is significantly higher compared 
to the pre-1977 results.  The behaviour of major economic variables such as exports, 
investment, and employment indicated that the economy was moving toward the correct 
path.  However, compared with the performance of the East Asian economies such as 
South Korea, and Taiwan, further policy changes are necessary to improve performance 





3.7 The Impact of Reforms 
Sri Lanka’s development experience during the post-1977 period has been subject to 
extensive analysis and debate over the recent past.  This section will review some of the 
major studies on the economic reforms of 1977 and after.  
 
One of the earliest studies in this area was by Rajapathirana (1988). He emphasized the 
following main issues arising from the 1977 reforms (Rajapathirana, 1988, p.143):  
• The reforms were implemented very quickly. The rapid elimination of QRs was not 
followed by an equally rapid reduction of tariffs. Although a large number of QRs 
were eliminated, no attempts were made to make the new tariff equivalent to the 
existing quotas. 
• The timing of reforms was inopportune as conditions in the world economy were 
unfavourable. If the reforms had been undertaken in 1973 and sustained until the late 
1980s, it would have ensured a higher and more permanent growth path. 
• The government was more concerned in achieving a rapid growth than liberalizing 
and reducing its own role in the economy.  The massive development projects 
funded through capital inflows caused   the exchange rate to appreciate. It reversed 
some of the competitiveness gained through the reforms and devaluation.  A reduced 
level of expenditure could have produced a better outcome than the macroeconomic 
instability created by large increases in public spending.   
• Tariff reforms were delayed due to the opposition by public enterprises.  A large 
number of items were exempted from tariffs in 1985 because of the possible adverse 
effects on output and employment in the public sector.   
 
The study concluded that the overall lesson from Sri Lankan experience is that once 
interventions are introduced they invariably become entrenched, and changing them is a 
long drawn-out process.  
 
A study by Lal and Rajapathirana (1989) supported the above view that the 1977 trade 
liberalization effort was not successful.   The major factors which hindered the success 
were inappropriate timing of the reforms, the worsening fiscal situation, and 






Considering Sri Lanka as a prospective NIC, Athukorala and Bandara (1989) examined 
Sri Lanka’s post-1977 commodity composition, and growth of exports in terms of  ‘net’ 
export earnings derived using the Input-Output technique.  They found that, in view of 
the high import intensity of the emerging export industry, the conventional practice of 
using gross export data to analyze export performance gave misleading conclusions as 
to the reduced importance of primary exports in the export structure and overall export 
growth.  
 
Cuthbertson and Athukorala (1991) argued that there are large gains to be made from 
initiating significant reforms early in the life of government, as there is less pressure for 
protection by vested interest groups.   The lobbying for protection will eventually 
increase and hence an early decisive action is very desirable.  Benefits of replacing 
quotas with tariffs arise in the form of easier entry to industry and thus greater domestic 
competition.   As they pointed out, for widespread reforms to happen, the main 
ingredient has to be bold, across-the board changes.  Although such a move is politically 
difficult, the important lesson is that with widespread changes investment and 
employment opportunities are created.  They make some useful propositions especially 
on timing and sequencing of a trade liberalization: i.e. (a) one or a few stages are 
preferable to a gradual approach; (b) credibility and commitment is more important than 
quick implementation; (c) the newer the government, the better the change of effective 
sustainable liberalization; (d) although replacing QRs with tariffs is desirable, a further 
reduction thereof may be difficult; (e) success of reforms largely depends on 
macroeconomic policies; and (f) uniform treatment of sectors is desirable. 
 
Athukorala (1992) examined the importance of macroeconomic policy for the outcome 
of trade policy in Sri Lanka.  He admitted that Sri Lanka’s 1977 trade reforms were bold 
and the economy responded swiftly with higher output and reduced unemployment.    
However, the continuation of the reforms was hampered by policy inconsistencies in the 
area of macroeconomic management.  Together with trade reforms, government 
embarked on a massive public investment program that included a multipurpose 
irrigation project and a housing development project.  The direct expenditure effect of 
the projects coupled with deficit financing triggered an appreciation of the real exchange 





ways; first, it reduced the relative profitability of tradable production and thus hindered 
the process of structural change; second, given the substantial dismantling of 
quantitative restrictions, the real exchange rate appreciation led to a widening current 
account deficit.  Both of these factors negatively affected the outcomes of the trade 
liberalization process. 
 
The growth and efficiency gains of Sri Lanka’s industrialization since 1977 and its 
future prospects were examined by Vidanapathirana (1994).   The study witnessed a 
substantial expansion of the industrial sector in the post 1977 period, which he mainly 
attributed to the private foreign investment after 1980.  The main issue encountered by 
the industrial sector is how the full potential of this sector could be exploited in order to 
accelerate the growth momentum.   The study emphasized that ad-hoc policy incentives 
and relatively high protection tend to undermine the pace of industrialization. The tariff 
policy is still not adequately geared towards raising efficiencies in the industrial sector. 
 
While giving credits to market friendly policies of all the governments since 1977, the 
World Trade Organization (1995) highlighted the following main points in its first 
review of Sri Lanka’s trade policies: (a) reforms were driven by unilateral 
considerations, not by multilateral or regional considerations; (b) the economy has 
performed well and there is no real constituency urging a return to control and central 
planning; and (c) there was still an unfinished agenda relating to such matters as 
controlling the budget deficit, factor market reforms, education and training, and 
improved infrastructure pricing and performance. Apart from that, it emphasised the 
need of a proper domestic competition policy to pass the benefits of trade reforms to the 
society.37  It has also commended the role of the PTC in its work related to tariff 
rationalization.  As an agency providing economy-wide, transparent, and independent 
estimates of the domestic effects of trade and industry policy, it has provided a good 
discipline on policy on Sri Lanka.    
 
Weiss and Jayanthakumaran (1995) tested the hypothesis that trade liberalization has a 
positive impact on manufacturing performance in Sri Lanka using certain performance 
                                                          





indicators.38  To explain the changes in those indicators at the branch level (three or four 
digit) they used several explanatory variables that reflect the characteristics of individual 
branches.39 They used the OLS cross sectional regression analysis across branches to 
explain the performance variables for branch by changes in the explanatory variables for 
the branch40 covering two alternative periods: 1979-1989 and 1985-89.  They found a 
better overall fit for the equations and some link between trade liberalization and 
performance mainly in the shorter period (1985-89).  They concluded that there was no 
long-run link between trade liberalization and productivity growth.  They also attributed 
the weak short-run relationship during the second half of the 1980s to the short-run 
resource reallocation in response to tariff changes between 1985 and 1989. 
 
In a recent study on the post 1977 trade reforms and industrial transformation in Sri 
Lanka, Athukorala and Rajapathirana  (2000) have found that trade liberalization 
resulted in a rapid export growth, and increased the potential returns to investment by 
capitalizing on comparative advantage.  Using the results of an econometric analysis, 
they emphasized the importance of a realistic real exchange rate in creating a broad-
based manufactured export structure with greater local capital participation.  They also 
showed evidence that the significant involvement of foreign firms in export-oriented 
manufacturing has affected the real exchange rate weakening export-performance.  Their 
results also points to a significant productivity improvements in private sector 
manufacturing.  They concluded that diversification into manufacturers from 
structurally-weak primary commodities is a way for developing countries to improve 
their standing in the world trade. 
 
Karunaratne (2000) examined whether the engine of growth for Sri Lanka after 1977 
was the growth in ‘total exports’ or ‘manufacturing exports’ using two econometric 
models. The study revealed that total export engine of growth, “which was operating in 
Sri Lanka since independence, also explains the behaviour of the manufactured growth 
engine” (Karunaratne, 2000, p.180). Therefore, he concluded, “the total export engine 
provided the preconditions for the evolution of the manufactured export engine. The 
                                                          
38 The indicators were:  labour productivity growth (LP), total factor productivity growth (TFP), and change in price cost margins 
(PCM). 





latter was not an innovation of the neo-liberal policies launched in 1977” (p. 180).  
Although the export engine enabled the economy to maintain high growth rates during 
the market friendly episodes, the incidence of poverty is still at the same level as was at 
independence. 
 
The Impact of Outward-oriented Policy: Summary 
The foregoing discussion intended to look into some major empirical evidence 
pertaining to post-1977 outward-oriented policies and their associated economic 
implications.  Most of the studies are in agreement that the economy performed better 
after the reforms. The difference in opinion is mainly with regard to the aspects relating 
to timing and sequencing of reforms, appropriateness of the other policy changes, the 
nature of macroeconomic policy, and the other institutional developments.   The main 
focus of most of the above studies is on trade reforms and growth, and they all are 
historical analyses.  There is little debate on how can trade and industry policy be used, 
why does Sri Lanka still remain as a developing country, or how can the East Asian 
experience be replicated in Sri Lanka to achieve NIC status. Therefore, there is 
apparently a gap in analytical researches in Sri Lanka in this area. 
 
3.8 Summary and Conclusion 
Sri Lanka had a remarkable standard of living both in terms of per capita income and 
quality of life compared to its Asian neighbours at independence.   After four decades, 
while the social standards have been impressive, its per capita income level has been far 
below that of South Korea and Taiwan, and lower than many other LDCs. With over 
two decades of outward-oriented policies, Sri Lanka still remains a ‘middle income 
developing country.’     
A considerable part of this chapter was used to discuss the policy evolution of Sri Lanka 
prior to 1977.  It was found that Sri Lanka’s development strategy during this period 
was based on an inward-looking policy strategy.  It has failed to deal with Sri Lanka’s 
growing economic problems successfully. Over the years, this situation has been further 
aggravated by the growing population and the adverse external factors. Although the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
40  The model was   PV = f (T, MS, TP). They hypothesizes that changes in one of the trade policy variables (TP) are significantly 
associated with the performance indicators with the expected sign.  Change in both NRP and ERP is used as an explanatory 





share of manufacturing in the GNP has increased, the IS strategy failed to maintained a 
satisfactory growth rate, or solve Sri Lanka’s chronic unemployment problem.  
Moreover, it has resulted in a heavy dependence on imported inputs by the 
manufacturing sector.  These outcomes indicated that IS was not a useful development 
strategy for Sri Lanka. 
 
In the second part of this chapter, a detail discussion of Sri Lanka’s attempt in 1977 to 
integrate its economy into the world economy through extensive reforms was carried 
out.  In this process, it examined Sri Lanka’s tariff and QRs reforms, elimination of 
administrative controls and other institutional supports, all of which have aimed to 
promote trade and thereby growth. 
 
Unlike the inward-oriented policies of the past, the new policies provided better 
incentives for industrial development.  They permitted specialization, and provided 
access to modern technologies.  Measures such as increased export subsidies, and free 
trade zones were very effective in promoting exports.  One area that benefited from this 
outward-orientation was the garment industry.  Foreign investment played a major part 
in transferring technologies and boosting manufacturing exports in this sector.  Sri 
Lanka’s lower wages, the competitive incentive regime, and the natural resource base 
enabled it to attract export-oriented investment.  However, the incentive structure for 
manufacturing industries has produced a bias in favour of export promotion.   
 
Overall, the policies used after 1977 have resulted in an improvement in the industrial 
performance in Sri Lanka. They have enabled the economy to accelerate industrial 
growth, and to establish a manufacturing sector which plays a larger role in the economy 
than during earlier regimes. Although the economy is in the correct path to 
industrialization, its industrial sector has been limited to very simple, low skilled 
activities. On the macroeconomic front, inflation and unemployment remained two 
major macroeconomic problems. Its external balance has never been recovered. The 
government continually found it difficult to bring about sufficient public savings, as 
public debt has become a major problem.  After 1977, the trade balance in the balance 






Although the growth performance after the 1977 reforms was higher compared to the 
pre 1977 period, Sri Lanka is still far behind most of its Asian neighbours in terms of 
industrial development. This clearly indicates the need of an alternative approach to 
economic development.  Accordingly, an investigation on how East Asia succeeded in 
achieving industrialization can be useful for Sri Lankan policy planners to find a 
solution for its development problem. This is the purpose of next chapter which 





COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT 
LESSONS FROM SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the evolution of Sri Lanka‘s development policy and 
associated performance of the economy since independence. As seen there, Sri Lanka had a 
unique place in terms of socio-economic achievements among LDCs, including South Korea 
and Taiwan, four decades ago. By 1980, these two nations had become newly industrialized 
countries while many other developing countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines were considered as potential newly industrialized economies (Chowdhury and 
Islam, 1993). Sri Lanka on the other hand remained a ‘low income’ developing country until 
1996.  The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the development experience of South Korea 
and Taiwan with a view to assessing what lessons Sri Lanka could incorporate into a new 
development strategy. 
 
This chapter accordingly will review the experience of the above two East Asian nations and 
discuss those policy strategies which helped them achieve NIC status.  Following Balassa 
(1980), and Dahlman and Sananikone (1997), this thesis assumes that South Korea and 
Taiwan reached NIC status in 1980.1  This chapter examines in detail policies that these 
countries adopted both before and after they became NICs.  The geo-economic context in 
which these two economies operated during their transitional period to NIC status is 
significantly different from that in which LDCs such as Sri Lanka have been operating since 
the early 1980s.2  Therefore, it will also assess the possibility of Sri Lanka utilizing aspects 
                                                          
1Although there are numerous studies on the phenomenal achievement of East Asian NICs during the last few decades, they are not 
specific about the exact time they became NICs. As indicated in Chapter One,  Balassa (1980) gives some indication that the above 
countries had fulfilled the requirements to be considered as NICs by 1980. As Dahlman and Sananikone (1997, p.105) confirm this, 
“Taiwan moved from a relatively underdeveloped country status taking advantage of the open world economy to a more advanced 
industrializing country” at the end of its Industrial Consolidation and New Export Growth (1973-80) Phase.   
2 Since 1980s, there has been an increased commitment by most countries to liberalize their economies. The end of cold war has further 
facilitated this.  Thus, most of policies and considerations which were available to Taiwan and South Korea during their pre-NIC period 
are no longer available to other LDCs today. Furthermore, even though these two nations reached the level of per capita GDP and  other 
criteria discussed in Chapter One (page 5) by 1980, they experienced a more rapid growth after 1980 which enabled them to become 
OECD members in 1990s.   
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of their post-NIC policies in developing strategies suitable for the current world economic 
environment. 
 
It is also pertinent here to explain why the experience of South Korea and Taiwan is 
considered relevant for Sri Lanka.  During the recent past, economists have turned 
increasingly to East Asian countries for more straightforward examples of rapid economic 
growth (Castley, 1997; Lall, 1996). The role of trade and industry policy in the development 
of East Asian economies such as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan is now 
well documented. Other East Asian economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong were not 
considered because they evolved as small city-states, not as typical developing economies. 
South Korea and Taiwan on the other hand, have some similarity with Sri Lanka in many 
respects including historical background, economic characteristics, demography, and socio-
political factors. Similar to Sri Lanka, they are also small to medium countries in terms of 
land area and population. All three nations have had experience under a colonial rule. At 
independence, they all had somewhat similar initial conditions,3 and all were typical LDCs 
with dualistic,4 resource-poor, and labour-abundant5 economies. All three nations have a 
long history under different trade policy regimes. Therefore, this chapter will examine how 
South Korea and Taiwan achieved NIC status and what policy lessons Sri Lanka can learn 
from their experience.  
 
4.2 South Korea 
4.2.1 Socio-economic Information 
The Republic of Korea is an industrialized economy with a per capita GNP of US$ 8,490 by 
1999 (World Bank, 2001). With a total land area of 99,200 square kilometres and a 
population of 47 million people, it is one of the most densely populated countries in the 
world.6 Of the total land area, 67 per cent is mountainous with poor quality forest. 
Therefore, it is a country with limited prospects in agriculture as only 22 per cent of land is 
available for cultivation (Michell, 1988). 
                                                          
3 i.e. strong governments with efficient public service, low cost labour, and high level of living standard of people  (Wignaraja, 1998) 
4  i.e. traditional agricultural sector and the modern industrial sector were not well integrated. 
5  Labour land ratio and labour capital ratio were unusually high (Byun, 1974).  




     Table 4.1 
    GDP /GDP per Capita of South Korea: 1953-1999 
         Annual Average Growth Rates (%) 
Period Population GDP GDP per Capita 
1953-63 2.5 3.9 1.3 
1963-73 2.3 9.0 6.4 
1973-79 1.6 9.2 7.4 
1980-90 1.5 9.4 6.7 
1990-99 1.5 5.7 5.1 
      Source: Pilat D. 1994, Economics of Rapid Growth: The Experience of Japan and Korea, Edward Edgar, England;     
      The World Bank, 2001, World Development Report 2000/2001, Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
South Korea’s per capita income in 1960 was US$ 153 (Chapter 3, Table 3.1).  In 1981 it 
was world’s fourth largest debtor with a total foreign debt of US$ 32.4 billion (World Bank, 
1981). As Table 4.1 above shows, its average GDP growth was 4 per cent during the 1953-
63 period. During the 1963-90 period its economy grew at a rate over 9 per cent per annum.    
South Korea has also had macroeconomic stability as reflected by low inflation (Agrawal et 
al, 2000).  A major factor behind this is its low fiscal deficit since 1970s (Table 4.2).   
Table 4.2 
   Overall Budget Deficit (-)/ Surplus (+) of Asian Countries: 1973-1992 
          (As a percentage of GDP) 
Period Korea Taiwan Singapore India Malaysia 
1973-75 -1.55 1.41 0.70 -3.64 -3.21 
1976-80 -1.67 -0.04 0.87 -5.04 -2.38 
1981-85 -1.95 -1.21 2.29 -6.80 -9.95 
1986-90 0.28 -2.32 5.48 -8.38 -3.98 
1991-92 -1.06 -8.12 10.85 -5.74 0.23 
Note: Consolidated central government only, in case of Taiwan, all levels of government 
Source: Agrawal et al (2000, p.34). 
 
In the 1973-99 period, South Korea's economic performance was extraordinary.7 There has 
been a significant structural change in the economy as evident from the increased share of 
the manufacturing sector in the GDP with a corresponding decline in the share of the 
agricultural sector during the period. According to Chang (1994), no other country has 
achieved a similar result during those 20 years (Table 4.3).  Apart from this remarkable 
structural change, there is also a marked change in the composition of the manufacturing 
sector itself (Appendix Table B-10).  The most significant change is seen in the heavy 
                                                          
7 Its GDP increased from US$ 2.1 billion in 1961 to US$ 484.4 billion in 1996 maintaining an 8% average annual growth. 
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industries with an incredible growth of 39.5 per cent during 1973-78 period, compared to its 
slower growth between 1963-72 period, reflecting the impact of the HCI drive.  It appears 
that even after the 1979-80 recession, this sector continued to grow at a faster rate than other 
industries. During the 1997-98 period, economic performance was remarkably disturbed due 
to the Asian financial crisis.  However, the economic set back due to the crisis was sort-
lived as it recovered from the crisis fully at the beginning of the new millennium.  
Table 4.3 
Composition of South Korea’s GDP (at current prices) 1953-2000  (%) 
Sector 1953 1963 1973 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Agriculture fisheries & forestry 42.9 40.1 25.1 14.9 12.8 9.0 6.2 4.6 
Mining 1.1 1.8 1.1 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Manufacturing 8.3 14.7 25.2 29.6 30.3 28.7 29.4 31.5 
Electricity gas & water 0.4 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.8 
Construction 1.8 2.6 4.4 8.3 7.7 13.2 11.3 8.2 
Transport & communication 1.8 4.7 6.8 7.6 7.6 7.0 6.6 6.5 
Wholesale & retail trade 11.1 12.1 17.6 12.7 12.2 10.9 12.5 12.0 
Finance insurance & real estate 22.3 10.6 7.0 10.9 11.8 14.4 18.1 19.1 
Other Services 10.3 12.5 11.4 12.7 13.9 14.3 9.2 10.9 
 Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts 1970 &1990 (in Pilat, D. 1994, Economics of Rapid Growth:  
            The Experience of Japan and Korea, Edward Edgar, England.); Asian Development Bank, 2001;  
            Key Indicators 2001: Growth and Change in Asia and the Pacific, Manila. 
 
Appendix Table B-2 illustrates the transformation of South Korea's industrial structure. In 
1961, its top 10 exports were composed entirely of primary products accounting for 62 per 
cent of the total.  By 1971, 41 per cent was made up of textiles and garments, which reflect 
South Korea’s policy of promoting light manufacturing goods. By 1980, the share of 
electronic products, steel products, and footwear has increased drastically as the three 
collectively made up 27 per cent while textiles declined to 29 per cent.  During the last two 
decades, primary products have disappeared from the top-ten exports. In 1991, electronic 
goods acquired South Korea's largest export share as the nation moved into high value-
added production.  South Korea’s achievements as a high exporter enabled it became the 
29th member of the OECD in December 1996 (Lee, 1999). South Korea’s industrial success, 







4.2.2 Historical Background 
 Before the Japanese colonization in 1910, South Korea was a closed, agrarian economy 
(Rees, 1988).  Under Japanese rule its productive capacity grew gradually as investment in 
basic infrastructure such as roads increased. Traditional institutions and beliefs disappeared 
gradually as the society began to be influenced by new and foreign ideas (Pilat, 1994).  
 
During the first decade under Japanese rule, South Korea became the main supplier of food 
and raw materials to Japanese market and a market for Japanese products (Pilat, 1994).  It 
also initiated infrastructure development projects such as improvement of harbours, and 
setting up of a communication network.  During the next decade (1920-1930), light 
manufacturing industries such as food and textiles were encouraged through direct capital 
inflows from Japan.  During the 1930-40 decade, its rulers encouraged heavy industry 
especially on military grounds after the Sino-Japanese war in 1937.  When economic 
regulations were introduced in Japan in the 1930s following the Great Depression, Japanese 
investors increased investment in South Korea (Kim and Romer, 1979).  The last few years 
of colonial rule in South Korea reflected Japan’s war efforts, emphasizing heavy industry, 
and limiting agriculture production and domestic consumption.    
   
Korean society was influenced by Chinese Confucian traditions and Japanese political 
system, which “conferred enormous powers on the bureaucracy” (Castley, 1997, p.5).  There 
are views that Confucian-derived values such as a positive attitude to world affairs, respect 
for authority, frugality, hard work, diligence and reverence for education have been 
conducive to economic development (Berger, 1988; Alam, 1989).   
 
Japanese colonial rule ended with the end of World War II in 1945 leading Korea to its 
eventual partition into two nations, North Korea and South Korea. While the independence 
made it distant from Japan, its major market for exports, the partition separated the vital 
complementary functions between the two states asymmetrically: heavy industry and energy 
sources in the north; and light industry and agriculture in the south (Michel, 1988).  In 1948, 
the Republic of Korea was founded in the southern half of Korea under Syngman Rhee 
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(Adelman, 1999).  The Korean War (1950-1953) devastated the whole economy costing 
millions of lives and production possibilities in the magnitude of three billion dollars (Byun 
et al., 1974).  With this historical background, South Korea’s accession to NIC status in 
1980 can be taken as a remarkable achievement. 
 
4.2.3 Policy Evolution in the Pre-NIC Period 
As an economy ravaged by War, South Korea evolved through three distinct policy stages 
since 1953 to mature as an industrialised nation by 1980.   
 
Stabilization and Reconstruction (1953-61) 
With the cease-fire signed in July 1953, the South Korean government faced a massive 
challenge to rebuild its economy. The main focus of the economic policy during this period 
was “reconstructing economic and social infrastructure, rebuilding industrial facilities and 
stabilizing prices” (Adelman, 1999, p.294).  One main advantage South Korea had over 
other LDCs during this time was the presence of US assistance (Kihwan and Leipziger, 
2000; Chowdhury and Islam, 1993).8  Despite dismal performance of the economy, the 
government continued its commitment to rebuild the human capital base for future growth 
(Adelman, 1999). Unlike in many contemporary LDCs, a major portion of its public 
investment was on social development.9  The influence of cultural factors such as 
Confucianism which placed a great emphasis on education is also significant.  The increased 
investments on education  resulted in a massive increase in student enrolment during this 
period10 (Franco, 1988, p.2). 
 
Another major policy step taken during this period was the establishment of limits on the 
ownership of farmland in the economy through land reforms. “Land reforms created a larger 
base for consumption than was the case ex ante, which served to mobilize demand, and at 
the same time helped to stabilize the political situation” (Franco, 1988, p.2).  
 
                                                          
8 The main reason for this was South Korea’s geo-strategic importance in the region for the USA. Apart from providing the basic 
security, the USA also provided financial assistance for South Korea’s economic development.   
9 i.e., about 26%  of the government investment during this period was on social development  (education and research 8.8%; subsidies to 
households 8.7%;  health 5.6%; roads and water and sanitation 2.8%)as compared to 14% on capital formation (Adelman, 1999).    
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The accession of Major General Park Chung Hee to the presidency in 1961 became the 
turning point in South Korean economic development in view of his commitment to 
economic development through industrialization from the very outset of his appointment 
(Adelman, 1999).  The new government, which was extremely interventionist (Castley, 
1997), considered economic development and national security as priorities.  The new leader 
restructured the government by replacing “the existing cabinet style of government with a 
form in which power and authority were concentrated in the presidency” (Kihwan and 
Leipziger, 1997, p.191).  The government’s active involvement was seen in economic 
planning; state enterprises; control over the financial system; purchase of foreign 
technology; investment in infrastructure; control over labour unions; and  macroeconomic 
policies (Kihwan and Leipziger, 1997, p.8).   
 
Accordingly, South Korea’s First Five Year Plan of 1961 made economic development a 
national priority, emphasizing the role of industrial policy in economic development.  The 
main reason for the policy change was the rising unemployment associated with high 
population growth (Table 4.1). Among the objectives of the Plan were the development of 
energy sources, revival of agricultural sector, development of basic industries and 
infrastructure, increased utilization of resources, increased employment, improvement of the 
balance of payments, and promotion of science and technology. The Plan anticipated an 
annual rate of growth of 7.1 per cent. To achieve this, it expected over three-fold increase in 
the ratio of domestic saving to total investment over four years.11  A 20 per cent increase 
was expected in the ratio of investment to GNP in two years12 (Byun, 1994, p.369).  Overall, 
the policies implemented during this initial period brought stability to a fragile economy 
devastated by war. 
 
Import Substitution Industrialization (1962-66) 
This period is the beginning of the South Korea’s long journey towards industrialization. 
Having recovered from the aftermaths of the Korean War, South Korea resorted to ISI to 
achieve the objectives of its First Plan.  The first focus was to set up domestic industries to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
10 During 1945-1960, student enrolment in higher education increased by a factor of twelve (Franco, 1988, p.2). 
11 The ratio of domestic saving to total investment was expected to increase from 18 per cent in 1962 to 57 per cent by 1966. 
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produce certain basic inputs such as cement, fertilizer, and synthetic fibre, and to attain self-
sufficiency in food (Adelman, 1999). Government policies to achieve these objectives 
included QRs, tariffs, and subsided credits (Appendix Table B-1), and selective foreign 
exchange licensing and allocations (Adelman, 1999).  
 
Along with these policies, South Korea gradually moved to labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries such as food processing, textiles, leather, and chemical products.  This provided 
the new entrepreneurs an opportunity to gain management skills and modern technology.  It 
also turned the traditional agrarian work force into factory workers (Ranis, 1985, p.254).  
 
In some industries, the type of government intervention to foster their rapid development 
was direct (Mihn, 1988). The government identified specific projects and promoted them to 
ensure their implementation. Sometimes, it initiated projects through state enterprises.13 The 
government’s direct involvement in investment took place through public enterprises.  South 
Korea’s share of public sector investment in total investment averaged about 35 per cent 
over the 1963-79 period (Appendix Table B-3). 
 
In the mid-60s, South Korea found that it was deviating from the Plan due to high levels of 
inflation that resulted from the increased money supply and the unfavourable balance of 
payments.  To continue its ISI, it required substantial amounts of both foreign exchange and 
domestic savings. The US aid covered a large portion of foreign exchange need. South 
Korea devalued its currency, and raised interest rates in 1965.14   It also reformed its tax 
administration system in order to increase public savings.  The government accordingly 
revised the targets of the Plan (Franco, 1988). These revisions enabled South Korea to 
achieve successful results in national savings, a factor which is vital for increased 
investment, as its share of GNP increased significantly since then  (Table 4.4). 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
12 The ratio of investment to GNP was to increase from 20 per cent in 1962 to 24 per cent in 1964.  
13 For example, Pohang Integrated Steel Company (POSCO) and the petrochemical Complex at Ulsan were established as agencies of 
state enterprises (Mihn, 1988, p.8).  
14  The exchange rate was devalued by 100% in 1964 and a unified floating exchange rate was adopted; the interest rate was raised from 




 Savings and Investment in South Korea: 1962-1997 
                As a Percentage of GNP  (%) 
 1962-66 1967-71 1972-75 1976-80 1990 1997 
Domestic Savings  6.9 14.8 18.6 25.8 36.5 33.7 
Foreign Savings 8.7 10.4 8.6 4.6 0.5 -.6 
Total Savings 15.6 25.2 27.2 30.4 37.1 33.1 
Investment 16.6 26.3 26.4 30.4 37.7 34.2 
       Source: Franco, Silvio de, 1988, Korea’s Experience with the Development of Trade and Industry:  
                  Lessons for Latin  America, The World Bank, Washington DC. (p. 4) 
 
A significant feature of South Korea’s ISI is that it was not prolonged unlike other 
contemporary LDCs. This was one reason why it managed to withstand  the excessive rent 
seeking behaviour or pressure group lobbying which was common in other LDCs who 
initiated ISI. 
 
Export-Oriented Industrialization  (1966-71) 
Theoretically, when the local producers acquire industrial maturity in manufactured 
consumer goods under IS, an economy has two options for further growth: (a) moving into 
‘secondary import substitution’15 or (b) resorting to ‘primary export substitution’16 (Ranis, 
1985, p.255).  South Korea swiftly resorted to the second option above in the late 1960s as 
was evident form its Second Five Year Plan (1967-71).  It identified labour-intensive 
manufacturing as the main source of rapid economic growth, and encouraged investment in 
export industries.  Among the major objectives of the plan were self-sufficiency in food 
production; development of industries such as chemical, machinery, iron, and steel; 
increased productivity in agriculture; and improvement of scientific and management skills 
of manpower. South Korea’s primary export-substitution “took the form of maintaining 
selective protection for certain import competing sectors and adding to it a combination of 
export incentives and currency management which resulted in broad neutrality” (Guimaraes, 
1991, p.6). 
 
It is useful to explore what specific measures South Korea used under this ‘dual-propose’ 
approach.  Credit allocation or  ‘policy loans’ became an important means of implementing 
                                                          
15 Moving into production of consumer durables and capital goods. 
16 Production of the consumer non-durable products for export market as well taking the advantage of lower labour cost. 
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the government’s IS objectives (Mihn, 1988). The government controlled the credit 
allocation of the banking system so that a significant portion of financial resources was 
allocated to industries earmarked by the plan including machinery, and shipbuilding, 
electronics, iron and steel, petrochemicals, and non-ferrous metals. Several promotional 
laws were legislated to initiate and develop those industries and a number of specialized 
medium-and long-term credit funds were set up under such laws to supply policy loans to 
those preferred industries.   
 
In order to promote exports, South Korea used highly discretionary policies such as multiple 
exchange rates, direct cash payments, permission to retain foreign exchange earnings to 
import restricted commodities, and permission to borrow in foreign currencies.  Tariff 
exemptions were given to direct as well as indirect exporters. Support for exports was 
channelled through the state controlled banking system. (Mihn, 1988; World Bank, 1993).  
Loans for exports were made available at low interest rate during this period (Appendix 
Table B-1).  Apart from concessionary lending, the other incentives for exports during this 
period included tariff exemption on imports of intermediate and capital goods, rebate of 
indirect taxes on intermediate inputs and export sales, income tax concessions on profits 
from exports, and discounted rates on electricity and railroad transport.  A notable feature of 
this export promotion was that it was ‘not accompanied by a removal of protection on 
import substitutes’ (Edwards, 1989).17   
 
With Taiwan’s success in its first Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Kaoshiung in 1965,  
South Korean planners considered the use of this strategy to speed up its industrialization 
process during this period.  Thus, it established its first EPZ in Masan in 1970 with the 
advisory and material assistance of Taiwan, (People’s Bank, 1988).  
 
Thus, the government’s active involvement during this period was seen in the following 
major areas: economic planning; state enterprises; control over the financial system; 
purchase of foreign technology; creation of the Institute of Science and Technology; 
                                                          
17 As in Guimaraes, 1991, p.6. 
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assisting strategic industries; establishment of free trade zones/industrial parks; investment 
in infrastructure; and establishing quality controls/productivity centres; (Kihwan and 
Leipziger, 1997, p.8).   
 
A brief analysis of economic performance during this period shows that the results of the 
export drive were impressive, as the average annual GNP growth rate for the 1962-71 has 
dramatically increased to 9.5 per cent compared with 3.7 per cent for the 1953-61 period 
(Table 4.5 below), the primary sector’s share in the GDP has declined from 41 per cent in 
1963 to 26 per cent by 1973 (Table 4.3 above), commodity exports have grown at annual 
rate of 40 per cent between 1962 and 1971, while share of manufactured exports has 
increased from 27 per cent to 86 per cent over the same period (Franco, 1988).    
 
     Table 4.5 
  Key Indicators of the South Korean Economy: 1953-1999 
                       Period Average Growth Rates (%) 
 1953-62 1962-71 1971-79 1980-90 1990-99 
GNP a 3.7 9.5 9.6 9.4 5.7 
GNP per capita 0.7 6.9 7.8 n.a n.a 
Exports n.a. 39.1 39.2 12 15.6 
Imports n.a. 21.3 30.7 11.9 8.0 
    a/ 1980-90 and 1990-99 figures are relating to GDP. 
Source: Franco, Silvio de, 1988, Korea’s Experience with the Development of Trade and Industry: Lessons for Latin 
America, The World Bank, Washington DC. (p. 4); The World Bank, 2001, World Development Report 2000/2001, 
Oxford University Press, New York. (p. 206). 
 
The above results should also be viewed in the context of following country specific factors 
during this period:  a long period of the impressive growth performance in the agriculture 
sector (Guimaraes, 1991); favourable conditions in the world economy (Guimaraes, 1991; 
James et. al, 1989); and the growing uncertainty about the US aid and the personal 
commitment of President Park who came to power in 1961 to build an economically and 
militarily strong nation (Franco, 1988).  Given that, South Korea’s policy development in 
this period can be taken as the turning point in the evolution of its competitive industry 
policy strategy, which subsequently led South Korea to NIC status. 
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The Heavy Industry Drive (1972-80) 
1970s witnessed a drastic change of South Korea’s industry policy.  While the focus on 
export promotion remained intact under South Korea’s Third Five Year Plan (1972-76), the 
emphasis was made to create large business conglomerate groups (Chaebols) to develop a 
new generation of heavy and chemical industries (HCI), which were capital intensive.  
Several reasons influenced South Korea for this shift away from labour-intensive, light 
manufacturing industries. The increased real wages in the economy, and the strong 
competition from other LDCs which began to liberalize their economies were the main 
concerns (Willmott and Thorpe, 1992).  Added to this was the impact of protectionist 
measures of the developed nations on South Korea’s dominant light industrial exports. The 
government’s objective therefore was to remain more competitive in the world market by 
changing the composition of exports towards more sophisticated items with higher value 
added (Sakong, 1993). The announcement of the troop reduction in South Korea by the US 
government further justified South Korea’s move to a strong industrial base.    
 
Six strategic industries were designated for active government promotion: steel, nonferrous 
metals, shipbuilding, machinery, chemicals, and electronics. To ‘pick winners,’ the 
government used several industry policy measures to those targeted industries including 
subsidized public services, and preferential financing. Achieving self-sufficiency in 
industrial raw materials,18 and development of technology-intensive export industries 
became the major objectives of the HCI drive  (Willmott and Thorpe, 1992, p.3).  The 
government used IS policies to promote industrialization. Unlike export promotion policies 
that are usually based on the performance, HCI incentives were firm specific, which acted as 
barrier for the new entrants (Chen and Ku, 2000). 
  
Although the 1973-74 oil crisis severely hampered the HCI drive, South Korea soon 
recovered and continued to maintain investment, which enabled it to resume export 
expansion once foreign markets recovered.  As a result, its real exports increased by 43 per 
                                                          




cent in 1976, and thereby it managed to have a current account surplus for the first time in 
1977 (Michell, 1988, p.13).  
 
While continuing this secondary IS episode further, its Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-81) 
aimed at developing industries using mainly technology and skilled-labour. The favourable 
treatments to targeted industries increased at the expense of traditional light exports such as 
textiles and non-metallic products. The most important measure was subsidized credits. 
Success of such industries was measured by export performance, and eventually all 
subsidies were expected to be withdrawn (Kihwan and Leipziger, 1997). Thus, South Korea 
altered its industrial structure dramatically, and most of the targeted industries managed to 
penetrate international markets (Appendix Table B-2). 
   
By the end of 1970s, however, South Korea found that the overall outcome of this policy 
regime was not impressive.  Deterioration of its terms of trade due mainly to increased oil 
prices, decreased export demand due to world recession, and increased debt service 
obligations associated with high interest rates were some major causes which were beyond 
its control.  Apart from that, its economic performance was hampered by several policy-
induced outcomes such as low capacity utilization in the HCI sector, real appreciation of the 
foreign exchange rate during 1974-79, and drastic fall in rice production. Added to this was 
the political instability caused by the assassination of the President (Collin and Park, 1989). 
 
Overall, South Korea’s HCI drive was the result of certain key factors that were unique to 
South Korea.  Although the strategy worked well during the first half of this secondary IS 
period, it was somewhat retarded during the later part of this period due to both external 
factors such as the oil crisis and the resultant world recession, and internal factors such as 
political uncertainty caused by the assassination of the President.  Nevertheless, South Korea 
managed to maintain its spectacular growth and export performance during this period 
(Table 4.1).  It is at the end of this policy regime that South Korea reached the GDP per 
capita threshold to be considered as a NIC.19 
                                                          
19 South Korea fulfilled the criteria to be qualified as a NIC (as discussed in Chapter One) by 1980 (see World Development Reports 




4.2.4 Policy Experience in the Post-NIC Period 
In the early 1980s, two reasons prompted the government to allow an increased role for the 
private sector in economic activity while exposing the domestic market to foreign 
competition. One was the realization by the new political leadership that an increased 
government involvement in the national economy was neither efficient nor feasible in the 
long run.  The other was the need to eliminate resource allocation inefficiencies among 
different sectors, and between large and small firms, which occurred mainly during the 
previous HCI regimes (Mihn, 1988, p.33).  The 1981-90 decade witnessed an increased 
emphasis on further liberalization of the economy (Appendix Table B-11).    
 
Several measures were taken to promote the market mechanism both internally and 
externally.  Privatization of government-owned enterprises and the creation of Private 
Sector Consultative Committees (PSCCs) by the Ministry of Trade and Industry for each 
industry were major steps to enhance the private-sector initiative. The latter consisted of 
members from the industry concerned, universities, research institutes, financial institutions, 
consumer organizations, and the press (Mihn, 1988, p.33).  These committees were assigned 
the task of recommending industrial, technological, fiscal, and financial measures for the 
development and promotion of the industries concerned.  
 
The abolition of the differential interest rate system in 1982 was intended to assist strategic 
industries by enhancing market efficiency, while the 1986 Industrial Development Law 
further transformed the industry-specific incentives to activity-specific ones.20  Large-scale 
preferences to the HCI sector reduced the impact of the main external policy changes, which 
included the abolition of the fixed exchange rate regime, devaluation of the won by 17 per 
cent, and implementing tight fiscal and monetary policy.  Thus, the Fifth Five Year Plan 
(1981-86) saw a return to a committed export-oriented policy.  Although these policies 
initially aggravated the economy’s worsening symptoms, they worked well within two 
                                                          
20  They refer to "fiscal and financial incentives which are non-discriminatory with regard to particular industry bur are selective with 
respective particular activities of the production process" (Mihn, 1988, p36). 
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years.21   The subsequent policy changes moved the emphasis away from heavy industries to 
small-scale export industries which were less import intensive, and encouraged the 
development of technology (James, et al., 1989). Increased emphasis on R&D and scientific 
training became a focus of policy throughout 1980s and 1990s (Appendix Table B-9). 
 
The main objective of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1987-91) was further liberalization of 
imports with a view to reducing tariffs and providing more equal rates of protection across 
industries. Increased incentives were given to private sector firms for R&D activities in 
order to improve industrial productivity (Willmott and Thorpe, 1992). 
 
South Korea continued its trade reforms throughout the early 1990s.   There can be seen an 
increase in investment in projects in engineering and electronics. It managed to maintain a 
rapid export growth rate through diversification and upgrading of its manufacturing 
products.  In 1996, it became a member of the OECD.   
 
Despite its enormous success as an industrialized economy, South Korea experienced a 
severe setback due to  Asian financial crisis during 1997-98 period.22  Some scholars 
attribute this to South Korea’s policy mistakes (Dooley, 1999; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 
1999; Krugman, 1998; Kim, 1998).  Some major policy mistakes according to them are the 
‘strong won’ policy in the 1990s, and the excessive protection of industries, and  structural 
rigidities associated with Chaebols. 
 
When the real value of Korean corporations was declining, the South Korean government 
kept the won at an artificially high level ignoring market forces. This worsened the balance 
of payments and exhausted Korea’s foreign reserves.  A proportionate depreciation of the 
won would have corrected the situation. However, the government had other objectives: i.e. 
to keep inflation under control; to push domestic firms to increase productivity; to reduce 
                                                          
21 Inflation dropped to 7 per cent in 1982 and to 3.4 per cent in 1983, and the current account deficit fell to 2 per cent of GDP (World 
Bank, 1993). 
22 The value of the Korean won dropped by 100 per cent between the period from December 1997 to December 1998. South Korea’s 
unemployment rate rose from 3.4 per cent in 1997 to 6.5 in March 1998, and to 8.5 per cent by March 1999.   The GDP growth rate fell 
from 6.8 per cent in 1996 to -6.8 per cent in the third quarter of 1998 (Yanagita, 2000, p.20). By May 1998, seven of its top 30 chaebols 
faced bankruptcy.  The ratio of external debt to GDP rose to 27 per cent in 1996 from 17 per cent in 1995 (Kim, 1999).  
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debt service burdens of firms; and to reach the target per capita income of US$ 10,000 (Lee, 
1998; Lee 1999; Kim, 1998).   There is also evidence that the high won policy was linked to 
lobbying of the Chaebols (Lee, 1999).  Firms which had overseas debts, or relied heavily on 
imported inputs benefited from over-valuation. This behaviour distorted the relative price 
level and encouraged foreign currency speculation, which later led to the crisis. 
 
The excessive protection of industries resulted in over-investment and excessive borrowing 
by the corporate sector (Kim, 1999).  The banks were not hesitant to lend money to 
companies, which were large and protected. This inefficient allocation of capital resulted in 
investment decisions that succeeded in destroying rather than enhancing the value of South 
Korean corporations.  In the five years from 1992 to 1996, nearly three-fourth of the listed 
companies in South Korea did not generate sufficient operating earnings to cover capital 
costs (Kim, 1999).   
 
The proponents of structural rigidities see the roots of the crisis in policies during South 
Korea’s HCI drive (Chen and Ku, 2000). South Korea continued with the institutions built 
during the initial HCI drive.  This made its development path biased towards “capital-
intensive technologies” and thereby locked in financial resources with the same Chaebols, 
which dominated the economy in the 1970s. This structural rigidity hampered the allocative 
efficiency of the subsequent financial liberalisation (Chen and Ku, 2000, p.112). 
 
In contrast, another school of thought relates the crisis to ‘contagion’ that resulted from the 
recently liberalized capital market in these economies (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Feldstein, 
1998; Stiglitz, 1999, Marshall, 1998, Park and Song, 2000).    As stock markets of East Asia 
are closely linked, the crisis became contagious through the stock market.  When stock 
markets began to plunge in other countries in the region, foreign banks in South Korea cut 
off lines of credit and recalled their short and medium-term loans from South Korea 
provoking a liquidity crisis in South Korea.   It is argued that the crisis in South Korea was 
thus originated not by foreign investors, but by foreign banks by refusing to offer short-term 




Some believe that contagion occurred as a result of the recently liberalized capital market 
(Lim, 1999).  When the economy was growing fast, foreign capital flocked to the open 
capital market, especially investing in high-return, short-term loans and portfolio 
investments resulting in over-valued exchange rates, current account deficits, and domestic 
assets bubbles. As the currencies continued to slide, the debt service commitment of the 
domestic private sector increased.  With the uncertainty about the security of their loans and 
investments, lenders pulled out their capital. 
 
Supporting the contagion argument Stiglitz (2002, p.89) alleges that the IMF is partly 
responsible for it by advocating “excessively rapid financial and capital market 
liberalization” which was likely to be the most important cause of the crisis apart from the 
other wrong policies of the affected countries.   The IMF advocated a restrictive monetary 
policy to remedy the crisis, which further  “exacerbated the downturns” of these countries 
(Stiglitz, 2000 p.89). When the problem was not ‘excess demand’ but ‘insufficient demand’, 
imposing higher interest rate only increased their indebtedness. (Stiglitz, 2000, p.104). An 
expansionary policy would have helped highly indebted countries such as South Korea.  The 
contractionary policy exacerbated contagion from one country to another.   
 
Although the crisis hampered the economic growth in the late 1990s, South Korea  quickly 
recovered and regained the strong position it possessed in the new millennium. 
 
4.2.5. South Korea’s Industrialization: A Review of Empirical Evidence 
Until recently, the main explanation to South Korea’s success was from neo-classical 
economists (Ranis and Fei, 1975; Chen 1979; Balassa, 1982; Krueger, 1985).  According to 
them, South Korean economy stagnated in the 1950s due to inward-oriented policies, but 
with the introduction of outward-looking policies, the economy began to grow from the mid 
1960s.  The important measures such as tariff reduction and abolition of QRs, introduction 





Trade liberalization encouraged competition among domestic producers and thereby 
improved economic efficiency. The realistic exchange rates enabled South Korea to gain its 
comparative advantage in labour intensive industries.  Higher real interest rates encouraged 
domestic savings enabling the economy to invest more on the one hand and use scarce 
capital more efficiently on the other.  Supporting the above conventional explanation, Ranis 
and Fei (1975) claim that the elimination of direct controls on trade, interest rate, and 
foreign exchange, created a more market-oriented economy.  And together with 
macroeconomic stability, this encouraged the domestic entrepreneurs to utilize its relatively 
abundant resource, labour, efficiently for industrial exports. Their argument is that economic 
development is a result of an efficient allocation of resources.  The basic requirements for 
their model are correct macroeconomic policies (to get the prices right) and economic 
liberalization.23  
 
The above view was further supported by Wolf (1988) who claimed that successful East 
Asian economies24 greatly benefited from the policies that limited the government’s role in 
the economy.  On a similar line, Westphal (1978, p.347) is of the view that the development 
of South Korea is “a classic case of export-led growth.” This study shows the contribution 
of exports and domestic markets to GNP growth separately (Appendix Table B-4). As the 
data shows, the contribution from exports to GNP increased remarkably over the period 
1961-83.25 
 
Many recent studies reject the neo-classical explanation of rapid growth in East-Asian NICs 
(Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Auty, 1997).  They maintain that there was a high degree of 
government intervention in these markets. The government of South Korea extensively and 
selectively promoted individual sectors. The level of protection and the variation of 
protection across sectors have been far greater than what was reported in the neo-classical 
explanations.  They argue that South Korea was able to achieve these results because its 
                                                          
23The necessary conditions for this are therefore, free trade, minimum government intervention, and the right factor prices, which result in 
economic efficiency. 
24 They included Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and China. 
25 Contribution of exports increased from 18% in 1961 to 65% in 1983. 
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governments invested heavily in the necessary infrastructure, strongly backed the production 
of intermediate goods, and encouraged subcontracting arrangements between smaller and 
larger firms. As postulated by Amsden (1989, p.14) “economic expansion depends on state 
intervention to create price distortions that direct economic activity towards faster 
investment.”   
 
Luedde-Neurath (1988) shows that the trade reforms in South Korea were not as pronounced 
as is often presented and were implemented rather half-heartedly.  Firstly, tariffs were still 
quite high after liberalization, and the bureaucracy retained the power to impose emergency 
tariffs as and where it deemed necessary.  By 1982, “93 per cent of total imports were 
subject to some sort of restrictions” (Luedde-Neurath, 1988, p.156).  There were also 
“prohibitive inland taxes, often used to ban the importation of luxury consumer items which 
were subject only to non-prohibitive tariffs” (Luedde-Neurath, 1988, p.130).  
 
There is ample evidence to support the view that the South Korean government selectively 
promoted infant industries considering their long-term benefits to the economy (Amsden, 
1989; Castley, 1997; Westphal et al, 1981 as quoted in Pilat, 1994). Similar to export 
industries, a wide range of measures such as high tariffs were used to shield these infant 
industries from international competition.  Some times, they were forced to export at 
discriminatory prices. The infant industries were expected to sell an increasing share of their 
output in the world market to gain competitiveness within a short period.  The government 
commitment to industrialization sometimes took the form of active participation in 
industries.  In the absence of private sector initiative, public enterprises were established if 
the industry was considered to be of great importance for growth in general.  However, in 
South Korea, unlike in many other LDCs, even for public enterprises, markets rules were 
used and a certain level of export performance was required. 
 
Another unique feature, which contributed to South Korea’s success, was its ability to 
acquire correct technology at the right time. During the colonial rule, Koreans gained 
experience with modern technology by working with the Japanese.  The US occupation 
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during the Korean War also offered an excellent opportunity for learning. As Westphal et al. 
(1981 as quoted in Pilat, 1994, p.91) point out, “large numbers of Koreans gained 
experience with modern technology during the Second World War in Manchuria, Japan, or 
other parts of the Japanese empire.”  This experience enabled them to “acquire most of its 
technology with relative ease” (p.92).  Initially much of its growth occurred in traditional 
sectors where mature production technologies were widely available.  In these sectors, the 
low-skilled workers were able to absorb the technology easily, and to make improvements 
and adjustments if necessary.  
 
Another factor of significance to South Korea’s rapid growth was the government’s 
commitment to R&D by way of building research parks and research institutes, and 
expanding university science and engineering programs, and encouraging the setting up of 
research associations.  The cost of R&D has been exempted from taxes (Kuznets, 1994, 
p.18). The Foreign Capital Inducement Law facilitated the importation of technologies used 
by Korean industries. The main categories of industries, which benefited from this, were the 
chemical industries during the 1960s, heavy and chemical industries during the 1970s, and 
machinery and electronics in the 1980s (Kim, 1985, p.9). Kim and Park (1985) found the 
new technology and increased technical capacities or advances in knowledge accounted for 
13 per cent of Korean output growth from 1963 to 1982 (Kim and Park, 1985).     
 
 Among the other reasons for South Korea’s astonishingly rapid growth are culture, political 
stability, administrative capacity and intelligent policy choices (Wade and Kim 1978). 
Castley (1997) attributes it to the factors such as export-oriented development strategy, 
consistent macroeconomic policies, high level of educational spending, disciplined and hard 
working workforce, US aid, command economy through government intervention, 
emergence of entrepreneurs, political stability, and Confucian heritage.  
 
The forgoing discussion emphasized several key factors which can serve as lessons for other 
LDCs.  While emphasizing outward-orientation, the South Korean government used 
deliberate policies to promote some selected industries with IS policies. The government 
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continued to provide direction to private sector firms through active participation in basic 
economic activities.  South Korea also showed that structural transformation of an economy 
could be accelerated by creating comparative advantage using deliberate industry policy.  
One of the most important lessons from South Korea is the development of human capital. 
In summary, it is clear that the economic success of South Korea is a result of a plethora of 
features most of which constitute competitive industry policy as defined in Chapter Two. 
 
4.3 Taiwan 
4.3.1 Socio-economic Information 
Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China, is an industrialized economy with a per capita 
GDP of US$ 12,941 in 2001.26  With a total land area of 36,000 square kilometres, which is 
mostly mountainous, and a population of 21 million, it is one of the most densely populated 
countries in the world. Of the total land area, only 25 per cent is available for cultivation.  
During the three decades from 1961, Taiwan managed to maintain an average rate of growth 
rate of around 9 per cent per annum, with equally impressive results in manufacturing value 
added and exports (Table 4.6).  In addition, Taiwan managed to contain its average inflation 
rate to around 4 per cent per annum while keeping its unemployment rate below 4 per cent 
through most its past, which indicates the superiority of its economic performance 
(Appendix Table B-6). This is mainly attributable to its capacity to maintain a low fiscal 
deficit (see also Table 4.2). The structural composition of the economy changed 
considerably over the years. The industrial sector’s share of the GDP increased from 19.6 
per cent to 33 per cent while the share of agriculture fell from 32 per cent to 3 per cent 
during the 1952-99 period (Appendix Table B-7).  Manufacturing share on the other hand, 
rose from 12.9 per cent in 1952 to 28.2 per cent in 1995 with a peak of 39 per cent being 
recorded in 1987 (Chen, 1999, p.234).  
                                                          





Taiwan’s Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 1961-94 
Period Average Growth Rates (%)  
Period GDP Manufacturing 
Value added 
Exports 
1961-70 9.2 16.0 23.0 
1971-80 9.0 21.0 25.1 
1981-90 7.6 9.0 7.1 
1991-94 6.1 7.5 9.2 
        Source:  Agrawal et al (2000). 
 
4.3.2 Historical Background 
 Taiwan was ceded to Japan after the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War.  It remained a Japanese 
colony until the defeat of Japan in World War II in 1945. During colonial rule, Japanese 
landlords controlled a substantial part of the land, and it became a major supplier of food to 
Japan. The colonial rulers made considerable investments in infrastructure, health and 
primary education (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1997).  
 
With the relocation of the Republic of China’s government to Taipei in 1949, and the 
resultant large influx of population from the mainland, its economic prospects looked 
gloomy.  Inadequate production and government budget deficits led to inflation after 1949, 
and it was further exacerbated by the general rise in the world commodity prices following 
the outbreak of Korean War in 1950 (Ranis and Fei, 1988).  With the war, however, the U.S 
assisted Taiwan with economic aid that was critical for controlling inflation.  Since then, the 
Taiwan’s economy has evolved through several policy regimes until it became a NIC in 
1980. 
 
4.3.3 Policy Evolution in the Pre-NIC Period  
The policy events that took place in Taiwan during its transition to a NIC can be discussed 
under 3 distinct policy phases:  
 
Import Substitution (1952-58) 
Under its First Four Year Plan 1953-56, Taiwan focused on self-sufficiency in both 
agricultural and industrial output. The activities related to decision-making and 
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implementation was assigned to the Council of Economic Planning and Development 
(CEDP) (Adelman, 1999). Taiwan was, thus, one of the earliest economies to use IS 
strategy. While the state directly established new industries such as chemicals, fuel, mining 
and metal working, fertilizer, food processing, and utilities which were capital intensive, it 
also promoted private sector light consumer goods industries such as textiles, plastics and 
synthetic fibre using IS policies such as tariffs, and quota restrictions (QRs) while restricting 
the entry of new producers to the domestic market.   
 
Unlike in most LDCs, the IS worked well in Taiwan.  The decade 1953-62 was one of very 
rapid growth for Taiwan’s industrial sector.  Agricultural output increased by nearly 60 per 
cent, industrial output more than tripled and the share of the industry in GNP rose steadily 
by about 1 per cent per year (Rani and Fei, 1988).  This was reflected in the increasing 
importance of consumer goods industries such as textiles, apparel, wood and leather 
products, and bicycles.  Imports of consumer goods on the other hand fell from 20 per cent 
to 6.5 per cent.  The annual average growth rate of GNP between 1951 and 1955 was 9.7 per 
cent (Kuo, 1999, p.54).  However, unlike many other LDCs, Taiwan began an unusually 
early shift towards export promotion as the domestic market for consumer goods reached 
saturation point.  
 
A unique feature of Taiwan’s IS was the substantial size of the public sector capital goods 
industries such as chemicals, fertilizer, and petroleum, which were taken over from its 
colonial rulers.  They accounted for over 50 per cent of total industrial production.  These 
industries received substantial official assistance in the form of direct subsidies. This was 
deemed necessary to capture foreign exchange resources that were to be used in public 
overheads and in protection of inexperienced private entrepreneurs (Rani and Fei, 1988). 
 
Taiwan’s primary import substitution differed from that in other LDCs in many respects 
(Rani and Fei, 1988). It promoted agriculture by increasing its productivity. This prevented 
industrial wages from rising prematurely while providing a market for the manufactured 
good industries. Its levels of protection were relatively low by LDCs standards.  It also 
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emphasized the need to maintain rural physical and institutional infrastructure, and the 
establishment of industry-oriented technology and investment institutes to provide 
management training and technical assistance. 
 
Similar to South Korea, US aid played a vital role filling the gap between foreign exchange 
earnings and domestic savings allowing a higher level of imports and domestic capital 
formation, which was also useful in controlling inflation in the early post–was period.27  
This has made a significant contribution to Taiwan’s economic success, which became a 
launching pad for the subsequent industrialization. 
 
In the late 1950s, Taiwan realized the importance of shifting away from primary import 
substitution.  As the domestic market for non-durable consumer goods exhausted, there was 
excess capacity in industries such as textiles, paper rubber goods, and soap.  There was 
pressure for secondary import substitution in industries such as chemicals, fertilizer, rayon, 
fibre, and compact cars.  However, the factors such as small size of the market, and the high 
cost associated with such capital and skill intensive industries became barriers for this.  By 
the end of 1950s therefore, the IS strategy as a means to development began to show its 
limitations.  Taiwan was one of the few countries to realize such limitations early.   
 
Compared to other LDCs including South Korea and Sri Lanka, Taiwan was one of the 
earliest nations to use IS policy.  The performance of the Taiwan economy during its first IS 
phase has been relatively smooth.  Similar to South Korea, Taiwan also had the advantage of 
US financial aid for economic development during this initial policy regime. Moreover, its 
macroeconomic environment as reflected by interest rate, exchange rate, and domestic prices 
(especially of agricultural products) were conducive for business initiatives during this 
period.  It also had a superior position in terms of technological know-how, which was vital 
for industrialization (Brautigam, 1995).   Not only the above facts are in sharp contrast with 
what was applicable for Sri Lanka at that time, but also the duration of IS regime was 
relatively short. 
                                                          
27 US economic aid amounted to 6 per cent of Taiwan’s GNP through 1961, totalling US$ 1.3 billion in non-military assistance between 




Export Promotion  (1958-72) 
Taiwan’s early realization of the limitation associated with primary import substitution 
prompted it to consider export promotion as a new strategy. Thus, the 1958-1962 period 
witnessed far-reaching policy commitments by the government to promote exports, 
investment, and industrialization in general (Dahlman and Sananikone, 2000). Having 
identified that capital shortage was the major hindrance for economic development, 
Taiwan’s Second Four-Year Plan (1957-60) set targets for the overall rate of growth of 
national income and investment, especially for the share of investment in major sectors.  It 
specified the role of fiscal and monetary policies to improve the investment climate. Thus, 
one half of gross capital formation in the 1958-61 period was carried out by government or 
public enterprises (Wade, 1990). The most important change was introduced through the 
1959 Nineteen Points Program of Economic and Financial Reforms that addressed “virtually 
every component of economic, fiscal, and trade policies (Dahlman and Sananikone, 2000, 
p.98). It was this program that laid foundation for Taiwan’s economic takeoff in the ensuing 
years and set “a precedence for future efforts to liberalize government policies” (Dahlman 
and Sananikone, 2000, p.98). 
  
Accordingly, by 1960, while other LDCs such as Sri Lanka were resorting to IS policies, 
Taiwan swiftly moved towards primary export promotion.  This became the most important 
period in its policy evolution.  The policies introduced during this time that enabled it to 
shape its economy to become highly industrialized.  Export promotion policies commenced 
with an ambitious annual growth target of 8 per cent in the Third Four-Year Plan for 1961-
64. Among the main elements of the plan were on-going reviews of existing controls for 
further improvement, liberalizing trade controls; preferential treatment to the private sector 
in the areas of tax, foreign exchange and financing, foreign exchange reforms, and measures 
to promote exports (Kuo, 1999). 
 
The Fourth Four-Year Plan 1965-68 further emphasized the importance of outward-
orientation of the economy for rapid industrialization.  To encourage private investment in 
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manufacturing, Taiwan made special provisions under the Statute for Encouragement of 
Investment during this period. It facilitated the acquisition of plant sites primarily by 
“productive enterprises.” The main investment incentives included (Kuo, 1999, p.60) a five-
year tax holiday for such enterprises conforming to the Statute’s criteria, a reduced rate of 
business income tax,28 tax exemption for undistributed profits, tax deductions for exports, 
and exemption/reduction of stamp tax.   To encourage exports, a generous tax and duty 
rebate scheme was put in place.  Table 4.7 below illustrates the direction and magnitude of 
tax rebates during the four decades since 1965.  As for exports, it was mainly rebates on 
customs duty and commodity tax, which were relevant. As can be seen, the share of rebate 
on these two categories has significantly increased during this export promotion phase with 
its culmination in the 1971-75 period.  
 
Table 4.7 
Taiwan’s Tax Rebates: 1955-94 
              
Period 
Tax Rebates as a % of Tax Rebates as 
a % of Total 
Tax Revenue 




1955-60 - 5.9 3.0 1.5 
1961-65 16.7 25.2 17.8 10.4 
1966-70 18.7 39.6 21.8 15.2 
1971-75 15.7 67.3 35.7 26.7 
1976-80 13.6 44.3 33.9 19.6 
1981-85 18.5 33.7 8.8 11.8 
1986-90 20.2 17.2 4.3 8.2 
1991-94 15.1 4.4 0.1 4.2 
Source: Kuo, Shirly W. Y., 1999, “Government Policy in Taiwanese Development Process: The past 50 Years”,  
             in Thorbecke E., and Henry Wan (eds.) Taiwan’s Development Experience:  Lessons on Roles of Government  
             and Market, Kluwer Academic Publishers, London. 
. 
 
The above Statute was revised in 1965 expanding its scope to cover Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs).  In the Asian region, Taiwan was the first to experiment with EPZs (People’s 
Bank, 1982). Accordingly, Taiwan established the one of the earliest EPZs in Kaohsiung to 
expand exports and encourage the acquisition of new technology (Brautigam, 1995). It 
reduced cumbersome official procedures for exporters under normal situations.  With raw or 
unprocessed raw materials coming into these zones, value was added mainly in the form of 
                                                          
28 18 per cent compared to 32.5 per cent maximum for ordinary profit seeking enterprises. 
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unskilled labour, and the finished goods re-exported.  They grew rapidly and captured a 
major part of foreign investment (Kuo, 1999).    
 
The Fifth Four-Year Plan 1968-72 indicated the continuation of its export-oriented 
development strategy.  In 1970, it established two more EPZs to speed up industrialization 
drive.29  High value-added industries such as precision machinery, electronics, electrical 
machinery, optical equipment, and plastic were given priority in the Zones (Dahlman and 
Sananikone, 1997). 
 
Export expansion during this period was the major factor contributing to economic growth.  
Exports grew at an average annual rate of 22 per cent in real terms during 1961-1971.  This 
rapid expansion of exports was attributable to Taiwan’s rapid transition from an agriculture-
oriented economy to an industry-oriented economy.  The open global economic system 
prevailed during this period facilitated this to a greater extend (Adelman, 1999). 
 
These policies changed the emphasis from import substitution to export promotion over 
time, and marked the beginning of the reduction of protection on manufacturing.  As Lee 
and Kuo-Shu (1975) in a study on Taiwan’s tariffs and import controls indicate “commodity 
categories containing all items subject to import control and with average tariff rates higher 
than 30 per cent have shown a decreasing tendency since 1956.”  Hsing (1970) in a similar 
study found that by the mid-1960s, effective protection on manufacturing was lower in 
Taiwan than in any other developing country examined except Mexico.  There is also 
evidence of the decreasing importance of the measures such as exchange entitlement tax, 
rebates, and subsidies, in addition to the continuing maintenance of more realistic exchange 
rate in the 1960s.  The above policy changes in the foreign exchange, fiscal, and monetary 
spheres at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s prepared the economic environment that was 
conducive to major adjustments in the structure of the economy.  These adjustments in the 
total environment permitted the economy to shift from an essentially domestic raw materials 
                                                          
29 It was Taiwan  who promoted this concept in the region by rendering material help to other countries including South Korea during 




or land-based pattern of production to an imported raw materials and labour-based pattern of 
exports. 
 
Between 1958 and 1972, Taiwan’s GNP grew at a rate of 10 per cent annually, while 
manufacturing expanded at a rate of 18 per cent, and exports grew at a rate of 23 per cent.  
The current account balance of the balance of payments turned positive after 1970. The 
unemployment rate declined to frictional level of 2.8 per cent. Exports shifted from 60 per 
cent agricultural in 1958 to 91 per cent manufacturing in 1972.  The relative weights of the 
private and government–owned enterprises in the industrial sector became 79 per cent and 
21 per cent respectively (Adelman, 1999).  The other policy measures during the above 
period have been supportive for the above achievements.  During the entire period from 
1961 to 1972, Taiwan used a fixed exchange rate regime.  Its monetary authorities managed 
to keep the real interest rate high by keeping inflation under control through supportive 
monetary and fiscal policy (Brautigam, 1995; Wade 1990).  
 
Similar to South Korea, this was the crucial period for Taiwan’s development policy.  A 
lesson for other LDCs is that Taiwan quickly moved to primary export promotion when it 
realized early that its limited domestic market was a bottleneck for a sustainable economic 
growth.   It initiated competitive industry policy measures such as encouraging FDI, 
establishment of EPZs, directed credits, and tariff reforms, among others, to increase 
manufacturing sector’s share in the total economy.   Thus, Taiwan experimented with an 
outward-looking development strategy at a time when inward-looking policies were popular 
among LDCs.   
 
The Heavy Industry Period (1973 –80) 
Similar to South Korea, Taiwan embarked on the building of basic industries critical to its 
external security mainly as a reaction to the resumption of diplomatic ties between USA and 
China in 1971 (Adelman, 1999).  In addition, external factors also influenced Taiwan to 
become inward looking.  One the one hand, protectionist pressure from the developed 
countries after the 1973 oil shock for labour-intensive products was immense. On the other 
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was the exhaustion of surplus labour and resultant wage increases exposing the economy to 
competition in labour intensive products from other LDCs with lower wages. Its Sixth Four-
Year Plan 1973-76 thus, emphasized the importance of new industries such as 
petrochemicals, electrical machinery, electronics, computer components, and similar 
products.  Sectors which require foreign investment were identified.  Public investment in 
physical infrastructure increased.  In the meantime, a proper balance between monetary 
policy and fiscal policy was maintained in order to curb inflation which accelerated in 1974 
due to the oil crisis on the one hand and the need to stimulate economic activities on the 
other.   
 
While South Korea resorted to large firms (Chaebols), Taiwan relied on medium and small 
size firms and state and semi-state enterprises for the implementation of its industry drive 
(Adelman, 1999).  Compared with South Korea’s Chaebols where growth was based on 
foreign debt, Taiwan managed its HCI drive while remaining a capital exporter.  Taiwan 
implemented its ‘Ten Great Projects’ in 1974-75, which absorbed about 20 per cent of total 
investment in 1975 and 1976.30   These industries increased backward linkages by providing 
domestic inputs, and transformed the factor content of exports from labour-intensive to 
capital and skill-intensive while infrastructure projects lowered transport costs and increased 
regional integration (Adelman, 1999, p.306). 
 
Taiwan’s Seventh Four-Year Plan 1978-81 further emphasized the government’s active 
involvement in industrialization (Adelman, 1999).  Thus, another 12 large public investment 
projects commenced in 1978 to develop infrastructure. As a result direct government 
ownership of industry increased to 19 per cent in 1983 from 15 per cent in the export-led 
growth era of 1958-72.  In contrast to South Korea, Taiwan’s HCI drive aimed at IS. Unlike 
South Korea’s Chaebols, these industries were under constant pressure for efficiency as their 
products were linked to export industries (Chen and Ku, 2000).   
 
                                                          
30  The 10 great projects consisted of direct government investment in heavy industry and infrastructure: an integrated steel mill, a 
petrochemical complex, a large shipyard, a freeway, two railways, an airport, two harbours, and a nuclear power plant  (Adelman, p.306).  
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1973-80 was a challenging period for Taiwan in its development history.  It managed to 
withstand unfavourable external conditions and recover relatively quickly due to the 
“swiftness of policy actions and the basic resilience of the economy” (Dahlman and 
Sananikone, 1997).  It also managed to regain the growth momentum while controlling 
inflation.31  Even the world recession that followed the second oil shock in 1979 impacted 
its economy relatively mildly.  The 1970s basically represented “the first difficult stage of 
Taiwan’s maturation process as it moved from a relatively underdeveloped country status to 
taking advantage of the open world economy to a more advanced industrialized country 
having to adjust drastically to a different international environment” (Dahlman and 
Sananikone, 1997, p.105).32 
 
 In sum, unlike South Korea, Taiwan’s HCI drive have worked well during the 1973-80 
period as it managed to continue the momentum of its economy’s performance despite 
unfavourable external factors.  One reason for this was its heavy reliance on small to 
medium sized firms to undertake its heavy industry drive with minimum external liability.   
The macroeconomic environment supported this.  The linking of incentives earmarked for 
targeted industries to their growth performance prevented the firms’ rent seeking behaviour 
which was the root cause for the failure of IS policy in other LDCs.    
 
4.3.4 Policy Experience in the Post-NIC Period 
The beginning of the 1980s witnessed a more challenging domestic and international 
environment for Taiwan.  As Taiwan moved to more technology-intensive industries, there 
was upward pressure for manufacturing wages which undercut the comparative advantage it 
had in labour-intensive industries.  This, coupled with the upward pressure on Taiwan dollar 
(particularly after 1984) dampened the competitiveness of its exports. Moreover, Taiwan 
had to face a very competitive as well as a protectionist environment globally. Taiwan’s 
large trade surpluses against its major trading partners (mainly the USA) caused growing 
                                                          
31 In the latter half of 1970s, it growth rate returned to above 10 per cent, and annual inflation fell back to 3 per cent (Dahlman and 
Sananikone, 1997, p.104) 
32.  Similar to South Korea Taiwan transformed into a NIC during this period.  Although there is no data regarding all the criteria for NIC 





protectionist pressure from them on the one hand, while there was increased demand for an 
open international trading and financial system on the other (Dahlman and Sananikone, 
1997).  As a result, Taiwan’s manufacturing industries had to face competition from LDCs 
for labour-intensive products on the one hand, and for high-technology products from    
industrialized countries on the other (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1997).  It was under this 
environment that Taiwan earmarked high technology industries as a means of enhancing 
economic competitiveness under its 1982-86 Four Year Plan.  Accordingly, key industries 
targeted included information, machinery, precision instruments, biotechnology, electro-
optics, and environmental technology.  Criteria used to select them included technology-
intensiveness, low energy consumption, low pollution level, and high market potential 
among other things (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1997).   
 
To enhance the competitiveness R&D institutes were set up in these industries with 
necessary fiscal and financial incentives including incentives for education and training 
(Wade, 1990).  Tax incentives were provided for firms for R&D commitments, improving 
production techniques, and product diversification.   Moreover, the targeted industries 
received credit allocations and income tax holidays under the Statute for Encouragement of 
Investment that was amended in 1984. The Hsinchu Industrial Park established in 1980 was 
further expanded to be used as an incubator for the high-tech firms. The push for high-
technology industrialization was further assisted with human resource development using 
the university system (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1997).    
 
With the above industry policies in tact, Taiwan’s industrial strategy underwent significant 
changes, especially after 1984 as it also introduced substantial economic and financial 
reforms in line with the global trend.  As a first step, tariff rates were reduced especially on 
raw materials and intermediate inputs.  The average tariff burden in the economy fell from 
7.9 per cent to 5.9 per cent between 1985 and 1990 (Table 4.8).   As a result, 96 per cent of 
tariff rates on industrial items were lower than 15 per cent by 1990 compared to 34 per cent 
in 1986 (Heather, 2000). QRs on imports and foreign exchange controls were abandoned 
(Adelman, 1999).   One main thrust of these changes was to reduce the over-capacity of 
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industries and make them more flexible. Accordingly, the expansion plans of certain 
industries such as shipbuilding and aluminium smelting were revised down wards. 
Privatization of public enterprises reduced the role of the state as an industrial entrepreneur.  
 
Table 4.8 












     a/ Total tariff revenue weighted by total import value 
     Source: Heather S. 2000, Industry Policy in Taiwan & Korea in the 1980s, Edward Elgar, (p.57); 
          www.photius.com/wfb2000/countries/taiwan/taiwan_economy.html.  
 
The Ten-Year National Science and Technology Development Plan (1986-95) had the main 
goal of improvement of the general environment for science and development.  The plan 
expected to raise R&D expenditure to 2 per cent of GNP by 1995, 40 per cent from the 
government, and 60 per cent from private sector (Heather, 2000).  The heavy dependence on 
the government to finance R&D activities was due to the lack of research capability in 
Taiwan’s small-and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  Information and electronic sectors 
received the major share of public R&D support by 1996. R&D expenditure as a percentage 
of GNP increased from 0.7 in 1978 to 1.9 by 1996 (Appendix Table B-8).  By 1994, 
however, private contribution to R&D increased to 50 per cent in line with the government 
objective. 
 
During this period however, the government's position as the major investor in the economy 
still remained significant. In 1994, for instance, state-owned enterprises and other public 
entities accounted for 46 per cent of gross capital formation compared to the corresponding 




Taiwan’s strong economic performance during the 1990s was somewhat marred by the 
Asian financial crisis during the 1997-98 period.  However, unlike South Korea, Taiwan 
recovered quickly with minimal harmful effects  (Wang, 2000; Chow, 2000). There are 
many reasons for this.  First and foremost, it has been emphasised that Taiwan’s economic 
fundamentals were in order as reflected by  low inflation and increased foreign reserves  
(Naughton, 2000).33 The only major problem facing Taiwan was its chronic budget deficit 
(Anderson, 1998b). 
 
Unlike South Korea, Taiwan opened its financial market gradually, and there were 
significant restrictions on commercial currency trading.34   There were strict capital controls 
to keep companies from using cheap foreign loans for speculative purposes.  Therefore, 
there was no room for excessive foreign borrowing as there was in South Korea.   Because 
of this conservative approach to credit usage, Taiwan’s firms had one of the lowest debt-to-
equity ratios in Asia.35  
 
The other major factor was its strong political leadership where there was little room for 
corruption, nepotism, or crony capitalism. There was no evidence of ‘egomaniacal’ 
infrastructure building, or overcapacity of industries, as was in South Korea.  There are two 
factors for this: Taiwan’s rapid transition to democracy, and the emergence of a strong 
opposition.36  
 
Unlike South Korea, Taiwan encouraged the emergence of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).37 This is evident in the fact that Taiwan has the highest ‘company 
density’ in the world (Anderson, 1998a). Theoretically, many firms mean greater 
                                                          
33 Its foreign loans were only $250 million in 1997.  At the start of the Asian crisis, Taiwan’s non-performing loans accounted for just 1.5 
per cent of total assets (Anderson, 1998b). 
34 It has allowed the currency to devalue down to a specified limit in order to remain competitive, but maintained close scrutiny of the 
resulting effects.  According to “Taiwan Banking Law, there is a 20 per cent upper limit for bank investment in the real estate and stock 
market” which prevent the economy from the formation of “financial bubbles”(Wang, 2000, p.159). 
35 Kwack (1998) compared the soundness of South Korean manufacturing corporations with those of Taiwan, Japan and USA.  As shown 
in Appendix Table B-5,  South Korea has the highest debt-equity ratio while Taiwan shows the lowest.  On the other hand, equity to 
assets ratio of South Korea was the lowest.  
36 The KMT party, which is far less corrupt than it was a decade ago; and according to Transparency International,36 Taiwan’s corruption 
ranking is 5.3, which is closer to USA (7.5) than Indonesia (2.0) (Anderson, 1998).  
37 Taiwan has the highest ‘company density’ in the world; one company for every 18 people. Nearly 98 per cent of total companies were 
SMEs, accounting for 47 per cent of total economy and about 80 per cent of all employment in 1995 (Anderson, 1998a).   
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competition, which ensures better management.  Also, the small scale enterprises are not 
only better adapt to global fluctuations, but are also less likely to encourage corrupt practices 
by bureaucracy and banks than large conglomerates, as was the case in South Korea.  The 
SMEs also worked as “densed network of firms” specializing in subcontracting and trading, 
and the “low threshold entry and exit costs facilitate the rapid transfer of resources from less 
efficient to more efficient producer with in an industry” improving national industrial 
productivity (Chen and Roberts, 1997).38 
 
4.3.5 Taiwan’s Industrialization: A Review of Empirical Evidence 
The causes of the Taiwan’s success as a NIC have been extensively debated among policy 
analyst and economists.  While the neoclassical economists attribute it basically to its freer 
trade regime, the opponents of that view argue that while exporters benefited from trade 
reforms, the government also played a significant role by assisting them through various 
policy measures such as subsidies, concessional credits, preferential tax treatments, 
infrastructure development, and marketing assistance.  Taiwan’s export-oriented policies 
have co-existed with import substitution policies for different sets of industries. As Wade 
(1990) explains, the Taiwan government has guided and steered the economy to a far greater 
degree than is consistent with neoclassical theory. Both before and after adopting an export-
oriented industrialization strategy especially on primary products and light manufacturing 
from 1958 to 1962, Taiwan’s planners consciously took the initiative in steering resources 
into selected industries.  The aim was to promote the development of production and 
technological capacity in more skill and capital-intensive industries.    The measures used 
included trade controls, fiscal incentives, selective credit allocations, state sponsored R&D, 
and the extensive use of public corporation to create new capacities in industries such as 
steel, ship building, chemicals, petroleum, and heavy machinery, where barriers for new 
initiatives were high. 
                                                          
38 Wang (2000, p.161) 
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A critical component of Taiwan’s success was its industry policy which established public 
enterprises when private initiatives are not forthcoming or private sector is unable to fund.  
It used import-limiting measures, and provided special credit facilities to private enterprises. 
Thus, its industry policy had decisive effects on the structure of production, which improved 
its overall economic welfare (Wade, 1990).   
 
Another fundamental factor behind the Taiwan’s success was the ability of its government 
to pick a winning industrial structure (Chen, 1996). Taiwan government picked winners at 
the initial stage of industrialization, especially in the textiles and apparel industries, which 
played a vital role in expanding total manufacturing output.   
 
Taiwan’s commitment to the accumulation of physical and human capital was also a major 
factor in its success.  It has demonstrated a great deal of efficiency in allocating physical and 
human resources to highly productive investment and in acquiring and mastering technology 
(World Bank, 1993). 
 
There are views that trade induced learning effects on growth had a significant role in 
Taiwan’s economic performance. As Chung (1996) pointed out using aggregate and two-
digit manufacturing industry data for Taiwan in a statistical model, the external economies 
were largely attributed to the economy-wide, trade-induced learning generated from opening 
trade with developed nations.   As he showed, over 40 per cent of output growth of 
manufacturing during 1975-90 period was due to trade-induced learning which is not 
explained by total factor inputs.     
 
The importance of having a strong and stable political leadership is also obvious from 
Taiwan’s experience.  The political stability in Taiwan is attributable to several factors such 
as a “consensus based, outsider regime that was insulated from political pressure,” the long 
presidencies of Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo, and strong party dominance of the 
political system  (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1997, p.143).  Providing a prescription for other 
LDCs, Dahlman and Sananikone (1997, p.143) explain: 
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 “[T]his is not to recommend any particular form of political system but simply to 
observe that a stable and a development-oriented government appears to be one of 
the elements of success.  More useful for other countries, perhaps, is the lesson that 
economic policy making was efficiently managed by a core group of competent and 
highly pragmatic leaders who shared the conviction that government intervention 
should co-exist with private sector development.”  
 
 
In sum, as empirical evidence indicates, Taiwan’s success as an industrialized economy was 
a result of several factors. There are many lessons Sri Lanka can learn from its experience.  
One is related to the role of the government in governing the market.  Taiwan’s government 
picked a winning industrial structure during the transitional period using trade and industry 
policy.  This has prompted some observers to claim that Taiwan’s government distorted 
prices to get policies right.  However, getting policies right at no time became an excuse for 
wholesale government intervention. The right policies provided ample scope for prices and 
markets to perform well. Although government intervention was necessary, what mattered 
most was the quality of intervention. The quality of intervention depends, as Jerkins (1991, 
p.199) indicated, on “flexibility, selectivity, and coherence” of policy, and emphasis on 
“promotion, rather than regulation.”  Taiwan’s macroeconomic policy ensured the economic 
stability required for the successful implementation of its industrial strategy. Thus, there are 
many lessons Sri Lanka can learn from Taiwan’s industrialization experience. 
 
4.4 East Asian Experience: Lessons for Sri Lanka  
The foregoing discussion showed how South Korea and Taiwan used competitive industry 
policy to achieve industrialization.  This section examines what lessons Sri Lanka can learn 
from their overall experience in order to work out an industrial strategy towards NICs status.  
   
When learning from the East Asian experience, it is important to consider only those aspects 
that are of some relevance to Sri Lankan case.   The question is which time period relating to 
their experience should be considered; i.e., pre-1980 period when they were growing rapidly 
as prospective NICs, or after 1980 when they achieved NIC status and further expanded as 
strong industrial economies.  This study strongly believes that while their pre-1980 
 
 124 
experience seems to be more relevant, due consideration should also be given to policies 
they used even in the 1980s and 1990s due to following reasons: 
(a) There is little evidence regarding the exact time at which the two economies became 
NICs.  Although most of the current studies on trade and industrialization use the 
term NIC extensively, there is no common agreement as to what constitute a NIC.  
Most studies use the term NIC to highlight the rapid transformation of an economy 
with high level of industrial output and exports associated with high growth.39  This 
lack of unanimity is evident as some studies use this term for some fast growing 
Asian economies such as Malaysia and Thailand without using any acceptable 
criteria.  
(b) The world economic conditions that the two East Asian NICs experienced before 
they were becoming NICs are quite different to those many other LDCs such as Sri 
Lanka have been facing since late 1970s.40  
(c) The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s has re-ignited the debate on the validity 
of East Asian development model for other LDCs, and therefore, it is hard to ignore 
the polices they used after achieving NIC status if one is to learn from their 
experience as a ‘whole package.’ 
 
In view of the above considerations, this study will strongly believe that their policy 
experience both before and after they achieve NIC status are of relevance to Sri Lanka.  This 
section therefore will briefly identify lessons Sri Lanka can learn from the two economies 
during these two distinct periods. 
 
4.4.1 Pre -NIC Experience  
The purpose of this section is to briefly identify the common factors and policies which have 
contributed to industrial development of both South Korea and Taiwan, which enabled them 
to achieve NIC status by 1980. It will then select the relevant aspects of this experience for 
                                                          
39 There is only one study in the current literature which has attempted to identify a NIC using certain criteria (Balassa, 1980). The 
economic position of South Korea and Taiwan  as industrialized nations and high exporters began to rise through out 1980s and 1990s. 
40 i.e., high competition among LDCs for similar products, increased trend towards rapid liberalization globally (This will be further 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five).  
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Sri Lanka.  Accordingly, following are the major common factors and policies which 
contributed to rapid industrialization of the two East Asian economies: 
(a) Initial conditions 
(b) Trade and industry policy: 
Tariffs and QRs  
Export rebates  
EPZs  
Sector targeting 
Credit allocation  
R&D  
Infrastructure development  
Human resource development 
(c) Macroeconomic stability 
(d) Political/institutional factors 
 
Initial Conditions  
The initial conditions of both South Korea and Taiwan have worked well for their cause of 
industrial development. Both nations started as small, labour-abundant, and resource-poor 
countries. They had the need of a strong economy due to the external security concern since 
1950s.  As a legacy of colonialism, they both inherited an improved infrastructure, and a 
strong industrial background.  The development burden was further assisted by the 
availability of financial aid and security assurance from the US in the 1950s and 60s. The 
governments of both nations allocated a major portion of their public investment on social 
development with a view to enhance the quality of manpower from the very outset. Sri 
Lanka’s on the other hand, did not have external security concern, nor did it have a strong 
industrial background.  However, it was endowed with a superior education system and 




Trade and Industry Policy 
Sri Lanka can consider the usefulness of trade policies that played an important role in 
industrial development of Taiwan and South Korea.  As seen in the two country studies 
above, Sri Lanka can use export promotion while promoting labour-intensive industries 
through IS. This strategy does not mean that it can have neutral policies during the 
subsequent policy phases, but it can put in place strategies that balance any import barriers 
with incentives  for export promotion.   This strategy enabled Taiwan and South Korea to 
maintain the world highest export-GDP ratios as early as the 1960s and 1970s.41  Both 
nations also promoted a hospitable environment for foreign investment through tax 
concessions, EPZs, and investment promotion. One of their most successful industry policy 
measures was general export subsidies that reinforced comparative advantages in the export 
industries.   
 
Both nations used industry policy measures extensively during all their different policy 
phases. The most successful policies were those used to reinforce comparative advantages. 
Industrial targeting through selective support was a key instrument used.42  However, Sri 
Lanka should encourage the emergence of SMEs to undertake target industries as occurred 
in Taiwan.  South Korean style of HCI promotion through IS policies is considered less 
relevant in view of the socio-economic cost involved.  It needs to target industries/sectors 
where it can create comparative advantage in a relatively short period based on its abundant, 
relatively cheap labour supply. 
 
Most targeted industries in South Korea and Taiwan received considerable functional 
support through other industry policy measures such as EPZs, and R&D.43 Both 
governments believed that mild financial repression through state banking or interest rate 
controls can improve the allocation of resources.  In Taiwan, regulated state banks co-
existed with   private banks which played a major role in meeting the financial needs of 
small manufacturing firms, while the former allocated credits for the selected priority areas.  
                                                          
41 Petri (1997). 
42 The industries they targeted include steel, automobile, petrochemical and shipbuilding. 




Increased investment in infrastructure was another important policy commitment they 
maintained in all the policy phases.  Sri Lanka can use similar policies as and where 
necessary.  
 
In summary, it can be said that most of their major industry policy measures, such as sector 
targeting, exporter rebates/subsidies, investment in infrastructure, credit allocation, human 
resource development, R&D, and EPZs are relevant for Sri Lanka.  Measures such as sector 
targeting and credit allocation should be temporary, and market confirming especially in 
view of the current global move toward freer trade regimes. 
  
Macroeconomic Discipline 
The two nations have taken due care to maintain macroeconomic stability during the pre-
NIC period. Of the two, Taiwan records the most impressive macroeconomic discipline as 
reflected by low annual inflation rates throughout  this period with a few exceptions in 
certain years.44 In South Korea’s serious consideration to achieve lower inflation only 
occurred somewhat later than Taiwan.   Both nations however, have shown impressive 
results in containing their overall budget deficits within targets (Table 4.2) in the 1970s to 
ensure macroeconomic stability which has been an essential part of their overall policy 
package.  The lesson for Sri Lanka here is to maintain a low inflation rate at least during the 
initial period in order to encourage saving-investment behaviour.  Maintaining a low budget 
deficit is the most essential component of this strategy. 
 
Political/Institutional Factors 
As noted, institutional arrangements and political leadership have played a crucial role in the 
East Asian industrialization process.  The close relationship between the state and the 
business was seen as vital (especially in South Korea) for their success.  This requires an 
efficient public service with proper checks and balances in place to minimise misuse of 
power and corruption.  A strong political leadership is also an essential requirement. Both 
                                                          
44 See Appendix Table B-6. 
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NICs under discussion fulfilled this requirement.45  This can be taken as a necessary 
condition for Sri Lanka in its model for rapid industrialization. 
 
4.4.2 Post-NIC Experience 
The purpose of this section is to identify the policies which have enabled the two East Asian 
NICs to gain industrial maturity during the period after 1980. The study has justified the 
relevance of this experience in view of the rapid changes which took place in the global-
economic context after 1980, which are now more relevant to prospective NICs such as Sri 
Lanka due to increased liberalization of world trading regimes, among others.  
 
As Taiwan and South Korea reached the threshold for NIC status in 1980, they had to adjust 
drastically to a different international environment.  They changed the course of their 
development by moving to high-technology industrialization with a view to gaining 
industrial maturity.  However, there was increased pressure for them to liberalize their 
economies in line with global trends.  The main objective of liberalization of imports by 
reducing tariffs and providing more equal rates of protection across industries was economic 
efficiency.  By subjecting those domestic firms that had managed to create competitive 
advantage through temporary assistance to international competition, the government can 
pressurise them to be cost efficient on the one hand, while minimising resource allocation 
deficiencies in the economy on the other. 
 
Several measures were taken to promote the market mechanism both internally and 
externally.  Privatization of government-owned enterprises and the creation of private sector 
consultative committees for each industry (by South Korea) were major steps to enhance the 
private-sector initiative. The latter consisted of members from various industries, 
universities, research institutes, financial institutions, consumer organizations, and the press 
and acted as a Think Tank.  These committees were assigned the task of recommending 
                                                          
45 South Korea had the strong leadership of President Park Chung Hee who replaced the cabinet style of government with a form in which 
power and authority are concentrated in the presidency. Taiwan too had a strong and stable political leadership, which is attributable to 
factors such as a consensus, based outsider regime that was insulated from political pressure, the long presidencies of Chiang Kai-shek 
and Chiang Ching-kuo, and the strong party dominance of the political system (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1997).  Thus, both of these 




industrial, technological, fiscal, and financial measures for the development and promotion 
of the industries concerned. The two economies also maintained a rapid export growth rate 
through diversification and upgrading of its manufacturing products.  Increased incentives 
were given to private sector firms for R&D activities to assist this.  
 
Another important policy lesson of this period is the abolition of differential interest rate 
system by South Korea in 1982 to assist strategic industries as a measure to enhance market 
efficiency.  Its transforming of the industry-specific incentives to activity-specific ones, and 
reducing of large-scale preferences to the HCI further facilitated this. Abolition of the fixed 
exchange rate regime with initial devaluation of their currency was deemed vital for this.   
Both nations considered that macroeconomic stability is of prime importance for LDCs to 
achieve high growth rate via industrial development.  The key factor here is the ability of the 
government to maintain a low fiscal deficit.  This was conducive for both saving and 
investment in the economy.   
 
In summary, the following policy measures of the two NICs during their post-1980 period 
can be considered as relevant for Sri Lanka: 
(a) Promote the market mechanism both internally and externally: 
Liberalization of imports by reducing tariffs/QRS; 
Privatization of loss making government-owned enterprises; 
Abolition of the fixed exchange rate regimes with initial devaluation of currency; and 
Policies such as abolition of differential interest rates. 
 
(b) Industry policy: 
Temporary assistance for selected industries (to create competitive advantage); 
Export diversification/ upgrading of manufacturing products; 
Increased incentives to private sector for R&D activities;  
Creation of private sector consultative committees for each industry (Think Tanks); 
Transforming of industry-specific incentives to activity-specific ones; 




(c) Macroeconomic stability through low fiscal deficit.   
 
These are the major policy options available for prospective NICs. However, what is 
important is to select the ones which suit most to the stage of industrialization and other 
economic objectives at the time.   
 
This section is incomplete without discussing the lessons from the Asian financial crisis.  
This is necessary to combat the argument that it was caused, to some extent, by industry 
policy and excessive intervention by government during the heavy industry particularly 
drive.  The following are the guidelines for prospective NICs to avoid similar situations 
when following their growth path: 
• Avoidance of using exchange rate to target inflation; 
• Avoidance of heavy reliance on big business for industrialization; 
• Withdrawal of protection  given to targeted sectors when they create comparative 
advantage; 
• Policies to liberalize financial markets should be gradual; and 
• Better control over foreign loans for speculative purposes. 
 
Overall, these are the major policy lessons available for Sri Lanka from the Asian NICs 
from their post-1980 experience.  It can select all or some of them as and when required in a 
way that is suitable for its cause. 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The South Korean and Taiwan experience discussed above provides Sri Lanka with many 
lessons. Their development experience as industrialized countries during the five decades 
from 1950 to 2000 was extraordinary.  Although there are differences in political and 
cultural factors, most initial conditions and economic factors of the two East Asian countries 
are relevant to Sri Lanka.   Along with the insight gained in the literature review (Chapter 
Two), those lessons are incorporated in the conceptual framework developed in the next 









As discussed in the literature survey in Chapter Two, there are several industrial 
development strategies that a country can use in order to achieve socio-economic 
objectives, i.e. (a) import substitution or autarkic industry policy (AIP), (b) free trade 
policy, (c) strategic trade policy, and (d) competitive industry policy (CIP).  The task of this 
chapter is to consider each of the above strategies and develop an analytical model that can 
be used to address the growth problem of Sri Lanka. 
 
AIP was popular among LDCs during the post-War period, but now has little support as a 
development strategy because of its adverse consequences (Little, 1982; Lal, 1983; Kruger, 
1990). Not only it is of little help to alleviate unemployment problem in LDCs as it usually 
encourages capital-intensive industries, but also it can encourage ‘rent seeking’ resulting in 
misallocation of resources and corruption. There are views that prolonged implementation 
of such policies creates an inefficient domestic entrepreneurial class, which is not healthy 
for the society in the long run.  Import substitution also results in over-valuation of the 
exchange rate, which will further aggravate balance of payments problems (Krueger, 1984).  
In view of these weaknesses, this study does not consider AIP as a development strategy 
suitable for a small economy such as Sri Lanka.   
 
 Theoretically, strategic trade policy as a development strategy is mainly suitable for 
industries where there are a few large-scale firms.  This strategy emphasizes the importance 
of acquiring cost advantage by the domestic industrial sector over foreign rival firms.   
Government promotion of exports from imperfectly competitive industries enables 
domestic firms to capture economic rents from foreign firms, thereby increasing national 
welfare.  This is achieved by selecting industries which require high capital outlays, high 
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R&D and give sufficient scale economies1 (Krugman, 1992; Baldwin, 1991). Sri Lanka is a 
capital-poor, small economy somewhat similar in size to Taiwan. Until it achieves a certain 
level of industrial maturity, it is hard to justify the viability of large-scale industries.  
Therefore, this strategy is of little relevance to Sri Lanka.  
 
Under traditional neo-classical economic assumptions, free trade is superior to all other 
strategies.  It is believed that free trade enables a country to use resources efficiently 
benefiting both producers and consumers with increased welfare (Balassa, 1988; Lall, 1983; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1992).  This theoretical superiority of free trade has 
however, been questioned with the emergence of recent literature on ‘statist political 
economy’ (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1994; Weiss, 1995) which has recently 
received increased recognition among policy makers. 
 
Traditional trade theory with its emphasis on static allocative efficiency has limitations 
when explaining how trade and industry policy influences economic growth through such 
mechanisms as R&D, technological diffusion, and learning by doing. The new growth 
theory, on the other hand, is capable of explaining how such dynamic factors influence 
growth.  This has made it somewhat easier for the ‘statists’ to show how state policies are a 
major determinant of industrial output. East Asian experience has shown that the 
government can manipulate the policy to get the desired outcome while conforming to 
general free market principles (Wade, 1990).  There is also growing evidence supporting 
the role of both trade and industry policies in industrialization (Amsden, 1989, 1994; Wade, 
1990, 1994; Evan, 1989, 1995).   The hypothesis under investigation therefore is that the 
competitive industry policy strategy is more relevant to Sri Lanka than any other strategy 
discussed above. It is useful therefore to conceptualize the causal relationship between a 
competitive industry policy and economic performance, which is discussed below. 
                                                          
1 Large-scale capital-intensive industries such as motor vehicle meet these criteria. 
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5.2 Competitive Industry Policy and Growth: A Theoretical Perspective 
The relationship between development policy and growth was discussed in the literature 
review.  The East Asian development experience was discussed in Chapter Four, and it 
showed how an economy could utilize a competitive industry policy to achieve industrial 
development. This section therefore develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of 
Sri Lanka’s development problem, amalgamating theoretical inputs from all of the above 
sources into a one coherent unit.  It is hypothesized here that by following this model, 
which is an ideal type, Sri Lanka can achieve rapid growth and industrialization.  Under this 
strategy, the government is assigned a leading role in the economy.  This section illustrates 




As noted, there is a close link between world trade and domestic production for a small 
open economy.  Thus, world demand is the key factor influencing higher economic 
growth.3 The higher the world demand, the greater would be the national output.  With 
increased output, the economy acquires productivity gains leading to further increases in 
demand.  Thus, ‘the initial level of exports determines the country’s international 
competitiveness, which in turn influences the rate of growth in world demand’ (Kim, 1995, 
p.90). Thus, it develops itself into a virtuous circle: the more the country can sell abroad, 
the more competitive it will be. If the country loses its initial share of the world market, the 
domestic production level declines resulting in a lower productivity.  State intervention can 
remedy the situation by using trade policy to restore world demand or industry policy to 
regain competitiveness.   The World Bank’s (1993) model of East Asian growth, on the 
other hand, attributed the superior performance of these countries to the influence of 
macroeconomic stability, institutions, and selective interventions, in addition to free trade 
policy.   Using inputs from both of these approaches, this study develops a new framework 
to illustrate the causation between CIP and economic growth  (Figure 5.1 in page 135). 
                                                          
2  Inputs from following sources were mainly useful for this framework: Kim (1995), World Bank (1993), Wade (1990), Amsden (1989), 
Johnson (1982), and Evans (1989).  
3 See Figure 2.1, Chapter Two. 
 
 134 
As can be seen, an economy can enhance its manufacturing output by expanding its share in 
the world market. For this, it is important for the domestic firms to be competitive.  Thus, 
CIP can be used to maintain the virtuous circle in motion. CIP includes both trade policy 
and industry policy.4  Thus, to expand manufacturing output the government can use 
industry policy measures such as establishment of FTZs, sector targeting, directed credit, 
R&D incentives, infrastructure development, and human capital development.  It can also 
use trade policy measures such as tariffs and QRs, FDI, and exchange rate as and when 
required. The above framework fits fairly closely with the East Asian state-led development 
approach.  This framework assigns an important role to state as the engine of growth.   
 
Developmental State  
The state can be defined as a “goal-oriented institution operating as an intervening variable 
between a country’s given historical, economic, political and natural conditions and 
economic outcomes” (Lee, 1993, p.12). It is an institution of special importance for the 
development process. The extent of its involvement in the economy reflects the socio-
cultural expectations of both its rulers and the citizens.  As such, states can be of different 
types and styles. 
 
According to the way the economic and political activities are regulated, there are three 
types of states (Lee, 1993). The minimal (i.e. non-interventionist) state intervenes in the 
market only to correct narrowly defined instances of market failure such as deficiencies in 
the provision of public goods or environmental protection.  In maximal states, on the other 
hand, the state’s political authority in the economy is predominant and reinforced by its 
ownership of the means of production.   In between the two extremes is the medium state. 
Its intervention goes beyond that of correcting market failure.  However, it does not allow 
complete control of the economy through the political authority.  According to Lee, South 
Korea and Taiwan are medium states. 
                                                          
4 CIP differs from traditional industry policy only in that they (CIP) are less distortive, selective, and temporary. 
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Figure 5.1  
Competitive Industry Policy and Economic Development 
Conceptual Framework and Approach 
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States can also be classified as hard states and soft states (Myrdal, 1968; Lee, 1993, 
Degnbol-Martinussen, 2001).  Hard states can be defined as those that are ready to place 
obligations on people in all social strata and to require rigorous enforcement of those 
obligations. Soft states, on the other hand, are those with a lower level of social discipline 
and as such, leaders are unwilling to impose obligations on the people (Myrdal, 1968). Such 
states are exposed to the ravages of rent seeking activities.    
 
The relative effectiveness of different types of states can be assessed in terms of their 
capacity to fulfil different socio-economic and political tasks.  An economy with the goal of 
rapid development would require a hard state because development requires a well-
coordinated exercise by the whole society.    It is able to resist the pressure from social 
groups and partisan interests, which affect the society’s innovational and adaptational 
capacity (Olson, 1982).  It is believed that the hard Confucian state set the basic background 
for the peculiar role of the state in East Asia (Lee, 1993).   
 
The view that East Asian development experience is a result of strong state activism is 
strongly supported by Bradford (1986, p. 123): 
 The dichotomy between market forces and government intervention is not only 
overdrawn; it misconceives the fundamental dynamic at work.  It is the degree of 
consistency between the two sectors -rather than the extent of the implicit or explicit 
conflict- that has been important in the successful development cases.  A coherent 
development strategy was not only formulated but also followed by both the 
government and the private sector in providing an unusual degree of common 
direction to national energies in these cases. 
 
Providing a theory of ‘government intervention’ for late industrialization, Amsden (1989) 
argues that inability of poorer nations to industrialize is due to the working of the market, 
and not the failure of the market. As Amsden asserts, state intervention is necessary even in 
the most plausible cases of comparative advantage due to some inherent problems such as 
technology gap, investment barriers, and savings deficiencies. In the absence of novel 
technology, the state needs to intervene and deliberately distort prices to stimulate 
investment and trade.  Therefore, a strong interventionist state is a prerequisite for late 




An alternative work in this regard is found in the work of Evans (1989) who distinguishes 
between three main forms of states: predatory, intermediate, and developmental, and takes 
South Korea as a prototype of a ‘developmental state’. A coherent and efficient bureaucracy 
equipped with strong internal networks characterizes Evan’s developmental state. It also 
enjoys a great deal of autonomy in decision-making, and maintains close connections with 
‘major players’ of the economy such as big business firms.  
 
Shin (1998) points out that economic development is a common objective of all political 
regimes, and that they differ only in their approach and ideology.  Asserting that the modern 
political regime is a kind of developmental state, Shin identified the following distinctive 
features in East Asian developmental state (1998, pp.7-8): (a) existence of autocratic power; 
(b) presence of economic policy making bodies in the economy;5 (c) management of 
investment by controlling the flow of money; (d) initiation of export-oriented 
industrialization as a strategy for economic growth; (e) creation of economic agencies and 
big business to carry out economic planning in the private  sector; and (f) maintenance  of a 
good business climate.   
 
The concept of a developmental state was originally suggested by Johnson (1982) to 
explain the role of the state in organizing the economic activities of private firms, which he 
believed could serve as a model for other countries.  As Degnbol-Martinussen (2001, pp. 
33-34) points out, Johnson’s developmental state has four fundamental characteristics: (a) 
political stability and an efficient bureaucracy which is immune from political influences so 
that it can function technocratically, (b) division of labour between state and private sector 
under the guidance of planning authority,  (c) the state’s increased commitment to 
investment in education, and social equity, and (d) the state’s preference for market 
conforming interventions where necessary.    
                                                          
5  E.g. The Economic Planning Board in South Korea, and the Council for Economic Planning and Development in Taiwan. 
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The developmental state model clearly shows how a country can achieve development 
objectives by using both free trade policy and industry policy.  It emphasizes the importance 
of the coexistence between the government and the market.  
 
5.3 Role of Trade Policy 
In order to see whether there is a case for CIP, we first examine whether trade policy alone 
can increase economic growth in a LDC such as Sri Lanka (see Figure 5.2 in page 139).  
Accordingly, the role of following policy variables on economic growth is analysed here:6 
Tariff, QRs, exchange rate, and FDI.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, trade policy reforms anticipate that markets correct 
themselves and achieve efficient outcomes for the economy.  There are numerous studies 
exploring the relationship between trade and economic growth.  This was also seen in 
Chapter Four which discussed how Taiwan and South Korea used such policies to 
accelerate their economic growth.   
 
Tariff 
A major policy measure under trade policy is reduction or abolition of tariffs. The most 
immediate effect of such a move would be an increase in imports.  Lower tariffs would 
result in extra buying power by consumers. In turn, it becomes a stimulant to other areas of 
domestic production.   Since the domestic market is now exposed to foreign competition, 
domestic industries have to become more efficient to remain competitive.  Theoretically, a 
low tariff protection compels the domestic firms to become efficient and lower their cost of 
production. The ultimate effect of reduction or abolition of tariffs is therefore increased 
competitiveness of domestic firms and increased consumer welfare. There are many studies 
showing a positive association  between lower tariff and faster growth (Kruger, 1984; Sachs 
and Warner, 1995; Dollar and Kraay, 2000). The reduction in the cost of imported inputs 
also leads to a higher domestic output and employment. 
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Tariff reduction can adversely affect import competing industries (e.g. light manufacturing 
industries such as bicycles, agricultural tools).  The output of those industries may decline 
resulting in large-scale unemployment and business closures.  With increased imports, 
balance of payments can worsen exerting downward pressure on the exchange rate 
(assuming the exchange rate regime is flexible).  With a lower exchange rate, the economy 
can regain some competitiveness leading to increased exports, and therefore higher 
domestic output and employment.   The ultimate impact depends on whether the growth in 
export industries is greater or less than the decline in import competing industries.  
 
The theoretical implications of tariff reduction described above may not materialize in 
practice for developing countries like Sri Lanka.  If imports exceed exports continuously, 
there are grounds for concern about advocating a liberalised policy regime.   This can be 
due to any of the following reasons: 
(a) High value of imports and low value of exports;7 
(b) Fall in output in import competing industries outweighs the gains from expansion of 
exporting industries;  
(c) Structural deficiencies inherent in the economy, i.e., there is no sizeable industrial 
sector to benefit from free trade; 
In these situations, a competitive industry policy can be used to promote industrialization in 
a transition period, while preserving the general principles of a market economy. 
 
Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) 
The next vital policy measure to bring an economy towards free trade is the reduction 
and/or removal of import quotas.  Similarly to a reduction of tariffs, the immediate effect 
would be an increase in imports. Since the domestic market is exposed to foreign 
competitors, domestic firms have to be efficient to remain competitive.  As there is little 
room for rent seeking activities and corruptions, such a policy will improve resource 
allocation in the economy.   Theoretically, the ultimate effect of reducing QRs is increased 
efficiency for domestic firms and increased welfare for consumers.   
                                                          
7 With liberalization, it is normally the case that LDCs such as Sri Lanka will import more (especially the intermediates and capital 




The immediate effect of the removal of quotas is increased imports. This can result in a 
decrease in both domestic output and employment hampering the growth potential of 
import-competing domestic industries (e.g. textiles, radio, bicycles).   These sectors may 
require restructuring in order to remain competitive and thereby increase production and 
employment in the long run.  In this case, industry policy can be used to complement trade 
policy.  Another inevitable outcome of increased imports is the worsening of the balance of 
payments difficulties.  It will thus exert extra pressure on the exchange rate. If the exchange 
rate regime is fixed, the monetary authorities need to possess extra foreign reserves to 
counteract the pressure. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, however, this will be offset 
by a depreciation of the domestic currency that can boost exports and thereby output and 
employment.   However, in the long run this policy is expected to contribute to growth due 
to improved efficiency of industries.  
 
Exchange Rate 
An essential requirement under trade policy reforms is exchange rate liberalization. This is 
normally achieved by making the exchange rate regime flexible.   In order to encourage 
local manufacturers through the importation of cheap capital and intermediate goods, 
foreign exchange rates in LDCs are often artificially over-valued.  This has the effect of 
raising the price of exports and lowering the price of imports in terms of the local currency.   
An overvalued exchange rate encourages capital-intensive production methods, and 
penalizes the export sector, particularly the traditional primary exports, by artificially 
raising the price of exports in terms of foreign currencies. This causes local producers to be 
less competitive in world market.  In terms of its distributional effects, the outcome of such 
policies may be to penalize the small farmers and the self-employed while improving the 
profits of owners of capital, both foreign and local.  By allowing the exchange rate to be 
determined in the market with an initial devaluation if necessary, a country can get rid of 
those unfavourable consequences and encourage foreign trade.  Real depreciation makes 
exports cheaper for foreign buyers, and thereby promotes domestic production and 




However, a flexible exchange rate regime is not always desirable for small nations who are 
heavily dependant on exports and imports such as Sri Lanka because they are unpredictable, 
subject to wide and uncontrollable fluctuations, and susceptible to foreign and domestic 
currency speculations. Such unpredictable fluctuations can disturb both short and long-term 
development objectives of developing nations.8    
 
Capital Market 
Another important requirement under trade policy reforms is the need to allow for the 
international capital mobility.  The international flow of financial resources takes two main 
forms: private foreign investment (FDI) mainly by the multinational corporations with 
headquarters in developed countries, and public development assistance (foreign aid) from 
both foreign governments and multinational donor agencies. The traditional neo-classical 
analysis considers FDI (as well as foreign aid) as a way of filling gaps between the 
domestically available supplies of savings, foreign exchange, government revenue, and 
skills and the planned level of those resources necessary to achieve development targets.  
Opening of capital account enables the economy to mobilize more savings for economic 
activities enhancing growth.  As seen in the literature survey, FDI can bring about not only 
direct benefits such as increased output and employment but also indirect benefits such as 
diffusion of new technology and skills development, in such capital-deficit economies.  It is 
those indirect benefits which are very vital for a sustainable domestic industrial sector.  To 
facilitate FDI, governments in LDCs can take initiatives by further liberalizing their capital 
markets. 
 
However, removal of restrictions on capital transactions can have certain adverse effects in 
the LDC’s economy especially in the long run such as foreign exchange difficulties, loss of 
public revenue, changed savings and investing habits of domestic individuals, and 
introduction of inappropriate products and technologies of production.  This can also 
encourage local firms to borrow excessively from overseas creating a possibility of a 
financial crisis as experienced in South Korea. 
                                                          






From the above points, it can be argued that trade policies alone cannot achieve 
industrialization for developing countries.  When the economy is opened for world trade, it 
is often the case that imports increase more than exports aggravating balance of payments 
problems in those countries.  Moreover, for trade policies to be effective the country needs 
to have a reasonably developed industrial sector to take advantage of new trading 
opportunities.  LDCs such as Sri Lanka lack such a well-developed industrial base. Free 
trade policies anticipate that these countries quickly respond to the advantage of openness.  
However, local firms sometimes cannot respond to the free trade opportunities due to 
inherent problems including inappropriate technology, and lack of capital.  Another 
common problem with free trade is that exposure to foreign trade results in reduced 
employment in import-competing industries, which can create political pressure that few 
states can withstand in the short run.  Fluctuations in the exchange rate can result in reduced 
investor confidence in the economy leading to a sluggish growth.  Foreign investment may 
flow mainly into low value-added, comparative advantage industries, which does not 
provide a good basis for substantial economic development in such countries. 
 
In view of the above problems associated with free trade policy, it is important that   LDCs  
use industry policies to complement trade policies.  
 
5.4 Role of Industry Policy  
This section discusses in detail how industry policy can be used to supplement the trade 
policies to achieve industrialization objectives in LDCs such as Sri Lanka (see Figure 5.1).  
Accordingly, the impact of the following industry policy variables on economic growth in 
Sri Lanka policy are discussed here:9 Sector targeting, credit allocation, infrastructure 
development, creation of EPZs, human resource development policy, R&D and government 
procurement.  
 
                                                          
9 Chapter Six gives reasons for selecting these variables in detail. 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, trade policy reforms anticipate that markets correct 
themselves and achieve efficient outcomes.  However, in reality markets do not operate 
efficiently and the government needs to apply industry policy to allocate resources so as to 
achieve efficient outcomes.   These policies aim to improve the competitiveness of the 
industries which have the potential to export by enabling firms to benefit from opportunities 
opened up by free trade.  The objective of these policy measures is, therefore, to maximize 
resource allocation to achieve the optimal outcome.   
 
Sector Targeting 
One of the main industry policy instruments is sector targeting. The aim of this policy is to 
build up new export industries, particularly value-added industries.  It also assists to 
restructure domestic demand industries especially by improving their capital and labour 
skills. Thus, unlike pure trade policies it can be effectively used to improve the import 
competing potential of these domestic industries.  Such industries can develop export 
potential over time.   In East Asian economies, this has been the case. The role of small 
manufacturing enterprises (SMEs) in the economy is also vital here. They usually play a 
considerable role in the LDCs' economies not only contributing directly to employment and 
output, but also indirectly to increased aggregate demand through linkages with other 
sectors in the economy.  The policy of sector targeting can effectively be used to generate 
and develop such SMEs as providers of supportive services including parts and components 
for those target export industries.   
 
The next question is how to select target industries?  It can be on the basis of world demand 
or the country’s capacity for the production of specific goods and services.   In the former 
case, production or trade information already available can be used to identify the potential 
export markets.  In the latter case, target industries can be identified by factors such as 
potential comparative advantages, availability of natural resources, and or the level of skills 





Credit allocation is another option that can be utilized to increase the competitiveness of 
industries. Directed credits towards specific sectors have been one of the major industry 
policy measures used by the East Asian NICs, especially South Korea and Taiwan 
(Dahlman and Sananikone, 1996). This is an area where Sri Lanka can learn a great deal. 
As Agrawal et al. (2000, p.72) point out, “in the presence of asymmetric or costly 
information, the banks will tend to lend mostly to the well-established and well-off 
individuals and firms.”   They normally ignore any positive externalities that would be 
forthcoming as a result of credit allocation for certain activities such as exports, or firms in 
an emerging sector.  There is therefore, support for government intervention in credit 
allocation on the ground of market failure (Stiglitz, 1993).  
 
 The sectors, which the government earmarks as potential employment generators, can be 
assisted by diverting low cost capital to those sectors.  This can be used to sustain both the 
exporting and import competing industries (mainly SMEs).   Sometimes, this policy can be 
linked with the village level poverty alleviating enterprises, if any, which can also play an 
important role in LDCs. The ultimate objective of this policy is to increase output and 
employment in the selected sectors and thereby achieve higher growth through increased 
exports. However, when allocating scarce resources (credit) among competing areas, it is 
also necessary to consider the possible inflationary effects this may exert on the economy. 
 
Infrastructure Development 
Another useful step in creating a competitive environment is infrastructure development 
projects.  The underlying logic is to reduce establishment cost and operational cost for the 
new investments and thereby to encourage the development of trading enterprises. This can 
be achieved by allocating resources to build or develop ports, roads, telecommunication 
systems, electricity and water supply, and waste disposal systems, which are all necessary 
factors for industrialization.  The problem, however, is to mobilize resources for these 
projects.  The government may be required to prioritize these needs and allocate money 
through the annual budget.  Another useful strategy is to encourage private participation in 
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such projects.  The BOO-BOOT (build, operate, and own or build, operate, own, and 
transfer) is a popular arrangement widely used by the governments in order to develop such 
projects.  If such services are currently carried out by state owned enterprises (SOEs) with a 
heavy burden on the government fiscal operations, privatization of those SOEs is another 
step which may improve supply and productivity in such services. 
 
Export Processing Zones 
Export processing zones (also known as Free Trade Zones (FTZ) or investment promotion 
zones) are used as a development strategy by many countries.  This strategy was first used 
in Shannon, Ireland in 1958.  Its success provided the impetus for other countries to 
establish similar zones.  In the Asian region, Taiwan was the first to experiment with this 
concept by establishing its Kaohsiung Export Promotion Zone in 1965 (People’s Bank, 
1982). 
 
Most of the newly industrialized economies have relied heavily on FTZs in the initial stages 
of export-oriented development strategy. Three is a question as to why we would need FTZs 
under a free trade regime. One reason is that industries operating in a FTZ have the 
advantage of concentrated infrastructure where they benefit from agglomeration economies 
as they act as a focus for support services and training programs, which can have a vital role 
in the industrialization process in LDCs.  During the interim period, it is useful to create 
and provide such support services under FTZs although they may need renaming as 
‘industrial parks’ or ‘enterprise zones’ to better reflect their new role.  
 
Foreign direct investment is vital for industrialization in LDCs.  As shown above, free trade 
policies alone cannot guarantee that a country will receive enough foreign investment. If 
this is the case, the government needs to take extra measures to encourage FDI.  Assistance 
through tax holidays, low-cost infrastructure, and labour training and government 
leadership are some of the widely used means available to achieve this objective.  The 




Human Resource Policy 
Human capital development is considered to be one of the key factors in the East Asian 
industrialization.  It can affect the ability of the manufacturing sector to compete in world 
markets in two ways (Agrawal, 2000, p.117): First, it can enhance productivity of labour 
force by increasing its capacity to absorb new information and assimilate new skills. A 
well-educated workforce enables a country to keep pace with rapid technological change.  
Secondly, it can enhance entrepreneurial and managerial capabilities such as risk taking, 
planning, organizing, and individual responsibility.  Formal education is the most important 
determinant of human resource development.  However, activities involving training, 
research, on the job training can also play an important role.  East Asian economies have 
placed a greater emphasis on training in science and engineering, as well as vocational   and 
in-firm job training.  As  Lall (1990, p27) points out, “while all kinds of education are 
important…their significance depends on the level of industrial development.” This 
indicates that constant revision of training and development programmes is also required to 
match the current needs of the economy.   
 
Government Procurement 
Government procurement is another policy tool which can contribute significantly to the 
industrialization objective.  This takes the form of a strategic agreement between the 
government and the suppliers of certain services subject to certain conditions such as prices 
and quality.  The government can agree to purchase certain goods or services from a local 
producer enabling that producer to expand its output and become competitive within a pre-
determined period.  The local firm however must have a strategy to improve its productivity 
and/or enhance labour skills as a condition of receiving the government contract.  Such 
firms, once well established, can expand their output overseas and become a leading 




Research and Development (R&D) 
Another major industry policy tool that can be used to accelerate growth in the long run is 
R&D expenditure.  In fact, R&D commitment of the government has been one of the main 
contributory factors in the maintenance of international competitiveness in the East Asian 
NICs (Ranis, 1999). Combined with highly skilled labour force, R&D investments have 
been the dominant component of the interaction between productivity change and exports in 
these countries in recent years. R&D can be used to raise technological competence in the 
economy, particularly at low levels of industrial development.  It enables an economy to 
keep track of and absorb new technologies.  A growing base of R&D capabilities permits 
better and faster diffusion of technology with in the economy.  As Lall (1996, p.60) 
explains, “it permits the industrial sector as a whole to achieve a greater flexibility and 
diversification of industrial activity, and allows it greater autonomy by creating a 
technology culture.” 
 
How important is R&D for economic growth? As Griffith (2000, p.2) points out, this 
depends on “how much output will increase when the level of R&D input increases.” This 
can be measured by estimating the elasticity of output with respect to capital stock, which 
normally equates the rate of return to R&D multiplied by the share of the R&D stock in 
output.   
 
Evaluation 
The industry policy measures discussed above can be used in conjunction with trade 
policies to achieve the industrialization objective by filling the gaps where trade policies 
fail.  However, it should be noted that the above policies are not without shortcomings.   
For instance, there is the risk that the assisted industries can go bankrupt once the assistance 
is withdrawn if they are not associated with an efficient industry development plan. There is 
always a risk that the assisted industry will become support-dependant if they are been 




Very high dependence on industry policies can become an unmanageable burden for already 
resource-poor LDCs.  They can worsen the government fiscal situation if they lead to an 
over-commitment of public funds.  In these circumstances, such policies will create an 
unnecessary burden on the economy.  Moreover, increased government assistance given to 
target industries can increase inflationary tendencies in the economy.  
 
 This approach demands the service of an efficient and dedicated public service to 
coordinate the development objectives of the government. The need for the government to 
maintain a close association with firms can otherwise result in corruption and misuses of 
power.  Another consequence of increased emphasis on manufacturing output is the 
negligence of domestic agriculture.  Agriculture has been, and in some cases still is, the 
major contributor to GDP and employment in many LDCs.  Even under a free trade 
environment, the importance of the agriculture sector cannot be undermined, as this sector's 
contribution to industrialization can be enormous in terms of forward and backward 
linkages.  In view of the above, the actual design of CIP in countries such as Sri Lanka must 
address those possible dangers. 
 
5.5 Other Considerations 
Macroeconomic Environment 
As discussed above, macroeconomic management plays an important role under CIP.  The 
ability of the economy to sustain rapid growth at relatively low rates of inflation while 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate is imperative. Macroeconomic stability was 
viewed as essential to the East Asian success (World Bank, 1993).  None of these countries 
pursue expansionary macroeconomic policy or tolerated “double-digit inflation” while most 
had “small governments” and “small budget deficits” (Fischer, 1996, p.1).    
 
A sustained increase in capital stock through increased savings and investments was one of 
the fundamental factors for the economic success of Taiwan and Korea.  They were the 
“only developing economies in which savings exceeded investment making them net 
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exporters of capital by 1990” (World Bank, 1993, p.41). The secret behind their high saving 
ratios was low inflation ensured by prudent fiscal policy (World Bank, 1993). 
 
Macroeconomic stability of an economy is vital for the growth of exports.  The key 
determinant of a country’s international competitiveness in exports is its real exchange rate 
(Edwards, 1989).  An over-valued real exchange can distort resource allocation in the 
economy by giving incentives for producers to shift from tradable sector to non-tradable 
sector. Not only does it hamper exporting activities, but it also discourages growth-
enhancing capital investment due to uncertainty of future movements in relative prices 
(Grober, 1993; De Long and Summers, 1991).    
 
Inflation can be contained by using fiscal policy, monetary policy, or a combination of both.  
A cause for concern is mainly the fiscal deficit that can exert a negative impact on market 
interest rate by creating inflationary expectations.  As discussed in the literature review, it 
could crowd out private investment, and hamper economic growth. Some of the industry 
policy measures such as infrastructure development, R&D, and human resource 
development involve a significant commitment of government expenditure.  This can 
interfere with the medium-term fiscal target, and thereby other macroeconomic variables 
such as inflation, real interest rate, and exchange rate.  The government may, therefore, 
need to look for some other sources such as foreign aid to implement the above policy 
measures.       
 
When implementing a development strategy based on CIP, maintaining a manageable fiscal 
deficit in the medium-term is a challenge.  A rapid rate of domestic economic growth can 
however reduce the investment risk especially in long-gestation investments such as large-
scale infrastructure projects. A competitive exchange rate on the other hand enables a 
country to maintain exports so that operation at high levels of capacity use is facilitated.  It 




Role of State 
For state activism to be effective, its ability for financial control is also critical. This 
includes not only credit allocations for selected industries, but also using other measures 
such as tariffs and tax incentives appropriately.  In credit allocation, while the state cannot 
only control the financial ability of firms, it can force the firms into full compliance in its 
overall policy objectives.  
 
The East Asian states managed to perform the following important roles effectively: (a) To 
get the cooperation of big business in policy making process by maintaining a close 
relationship with them; (b) To create “an elite bureaucracy staffed by the best managerial 
talents;” and (c) To maintain an “authoritarian political system where the bureaucracy is 
given sufficient scope to take policy initiative” (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993, P.48).   
 
It is believed that the first role above is the most important element for successful 
industrialization as it converts the state into a “quasi internal organization”(QIO) 
(Chowdhury and Islam, 1993. p.48).10   The QIO can operate in two forms: (a) as an 
internal capital market;11 and  (b) as a subtle network of long-term ties with the corporate 
sector.12  Chowdhury and Islam explain the way QIO works as an internal capital market by 
using Williamson’s (1985) theory of the firm.  As they explain, the firm tends to use its 
internal funds to finance its operations “in the presence of high business transaction costs 
and imperfect capital markets.” Similarly, the state “in the presence of imperfect capital 
markets can operate as a vast internal capital market” where it can exercise discretion in 
channelling credits to various industries in the economy (p.48).   This ability of the state as 
a QIO to control and regulate the financial system is very important in formulating a correct 
industrial policy. And also, care should be taken to keep a close eye on foreign borrowings 
                                                          
10 Lee (1992) and Lee and Naya (1988) as cited by Chowdhury and Islam (1993). 
11 Wade (1988) and Lee (1992) as cited by Chowdhury and Islam (1993). 








of such big firms to avoid possible financial crises as experienced by South Korea in late 
1990s.  
 
The QIO can also be used as forum for informal discussions between bureaucrats and 
private firms to discuss on the future course of the economy.  This 'network' role of the QIO 
is some times more effective in terms of final economic outcomes, because it allows for the 
decision making, economizes on communication costs, and reduces uncertainty by 
coordinating the decisions of interdependent units in adapting to unforeseen contingencies 
(Chowdhury and Islam, 1993, p.49).  Firms and governments in most LDCs normally 
operate very distantly, and this can become a barrier for the effectiveness of the QIO role. 
 
The state's commitment to infrastructure development also has contributed significantly to 
the success of East Asian NICs' industrialization. During the initial stage of development, 
state-controlled enterprises constituted a leading sector in those economies.  The majority of 
public funds were allocated to infrastructure projects.  New public sector firms were set up 
to develop industrial infrastructure facilities and to supply inputs to down-stream industries. 
Such projects not only made a major contribution to capital formation and technological 
development but also created forward and backward linkages with other sectors of the 
economy. However, infrastructure development can exert an added burden on government 
budget, which then can make it difficult to maintain its macroeconomic targets such as the 
exchange rate and inflation. 
 
The other widely used tool of industry policy by the East Asian NICs was sector targeting.  
This was achieved by minimizing firm-level risk without conferring rents.  The role of state 
in this regard was to gather information, formulate plan targets, and designate corporate 
tasks.  The government negotiated with the prospective MNC partners to secure absorption 
of the best technology on the most favourable terms.  It encouraged the growth of large 
domestic firms.13  Incentives were given in exchange for the achievement of growth and 
export target.   The incentives were of limited duration because the new comers were 
                                                          




expected to be competitive through organizational changes and innovation under the 
discipline of foreign and domestic competition. 
 
For successful industrialization, states in LDCs therefore, have a critical role to play.   
Trade policies can be used to preserve the market mechanism so that resources are 
efficiently distributed in the economy maximizing everyone's welfare.  Industry policy 
should be introduced to promote selected industries using measures such as directed credit, 
or sector targeting directly, or create the economic conditions suitable for further 
investment in such industries using measures such as R&D, infrastructure, FTZ, or human 
resource development indirectly.     
 
5.6 Research Propositions 
This section makes the following research propositions in the light of the discussions made 
in the previous chapters, and the conceptual framework discussed above.  Further 
discussion on validity or otherwise of these proposition will be made in the next two 
chapters. 
1. Sri Lanka has not managed to achieve the level of economic progress required to be 
considered as a NIC despite significant economic reforms after 1977. 
2. Liberal trade policy is conducive to economic growth as  the world demand is the 
principal determinant of growth for a small open economy.14  
3. Industry policy is conducive to growth as it is an essential complement to trade 
policy.15  
4. A competitive industry policy based on both trade and industry policy will provide a 
better impact on economic growth in Sri Lanka than either policy used in isolation. 
5. To achieve rapid industrialization aiming at NIC status, the government needs to 
accept the role of a developmental state. 
6. It is imperative that Sri Lanka maintains a supportive macroeconomic environment 
evidenced by lower inflation, and realistic interest rates and exchange rates to ensure 
that  trade and industry policy work effectively. 
                                                          
14 As a functional relationship this can be shown as g = f (Trade policy) where g = economic growth. 
15 g = f (Industry policy). 
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7. Sri Lanka can customize a development strategy based on  trade and industry 
policies used by Taiwan and South Korea both before and  after 1980 for rapid 
industrialization aiming at NIC status. 
 
The East Asian experience provides some useful insight as to the nature of the state and the 
extent of intervention required to generate a competitive industrial sector within a 
developing economy.    The two economies under consideration evolved through a long 
period of distinct policy changes. When learning lessons from the two East Asian 
economies,  other LDCs such as Sri Lanka should be careful to select only the relevant 
aspects of their strategy.  For instance, both these nations were early colonies of Japan and 
its influence on their industrial development cannot be overlooked. They had not only the 
financial assistance from the USA in the cold war period, but also the privileged access to 
its market for their products for a considerable time in the past.  Both countries resorted to 
export promotion in the 1960s, earlier than many other LDCs, and continued it along with 
HCI drive during the 1970s.   Since the early 1980s, they have introduced rapid trade 
reforms which contributed to their phenomenal growth during the last two decades. 
 
 The overall world trade system has changed since 1980s, and LDCs such Sri Lanka are 
facing a different situation.16 Therefore, it is also necessary to consider the relevant aspects 
of their policies after 1980. Besides, as explained in Chapter Four, 1980 was arbitrary 
selected by this study as the year in which the two NICs just reached the threshold to 
become a NIC  (in terms of Balassa’s definition discussed in Chapter One).  It was after 
1980 however that both nations experienced a rapid industrialization and growth with 
eventual industrial maturity through competitive industry policy by mid 1990.  As such, this 
study will also consider the relevant aspects of their post-1980 policies as well to suit the 
current world economic circumstances.  
                                                          
16  See Chapter Four (Section 4.1 Introduction) for detail. 
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5.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In the foregoing conceptual framework, a detailed study of the growth path to NIC status 
was made.  In the light of the literature review in Chapter Two and the two case studies 
made in Chapter Four, two types of policies were considered as relevant for the economic 
success of Sri Lanka: trade policies; and industry policies. Each policy has its own strengths 
and weaknesses, and in the real world they can be used in variety of combinations.  
According to neoclassical arguments, free trade policy alone can bring about economic 
success for a country. The statists’ view however is that free trade policy alone is not 
sufficient for the LDCs’ economic success and, therefore, government has an active role 
beyond the correction of market failure.  The proponents of this school of thought believe 
that East Asian NICs such as South Korea and Taiwan achieved economic development by 
following a similar strategy as discussed above (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990).   
There are, however, certain pre-conditions to fulfil for the success of this strategy: 
macroeconomic stability, and a developmental state.  The chapter also made several specific 
research propositions in order to facilitate the quantitative analysis undertaken in Chapter 
Six, and the policy analysis undertaken in Chapter Seven.  
 
The conceptual framework developed using the models of World Bank (1993) and Kim 
(1995) can be taken as an ideal type demonstrating the dynamics of development of an open 
economy.  It proposes a process through which a country can become a NIC by adopting 
competitive industry policies assisted by macroeconomic stability.  In reality however, 
when applying this theoretical model for Sri Lanka in a quantitative context, there could be 
some practical problems in relation to specification of a functional model, selection of 
appropriate variables, and collection of accurate data.  Given those limitations, it is assumed 
that this is a useful framework within which the development problem of Sri Lanka can 






THE POST-1977 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN SRI LANKA 




In the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter, it was argued that a 
development model based on a competitive industrial policy is more relevant to LDCs 
such as Sri Lanka (Proposition 4). The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a diagnostic 
analysis with a view to evaluate the current position of Sri Lanka in terms of NIC status.  
Accordingly, this chapter firstly discusses a methodology to incorporate the key variables 
proposed in the conceptual framework as growth factors.  It undertakes a detailed 
analyses of the performance of the Sri Lankan economy with particular reference to the 
following: (a) the pattern of economic growth in Sri Lanka during the last four decades; 
(b) whether there has been any structural change in the economy after 1977; (c) the 
sources of growth during the post-1977 period; and (d) evaluation of the results in terms 
of theoretical expectations. 
 
6.2 Methodology 
As noted in the South Korean and the Taiwan cases, a competitive industry policy can 
play a major role in achieving a higher economic growth for LDCs. The basic argument 
of this study is that trade reforms alone cannot help LDCs achieve economic success, 
and hence industry policy has an important role to play in the economy. The next 
question is how to identify the contribution of those policies to economic growth.  It 
would therefore be useful to explore various mathematical, statistical, and conceptual 
models, which have been used to analyze such economic relationships in the past.  In the 





Mathematical Growth Models 
One of the earliest growth models, which were popular among planners until 
neoclassical theory received wider acceptance in the mid-1950s, was the Harrod-Domar 
model.1  It was based on two assumptions:  (i) the aggregate demand and supply would 
be balanced when investment (It) in any period equals the change in the national income 
(Yt-Yt-1) times the capital output ratio (k); and (ii) at equilibrium, in a closed economy 
investment (It) is equal to savings (St). Thus, according to this model, economic growth 
depends on savings rate and capital output ratio. If capital output ratio (k) is constant 
then growth of output depends on the saving rate of the economy.2  
 
A main problem with this model was the assumption of a strict link between growth of 
capital stock on the one hand and the consequent growth of potential output on the other, 
implying that physical capital accumulation is the only ultimate source of growth if 
demand conditions are set correctly.  Thus, this model left little scope for other factors 
and forces in the growth process. However, Bruton (1955) revised the above model with 
an important but simple extension of the model introducing foreign trade, imports (I) and 
exports (X) so that kksg // δ+=  where, YXI /)( −=δ .  The significance of this is 
that imports can only exceed exports if a country is in receipt of aid, credit or foreign 
investment.  Such a capital transfer enables the economy to make additional investments. 
The income generating effect of this additional investment is assumed to be the same as 
that from investment financed by domestic savings.  Thus, this opening up of the model 
indicates a strategic growth-generating role for foreign resources in poor countries. 
 
Solow (1956) studied economic growth using the neoclassical production function 
assuming constant returns to scale in capital and labour but decreasing returns to capital 
alone.3  Taking the rates of savings and population growth, and technological progress as 
exogenous, Solow showed that these variables determine the steady-state level of income 
per capita. Because saving and population growth rates vary across countries, different 
countries reach different steady states. Solow’s model gave simple testable predictions 
                                                          
1  This model was developed by Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946). 
2 These assumptions produce the equilibrium condition that:  It= St = k(Yt-Yt-1).  By dividing the above equation through by Yt to 
produce saving rate, s, equal to St /Yt and the growth rate, g, equal to (Yt-Yt-1)/Yt we obtain the Harrod-Domer growth equation: s = 
kg  or g = s/k.  If “k” is constant then output will grow at “g” because a higher “s” will lead to a higher long-run output per head. 
3 The model is Yt = A(t) Kt  Lt  where Y is output, K is Capital and L is labour. A reflects the level of technology which is assumed 
to be growing at the constant rate g, so A (t) = A (0)egt.  The parameter g is often referred to as the exogenous productivity growth 
rate.  It is called exogenous because it is unaffected by any of the parameters of the model such as the share of capital (K). 
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about how these variables influence the steady state level of income.  The higher the rate 
of saving, the richer the country.  The higher the rate of population growth, the poorer 
the country.  This model has been used to show how exogenous technological progress 
might be needed to sustain economic growth.  However, it was of little use to find 
solutions to questions such as why there were wide disparities of growth rates among 
countries, how trade affects growth prospects, how institutions and culture affect long 
run growth, and how government policies can be used to accelerate growth.  
 
Recent models of economic growth can generate long-term growth without relying on 
exogenous changes in technology.  A general feature of these models is the endogenous 
determination of the long-run rate of growth through aggregative increasing returns to 
scale induced by human capital accumulation (Romer, 1986; Lucus, 1988; Rebelo, 
1991). Growth is endogenous in the sense that it occurs in the absence of exogenous 
increases in productivity such as those attributed to technical progress in the neoclassical 
growth model.  
 
Models based on the new growth theory assume that technology grows endogenously.4  
In one type of endogenous growth models, growth of technology (A) is assumed to 
depend on growth of capital (K).  New investments foster inventories and improvements 
in the machines that comprise the stock of capital.  There is also assumed to be 
momentum to advances in knowledge.   Inventions and productivity advance themselves 
leading to more knowledge by what is known as the ‘learning by doing effect’.  In other 
models, an increase in labour input also increases the stock of knowledge.  As Stadler 
(1990, p.764) argues: "The greater the level of labour input, the greater the scope for 
learning and acquisition of new skills.  A higher level of labour input also requires more 
intensive use of factors fixed in the short run, thus raising the incentives to eliminate 
waste and other bottlenecks." 
 
Those endogenous models became increasingly useful in studying not only how profit 
driven industrial innovations and income driven education and training can fuel long run 
                                                          
4 Assume that the production function is Yt = F (K t, L t, A t) where Y is the level of output, K is the level of capital, and L is the 
level of labour.  In this model, output also depends on level of technology (A), which now appears inside the production function as 
one of the endogenous inputs.  The relationship between output and technology is however, different from that with other inputs.  
The level of technology is not assumed to grow exogenously. 
 
 159 
growth, but also how income distribution, cultural norms, and political institutions affect 
economic growth. 
 
Recent Quantitative Models 
 Scholars have widely used statistical regression models to examine the sources of 
growth. Most of those studies examine the relationship between trade, especially exports, 
and economic growth (Balassa, 1978; Michael, 1977; Metwally and Tamaschke, 1980).5 
Some studies show that exports contribute to GDP growth in more ways than just 
through the change in the volume of exports (Krueger, 1978; Feder, 1982; Kavoussi, 
1982). Most of these studies explain the various indirect contributions of exports to 
economic growth as a result of greater capacity utilization, economies of scale, 
incentives for innovation and efficient management due to competitive pressure abroad. 
They maintain the view that export expansion contributes to economic growth by 
increasing the rate of capital formation and enhancing the growth of factor productivity. 
 
Most of the recent studies in this area are cross-sectional studies. Feder (1982) for 
example used a regression model using non-export sector output, export sector output, 
sector specific capital stock and sector specific labour stock as dependent variables to 
examine the sources of growth for a group of semi-industrialized LDCs in the period 
1964-1973. The study found that marginal factor productivities are significantly higher 
in the export sector, and that the growth can be generated not only by increasing the 
aggregate levels of labour and capital, but also by the reallocation of existing resources 
from the less efficient non-export sector to the highly productive export sector. A similar 
study was made by Kavoussi (1982) to examine the argument that exports contribute to 
growth by increasing the rate of capital formation and enhancing total factor 
productivity. He used average annual growth rates of GNP, investment, labour force and 
exports for a sample of 73 countries between 1960 and 1978.   The findings of the study 
were that in both low and middle income countries, export expansion is associated with 
better economic performance and that an important cause of this association is the 
favourable impact of exports on total factor productivity (TFP). 
 
                                                          
5 There is little quantitative research in the literature exploring the relationship between industry policy variables and growth, which 
is the main focus of this thesis.  This is the reason for reviewing only the studies based on trade and growth here.   
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Kavoussi also showed that while primary exports seem to raise TFP, at low-income 
level, their effectiveness on the productivity front tends to diminish as countries become 
more advanced.  On the other hand, among middle-income countries, gains from export 
expansion are significant only in those countries that shift to exports of manufactured 
products.  The survey further shows that if primary exports contribute to economic 
growth in more advanced developing countries, they do so mainly through the 
acceleration of the rate of capital formation.  A significant finding of this study is that 
exports can enhance economic performance even in cases where they have no effect on 
factor productivity. 
 
Ram (1987) used two models to provide estimates on export-growth linkage for 88 
countries on the basis of annual time series data for each country: One is the 
conventional production function framework in which the level of exports enters as an 
input in the production process,6 and the other is the framework proposed by Feder 
which we discussed above.  The study found, among others, that in the entire sample of 
88 countries, the coefficient of exports variable is positive for more than 80 per cent of 
the countries, and nearly one half of those positive coefficients are statistically 
significant at least at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Lopez (1991) examined the effects of trade and macroeconomic policies on economic 
growth using cross-country data for a set of 35 LDCs for the period 1975-85.7 He 
postulated that the rate of growth of productivity depends on the trade/macro policy 
regime.  The more open the trade regime is, the more rapid the adoption of new 
technologies is likely to be, and hence, export and import restrictions hinder economic 
growth.  The major findings of the study are that a stable exchange rate is crucial to 
economic growth; export promotion generates faster economic growth than import 
                                                          
6 This is the form that have been used by most studies which is derived from a general production function of the following type:  Y 
= f ( L, K, X) where Y is real output, L and K are the conventional; labour and capital inputs, and X denotes the level of exports.  
Taking differential from both sides and manipulating the expression, growth equation can be derived in the following form: 
')/(' XXYIKLLY βαβ ++  where '' andXY  represent their real growth rates. 
7 The model was: Y = F (K, L, Z; A) – q A  where Y is GDP level, K is the stock of physical capital, L is labour, Z is the level of 
imported intermediate inputs, A is an index of productivity, and q is the real price of imported intermediate inputs. Assuming that 
the effect of Z on GDP is zero if GDP is measured in domestic prices as is the case with conventional statistics, Lopez postulated the 
following growth equation: 
AALLKKY ˆˆˆˆ ααα ++=    where Ŷ  is per capita GDP growth, K̂  is the rate of growth of capital, A is the rate of productivity 
growth, and   Kα  , Lα , and Aα  are fixed coefficients. 
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liberalization; economic instability and foreign debt are key determinants of capital 
growth. 
 
A recent study by Shamshad and Shamsuddin (1998) show that export growth has 
significantly increased economic growth through its positive impact on total factor 
productivity in the economy.8  They further point out that an increase in the share of 
investment in GDP significantly increases the growth rate of GDP in normal years, but 
the increase is negligible in abnormal years (due to political turmoil, wars, or natural 
disasters etc).  
 
Piazolo (1995) examined the determinants of economic growth for South Korea using a  
statistical model taking into account a wide range of growth factors such as labour, 
capital, exports, trade policy, institutional arrangements, and the role of government.9   
The study showed that human capital, investment, and exports enhanced economic 
development, while inflation and government consumption exerted a negative influence 
on growth.  Other than capturing the growth factors of the South Korean economy, it 
does not relate the outcomes to policies in operation.  However, among the various 
approaches, Piazolo's model is more useful for this study only because it includes a wide 
range of policy, and institutional variables.  Other than that, it could be of little relevance 
for any direct policy comparison between the two economies. 
 
Conceptual Methods 
Economic relationships can also be analyzed using descriptive or conceptual models.  
From the beginning of modern economics as a field of study, economic growth has been 
a central area of inquiry.10 With the troubled economic times after World War I, 
economists began to comprehend quantitatively what they had long known qualitatively.  
                                                          
8 They formulated a two-sector growth model based on Feder’s above model to investigate the effect of exports on economic growth 
in Bangladesh.  Using annual data for the period 1961-92, the study estimates an autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic model 
of economic growth, which is found to capture the volatility of the Bangladesh economy. 
9 Piazolo used a single equation regression in the following form:  
 Yt = a0 + a1X1t + a2X2t + .......+ akXkt+ Ut        for t =1, 2, ...,T.  where Y is the GDP growth rate, and the variables X1 to  Xn 
represent the following: Labour (Population, Education); Capital (Gross Investment, Foreign Debt); Foreign Trade (Exports); Trade 
Policy (ISI, EP); Institutions (Inflation, Government revenue, Government Consumption, wages).  He also used this methodology to 
study the sources of growth in Indonesia and South Africa. 
10 For example, much of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations was about economic growth. He used descriptive methodology in 
building his profound theories.  Although the formal theories Alfred  Marshall developed were concerned with statistics, the most of 




Even though most of the economic research today uses quantitative techniques, the 
qualitative models still play a useful role in explaining important economic relationships.  
 
A useful analysis of industry policy can be found in the work of Mihn (1988). In his 
conceptual framework on the discussion of industry policy for industrialization of South 
Korea, he identified four levels of interventions by the government, viz. (i) general (ii) 
sector-specific (iii) industry-specific and (iv) firm-specific.  Then he roughly divided the 
history of Korea’s industrial policy into three phases namely, the import substitution 
phase during 1962-71; the industrial deepening phase during 1972-81; and the 
liberalization phase since 1982.  The years were chosen so that they coincided with the 
initial and terminal years of Korea’s successive five-year development plans.  With the 
supportive data in tables, and the graphical illustrations of the changes in selected 
important indicators, he analyzed how industry policy has evolved during the above four 
phases leading South Korea to become an industrialized nation. 
 
Wu (1988) provides an excellent discussion on the causes behind the economic 
performance of South Korea and Taiwan.  The methodology used in the study was to 
compare South Korea and Taiwan, and then to compare the two with other developing 
and developed countries using comprehensive data in the tabular format.  The study 
comprises three sections.  In section one, Characteristics of Economic Development, the 
question of the causes of characteristics of development is raised.  The second section, 
Role of Government, compares government activities in the allocation and supply of 
resources in the two regions with those in other countries and regions, and also compares 
the two with each other.  The third section, Behaviour of Enterprise, examines the 
pattern of enterprise growth and two factors affecting growth: human resources and 
institutions.  The study concludes that the particular pattern of behaviour by enterprises 
and governments under the given social and economic conditions provide the main 






The objective of the foregoing discussion of various methodologies used in research on 
sources of economic growth is to formulate a methodology for the analysis of Sri 
Lanka’s economic performance in accordance with the conceptual framework. A priory 
reasoning in this study is that a competitive industry policy should result in higher 
economic growth in Sri Lanka.  There are few empirical studies in this area.  However, 
as discussed above, there are many quantitative studies analyzing the relationship 
between trade and growth, or investment and growth.  There are also many qualitative 
studies analyzing the role of trade and or industry policy and economic growth, 
especially in relation to East Asian NICs. It may not be meaningful to incorporate all the 
CIP measures available to a country in a simple, reduced form statistical model. 11 
Therefore, this study uses both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Every attempt 
is made to show causal relationships between CIP measures and economic performance, 
which can be shown statistically by modifying the model used by Piazolo (1995) for 
South Korea. The aspects which cannot be explained quantitatively are analyzed 
descriptively with supportive evidence where available. 
 
6.3 Sri Lanka’s Growth and Stability: A Preliminary Analysis 
This section intends to carry out the following two analyses prior to its main statistical 
analysis in the next section: (a) a comparison of the pattern of Sri Lanka’s economic 
growth during the post 1977 period with that of pre-1977 period; and (b) a stability test 
in order to see whether the 1977 economic reforms have resulted in a structural change 
in the economy. The purpose of this analysis is to see whether there is a prima facie 
cause for this study to undertake a regression test to identify the sources of growth for Sri 
Lanka during the period after 1977. This is useful for the detailed policy analysis 
undertaken in the next chapter in which Sri Lanka’s position in relation to NIC status is 
evaluated in details.   
 
6.3.1 The Pattern of Growth: 1960-2000   
The real growth of the Sri Lankan economy over the 1961-2000 period has been highly 
variable ranging from a minimum of 0.2 per cent in 1971 to a maximum of 8.2 per cent 
in 1978 (Appendix Table A-1) with an average annual growth rate of 4.5 per cent (Table 
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6.1 below). The annual growth rates are impressive during the 1977-2000 period except 
for the years 1987, 1988 and 1989.12  By contrast, the economic performance during the 
pre-1978 period is not impressive, except for the 1965-1970 period (Appendix A-1).  
The higher growth rate during the 1966-70 period seems to reflect the softening of the 
inward-looking policy stance by the then government (center-right UNP). The periods 
from 1960 to 1965 and 1970 to 1977 on the other hand, were rampant with inward-
looking policy.   
 
      Table 6.1 
         Average Growth Rates of GDP: 1961-2000 
 





      Source: Appendix Table A-1 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, in 1977 the new government introduced drastic measures 
to liberalize the economy.  There was no reversal of the economic policy regime despite 
the change of government in 1994.    The 1977 reforms have become a springboard for a 
more dynamic and a sustainable course leading to rapid growth.  The pattern of GDP 
growth rates since 1961 indicates that the real growth rate in the economy has been 
significantly higher since 1977 (Figure 6.1).  During the first five years after major 
reforms in 1977, the GDP growth averaged 6.2 percent.  Even after 1985 when the 
economic activities were affected due to pro-longed civil disturbances, the growth rate 
averaged 4.5 per cent per annum.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
11 This can cause methodological problems such as multicolinearity. 
12 The poor economic performance in the 1987-89 period is due to a combination of factors. The main factor was the poor 
performance of agricultural sector due to adverse weather condition and increased civil disturbances in the Northern and Eastern 
regions in these years (Central Bank of  Sri Lanka, Annual Reports 1987, 1988, and 1989). 
  Period GDP Growth Rate % 
    1961-1965 3.6 
    1966-1970 5.3 
    1971-1977 2.9 
    1978-1985 5.8 
    1986-2000 4.5 
    1961-2000 4.5 
    1961-1977 3.8 




6.3.2 Structural Change 
Theoretically, a more outward-orientation results in a higher growth. Figure 6.2 below 
shows the trend in Sri Lanka’s real GDP during the 1960-2000 period.  As is seen, there 
is a clear upward movement in Real GDP after 1977.  This movement has been more 
rapid since 1989. Using a statistical analysis, we can verify whether this upward trend in 
GDP after 1977 is real.  For convenience, only the relationship between exports growth 
and economic growth for the entire period (1960-2000) is first considered.  This can be 
justified as many studies have used export growth to explain economic growth especially 
when examining the economic performance under a more outward-oriented policy 
regime (Micheally, 1977; Metwally and Thamaska, 1982). 
Figure 6.2
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 It can be hypothesized that export growth significantly explains GDP growth. As 
exports performance is usually related to the type of policy regime in operation, we can 
use this relationship to demonstrate the effects of the policy change in 1977. Thus, the 
following relationship is considered: 
 tt XaaY 10 +=  Where, Y is real GDP, X is real exports, and the subscript t denotes the 
current values of the variables.  
 
Data 
Time series data on GDP and exports (at 1995 prices) over the 1960-2000 period are 
used here.  Nominal data were obtained from the Annual Reports of the Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka, and real data were derived by using the GDP and export deflators that are 
obtained from the World Tables13 (World Bank, 2000).  All variables were taken in 
natural logs as time series data normally exhibit variation that increases in mean and 
dispersion in proportion to absolute level over time (Piazolo, 1995).   
 
Results 
The results of the three regressions for the periods (a) 1960-2000, (b) 1960-1977, and (c) 
1978-2000 are summarized in Table 6.2 below.  A glance at the results shows that the 
behaviour of GDP in relation to exports for the period 1978-2000 seems to differ from 
the period 1961-1977.  This change is tested using the Chow Test.14 
 
Table 6.2 
Exports & Growth in Sri Lanka: 1960-2000 
Regression Results  
 Eq.1: 1960-2000 Eq. 2: 1960-1977 Eq. 3: 1978-2000 













 R2 .885 -.021 .972 
RSS 1.408 1.030 0.057 
df 39 16 21 
 (Figures in parentheses are t values) 
                                                          
13 This was necessary as there was no real data series for both variables covering the entire period. 
14 The statistical test for structural change is known as the Chow Test (after Gregory Chow [1960]).  There are two approaches to it.  
We use the first one which divides the sample into two (or more groups, depending on the requirement) estimating the model 
separately for each period and with all the sample taken as a single period.  It then constructs an F  statistics with which to perform 
the test.  Under the second approach, we need to use dummy variables.  
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The observed F value for this test is 5.47.  This was arrived at by adding up the two 
residual sums of squared (RSS) of equation 2 and 3 above (i.e. equations relating to the 
pre-1978 and post 1977 periods), deducting the result from the RSS of equation (1), and 
using the formula for F value under Chow test.15  The critical F2,37 (at 5% level) is 3.30. 
Since the observed F value of 5.47 is above the critical value, we reject the hypothesis 
that the relationship between export and GDP for the two periods is the same.  The test 
supports the expectation that there is a clear structural change in the economy associated 
with the outward-orientation (and the resultant expansion of exports) after 1977. 
 
6.4 Sources of Growth: Model Specification and Variable Selection 
As noticed in the above section, there is a clear structural change in the economy during 
the period after 1977.  This section further examines the nature and magnitude of 
performance of the economy in this period, especially with reference to the factors which 
were discussed in the conceptual framework.  It was emphasized in the conceptual 
framework in Chapter Five that economic growth could be achieved using a combination 
of free trade policy and industry policy (Proposition 4).  Accordingly, this chapter will 
examine the  sources of growth for Sri Lanka during the 1978-2000 period with the help 
of a time series analysis.  The purpose of this test is to see how the two types of policies 
have  contributed to Sri Lanka’s economic growth during this period,  which will be 
useful for the policy discussion to follow in the next chapter.   
 
6.4.1 The Model 
The statistical model to be used here includes two types of variables: trade policy 
variables, and industry policy variables.  Most of the statistical models discussed earlier 
have considered only trade related variables in their analysis.  This study uses a 
regression equation similar to one used by Piazalo (1995) who studied the sources of 
growth for Korea.  The model takes the following form: 
GDP = f [Trade policy, Industry Policy] 
 
                                                          
15 Using the data in Table 6.2 above, F value is worked out as follows:  S4 = (S2+ S3) =  1.087;   S5 = (S1 - S4) =  0.321 






 One note of caution is that this analysis serves only as a diagnostic test to determine 
whether Sri Lanka is on the correct path to industrialization and whether the identified 
variables are relevant to developing an appropriate policy agenda to improve economic 
growth in Sri Lanka.16 Following this diagnostic test, a comprehensive analysis is 
undertaken to evaluate the post-1977 economic policies in the next chapter.   
 
6.4.2 Trade Policy Variables 
As seen in Chapter Two,  the empirical literature contains many studies relating trade 
policy to economic growth (Balassa, 1978; Edwards, 1991; Michaelly, 1977, World 
Bank, 1987). They use proxy variables such as exports to represent trade policy in their 
regression analyses. This study uses exports, imports, FDI, and real exchange rate, as 
growth factors representing the extent of outward orientation in the economy. This 
section will provide a justification for selecting these variables while discussing their 
expected contribution to the overall model.  
 
Exports (EXP) 
One of the major trade policy variables used in this study is exports.  As discussed 
earlier, exports can exert a positive influence on growth in a number of ways.  Especially 
for a small open economy, it is an essential part of achieving economies of scale, which 
can increase profits by reducing the cost of production (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).    
It also exposes the domestic firms to international competition forcing them to be 
efficient.  There are also views that exports generate externalities enhancing labour 
productivity, which can promote growth (Lucas, 1990).  Moreover, export production 
tends to concentrate investment in the most efficient sectors in the economy leading to 
reallocation of resources according to the comparative advantage (Emery, 1967).  Above 
all, exports itself is an essential component of GDP as defined in the national accounting 
identity,17 which constitutes a direct link between export and growth.  As discussed in 
the Section 6.2 above, Piazolo (1995) in his regression used annual total exports as a 
growth factor for South Korea.  This study incorporates annual exports (real) in the 
model as an independent variable to capture the effects of trade reforms on growth with 
                                                          
16 Sri Lanka’s annual defence expenditure has increased since early 1980s due to ongoing civil war.  The period under consideration 
of this test is 1978-2000.  Therefore, it was deemed not necessary to use a dummy variable to arrest the war effect on growth. 
17 National Accounting identity is Y= C+I+G+(X-M) where C is household consumption, I is investment, G is government 
consumption, X is exports and M is imports 
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an expected positive relationship.  The value of the export coefficient estimated in the 
equation will be considered as an indicator of the contribution of trade policy in Sri 
Lanka after 1977. 
 
Imports (IMP) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a major policy measure under trade policy is 
reduction or abolition of tariffs. An inevitable outcome of tariff reform is an increase in 
imports.  Lower tariffs  result in extra buying power by consumers, which in turn, 
become a stimulant to other areas of domestic production.   Since the domestic market is 
now exposed to foreign competition, domestic industries have to become more efficient 
to remain competitive.  The ultimate effect of reduction or abolition of tariffs is therefore 
increased competitiveness of domestic firms and increased consumer welfare. (Kruger, 
1984; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Dollar and Kraay, 2000). The reduction of cost of 
imported inputs also leads to a higher domestic output and employment.  
 
In this study, growth in imports will be taken as a proxy for the tariffs reforms. As 
imports are a function of rising national income, growth in imports is expected to 
influence the economy in two ways: (a) making the domestic firms more competitive, 
and (b) enabling the economy to increase its share of investment goods (Khan and 
Reinhart, 1990).  However, as discussed in the previous chapter, tariff reduction may 
also lead to closure of non-competitive domestic industries exerting negative pressure on 
growth. Therefore, overall effect of tariff reduction could be positive or negative.  This 
study includes annual imports in the model as an indicator of the tariff reforms after 
1977. The coefficient so estimated in the equation will be taken as an indicator of the 
contribution of tariff reforms to growth in Sri Lanka after 1977. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Another important trade policy measure in reforming an economy is to remove or reduce 
controls over international capital mobility.  International capital flows are normally of 
two forms: private foreign investment (FDI) and public development assistance (foreign 
aid). The traditional economic theory considers FDI (and foreign aid) as a way of filling 
gaps between the domestically available supplies of savings, foreign exchange, 
government revenue, and skills and the required level of those resources necessary to 
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achieve development targets (Caves, 1971; Kindleberger, 1974).  Elimination of controls 
on capital account enhances growth mainly by enabling a country to mobilize more 
savings for economic activities. As seen in the literature survey, FDI can bring about not 
only direct benefits such as increased output and employment, but also indirect benefits 
such as diffusion of new technology and skills development, in such capital-deficit 
economies.  It is those indirect benefits which are very vital for the development of a 
sustainable domestic industrial sector.  To facilitate FDI, governments in LDCs can take 
initiatives by further liberalizing their capital markets. 
 
When restrictions on capital mobility are removed, capital poor-countries such as Sri 
Lanka can close its investment gap through an inflow of foreign capital.  In principle, 
capital poor countries offer higher rates of return on capital for foreign investors than 
developed countries.  A resultant increase of foreign exchange can thus increase the level 
of capital goods imports and thereby total investment in the economy. Therefore, a 
positive impact of FDI on a developing country such as Sri Lanka can be expected.  
 
However, removal of restrictions on capital transactions can have certain adverse effects 
in the LDC’s economy especially in the long run including foreign exchange difficulties, 
loss of public revenue, changed savings and investing habits of domestic individuals, and 
introduction of inappropriate products and technologies of production.  This can also 
encourage local firms to borrow excessively from overseas creating a possibility of a 
financial crisis as experienced in South Korea. 
 
There are many studies linking growth in FDI to economic growth (Borensztein et al., 
1998; Campos and Kinoshita, 2002). Most of such studies use annual FDI inflows as a 
proxy for benefits a country can gain from improved capital availability.  This study will 
take annual growth in FDI inflows as a proxy for liberalization of capital markets. The 
FDI coefficient so estimated in the regression is expected to be positive and show the 
magnitude of the contribution to growth by the liberalization of capital control in Sri 




Exchange Rate (RER) 
If the economic reforms involve substantial measures to liberalize the exchange rate 
regime, then the behaviour of the real exchange rate plays an important role in economic 
performance of a country.   It determines whether growth occurs in the tradable sector or 
non-tradable sector. If domestic policies manage to maintain real exchange rate 
depreciation, then theoretically the tradable sector, especially export, accounts for a high 
level of growth (Athukorala, 1992).    
 
Since the real exchange rates for the period under review were not readily available in a 
secondary data source, this study computed them using appropriate data.18 An increase in 
the real exchange rate indicates a real depreciation of the local currency, which leads to 
an increase in international competitiveness (Shostak, 2003).  Hence, a positive relation 
between RER and GDP can be expected.  This is also consistent with neoclassical 
theory. There are studies supporting this relationship (Illarionov, 2002; Devereux, 1999). 
The RER coefficient in the estimated regression is expected to be positive and show the 
contribution of Sri Lanka’s exchange rate reforms to growth after 1977. 
  
6.4.3 Industry Policy Variables 
As discussed in Chapter Two, there is a significant literature relating industry policy to 
economic growth.  These studies support the view that the government has an important 
role to play in economic development by formulating correct trade and industry policies 
for the economy (see, for example, Amsden, 1989; Rodrik, 1995; Wade, 1990).   The 
study uses the following proxy variables to represent industry policy: textiles output, 
government capital expenditure, annual enrolments in secondary education and 
universities, the number of FTZ firms, and gross domestic capital formation.  
 
Sector Targeting (TEX) 
Sector targeting is one of the major industry policy measures the East Asian NICs used 
in achieving industrialization. Targeted industries can be identified by examining (a) the 
                                                          
18 The following formula was used: RER = NER * (Pi/Di) where NER = Nominal exchange rate; Pi  = average rate of international 
inflation; and Di  = average rate of domestic inflation.  Average annual rate of international inflation was derived from the consumer 
price indices of Sri Lanka’s major trading partners: USA, UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, 





tariff structure, (b) the pattern of investment in industries, (c) the government economic 
policy documents such as budget papers, and (d) the share of industrial output/exports in 
total output/exports.  This study uses the last method.  As shown in the Appendix Table 
A-11, the share of industrial exports in total exports has risen from 2 per cent in 1970 to 
31 per cent in 1980 and then to 60 per cent in 1991. This is mainly due to the drastic 
increase in textiles and garments as a major export item after 1977.   It has emerged as 
the country’s largest export earner since 1986 repositioning tea to the second place 
(Kelegama, 1994).  This can be attributed mainly to the government’s encouragement of 
investment, especially foreign investment, to establish textiles and garment factories in 
the Katunayaka Investment Promotion Zone after 1977.  Annual output of textile and 
garments in the economy, therefore, can be taken as a proxy for sector targeting with an 
expected positive impact on growth in GDP.    
 
Domestic Investment (GDCF) 
As a factor of production, capital plays an important role in industrialization as it 
increases investment.  It can not only raise the rate of economic growth, but also create 
large positive external effects (Piazolo, 1995).  Government policy, especially those 
encouraging domestic investment, plays an important role in guiding capital formation in 
the economy.   Following Piazolo (1995), this study will use Sri Lanka’s annual  gross 
domestic capital formation (GDCF) as a proxy for physical capital.   This proxy is 
expected to have a positive effect on long-term growth.  Thus, the coefficient of GDCF 
in the regression is expected to show the contribution of government policy of industrial 
promotion to growth after 1977. 
 
Institutional Effects (CAP) 
The success of the four East Asian NICs brought the relevance of institutions in fostering 
economic development into the forefront of the theoretical debate on industrialization.  
Normally, institutions are a part of the framework for the economic activity of a nation, 
which can either foster or hinder the process of economic growth (Ranis, 1989).  Piazolo 
(1995) in his study on growth factors for South Korea used a wide range of variables 
such as government revenue, government consumption, and wages as proxy variables.  
In this study, the institutional role of government is represented by government capital 
expenditure.  It is assumed that Sri Lankan government’s increased commitment to 
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provide institutional support including setting up of special governing bodies such as 
GCEC (BOI) is better represented by capital outlays. Accordingly, the coefficient of this 
variable is expected to be positive. 
 
There are mixed view on the effects of government expenditure on economic growth.  
The proponents of the Keynesian view on growth argue that government investments and 
provisions of public goods generate positive effects on the economy (Easterly, 1991).   
Some supply side economists argue that strong government intervention distorts markets 
and leads to misallocation of resources (Otani and Villanueva, 1989). However, in this 
study we assume that the former argument is more relevant for LDCs.  Thus, the 
coefficient of CAP in the equation can be taken to gauge the importance of institutional 
factors in Sri Lanka’s growth performance after 1977. 
 
Free Trade  Zones (FTZs) 
The concept of Free Trade Zones (export processing zones) as a development strategy 
was originated in Shannon, Ireland in 1958 (People’s Bank, 1982, p.6).  Since then, it 
has been widely used by many countries including Taiwan and South Korea as far back 
as the 1960s.  Sri Lanka introduced this strategy in 1978 in order to attract export-
oriented private foreign investment; and to make non-traditional exports more attractive 
than import substitution for new investment projects. 
 
Few empirical studies have measured the effect of FTZs on economic growth 
quantitatively. This study takes the number of investment projects established annually 
in the FTZ as a proxy for the contribution of the FTZ to the economy.  A better variable 
would have been annual investment or value of annual output in the FTZ.  However, as 
this data is not currently available for the entire series, this study has no option but to 
assume that the number of firms operated annually represents the contribution of FTZ to 
economic growth reasonably.  Thus, it is assumed that the number of projects operated 
under the FTZ is positively related to economic growth. The coefficient of FTZ in the 




Human Capital Development (EDU) 
The East Asian economies used industry policies extensively to encourage the quality of 
human capital by allocating resources on activities such as education, training, and 
research and development.  Education increases the quality of the labour force, and 
thereby shifts the long-term production possibility curve outward (Piazolo, 1995).  There 
are many studies relating to the contribution of human capital development to growth 
(Arrow, 1962; Lucas, 1988; Denison, 1982).  Due to data limitations however, the 
annual enrolment in secondary education and university education are taken here as a 
proxy for the development in human capital in Sri Lanka after 1977 with an expected 
positive relationship. Following Piazolo (1995), this study expects a positive 
contribution  to Sri Lanka’s growth from the variable EDU during the 1978-2000 period. 
The coefficient of EDU is expected to reflect the magnitude of contribution to economic 
growth by government’s human resource development policy after 1977. 
 
Government Procurement (REC) 
Government procurement is a widely used industry policy measure to assist local SMEs.  
However, there are few empirical studies in the economics literature that show the 
relationship between government procurement and growth.  Nevertheless, this study 
argues that it can have a significant effect on industrial development in LDCs.  There is 
no direct data available on government procurement in Sri Lanka after the 1977 reforms.  
However, it is a part of government’s recurrent expenditure on goods and services. It is 
therefore assumed that annual recurrent expenditure on the government purchases of 
goods and services would reasonably represent government procurement. It is assumed 
that the government procurement is positively related to economic growth.  Thus, the 
coefficient REC is expected to indicate the contribution of government procurement to 
Sri Lanka’s growth performance after 1977 in the regression analysis. 
 
6.4.4 Summary 
The study assumes that the variables identified under trade and industry policy above can 
sufficiently explain economic performance during the period under review. Functional 
relationships between independent variables and dependent variable (growth) are 
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consistent with the economic theory. Table 6.3 below summarises the expected outcome 
of the coefficients relating to each variable discussed above.19   
 
            Table 6.3 
Variables and their Expected Signs: Summary 
Explanatory Variables Explained Variable  (GDP) 
   Trade Policy:     EXP                                           + 
                            IMP + or - 
                            FDI + 
                            RER + 
Industry policy:   TEX + 
                           GDCF + 
                           CAP + 
                           FTZs + 
                           EDU + 
                           REC + 
 
6.5 Sources of Growth: The Results 
The study used time series data at constant (1995) prices derived from various sources 
such as the World Bank (World Tables) and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (Annual 
Reports).  All data were transformed into natural logs.20  It used the SPSS (Version 11) 
statistical programme extensively for these regression analyses. The study estimated the 
sources of growth equation for Sri Lanka in three ways. First, it examined separately how 
the two types of policy variables have contributed to growth over the 1978-2000 period.  
Based on the results of these two tests, a third equation was estimated using all the 
variables that emerged as significant growth factors.  Three additional equations were 
also estimated repeating the above process for the 1989-2000 period to see which 
variables can capture the higher level of growth experienced during this latter period.    
 
6.5.1 Trade Policy and Growth 
This section examined the effects of free trade variables identified in the pervious section 
on Sri Lanka’s economic performance during the post 1977 period.  As illustrated in the 
conceptual framework, trade policy is one of the main instruments used to achieve rapid 
growth under CIP strategy.  Thus, it is hypothesized that exports, imports, foreign 
investments, and real exchange rate significantly explain GDP growth, other things being 
                                                          
19 Variable TEX was, however, not included in the regressions as annual textile and garment output is a part of the GDP itself, to 
avoid specification errors. 
20 This can minimize the problems associated with skewed data, outliers, or unequal variations. 
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equal.  Two equations are estimated for the 1978-2000 period, and the 1989-2000 
period.21 A summary of the regressions results is shown in Table 6.4 below. 
 
Table 6.4 
Trade Policy and Economic Growth: Regression Results 
Dependant variable GDP (1978-2000) GDP (1989-2000) 

















R2 .954 .974 
F 159.77 138.4 
DW 1.508 1.843 
Figures in parentheses are t values;  * significant at the 1% level 
 (See Appendix C Parts 1-A and 1-B for detailed results) 
 
All the trade variables discussed earlier were included in the tests other than imports 
(IMP).22  As can be seen in Table 6.4 (Column 2) above, both the overall fitness of the 
equation, and the overall usefulness of the model in explaining the causality between 
trade policy variables and economic performance are very satisfactory.23   As confirmed 
in many other studies (for example see Balassa, 1978; Michaely, 1977), exports have 
become a strongly significant growth factor at one percent level. The real exchange rate 
(RER) also shows a positive effect on growth as expected.  This is in line with the a 
priory reasoning that a depreciation of the real exchange rate improves the profitability 
of tradable production, and thereby growth.  However, it is not as significant as expected. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) however, is negatively related to GDP, which is contrary 
to the expectation. According to the results it is not significant. Thus, apart from the 
distinct contribution of exports, there is little evidence that the other trade variables have 
made any noteworthy contribution to Sri Lanka’s GDP after 1977.   
 
The second regression which examined the growth factors for the 1989-2000 period  
(Column 3, Table 6.4 above) further establishes the superior position of exports (EXP) 
                                                          
21 As can be recalled, in Section 6.3.2 Structural Change earlier in this chapter, the period 1989-2000 recorded a higher growth rate 
than the rest of the period. 
22  As a preliminary test showed some evidence of multicolinearity between imports (IMP) and exports (EXP), variable IMP was not 
included in the test.  Such presence of  multicolinearity can be related to the  high import content in the manufacturing exports 
during the period after 1977, which will be further discussed later in Chapter Seven. 
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over the other growth factors.  The only noteworthy change in the result is that FDI 
which showed a negative relationship with GDP during the 1978-2000 period has 
improved as a positive growth factor, although it was not statistically significant.  Apart 
from that, there was no noteworthy change in the overall outcome. 
 
6.5.2 Industry Policy and Growth 
As discussed earlier, there are strong views among scholars that industry policy has a 
significant role in rapid growth of capital-poor LDCs (Auty, 1994; Wade, 1990).   It 
played a complimentary role in the East Asian CIP model. Before estimating an equation 
to verify this complementarity between trade policy and industry policy in the next 
section, it is useful to identify the extent of contribution of each industry policy variable 
to Sri Lanka’s GDP during the period after 1977.  As in previous section, two equations 
were estimated for the two periods under review.  
 
Table 6. 5 
   Industry Policy Variables & Growth: Regression Results  
Dependant variable GDP (1978-2000) GDP (1989-2000) 























R2 .983 .959 
F 317.66 85.95 
DW 1.14 1.343 
   Figures in parentheses are t value;   * significant at 1% level;  **significant at 5% level 
 
 
The first equation (1978-2000) included only the following variables:24 GDCF, CAP, 
REC, and EDU.  As can be seen in Table 6.5 (Column 2) above, both the overall fitness 
and the usefulness of the model are very satisfactory. The variables GDCF and REC 
                                                                                                                                                                           
23 The overall fitness of the equation is shown by the R2  (of .98) which is very high; the overall usefulness of the model is shown by 
F ratio (of  349.8) which is very satisfactory. Indeterminate DW level, however could be associated with the use of proxy variable. 
24  FTZ was dropped from the first equation (1978-2000) to avoid multicolinearity problem especially with GDCF. This is 
discernible as the number of firms in the FTZ increased so did the amount of investment in the economy under the freer environment 
since 1977.  
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have emerged as significant growth factors at one per cent level.  These two variables 
represent the government policy of encouraging total investment in the economy and the 
government procurement respectively.   The variable EDU which is the proxy for human 
resources policy in the economy also shows a positive contribution to growth with a five 
per cent level of significance. CAP which was used to capture the institutional factors in 
the economy after 1977 is positively related to GDP, but is not significant. Accordingly, 
there is evidence that most industry policy variables have positively contributed to 
overall output of the economy during the 1978-2000 period.   
 
The second equation examined the contribution of industry policy variables to GDP 
during the 1989-2000 period.  The following variables were used in the equation:25  
CAP. EDU, and FTZ. According to the results, only the FTZ variable shows a 
noteworthy contribution to GDP after 1989 (Table 6.5, Column 3).  As was observed in 
the previous equation (Table 6.5, Column 2), CAP remains positive with no notable 
change in its weak level of significance. Surprisingly however, the variable EDU shows 
a negative association with GDP during this period, which is contrary to the expectation.   
Overall, the results seem to show mixed results, with no strong evidence showing 
significant contribution from industry policy variables to the economic performance 
especially during the latter years.  It can be argued therefore that most of the growth 
occurred during the latter years in Sri Lanka is due to trade policy.  This further 
emphasizes the need of complementary industry policy if Sri Lanka is to achieve NIC 
status. 
  
6.5.3 The Combined Model and Growth 
The complementarity between trade policy and industry policy emerged as a distinct 
feature of the East Asian CIP development model. This section estimates the equation 
incorporating following policy variables which emerged as important in the previous two 
sections: EXP, RER, CAP, and EDU.    As before, two equations were estimated for the 
two periods under review as shown in Table 6.6 below.  
 
                                                          




Combined Model: Regression Results  
Dependant variable GDP (1978-2000) GDP (1989-2000) 
No. Observations 23 12 

















FDI - .00465 
(.312) 
R2 .993 .970 
F 768.96 71.73 
DW 1.280 1.889 
Figures in parentheses are t values.    * Significant at 1% level 
(See Appendix C Parts 3-A and 3-B for detailed results) 
 
As shown in above Table (Column 2), both exports (EXP) and human resource 
development (EDU) have emerged as dominant variables with a level of significance of 
one per cent.  The variable CAP (institutional factor) has improved its position but still 
not significant even at 10 per cent level. Contrary to the expectation however, exchange 
rate has resulted in a negative effect.  
 
Most of the variables included in the model have failed to capture the high growth 
performance during the post 1989 period.  Again, only exports have emerged as the 




It would be useful to review the above results in relation to those that Piazolo (1995) 
found for South Korea.  This may not however be realistic as the two regressions have 
not only different variables but also different objectives. As seen earlier, Piazolo 
captured growth factors for South Korea using a wide range of variables in his model to 
represent the following four fields: labour, capital, foreign trade, and institutional 
framework.26  His results indicated that exports, investment, and human capital enhanced 
                                                          




economic development, while inflation and government consumption exerted a negative 
effect on growth.  The existence of a strong positive relation between exports and growth 
reflected the importance of the overall progress of South Korea’s industrial structure.  
The positive influence of labour in the economy is attributed the quality of education. 
The negative contribution from the government consumption is rather surprising given 
South Korea’s higher share of government consumption in the GDP.  
 
According to Sri Lanka’s results, exports were the main source of growth throughout the 
1978-2000 period. Similar to South Korea, both investment and human resource 
development have made substantial contributions to Sri Lanka’s economic performance, 
but it appears that the latter has lost its momentum in recent years.   Over all, Sri Lanka 
has still an unfinished agenda in order to achieve NIC status. 
 
Due to these problems, this analysis cannot take this study any further. Due to the 
insignificance of most of the results, it was not deemed worthwhile developing a more 
elaborate model. The variables used are in line with the theoretical arguments developed 
in the conceptual framework. However, they are only proxies for rather complex and 
interrelated policy variables. It is not advisable therefore to make strong conclusions 
about the role of trade and industry policy measures in Sri Lanka based on the above 
diagnostic tests alone. 
 
6.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
One of the objectives of this research as stipulated in Chapter one  is to investigate 
whether there has been any structural change in the economy after 1977 economic 
reforms.  A detailed analysis on the pattern of growth since 1960 followed by a stability 
test was undertaken in section 6.3 of this chapter to answer this question.  As is found, 
there has been a clear structural change in the economy after 1977 which is attributed to 
the outward-orientated economic reforms introduced in 1977 and thereafter.    The other 
major objective of the thesis was to estimate a regression equation incorporating both 
trade policy and industry policy variables to identify the major sources of growth for Sri 
Lanka during the post-1977 period.   This was undertaken in the second part of this 
chapter.   The idea of this exercise was to analyze Sri Lanka’s trade and industry policy 
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performance during the post-1977 period with a view to see how far it is on the path to 
NIC status which is the third major objective outlined in Chapter One. 
 
To achieve the latter objectives, this chapter first explored various methodologies used in 
the previous studies of this nature, and then developed a statistical model to assess Sri 
Lanka’s sources of growth during the post-1977 period.  Regression tests were carried 
out to identify the extent of the contribution to growth by the CIP variables identified by 
the model.  They show some useful results.  Although many of the variables considered 
in the model have not been able to explain past growth of Sri Lanka as expected, a few 
variables showed some positive contribution to growth.  Export was found to be the only 
significant variable emerged from the free trade equation.  Government procurements 
and human capital development are the two variables which have contributed to 
economic growth significantly as seen in the industry policy equation estimated.  
According to the analysis, it appears that although the type of policies Sri Lanka has been 
pursuing since 1978 are appropriate, they are not sufficient to take Sri Lanka off to a 
level to be considered as a NIC.  Nevertheless, Sri Lanka has a strong background which 
can be used as a springboard to accelerate growth required to become a NIC using 
appropriate CIP policies which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. 
 
Finally, it should be emphasized here that this study did not use a more elaborate model 
in view of the methodological and data limitations. Therefore, this analysis also calls for 
some other approaches to analyse Sri Lanka’s growth performance in terms of the NIC 
standard, especially in view of the complexity and interrelatedness of the different types 
of policy variables and institutional factors illustrated in the conceptual framework. 
Thus, this study will analyse the major policies that Sri Lanka has used since 1977 
conceptually, and evaluate the outcome of the major economic variables discussed above 
in a comprehensive manner to determine what policy changes are likely to impact future 






SRI LANKA AND NIC STATUS   
AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF   POLICY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the diagnostic tests conducted in the previous chapter, the factors which have 
affected past economic growth of Sri Lanka were observed. With a few exceptions, 
the variables chosen to represent trade and industry policy measures were positively 
related to economic growth.  However, they did not adequately reflect the increased 
commitment of the government by way of trade and industry policy towards 
industrialization after 1977.1 The statistical analysis justified the research 
proposition that Sri Lanka has not managed to achieve the level of economic 
progress required to be considered as a NIC despite significant economic reforms 
after 1977 (Proposition 1).2  This chapter investigates why did Sri Lanka fail to  
achieve a level of industrial development which could have placed itself among 
NICs  by undertaking a detailed review of policy during the post-reform period with 
particular reference to the research propositions made in Chapter Five.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter will first assess Sri Lanka’s position in terms of NIC status 
using some quantitative/qualitative criteria. Second, it will observe how far Sri 
Lanka has fulfilled the two main pre-conditions for NIC status: developmental state; 
and macroeconomic stability and associated saving-investment behaviour 
(Propositions 5 and 6).  Finally, it will evaluate the nature and extent of both trade 
and industry policy in Sri Lanka during the post-1977 period (Propositions 2 and 3).  
An attempt will be made to compare Sri Lanka’s policy experience with that of 
South Korea and Taiwan with particular reference to their pre-NIC period, where 
comparable data is available.  This analysis would serve as the basis for the policy 
recommendations in the next chapter, which would enable Sri Lanka to achieve 
rapid industrialization required to become a NIC.3  
                                                          
1 Chapter Six noted that there has been an structural change in the economy after 1977 indicating the high growth 
performance associated with the economic reforms after 1977; but this high growth was not adequate to put Sri Lanka into a 
growth path towards NIC status.  
2 See Section 5.6 Research Propositions  in Chapter 5. 
3 As postulated by the proposition 7 (Chapter Five). 
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7.2  Sri Lanka’s Position in terms of NIC Status 
What is Sri Lanka’s position in terms of NIC status? This can be answered by 
examining the criteria for NIC status discussed in Chapter One.4  To examine the 
first criterion, it is necessary to estimate the ‘minimum’ GNP per capita level for a 
NIC in a given year. According to Balassa’s (1980) definition, NICs (in 1978) 
overlapped with the upper range of the group of ‘Middle-income Countries’ as 
defined in the 1978 World Development Report (World Bank, 1978).  Therefore, the 
average income of that group of countries (Middle-income countries) can be 
considered as the per capita income level of a NIC in a given year. Accordingly, the 
average per capita GNP for the ‘Upper middle-income countries’ in 1998 was US$ 
4,860 (World Bank, 2000).5  The per capita GNP of Sri Lanka in 1998, on the other 
hand, was only US $ 8126 which was far behind the threshold for NIC status. On the 
basis of this situation, the  possibility that Sri Lanka will achieve NIC status in terms 
of GNP per capita in the near future is quite remote.7   
 
As regards other indicators, Sri Lanka’s saving (domestic) ratio has improved since 
late 1990s, and by 2000 it was 17.3 per cent (Appendix Table A-15) which is 
satisfactory (i.e. above the required level of 15 per cent).  Its manufacturing share in 
the GDP was 16.8 per cent in 2000 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2000), which is 
below the norm (i.e. 20 per cent).   Its HDI was  .735 in 1999 (as against the norm of 
.75), which has given Sri Lanka a HDI rank of 81 among 162 countries (and 16th 
among 78 medium human development nations).8 Thus, Sri Lanka needs to improve 
all the criteria except the saving ratio to qualify for NIC status. 
 
The foregoing discussion indicates that Sri Lanka has a long way to go to become a 
NIC. This demands a detailed investigation on two fronts: how far Sri Lanka has 
gone fulfilling the necessary conditions for NIC status; and how has trade and 
industry policy been used in Sri Lanka during the period after 1977.  This analysis is 
basically a ‘post mortem’ as to why Sri Lanka still remains a developing country, 
                                                          
4 Real GDP per capita (1978= US$ 1000) adjusted for inflation; a saving ratio of 15 per cent; a share of manufacturing in 
GDP equal to 20 per cent; and HDI of  0.75. 
5 The corresponding figure for the Lower-middle income countries was however, US$ 1710. 
6  Annual Report 1998, Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
7 Even to achieve this target by year 2020, Sri Lanka would require an annual average growth of 16 per cent from now 
onward (see Appendix D for details). 
8 UNDP, 2001, Human Development Report. 
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making way for policy recommendations for NIC status in the next, concluding 
chapter. 
 
7.3 Necessary Conditions Reviewed 
As emphasized in the research propositions made in the theoretical framework, in 
order to achieve NIC status it is necessary for the state to function as a 
developmental state, and to ensure macroeconomic stability. This section will 
review Sri Lanka’s position in this regard in detail.  
 
7.3.1 Developmental State 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate both the nature and the role of Sri Lanka’s 
state during the period under review to see to what extent it has evolved into a 
developmental state. This can be achieved by reviewing how far Sri Lanka has 
fulfilled the characteristics of Johnson’s (1982) developmental state.9  Of those 
characteristics, this section particularly investigates the political stability and 
efficiency of the bureaucracy, and government’s commitment to education and 
social equity.  
 
Political Stability  
As seen in Chapter Three, Sri Lanka was ruled by two major political parties 
alternatively for short periods (five years, except the period 1970-77) since 
independence and, as such, there was no political stability required for the 
implementation of a long-term development strategy as was seen in South Korea 
and Taiwan.  However, Sri Lanka changed this system of government in 1978 along 
with the economic reforms.  The new Constitution of 1978 provided for a strong 
executive president elected for a six-year term. The main objective of this change 
was to ensure the political stability and strong leadership required to carry out 
economic reforms.  Although the political leadership changed three times during this 
period,10 the system of government along with the on-going economic programs 
                                                          
9 As discussed in Chapter Five Johnson’s developmental state has four characteristics: political stability and an efficient 
bureaucracy free from political influence; division of labour between state and private sector; the state’s increased 
commitment to investment in education, and social equity; and the state’s preference for market conforming interventions 
where necessary. 
10 Three presidents were: Junias R. Jayawardena (1978-1988); Ranasingha Premadasa (1989-1994); and Chandrika  
Kumaranathunga (1994-1999, and 1999-to date). 
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continued throughout the period under review. Therefore, Sri Lanka had the political 
stability required for the successful operation of economic reforms during the period 
under review.  
 
Efficiency of Bureaucracy 
Sri Lanka inherited an efficient civil service from the British. Until 1972, the 
efficiency of public service was maintained through the provisions of the Public 
Service Commission (PSC) which was a politically independent body. The 1972 
Constitution repudiated this and the public service was brought under the control of 
the executive branch of government. Although the 1978 Constitution reintroduced 
the PSC, ‘its powers were severely limited as it is dependent for its power on 
Cabinet delegation” (Edirisinha and Selvakumaran, 2000, p.109).  Therefore, there 
was room for political influence in the public service especially relating to 
appointments, promotions, and transfers of public servants. This was mainly 
responsible for the inefficiency of the public sector in Sri Lanka during the 
subsequent period.  
 
There are also views that the legacy of colonial civil service itself was detrimental 
for development.  As Haque  (2002) points out, the inherited colonial civil service 
has been a hindrance for economic performance in   countries in South Asia such as 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. According to Haque, these countries ‘love’ large 
governments. With their ‘die hard legacies and antiquated sovereignty’ it is very 
difficult to give a sizable role in the economy to private sector. 
 
According to the Public Institution Indicators grouped under Contracts and Law and 
Corruption by the Global Competitiveness Report 2001, there are certain areas 
where Sri Lanka needs improvements. Sri Lanka’s achievements are impressive 
only in a few areas such as reduction of business regulation and red tape. Problem 
areas which affect Sri Lanka’s growth potential include weak property rights, 
favouritism of government officials, a lack of judicial independence, organized 
crimes, and irregular payments or bribes associated with taxes, international trade, 
and public utilities connections.  These are some symptoms of the impotence of the 
‘rule of law,’ which are a drag for economic and social development.  They are 
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indicators that Sri Lanka still lacks a strong government to undertake a 
developmental role. 
 
Division of Labour between State and Private Sector 
Since 1977, the government’s declared objective was to give private sector a leading 
role in the economy.11  Has the private sector undertaken the expected role during 
this period? This can be easily found by examining the share of private and 
government sectors in Sri Lanka’s total annual investments.  As Table A-16 
(Appendix A) shows, public investment as a percentage of GDP has decreased from 
6.4 per cent in 1978 to 3.2 per cent in 2000 while that of private sector has increased 
from 13.8 per cent to 24.8 per cent in the corresponding period.  This indicates that 
the private sector has undertaken an increased role as expected.   
 
Apart from this limited evidence, it is not clear how important  role the private 
sector was expected to play in Sri Lanka.  Both Korea and Taiwan had a central 
agency for economic planning which allocated functions for state and private sector 
in their periodic development plans.  As seen in Chapter Four, South Korea had four 
Five-Year Plans since 1961, and Taiwan had seven Four-Year Plans since 1953 until 
they reached NIC status in 1980.12  Sri Lanka did not have similar consistent 
development programs to consolidate the national industrialization efforts.  Its 
Annual Public Investment Program was more or less an annual operational plan 
emphasising the government commitment to development.   There was no adequate 
institutional arrangements to ensure that the objectives are achieved.  Hence, it can 
be argued that there was division of labour between state and private sector after 
1977, but how effective it is in terms of NICs’ experience is questionable. 
 
Commitment to Education and Social Equity 
The extent of government commitment to educational development and social 
equity can be examined by using proxy variables such as public expenditure on 
education, subsidies to households, income tax revenue, and the Gini coefficient.  
                                                          
11 This emphasis can be seen in every Budget Speech which is the major policy document of government in respect of the 
ensuing year, after 1977. 
12  South Korea had Five-Year Plans for the following periods: 1961-65, 1966-1971, 1972-1976, and 1977-81; Taiwan had 
Four-Year Plans for the following periods: 1953-56, 1957-1960, 1961-1964, 1965-68, 1969-72, 1973-76 and 1977-81.  
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As shown in Table 7.1, Sri Lanka’s commitment to educational development has 
been at the same level as South Korea.  Sri Lanka’s annual social welfare outlays 
after 1977 reflects its increased commitment to social equity (Appendix Table A-
17). Social security consideration in terms of direct subsidies has exceeded the level 
experienced by South Korea (Table 7.1).  However, a comparison of the share of 
income tax in total revenue between the two nations indicates that Sri Lanka’s 
income tax (both corporate and personal) collection is lower than that of South 
Korea.  One can argue that Sri Lanka has preferred a ‘growth-first, equity later’ 
approach compared to South Korea’s ‘growth with equity’ approach. The respective 
Gini coefficients   also seem to prove this further.    
 
Table 7.1 
Government Commitment to Education and Social Equity 
  Selected Indicators for Sri Lanka and South Korea 
 Sri Lanka South Korea 
1978 2000 1960 1978 
Public Expenditure on Education 
(% of GDP) 
2.6 2.5 2.0 2.9 
Social security a 
(% of Total Expenditure) 
4.0 12.0 6.0 9.0 
Income Tax 
(% of Total Revenue) 
10.0 14.0 19.0 20.0 
Gini Coefficient 0.35 0.43 0.34 0.39 
a. Only direct transfers to households were included in case of Sri Lanka. 
b. The two Gini coefficients for Sri Lanka are for 1973 and 1997 respectively. 
 Source: The World Bank, World Development Report; (Various Issues); The World Bank, World 
Tables (Various Issues); Chowdhury and Islam (1993); World Bank (1993); Central Bank of Sri 




As the forgoing analysis shows, Sri Lanka had the political stability which was vital 
for investment and growth. The government was committed to educational 
development and social equity reasonably well. However, Sri Lanka has failed to 
create an efficient bureaucracy which was free from political influence. It also lacks 
evidence to show East Asian-type division of labour between state and private 
sector.  Its social equity consideration which is vital for human resource 
development and political stability also has been somewhat overlooked especially 
during the initial period after reforms.  In sum, therefore, it can be argued that the 
state in Sri Lanka has some features of Johnson’s development state, but it has a 
long way to go to evolve as a developmental state in terms of NIC standard.   
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7.3.2 Macroeconomic Policy 
Macroeconomic management is considered to be one of the major factors behind 
the success of the East Asian NICs (World Bank, 1993; Leipziger and Thomas, 
2000).  This was achieved by using appropriate fiscal and monetary policy. Its 
effects were mainly reflected through the private sector’s savings and investment 
behaviour.  This section discusses major features of the macroeconomic policy in 




Sri Lanka’s fiscal policy has been highly expansionary for most of the post reform 
period as reflected by its increased share of the budget deficit in the GDP (Appendix 
Table A-25).  As shown in Table 7.2 below, this is quite contrast with what South 
Korea and Taiwan achieved during their Pre-NIC period.  
 
      Table 7.2  
        Fiscal Balance of Sri Lanka, South Korea, and Taiwan 
 Average Annual Budget Deficit (Surplus) 
As % of GDP 
Sri Lanka:      1978-88 
                       1989-99 
14.2 
9.4 
South Korea: 1960-69 
                      1970-79 
0.7 
1.7 
Taiwan:         1970-79 (1.4) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2000; Krueger, A. 1998, “Contrasts in Transition to Market-
oriented Economies: India and Korea,” in Hayami, Y. and Aoki M. (eds) The Institutional  Foundations of East 
Asian Economic Development (Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Tokyo, Japan, St.  Martin’s Press 
Inc. New York; Leipziger, M. and Thomas, V., 1997, “An Overview of East Asian Experience” in Leipziger, D. 
M., (ed.) Lessons from East Asia, The University of Michigan Press. 
 
This requires a detail analysis of Sri Lanka’s fiscal performance during the post-
1977 period. As shown in Appendix Table A-25, the high budget deficit during the 
first few years after 1977 reflects the increased capital outlays associated with the 
major infrastructure development programs, and the continuation of the welfare 
expenditure commitments.  However, high defence expenditure emerged as a major 
fiscal problem in the last two decades as a consequence of the escalation of civil 
conflicts since the mid-1980s. As shown in Appendix Table A-23, the defence 
expenditure as a ratio of GDP rose from 0.7 per cent in 1980 to 4.6 per cent by 
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2000. This has accounted for 47 per cent of government expenditure by late 1990s 
compared to only 3 per cent prior to 1980.  The high defence expenditure of around 
5-6 per cent of GDP, which constitutes 25 per cent of recurrent expenditure, was 
clearly not sustainable.  It is worthwhile to discuss the macroeconomic impact of the 
civil conflict further as it has been considered as one of the major obstacle for Sri 
Lanka’s economic development.   
 
Sri Lanka’s defence expenditure as percentage of GDP has increased from 1.3 in 
1980 to 4.2 per cent in 1998 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1980 and 1998).  This has 
constrained the economic growth rate by 2 to 3 percentage points a year (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, 1999). As Arunatilake et. al (2001) estimate, the present value of 
the cost of the conflict during the 12-year period from 1984 to 1996 is equivalent to 
at least twice Sri Lanka’s 1996 GDP.  They also estimate the cost of lost FDI 
inflows at 71 per cent of its GDP in 1996. Other adverse effects include the 
reduction of tourism income, the need to pay a high-risk premium on international 
trade, the drop of output in agriculture, and the need to curtail social security 
commitments (World Bank, 2000, p.12).  The conflict also has a social cost.  Over 
two decades it has taken a death toll of over 60,000 while another 700,000 people 
being displaced. The number of people in the refugee camps is estimated at 172,000 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2000).  It has also taken the lives of many political 
leaders (World Bank, 2000).   The socio-economic consequences of the conflict 
therefore have seriously interfered with the government in its role as a 
developmental state by impacting on directing resources better used for economic 
objectives such as infrastructure development. 
             
The rising interest payments on public debt were another major fiscal problem 
which arose from the outset of the 1977 reforms for Sri Lanka.  The debt service 
payments pre-empted almost one quarter of government revenue during this period.  
The problems of high public debt are consequences of persistently high fiscal 
deficits, declining government revenue and the rising cost of borrowings.  Whilst 
interest payments on public debt have risen from 3 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 6 per 
cent at the end of 2000, the revenue/GDP ratio has declined from 20 per cent to 17 
per cent, reducing the ability of the government to service such debt without 
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curtailing much needed public investment. This, coupled with the additional 
external borrowings for debt service purposes alone, has exerted added pressure on 
the balance of payments.  The foreign debt service by 2000 was however at a 
manageable level of 14 per cent of foreign earnings, owing to highly concessionary 
and longer-term borrowing mainly from the IMF (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
Annual Report, various issues).   
 
Among the other contributing factors for the higher government expenditure were 
the expansion of welfare commitments designed for the poor, and transfer of funds 
to public sector institutions, which still cater for the political wishes of the rulers. 
During the 1990s, several public enterprises were privatized while some of them 
were in the process of liquidation. However, the slow progress in this area has 
reflected both the complications of process of divestment and the lack of focus on 
essential public sector reforms (Jayawardena, 2000). 
 
The performance of government revenue also was unimpressive (Appendix Table 
A-25). The lower level of revenue was attributable to lower profit taxes from public 
enterprises, a slow growth in excise taxes and a decline in customs duties (Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report, various issues).  
 
The nature of the fiscal policy during the post-reform period therefore has not been 
conducive for long-term growth prospects in Sri Lanka. As is discussed later, the 
lack of fiscal discipline has impacted on the implementation of monetary policy and 
most other policy areas as well.  Excessive domestic borrowings by the government, 
while crowding out private investment, have led to high interest rates and further 
discouraged investment.  As witnessed in the South Korean/Taiwan experience in 
Chapter Four, a strong economic growth combined with a rising level of government 
revenue and foreign exchange earnings would have been the ideal situation for Sri 
Lanka.  Fiscal discipline on those lines would not only reduce the debt burden, but 
also create a supportive environment for private investment.  Sri Lanka has failed to 
fulfil this important necessary condition from the very outset of the reforms. 
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Monetary Policy  
As can be seen in Table 7.3 below, Sri Lanka’s monetary policy (as reflected in the 
growth of annual money supply) during the post-1977 period has been moderately 
expansive compared with East Asian counterparts during their transitional period to 
become NICs. Sri Lanka seems to have done better than South Korea in containing 
inflation, but  due care should be taken to consider the adverse external 
circumstances these economies faced  in the mid and the late 1970s in the wake of 
two oil crisis. An inquiry of how these variables affected real exchange rate and real 
interest rates of these countries would have been more relevant, but due to lack of 
comparable data, this section will mainly focus on monetary policy developments in 
Sri Lanka after 1977. 
                   
       Table 7.3 
              Annual Growth in Money Supply and Inflation 
                      Sri Lanka, South Korea, and Taiwan 
 Average Annual 
increase in Money 
Supply (%) 
Average Annual 
Inflation rate (%) 
Sri Lanka:     1978-88 





South Korea: 1960-69 





Taiwan:        1960-69 





Source:  Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2000; Krueger, A. 1998, “Contrasts in Transition to Market-
oriented Economies: India and Korea,” in Hayami, Y. and Aoki M. (eds) The Institutional  Foundations of East 
Asian Economic Development (Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Tokyo, Japan, St.  Martin’s Press 
Inc. New York; Leipziger, M. and Thomas, V., 1997, “An Overview of East Asian Experience” in Leipziger, D. 
M., (ed.) Lessons from East Asia, The University of Michigan Press. 
 
As shown in Appendix Table A-7, a high inflation rate has been a major 
macroeconomic problem for Sri Lanka during its post-reform period (except for a 
brief period of moderate inflation during 1985-87).  This was primarily due to 
domestic credit expansion. The movements in some selected monetary indicators 
during this period show a close long-term association between money and prices 
(Appendix Table A-26). This trend reflects the expansion in total aggregate demand 
stemming largely from high budget deficits after the reforms.  Among the other 
reasons for high inflation were the exchange rate depreciation, increases in the world 
prices of essential consumer items such as wheat flour, and of intermediary inputs 
such as fertilizer, upward revision of the guaranteed procurement price of paddy, 
 192 
and the increases in the oil prices by the OPEC (Jayawardena, 2002). A restrictive 
monetary policy would have controlled this inflationary situation.  It seems that the 
government did not consider it, as the priority was economic growth in this period. 
 
Appendix Table A-26 also indicates the trends in money and credit aggregates 
during 1990-2000. Following the encouragement given to the private sector-driven 
growth process, credit to the private sector increased throughout the 1990-2000 
period increasing the broad money supply growth to 19.2 per cent by 1995.  By 
tightening the monetary stance, the money growth was brought down to 13 per cent 
by the end of 2000. The switch to a managed float of the exchange rate gave the 
Central Bank greater flexibility in setting domestic interest rates.  At the same time, 
the role of the nominal exchange rate has diminished and the exchange rate has now 
become an important channel through which changes in the policy are transmitted to 
the domestic economy.  The reserve money target, which is also the intermediate 
policy target, is a first step towards a full-fledged inflation-targeting framework.  
More importantly, reserve money targeting has changed the focus of monetary 
policy away from the external balance (under a fixed exchange rate regime) to the 
internal balance.  These targeting regimes presuppose domestic price stability as the 
prime objective of monetary policy.  A Monetary Policy Committee was appointed 
to monitor closely the movements of reserve money target and make monetary 
policy recommendations (Jayawardena, 2002). 
. 
The rate of inflation has, however, come down to a one-digit level during the later 
period, especially since 1994 except for the year 1996.  The low inflation was 
attributed mainly to greater agricultural production and increased availability of 
cheaper imported food items. Improved monetary control, fiscal discipline, and 
rationalized tax and tariff structures also eased inflationary pressure. In addition, 
although the rupee depreciated against the US dollar, the drop in the world market 
prices of major imported consumer items such as rice, sugar, and wheat more than 
compensated for the upward pressure on prices through the currency depreciation.  
 
Although the Central Bank’s interest rates were low, the market interest rates 
remained high. This reflected the high inflationary expectations in the economy, 
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which was a result of the long period of high inflation in the past. This indicates, 
thus, the need to maintain a low inflation for some time so that public expectations 
are gradually changed.  
 
Manpower Policy13  
The 1977 reforms also included plans to reform labour legislation to achieve greater 
labour market flexibility necessary for rapid industrialization.  This was necessary as 
Sri Lanka’s labour market, unlike that of its East Asian counterparts, remained quite 
rigid for a considerable time due to certain inherent factors such as minimum wage 
legislation,14 retrenchment restrictions, and excessive public holidays.  However, the 
intended reforms have not been fully implemented due to pressure from trade 
unions.   
 
Given the above drawbacks, the labour market seemed to have adjusted positively to 
the new industrialization drive during the post-1977 period. For instance, the firms 
in the private sector did not face significant costs in terms of labour conflicts and 
real wages were remarkably flexible (Athukorala, 1997). Nominal wage increases 
were largely limited to mild periodic adjustments introduced under the normal Wage 
Board mechanism.  As can be seen in Table 7.4 below, the average annual increase 
in manufacturing real wages in Sri Lanka was a mere 1 per cent compared to 5 per 
cent in Singapore, 2.2 per cent in Malaysia, 1.9 per cent in India and 7.8 per cent in 
South Korea during the period 1980-1993.  
 
It is useful to find whether Sri Lanka had competitive advantage over its competitors 
in terms of labour market flexibility.15  This can be done by examining the 
indicators which investors usually consider important such as growth of real wages 
and labour productivity.  Athukorala provided some useful insights. He estimated 
the growth rates of labour productivity and real wages in Sri Lanka and in some 
selected developing countries during the 1980-93 period using a logarithmic trend 
                                                          
13 Although this is not directly related to macroeconomic policy, it is discussed here as it is directly related to employment 
and the level of productivity in the overall economy. 
14 The wage determination of private sector was governed by the Wage Boards established under 1944 minimum wage 
legislation. 
15 In a flexible labour market, wage is determined largely by demand and supply conditions, while the rules and regulations 
governing labour market are kept to a minimum level.  
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equation as shown in Table 7.4. As can be seen, although Sri Lanka’s labour 
productivity growth does not match that of most of the countries in the selected 
group, its real wage adjusted labour productivity growth is promising.  This 
indicates that Sri Lanka remains as an attractive venue for relocating labour-
intensive industries especially for foreign investors. 
 
      Table 7.4 
       Growth of Labour Market Indicators in Sri Lanka and Some Asian Countries 1980-93 
Country Labour 
Productivity 1 
Real Wage 2 Real wage 
Adjusted labour 
Productivity 3 
South Korea  7.70* 7.96*             -0.26 
Singapore 2.34* 5.07* -2.72 * 
Malaysia  4.84** 2.22* 2.62 
India 4.95* 1.87* 3.08* 
Sri Lanka 3.14*             1.0 2.15* 
Notes: The statistical significance of trend estimates are: * 1 per cent; ** 10 per cent. 
 1. Real output (value added) per worker. 2. Real earning per employee.  3. Estimated as (labour 
productivity/real wage)*100. 
Source: Athukorala, P. 1997, Labour Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector in Sri Lanka, 
Department of National Planning, Colombo (quoted in Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2000, p.58) 
 
In a recent study, Athukorala and Rajapathirana (2000) compared Sri Lanka’s 
average manufacturing wage growth during 1985 and 1993 with some selected 
competitors.  Some of the relevant information is summarized in Table 7.5 below.  
The data clearly indicates that Sri Lanka has the competitive advantage in terms of 
lower real wages against most of its competitors except China.   
 
  Table 7.5 
       Manufacturing Wages in Sri Lanka and Some Selected Countries 
  (Average wage per month in current US $) 
Country 1985 1993 
Singapore     448.2 a 1124.9 
Hong Kong 277.6   621.7 
Malaysia 268.2  323.2 
China  31.5       41.9 b 
India  59.8       n.a. 
Sri Lanka 33.0     49.9 
  (a/ The figure is for 1986;   b/ The figure is for 1992)  
 Source: Athukorala,  P., and Sarath Rajapathirana, 2000, Liberalization and Industrial 
Transformation: Sri Lanka in International Perspective, Oxford University Press, New Delhi  (p.61) 
 
Other labour market developments have also been conducive towards the 
industrialization process since 1977.  Compared to the pre-1977 period, the trade 
union movement was less active as reflected by both the number of unions 
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registered with the Commissioner of Labour, and the number of members belonging 
to each union.16  The strong political leadership during the first decade and half 
since 1977 can be mainly attributed to this favourable situation. The United National 
Party (UNP) government, which came to power in 1977, was not lenient towards the 
union movement.  In an unprecedented move, it crushed a major strike in July 1980 
using its emergency power dismissing thousands of workers. This dramatic move, 
coupled with two subsequent victories by the incumbent government, acted as a 
major deterrent to active unionism.  Even after the change of political leadership in 
1994, the union movement remained relatively calm, which was conducive for 
investment.  
 
It appears therefore that Sri Lanka has shown some progress in creating a relatively 
flexible labour market.  It is important, however, to create an environment where 
there is an increase in the demand for labour.  This depends on the ability of the 
government to attract foreign and domestic investment on the one hand and to 
improve the training and education on the other.  Any attempt by the government to 
become a major employer or to use legislation to improve wages and security for 
employment would be counter-productive (Asian Development Bank, 1995).  
 
Summary 
The foregoing analysis indicates macroeconomic management is Sri Lanka’s top 
priority.  The prolonged civil unrest, rising foreign debt, and increased social 
welfare commitments remain the major challenges in this regard.  This lack of fiscal 
discipline has impacted on the implementation of monetary policy as well. As a 
combined effect of these forces, inflation has remained high. As a result, nominal 
interest rates have remained high crowding out investment in the economy.  This is 
quite contrast with what East Asian NICs managed to achieve before achieving NIC 
status. Sri Lanka’s labour market reforms however, have shown significant 
improvements. 
 
                                                          
16 The number of registered trade unions declined from 1600 in 1977 to 900 in 1987, while the total union membership 
(excluding plantation  workers) declined from 1.8 million in 1980 to 1.2 million by 2000; and the percentage of all private 
sector workers went on strike in any single year was less than 0.5 per cent  (Rama, 1994 (as quoted in Athukorala, 2000). 
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7.4 Review of Savings-Investment Performance 
This section briefly evaluates how did Sri Lanka’s saving and investment grew in 
the macroeconomic background discussed above. 
 
Savings 
A sustained increase in capital stock through increased savings and investments was 
one of the fundamental factors for the economic success of Taiwan and Korea.  
They were the ‘only developing economies in which savings exceeded investment 
making them net exporters of capital by 1990’ (World Bank, 1993, p.41). They 
basically used two policy tools to increase savings: maintaining low inflation; and 
creating a secured and more convenient banking service to small and rural savers 
through strong prudential regulation and supervision and institutional reforms 
(World Bank, 1993, p.16).  It would be useful therefore to study Sri Lanka’s 
savings-investment behaviour along with the associated economic policies during 
the post-1977 period.   




















Figure 7.1 above shows the behaviour of domestic and national savings in Sri Lanka 
during the post-reform period.17  The domestic savings ratio has been below its pre-
1977 level of 18 per cent throughout the 1977-99 period, except for the year 1984.  
Its national savings also follow a similar pattern, but the main feature has been that 
since 1978 it has exceeded the ratio of domestic savings reflecting the contribution 
from external savings in the economy. Gross domestic savings as a percentage of 
                                                          
17 See Appendix Table A-15 for details. 
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GDP in South Korea and Taiwan on the other hand increased from 1 per cent and 13 
per cent in 1960 to 28 per cent and 30 per cent in 1978 respectively (Table 7.6).  The 
maintenance of a high level of domestic savings has been vital for their economic 
development because it increases the availability of financial resources in the 
economy for further investment. 
            
Table 7.6 
     Savings, Investment, and Incremental Capital Output Ratios (ICORS)  
                             Sri Lanka, South Korea, Taiwan  
 Gross Domestic 
Savings 
( % of GDP) 
Gross Domestic 
Investment 
( % of GDP) 
ICORs* 
Sri Lanka:      1980 12.0 34.0 6.1a 
                      2000 17.3 28.0  
South Korea: 1960  1.0 11.0 2.8b 
                      1978 28.4 31.1  
Taiwan:         1960 13.0 16.0 2.6c 
                      1978 30.0 34.0  
a. 1980-89 period average, b. 1965-80 period average; c. 1965-80 period average. 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2001, Key Indicators 2001: Growth and Change in Asia and the Pacific, 
Manila; *Syrquin  (1994, Table 3) in Wignarajah, G. 1998, Trade Liberalization in Sri Lanka: Exports, 
Technology and Industrial Policy, London, Macmillan (p.132); World Bank, World Tables (various Issues). 
 
 
One reason for Sri Lanka’s poor domestic savings was the higher inflation.  Sri 
Lanka’s annual inflation remained over 10 per cent for a considerable period since 
1977 (Appendix Table A-7).  It was only during the late 1990s that Sri Lanka’s 
inflation rate has taken a downward trend towards a single digit.  In contrast, the 
East Asian counterparts, particularly Taiwan, managed to maintain a low level of 
inflation during their transition to NIC level.  Both nations controlled inflation by 
avoiding long-term fiscal deficits.  Theoretically, persistent fiscal deficits fuel 
inflation by increasing aggregate demand in the economy.  Low inflation on the 
other hand, leads to positive real interest rates, which encourages savings (Table 
7.7).   As the rate of inflation exerts a negative effect on the real interest rate, people 
save less when inflation rises. This was what happened in Sri Lanka. The main 
reason was the persistent budget deficit throughout the post reform period.   
 
Investment 
One of the most remarkable elements of Taiwan’s and South Korean success is their 
unusually high rates of private investment (Table 7.6 above). Sri Lanka has 
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maintained a higher level of investment despite a low level of saving through 
foreign savings. 
 
  Table 7.7 
   Average Real Interest Rates in Sri Lanka, South Korea, Taiwan  
 Real Interest Rate % 
(Average Annual) 
Sri Lanka:a      1978-88 -1.5 
                       1989-99  1.6 
South Korea:  1960-69 3.1 
                       1970-79 - 0.6 
Taiwan:          1960-69  7.3 
                       1970-79  1.9 
a/ calculated by Author using the National Savings Bank deposit rates with adjustments for inflation. 
Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Reports;  Wu (1988, p.44). 
 























Figure 7.2 above indicates that public investment in the Sri Lankan economy has 
dropped from 5.1 per cent before the reforms to 3.2 per cent in 2000 with a peak of 
8.6 per cent in 1980.  Private investment, on the other hand, has played a significant 
role in the economy during the period, as its share of GDP has increased from 9.3 
per cent in 1977 to 24.8 per cent by 2000 with a peak of 25.8 per cent in 1982.18   It 
is a positive sign that, with economic reforms, the private sector has undertaken the 
leading role in investment in the economy. High private investment is a result of 
secured property rights and complementary public investment in infrastructure 
(World Bank, 1993). However, the level of Sri Lanka’s infrastructure is far behind 
that of the East Asian nations such as South Korea during their transition to NIC 
                                                          
18 See Appendix Table A-16 for more detail. 
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status (Table 7.8).  This highlights the need to allocate more resources to develop Sri 
Lanka’s basic infrastructure to encourage investment. 
 
          Table 7.8 
  Infrastructure Profile: Sri Lanka and South Korea (in Selected Years) 
 Percentage of Roads 
Paved (%) 
Electricity Generating 




Sri Lanka:      1980 





  4 
 17 
South Korea: 1965 







a/ this figure is for 1985;  b/ this figure is for 1990.  
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1999, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka, Colombo;  
World Bank (1993, p. 222); World Development Report, World Bank (Various Issues). 
 
What is more important for an LDC is not the amount of investment per se, but the 
efficiency of investment as measured by the incremental capital output ratio 
(ICOR).19  As discussed earlier, Sri Lanka’s efficiency of capital is lower compared 
to East Asian NICs such as South Korea (see Table 7.6). There are studies which 
attribute this lower efficiency of investment to public investment in large-scale 
public projects with long gestation periods during the first few years of reforms20 
(Sirisena, 1987).  In sum, Sri Lanka’s infrastructure profile is far below the East 




One of the major factors of East Asian success was the high level of private 
investment supported by high levels of domestic saving.  Although Sri Lanka’s 
private investment have improved especially during the recent years, its saving is far 
below the NIC standard. Large fiscal deficits have not only crowded out resources 
from the private sector, but also led to higher interest rates by discouraging 
investment further.  This has resulted in inadequate infrastructure which has been 
another obstacle for new investment in the economy.  Apart from that, its efficiency 
of capital has also been low compared to East Asian NICs.  Overall, Sri Lanka’s 
                                                          
19 ICOR measures   the effect of an increment to capital stock on total output. 
20 They include a number of irrigation and hydroelectric projects, and infrastructure development projects including road and 
rail transport, telecommunication, and ports. 
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saving and investment performance during the post reform period has not been up to 
the NIC standard. 
 
7.5 Review of Industry Policy  
In the Conceptual Framework discussed in Chapter Five, it was proposed “Industry 
policy is conducive to growth as it is an essential complement to trade policy”  
(Proposition 3).  The role of industry policy in Sri Lanka’s growth performance after 
1977  was tested statistically in Chapter Six in terms of this proposition.  Overall, 
the tests indicated mixed results, and were not strong enough to make conclusions 
about the contribution of Sri Lanka’s industry policy to growth in terms of the above 
proposition.    This section will therefore, attempt to fulfil that task by analysing Sri 
Lanka’s industry policy variables conceptually. Thus, it will explore the special 
areas of industry policy namely; sector targeting, credit allocation, infrastructure 
development, export promotion zones, research and development, and government 
procurement.  Where comparable data is available, this analysis will compare Sri 
Lanka’s industry policy experience with those of South Korea and Taiwan during 
their pre-NIC period.  
 
Sector Targeting 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the aim of sector targeting is to build up new export 
industries, particularly value-added industries. As noted in Chapter Four, both South 
Korea and Taiwan targeted industries during their pre-NIC period to achieve rapid 
industrialization.21   South Korea’s HCI drive created dynamic industries as well as 
costly failures (World Bank, 1987) while Taiwan’s industrial targeting was more 
constrained. Although it managed to promote industries such as steel and 
petrochemicals, industries such as automobile and shipbuilding failed (Dahlman and 
Sananikone, 1993).  Taiwan’s most dynamic sectors such as apparel, electronics, 
and computers were a result of more functional support through EPZs and research 
and development rather than sector targeting.  It needs to be emphasised here that 
sector targeting is something the planners should carefully do as it otherwise can 
                                                          
21 South Korea  first targeted capital-intensive heavy industries in the early 1970s and subsequently reviewed its policy in 
order to develop export industries that are smaller in scale, less import-intensive, and encourage the development of 
technology.  Taiwan has a longer history in this regard than South Korea who initially targeted standardized products (such as 
bicycles, radios, and colour TVs), and later shifted towards heavy engineering goods. 
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generate adverse consequences similar to those under IS strategy or infant industry 
argument discussed in Chapter Two.  
 
Unlike these countries however, there is little evidence that Sri Lanka had a 
deliberate policy to target a particular industry or a sector even under its autarkic 
policy regimes prior to 1977. Due to data limitation, this was not examined in the 
statistical test conducted in Chapter Six.  However, it is worth investigating whether 
there has been any sector targeting in Sri Lanka during the post-1977 period.  
 
As seen in Chapter Three, the first major step of 1977 policy reforms of Sri Lanka 
was to shift the licensing and quantitative restrictions to tariffs, and to remove most 
of the price controls on domestic trade.  During the post-1977 period, the tariff 
structure was gradually simplified and rationalized reducing across the board tariff 
rates to ensure overall competitiveness of the economy.  It used measures such as 
duty rebate payments22 and free trade zones basically to promote non-traditional 
exports.  There is no indication of any deliberate attempt by the Sri Lankan 
government to target a particular industry or a group of industries.   
 
Although there was no deliberate policy in Sri Lanka to target industries, it is 
worthwhile examining what industries have emerged as leading sectors after 1977.   
The sectoral composition of GDP (Appendix Table A-2) shows that the agriculture 
sector’s share in the GDP has declined from 35.7 per cent in 1977 to 20.5 per cent 
by 2000, while both the services and the manufacturing sectors have increased their 
shares from 47.1 per cent and 12 per cent to 53.4 per cent and 17.4 per cent 
respectively.  This structural transformation is somewhat in line with the East Asian 
experience. To identify what industries have emerged as leading industries, a further 
analysis of the structure of the manufacturing industries is necessary.  
 
As Table 7.9 indicates, Sri Lanka’s textiles and apparel industry has emerged as the 
major contributor to total output after its modest beginnings in the 1970s.  This 
sector accounted for only 10 per cent of total industrial production in 1977 
                                                          
22 Which will be discussed under Review of Trade Policy  later in this chapter. 
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compared with 35 per cent for the chemical, petroleum, and plastic products 
industry, and 33 per cent for the food, beverage, and tobacco industry.   By 2000, 
however, the textile and garment industry increased its share to 47 per cent, 
becoming the leading industry in the economy relegating the food, beverage, and 
tobacco industry (23 per cent) and the chemical, petroleum, and plastic industry (16 
per cent) to the second and the third places respectively.   
 
The composition of Sri Lanka’s exports also indicates that manufactured exports are 
heavily concentrated in textiles and clothing.  By 2000, it represents 54 per cent of 
total exports and 71 per cent of Sri Lanka’s total industrial export  (Appendix Table 
A-11). Thus, this industry has become the leading industry in the economy after the 
reforms.  
Table 7.9 
      Composition of Sri Lanka’s Industrial Production in Selected Years 
    (As a % of Total Value) 
Product Category 1977 1982 1985 1990 1993 1996 2000 
Food, beverage, tobacco 32.8 20.3 27.1 25.3 23.9 24.7 22.8 
Textile, apparel & leather products 10.0 14.9 24.6 32.2 42.1 42.6 46.6 
Wood and wood products 1.8 1.4 1.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Paper and paper products 3.9 2.8 3.1 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.4 
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber & plastic 35.2 50.6 33.9 24.5 17.3 17.0 16.1 
Non-metallic mineral products 5.9 5.3 4.8 8.7 7.4 6.9 6.1 
Basic metal products  1.9 1.0 0.3 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Fabricated metal, machinery & transport. 8.1 3.5 4.1 4.8 3.6 3.2 3.4 
Products not elsewhere specified 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.0 2.2 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Appendix Table A-12 
 
In the early 1990s, textiles and apparel industry overtook tea as the major export 
earner.23  This industry expanded rapidly after 1977 due to increased investment by 
foreign firms who were shopping around for unexploited quotas made available by 
the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA).24  When the investors from successful Asian 
countries had fulfilled the export quota of their own countries they shifted to new 
countries to obtain the available quota generated by MFA especially after the late 
1970s (Jayanthakumaran, 2002).    The availability of a stable market eliminated the 
                                                          
23 Noticeable increases in exports are also recorded lately in some other products such as leather goods, ceramics, footwear, 
toys, plastic and plastic products, and diamond and jewellery which are also labour intensive (Athukorala, 2000, p. 5) 
24 MFA is a regulatory arrangement designed to govern international trade between the major industrialized and semi-
industrialized countries. 
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danger of competition from established industrialists in the international field, and 
attracted direct foreign investment and helped Sri Lanka prosper in this industry. 
Apart from the stable market assured by the quota system, low labour cost, liberal 
economic policies, and tax concessions granted to the industry were also responsible 
for this outcome  (Presidential Secretariat, 2001). Thus, the emergence of the textile 
and garments as the leading industry in the economy can be regarded as more of an 
accident rather than an outcome of deliberate planning by the government. 
 
The future of this industry is uncertain due to two main reasons: (a) the uncertainty 
of the market when the current quota system exhausts by 2005,25 and (b) the 
question of economic viability due to the high import content of the final output 
(Guimaraes, 1991; Athukorala, 2000).   
 
With the proposed termination of quota system in 2005, it is estimated that about 60 
per cent of the existing textile and garment factories in Sri Lanka would be closed 
down (Wignaraja, 1998).  Sri Lanka will thus need to find new markets for this 
industry.  Assuming that Sri Lanka can resolve its civil conflict, competing with 
other countries such as India and China in the textile and apparel industry will be a 
significant challenge.  The survival of this industry beyond 2005 will depend on the 
ability of the industry to adjust its capabilities and quality to suit the international 
standard.  India and China have the added advantage in this industry as the largest 
producers of cotton fibre (The Bobbin Magazine, 2003). China has already 
transformed this industry by taking the following measures (The Bobbin Magazine, 
2003): (a) setting up special economic zones (SEZs) to attract foreign investment;  
(b) reforms in cotton distribution with a view to rationalize the prices in line with 
international prices and improve cotton circulation; and (c) development of high 
quality fabric.26  How Sri Lanka can compete with China in these circumstances is 
yet to be seen. 
 
According to an analysis by the Presidential Secretariat (2001), Sri Lanka’s share of 
the world apparel market is just 1 per cent, and 60 per cent of this is exported to the 
                                                          
25 It was agreed to fully eliminate the quota system of the MFA by year 2005 in 1995 at the Uruguay Round of talks of World 
Trade Organization (earlier known as GATT).  
26 i.e., PFY fabric and wrinkle resistant fabric. 
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USA.27 With the abolition of the quota system in 2005, the future of the garment 
industry in Sri Lanka will depend on its ability to face competition. The above study 
further reports that one third of the total exports from Sri Lanka are from 25 large-
scale manufacturers who have the capacity to restructure and sustain themselves in a 
competitive market.  But the survival of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) 
is at stake.  This is a critical issue because the SMEs are the biggest employers in the 
apparel industry.28 Sri Lankan manufacturers will have to meet the challenge of 
competition in the international market, and be sensitive to impending changes. Sri 
Lanka has to become more concerned with supplying products of high quality at low 
prices, reduced production costs and minimized delays in supply of products 
(Presidential Secretariat, 2001).   
 
The above study also discusses the following disadvantages of the quota system, 
which can be useful for policy makers to develop new measures to allow industry to 
remain competitive beyond 2005: (a) it promotes inefficiency by protecting 
industries from competition; (b) it does not encourage specialization; (c) there is no 
motivation for industrialists to introduce new technology despite vast profits,29 (d) it 
adds to competitive pressure due to rising labour costs,30 low productivity, obsolete 
labour laws, frequent labour disputes/strikes,  and the numerous public holidays; (e) 
there is slow adaptability to the fast changing fashions and styles;31 and (f) it lacks 
modern management techniques and new technology.  
 
The emergence of textiles and garment industry as the leading export industry of Sri 
Lanka during the post 1977 period cannot be considered as a result of deliberate 
sector targeting.  It has been due to the functional support this sector received 
through EPZs.  High dependence on a single industry such as textiles and garments 
can be a danger given the 2005 deadline for quota restriction under the MFA.   
 
                                                          
27 Sri Lanka’s market share in the USA is 1.2 per cent. 
28 In 2000, the total employment in this industry was 242,435 which was 65 per cent of the total workforce under the BOI 
(Annual Report 2000, Central Bank of Sri Lanka). 
29 This may hamper the qualitative and quantitative growth of the industry. 
30 The current hourly wage rate in Sri Lanka is 35 US cents, whereas in Vietnam it is 26 US cents, in China it is 25 US cents 
and in Bangladesh 16 US cents (The Presidential Secretariat, 2001, p.1). 




One of the positive aspects of this industry is that Sri Lanka does have a great 
potential for further growth, because this industry is a mature one with over two 
decades of experience (Athukorala, 2000). The trade is mainly in the hands of the 
private sector and it is up to these entrepreneurs to adopt direct measures to face 
these challenges. The government has a role to play by offering fiscal incentives for 
exporters and facilities for investors. The government needs to implement an 
awareness program with a view to repositioning this industry in a competitive 
setting. It is also important to develop a sector strategy to deal with this challenge.  
Exploring for new markets should come first in that strategy. 
 
It is useful to see what other industries have emerged after 1977 reforms.  As seen in 
Table 7.9 above, apart from textiles and apparels, there seem to be no leading 
industries in the economy either in terms of production or exports (see also 
Appendix Tables A-11, and A-13).  The question is that if Sri Lanka were to target 
any industry or group of industries how should it be done?  This appears to depend 
on the ability to correctly identify the industries or sectors where Sri Lanka has a 
comparative advantage or has the capacity to develop a competitive advantage in the 
near future.  It is also important to consider their net value addition to the economy. 
Some prospective areas in this regard include agro-based manufacturing industries 
such as processed food. The food, beverage, and tobacco industry group recorded 
the next highest contribution to total production and value added.  They were more 
sustainable due to the low import content in their total input content. Technology 
based light manufacturing industries such as electronics products should also be 
considered in view of the availability of a low-cost, highly educated labour force.  
The question is how to pick the suitable industries among them. The share of value-
added in the total production, export potentials, employment creation, and the ability 
to create linkages are some of the criteria, which can be helpful in this regard. 
 
Sector targeting can be linked with export diversification, which is another strategy 
that the East Asian NICs used in their early stages of development.  Exports 
diversification is a useful way to identify promising industries. As can be seen under 
Foreign Direct Investment later in this chapter, industries such as precious stones 
and jewellery, artist’ brushes, precision moulds, bolts and fasteners, costume, 
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artificial flowers, steel enclosures, tobacco processing and rubber products are some 
of them which can be promoted as alternative export industries.  
 
Sri Lanka’s policy failure in targeting industries that would have grown into leading 
industries as had occurred in the East Asian NICs could be elaborated by inquiring 
into its ‘missed opportunities.’ Sri Lanka introduced economic reforms in the late 
1970s, earlier than other LDCs (World Bank, 2000, p.1). It failed to take steps 
beyond textile and apparel industry to higher value-added manufacturing.  One main 
missed opportunity is the computer hardware and software boom in the 1980s and 
1990s. One reason for this failure was that Sri Lanka did not have the technological 
infrastructure required for those industries.  Taiwan and Korea on the other hand, 
had a well-developed electronic industry to take the advantage of this boom thanks 
to their governments’ assistance to this industry over two decades (Wignaraja, 
1998). Although Sri Lanka began an electronics industry in the early 1960s, “it made 
little progress into exports” unlike Taiwan and Korea (Wignaraja, 1998, p.124).  
Although the 1977 reforms enabled this industry to attract FDI by providing 
incentives through FTZs, it began to pick up only in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
with the special treatments to this industry under the first (1983-87) and the second 
(1990-94) Export Development Plans (Wignaraja, 1998, p.125).  Sri Lanka’s policy 
in this regard differed from those of Taiwan and South Korea in three ways which 
explain why Sri Lanka missed the said hardware and software boom (Wignaraja, 
1998, p.128):  (a) “inadequate technology support for capability building in 
SMEs;”32 (b) absence of a “targeted approach to attract FDI” which resulted in poor 
“subcontracting linkages between MNCs and SMEs;” and (c) lack of pressure to 
induce export-orientation for the SMEs in their early stages of learning, and weak 
“institutional support for export marketing.”  
 
Sri Lanka could also have gained some early advantage in light manufacturing 
products, as did Taiwan. Its inadequate performance in this regard reflects policy 
failure. Why Sri Lanka could not acquire a strong position in the international trade 
similar to Taiwan and Korea in such industries?  According to Haque (2002),33 most 
                                                          
32 There was only one institution, the CISIR,  for R&D work, and no program to encourage corporate R&D activities.  
33 As cited by Karawita (2002). 
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South Asian countries including Sri Lanka still maintain the colonial civil service 
which has been a main hindrance to reforms in the region as a whole. These 
countries prefer to have large governments, and are averse to privatization.  Apart 
from being an undue burden to the economy, such large governments are also 
hesitant to undertake policies to reduce protection and nationalization.  Over the 
years, this has inculcated an attitude in the minds of its people that ‘government 
must do everything.’  
  
There is also a natural tendency of these nations to evade risk taking (Haque, 2002).  
It can also be due to a lack of institutions such as efficient legal systems to safeguard 
the property rights of individuals and firms, which are essential elements in a market 
economy.  
 
Credit Allocation  
The question to be discussed in this section is whether credit allocation as a means 
of competitive industry policy is applicable to Sri Lanka.  Due to data limitation, 
this was not examined in the statistical test conducted in Chapter Six.  The East 
Asian economies used three broad types of directed credit intervention in 
industrialization i.e., (a) directed credit to specific industries/firms; (b) directed 
credit on the basis of some functional criteria,34 and (c) directed credit to achieve 
social objectives (World Bank, 1993).  Korea in the 1970s directed substantial credit 
to specific sectors and firms, mostly in heavy and chemical industries. Taiwan used 
preferential medium and long-term low interest loans to subsidize strategic 
industries (Heather, 2000).  The broadest functional target of credit in both of these 
countries has been to exporters and medium-sized enterprises. This was available to 
exporters in all industries (World Bank, 1993).  The third type, social objectives 
related bank credits, however, has not been so important in either of these two 
countries.  
 
Appendix Table A-19 presents the major domestic financial institutions in operation 
in Sri Lanka.  As it shows, both the number and the types of financial institutions 
have increased since 1977.   Except for the finance companies, the financial 
                                                          
34 such as export promotion, and small industries. 
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institutions were setup either by the government or with the approval of the 
government. Among the main reasons to make this institutional arrangement were 
(a) the provision of central banking services to the economy; (b) improving the rural 
credit system; and (c) the provision of term loans to foster industrialization (Lee, 
1987).  For the purpose of this study however, the discussion is only confined to the 
third reason above.   
 
There is no evidence to show whether Sri Lanka had any declared policy to allocate 
credit to priority sectors or industries, as was the case in South Korea and Taiwan. 
However, there is some evidence that Sri Lanka used this strategy to promote the 
industrial sector.  The National Credit Plan of 1981 is one indication of the 
government credit policy towards industries (Lee, 1987). Under this plan, there have 
been some arrangements between the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the financial 
institutions to control the overall expansion of credit for the private sector and to 
direct them to prioritise agriculture, industry and exports.  Under the plan, the total 
amount of credit in the economy was allocated among financial institutions by 
negotiation.  There were no hard and fast rules as to how it should operate.  The 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka monitored the progress at regular discussions with banks, 
and used ‘moral suasions’ where necessary to bring banks to line.   These covered 
only credits extended to private sector and public corporations by the banks and did 
not include government borrowings from the banking system. There is little 
evidence that the plan identified special sectors or industries to which credit was to 
be directed.  Nevertheless, it indicates, at least, that credit allocation to industrial 
sector in general has been a concern for policy makers after the 1977 reforms.   
 
It is useful also to see the contribution of the development banks, which provide 
long-term credits to large-scale projects, after the 1977 reforms.  Table 7.10 
indicates that of the total long-term credits in 1979, 54 per cent was for industrial 
purposes followed by 21 per cent for housing.  The share of industrial loans further 
increased to 59 per cent in 1984, and declined to 36 per cent by 2000. The National 
Development Bank and the Development Finance Corporation have been the two 
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leading lenders in the economy especially for industrial activities.35 Housing 
development accounts for the third largest amount of credit in the economy.  The 
State Mortgage and Investment Bank has been the major contributor towards 
housing development.  Agriculture related credit increased its share to 6 per cent by 
2000 from 2 per cent in 1979. There is little evidence however, to see whether there 
has been a deliberate policy of directing credits to a special industry or sectors in the 
economy similar to the East Asian NICs. What is clear is that there has been some 
type of credit allocation in the economy, but it was neither persistent, nor directed 
towards specific industries.  
 
Table 7.10 
   Purpose-wise Loans of Long-term Credit Institutions in Sri Lanka 
(Selected Years) 
Source /Purpose 1979 1984 2000 
Rs. 
Mn 








%  of 
Total 
A. Institution:       
 Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon 97 61.4 338 24.2 8074 25.2 
 National Development Bank of Sri Lanka - - 629 45 10077 31.5 
 State Mortgage and Investment Bank 27 17.1 368 26.3 1522 4.7 
 National Savings Bank 21 13.3 33 2.4 7099 22.2 
 HDFC of Sri Lanka  - - - - 649 2.0 
 National Housing Development Authority - - - - 3580 11.2 
 Insurance Companies & Other 13 8.2 31 2.2 1921 6.0 
Total 158 100.0 1399 100.0 31963 100.0 
B. Purpose: 
 Agriculture 3 1.9 12 0.9 1895 5.9 
 Industry 85 53.8 823 58.8 11561 36.1 
 Tourism 13 8.2 35 2.5 231 0.7 
 Financial 7 4.4   3026 9.46 
 Housing 34 21.5 381 27.2 7884 24.6 
 Redemption of Debt 9 5.7 15 1.1 45 0.15 
 Commercial & other 7 4.4 133 9.5 7321 22.9 
Total 158 100.0 1399 100.0 31963 100.0 
Source:  Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Reports (Various Issues) 
 
 
Next, the role that Sri Lanka’s commercial banks have played in allocating credits 
during this period is examined.  According to Lee (1987), they are the most 
important source of institutional credit in Sri Lanka.  For example, in 1984 they 
collectively provided nearly 44 per cent of the total credit granted by financial 
                                                          
35 There are no details regarding their industrial lending by sector. 
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institutions, and nearly 90 per cent of the total amounts of loans and advances (Lee, 
1987).  Those loans and advances of commercial banks to the private sector for 
various purposes, therefore, can be of help to determine the extent and the direction 
of credit allocation in Sri Lanka. 
  
As Table 7.11 below reveals, trading activities absorbed the bulk of commercial 
bank loanable funds. This share ranged between 40 and 50 per cent of the total loans 
during the 1977-99 period.  Loans to the industrial sector accounted for the second 
highest proportion, though this has halved during the period from 23.4 per cent in 
1977 to 12 per cent in 1999.  Significant increases were recorded in consumption, 
and housing loans while credit to agriculture declined by 66 per cent. It is not 
possible to make any strong inferences about the credit allocation policy during the 
post-1977 period from this limited data.  The downward trend for industrial loans 
during this period, however, reflects the low level of dependence of the private 
sector on bank credit in financing industrial activities. Most of the increases in bank 
credits were in housing and consumption related activities, which is quite contrary 
to that experienced in Korea and Taiwan.  It is possible that this outcome is 
associated with the lower personal income tax rates and higher corporate tax rate 
found in Sri Lanka.  However, these data do not help us identify any specific 
industries towards which credits were directed.  
         
    Table 7.11 
Composition of Loans and Advances of Sri Lanka’s Commercial Banks: 1977-99 
(% of Total) 
Purpose 1977 1988 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 
Commercial 47.7 49.5 45.7 43.6 45.1 42.7 39.9 
Industrial 23.4 20.0 13.5 11.9 11.9 10.5 12.1 
Financial 2.2 2.1 3.7 4.4 4.2 4.7 4.3 
Consumption 3.6 2.0 4.6 7.4 8.3 9.7 10.5 
Agricultural 17.2 10.1 10.2 7.1 5.4 5.4 6.1 
Housing/Property 3.6 8.3 11.7 13.2 12.3 12.9 13.0 
Other 2.3 7.9 10.5 12.3 12.7 14.2 14.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Appendix Table A-20 
 
Lending rates charged by commercial banks can also be used to identify the nature 
of the credit allocation in the economy. As a common measure, the average lending 
rates of the commercial banks are considered here.  Table 7.12 below shows the 
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average interest rate charged by the commercial banks on loans for various 
purposes.  The lower interest rates are for loans given to priority areas in the 
development program.  Accordingly, export trading attracts the lowest rate followed 
by agriculture.  However, there is no indication that industry in general received 
favourable treatment. These lending rates are used here only as a guideline, and they 
may not be taken as a strong indicator of credit allocation in the economy. 
 
    Table 7.12 
      Lending Rates of Sri Lanka’s Commercial Banks: 1984 
Purpose Interest Rate 
(Lowest and Highest) 
Export 18 - 21 
Import 22 – 24 
Agriculture 21 - 23 
Industry 22 - 24 
Transport 25 - 26 
Trade 23 - 24 
Construction 22 - 25 
Consumption        28 
         Source: Lee, J., 1987, Improving Domestic Resource Mobilization through                                        
           Financial Development: Sri Lanka, Asian Development Bank, Manila. (p.32) 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that there has been no ‘East Asian’ type credit 
allocation in Sri Lanka during the post-reform period.  However, by analyzing the 
limited data available, it can be inferred that government policy has encouraged 
some mild form of credit allocation.  Compared to the East Asian counterparts 
however, this has not had a significant impact on Sri Lankan industrialization 
process.  This is another area where Sri Lankan policy makers can learn from the 
East Asian NICs.  By properly identifying the industries, which can generate 
competitive advantage, and directing the financial institutions to allocate credit for 
such industries, planners can speed up the industrialization process. 
 
Infrastructure Development 
One of the major contributing factors of East Asian development is the high 
infrastructure investment by their governments.  As Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
point out in their cross-country study, infrastructure investment has a high payoff for 
economic growth. In the statistical analysis in Chapter Six, it was found that 
infrastructure development (as represented by CAP) was positively related to growth 
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of Sri Lanka. As seen in Chapter Three, Sri Lanka has given a high priority to the 
development of infrastructure since the reforms in 1977.  The emphasis on 
infrastructure can be viewed by looking at the share of capital expenditure in the 
budget. As shown in Table A-14, the average growth rate of capital expenditure 
related to development work has been 11.3 per cent of the GDP during the 1978-
2000 period. During the first 10 years after 1977, this share has been as high as 15.6 
per cent.   Even during the 1990s, when the government had to contain its budget, it 
still maintained a share of around 6 per cent.   As Table 7.13 below shows, this 
increased emphasis on infrastructure development has resulted in some 
improvement.  As is evident, the installed capacity of electricity has increased from 
401 MW in 1978 to 1636 MW by 1998 a fourfold increase; the national road 
network expanded by 25 per cent between 1978 and 1993;36 and the number of 
telephones per 1000 persons increased from 7.2 in 1992 to 24.8 in 1998.   
 
Table 7.13 
Infrastructure Profile: Sri Lanka 
Indicator 1978 1992 1998 
Telephones per 1000 persons n.a 7.8 24.3 
Electricity capacity available (MW) 401 1409 1636 
Road Kilometerage (Class A & B roads) 8668 10855 11285 
n.a: not available 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1999, Socio-Economic Data 1999. 
 
In order to achieve NIC status, however, the current level of infrastructure is not 
adequate (see Table 7.8), and it is important to identify the priority areas.  One such 
area is roads and railways. Over the years, there has been a substantial increase in 
motor traffic. This has resulted in traffic congestion and many other socio-economic 
problems resulting in economic inefficiency.   To overcome these problems, the 
government has to plan new strategies such as building expressways, and upgrading 
the existing road network.   Railways are the primary mode of long distance 
transport in Sri Lanka.  Currently, Sri Lanka has a rail network of 1500 km. The 
quality of services and the scale of operations have been adversely affected due to 
poor condition of the track, insufficient and obsolete locomotives, outdated 
signalling and communication systems. Lack of funds to acquire new equipment and 
out-dated administrative and management structures have also contributed to this 
                                                          
36  This was an outcome of the massive public investment program during the initial period after reforms. 
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situation (Trade Partners, 2002).  In order to achieve NIC status, it is vital that 
sufficient funds be allocated for the development and improvement of the railway 
services.  
 
Another area of infrastructure, which is essential for industrial development, is 
ports. Sri Lanka has five commercial ports, namely Colombo, Galle, Trincomalee, 
Kankesanturai and Point Pedro.  Presently, only Colombo port is capable of 
handling containers.  The Colombo port has been ranked 24th amongst the 352 
container handling ports in the world (Trade Partners, 2002).  Colombo also enjoys 
a hub status for transhipment of cargo to and from countries on the Indian sub-
continent.   With competition from other ports in the region, the government has a 
big challenge to avoid Colombo port losing its hub status. It is imperative that 
government should enhance the capacity, efficiency and productivity of the 
Colombo port.  
 
Not only the current supply of electricity, gas, and water in the economy is 
insufficient for the economy’s requirement. The demand for certain services such as 
electricity increases over 10 per cent annually (Jayawardena, 2002).  Unlike in East 
Asia, there is no private participation in the supply of utility services in Sri Lanka.  
As Jayawardena (2002, p.4) points out the, Sri Lanka’s power shortage is 
attributable to the following factors: (a) delays in project implementation; (b) 
monopoly power, and (c) opposition of the environmentalists. 
 
The capital expenditure component of the government’s annual budget is mainly 
concerned with infrastructure development.  Given the persistent budget deficits Sri 
Lanka has been experiencing since 1977, the ability of the government to divert 
more resources towards infrastructure is restricted. When there is pressure to 
increase recurrent expenditure, the usual practice of the government has been to 
curtail capital outlays to keep the budget within manageable targets.   The reduction 
of capital expenditure for infrastructure development has thus created a serious 
impact on long-term economic growth.  In similar situations, South Korea and 
Taiwan encouraged the private sector to provide such facilities at competitive rates 
through proper fiscal incentives under the schemes such as BOO-BOOT.   However, 
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this strategy has not worked well in Sri Lanka.  This can be due to the lack of 
potential investors in the economy. There is also a view that although BOO-BOOT 
schemes can be successful in areas such as telecommunications and electricity, they 
may not be effective in other areas such as road ad railway development and water 
supply (Kelegama, 1996).  Infrastructure development efforts by the state should 
therefore be positively viewed as laying the foundation for future private sector 
investment.   
 
Export Promotion Zone (EPZs) 
The objective of creating EPZs was to attract foreign investment as the basis of a 
sound industrial sector which could generate benefits such as employment creation, 
backward and forward linkages with local firms, and technology transfer to local 
entrepreneurs.   Healy and Luthkenhorst (1989) show how South Korea achieved 
those benefits through FDI in EPZs.  The statistical analysis in Chapter Six showed 
a significant relationship between EPZs and GDP during the 1989-2000 period.  
This section attempts to evaluate the contribution of EPZs to the industrialization 
process in Sri Lanka by deriving further information from various studies on the 
subject area.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, until the Board of Investment (BOI) was set up in 
1992, the GCEC was the governing body for investment activities in the three 
EPZs,37 while the FIAC was in charge of export promotion in all other areas of the 
island.  Unlike in many countries where local investors’ participation in EPZs 
activities has been significant, there were only 18 fully locally owned firms among 
125 firms operating in the three EPZs in Sri Lanka by 1992 (Athukorala and 
Rajapathirana, 2000). As a norm, about one-third of firms in EPZs should preferably 
be fully-locally-owned. (Warr, 1990, in Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2000)   At 
the same time, foreign involvement in export-oriented ventures in other areas of Sri 
Lanka has been significant. There appeared to be no vast difference between firms 
operating in EPZs and those located outside as far as concessional treatments for 
investment in Sri Lanka are concerned (Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2000). 
                                                          
37 The locations of the three EPZs with their years of establishment were as follows:  Katunayaka, 1978; Biyagama, 1982; and 




What has been the EPZs’ contribution to employment?  The above study reveals that 
local employment in the GCEC firms recorded over a twenty-fold increase, from 
10,538 to 223,000 between 1980 and 1995 (Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2000, 
p.113).  A remarkable feature of this is that over 95 per cent of these opportunities 
has been in the manufacturing sector mainly in clothing and apparel.  The 
contribution from foreign firms has been found to be around 87 per cent of the total 
employment.  Employment in non-GCEC areas on the other hand according to 
surveys by the FIAC, has increased from 2,500 in 1978 to 50,000 by 1988. About 50 
per cent of this has occurred in export-oriented projects.  The study claims that the 
share of export-oriented foreign firms in total manufacturing employment increased 
from 10 per cent in early 1980s to over 60 per cent by the mid 1990s suggesting an 
impressive outcome. 
Table 7.14 
            EPZs Industry Linkages with Domestic Economy 
          Indicator Sri Lanka South Korea 
1979 1979 1988 
No of firms    12     80     94 
No employed 5876 45728 31153 
% of net earnings to exports    20        20.3          51.8 
% of local to total raw materials       4.8 a       5.0      34.0 
a.  1981 value is used as 1979 value is not available. 
Source: Jayanthakumaran, K., 2002, An Overview of Export Processing Zones: Selected Asian Countries, 
Working Paper Series 2002, Department of Economics, University of Wollongong. 
 
Have Sri Lanka’s EPZs created backward and forward linkages within the 
economy? Jayanthakumaran (2002) in a study examining the linkage and technology 
transfer effects of EPZs in some Asian countries including Sri Lanka provides some 
useful findings (Table 7.14). Accordingly, most of the local purchases by foreign 
firms located in the EPZ were sub-products, or services, of wearing apparel. These 
purchases were also small. The attempts to promote sub-contracting were not 
successful for a number of reasons: the EPZ firms mostly buy their inputs from the 
cheapest source that are usually from outside the country, utilizing the facilities 
offered to them such as tariff free import of raw materials, parts and components; 
firms have no direct contact with domestic firms; and linkages of zone enterprises 
with local industries are limited, as there is a low level of industrialization in the 
country and the nature of import-based manufacturing processes that they adopt. 
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Similar to other Asian EPZs, local purchases have not been impressive.  Using the 
findings of a study by Warr (1989), Jayanthakumaran emphasizes that as far as 
technology transfer is concerned, technology used for the garment industry is simple 
and universally available, while for other industries such as electronics it is heavily 
guarded. This indicates that unlike in the East Asian countries, the linkages and 
other flow-on effects of EPZs are not significant in Sri Lanka.  
 
The above study further analyses how far the EPZ firms have transferred skills to the 
local work force.  Foreign investors in the EPZs are attracted by low-skilled workers 
for their labour-intensive industries such as textile and apparel industry for low 
wages.  However, they applied labour-saving techniques in industries such as 
electronics reaping the advantage of rapid technological innovation.  Investors in the 
EPZs favoured unskilled female workers who accounted for about 80 per cent of the 
total work force in the 1990s. The workers worked under strict factory discipline, 
and there is little evidence to show that adequate skill transfer has taken place in the 
industries in the EPZs.   
 
The lack of linkages between the FTZ industries and the rest of the economy is often 
shown as a cause to justify that this strategy has not worked in Sri Lanka as did in 
Taiwan and South Korea. As witnessed above, the major sector emerged from the 
trade reforms in Sri Lanka is the textiles and apparel industry.  The high dependence 
on a single industry, which has little linkages with other sectors, will not help Sri 
Lanka achieve NIC status.  The expansion of textile and garment industry was more 
of an inevitable outcome of the availability of the quota system under the MFA than 
a result of reforms.  East Asian NICs, on the other hand, did not have such 
constraints at their initial level of development 
 
Human Resource Development 
As noted in Chapter Three, Sri Lanka has managed to maintain a unique place 
among LDCs in terms of education and health indicators.  Especially, the enrolment 
rates for primary and secondary education have been very high due mainly to its free 
education policies since independence. As seen in the statistical analysis in Chapter 
Six, human resource development as measured by the total annual enrolments in the 
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secondary and university education was a major contributory factor to Sri Lanka’s 
growth during the 1978-2000 period. The question is whether Sri Lanka has done 
enough in this area compared to East Asian NICs.  As Table 7.15 shows, South 
Korea and Taiwan have managed to maintain a higher share of education 
expenditure in total government expenditure throughout their pre-NIC years than Sri 
Lanka’s commitment after the 1977 reforms.  In the post-1977 period Sri Lanka has 
reduced it budgetary commitment to education as a part of the government’s social 
welfare reforms (Griffin, 1989).  The 1989 education reforms however attempted to 
regain the increased commitment to primary and secondary education while 
emphasizing the need of a vocational training program for school leavers (ADB, 
1989).  However, Sri Lanka was far behind the two East Asian NICs in terms of 
budgetary commitments to education. 
 
                Table 7.15 
Education Expenditure in Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Korea 
 % of Total Government 
 Expenditure 
Sri Lanka:       1982 
                        1999 
7.4 
11.0 
Taiwan:          1967 
                       1972 
17.0 
14.5 
South Korea:  1960 
                       1972 
15.0 
15.8 
  Source: World Bank, World Development Report (Various Issues); World Bank, World Tables (Various 
Issues); Lall, S. and Wignaraja, G. 1996, “Skills and Capabilities in Ghana’s Competitiveness” in Lall, S. (ed.)  
Learning from the AsianTigers, Macmillan, London. 
 
Another significant difference between Sri Lanka and the above two nations was the 
importance they have given to both vocational and tertiary-level engineering skills 
required for operating complex technologies (Wignaraja, 1994). For example, 
university students in engineering as a per cent of urban population in the late 1980s 
was 0.06 per cent, far below the level of 0.8 per cent for South Korea, and 0.9 per 
cent for Taiwan  during their transition to NICs (Lall, 1992).   
 
Table 7.16 above shows the difference in policy approach. Sri Lanka has been able 
to match the primary and secondary enrolments of the East Asian NICs, but it is still 
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far ahead in tertiary education enrolment. There has been no policy change to 
improve this situation in the 1990s.38  
 
      Table 7.16 
      Educational Attainments of Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Korea 
(As a Percentage of Age Group Enrolled in) 
 Sri Lanka          South Korea Taiwan 
1978 1992 1965 1978 1965 1978 
Primary Education 94 107 101 111 97 98 
Secondary Education 52 74 35 74 38 68 
Tertiary Education 1 6 6 12 7 11 
 Source: Wignaraja, G. 1998, Trade Liberalization in Sri Lanka: Exports, Technology and Industrial 
Policy, London, Macmillan (p.144) 
 
 
It is also useful to see what other human resource development programs were in 
place in Sri Lanka apart from the formal educational training discussed above.  As 
Lall and Wignaraja (1996) find in a study of Sri Lanka’s 20 large exporters, not only 
the training opportunities were limited in all industries considered, but also the 
quality of the training was low compared to the level of skills required for the tasks 
involved.  Only seven firms had in-house training programs, and the budgetary 
allocations for training was low for most of the firms.  The study revealed that Sri 
Lankan firms generally pay more emphasis to train managerial staff rather than 
technical staff.  The level of external training in industrial firms such as electronics 
and engineering was very low in terms of NICs standards.39  This indicates that if 
Sri Lanka were to achieve NIC status, it should also develop programs which 
enhance technical skills required for specific industries. 
 
 
‘Brain drain’ also can be considered as a factor affecting Sri Lanka’s lack of human 
resource skills. There is no doubt that a large exodus of educated work force directly 
affects the technological strength of the country. If Sri Lanka is “ever to be a rich 
country, it has to keep a larger share of its education dividend while continuing to 
use its educational excellence to generate a substantial amount of global income” 
(Rankin, 2001, p.2).   Although no data is available on the economic cost of the 
brain drain in Sri Lanka, it is one factor contributing to the lack of technical 
                                                          
38 By 1990, the number of students enrolled in vocational training as a percentage of population was 0.3 for Sri Lanka 
compared to 2.1 and 1.9 for Taiwan and South Korea respectively (Wignaraja, 1998, p.144).   
39  For example, the share of employees who received external training in engineering and electronics was 5.5% compared to 
29.2% of Korea in 1993 (Wignaraja, 1998, p.251).  
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personnel available for R&D activities. Taiwan and Korea on the other hand had 
appropriate policies to prevent such problems and get the maximum benefit from its 
domestic professionals.  
 
Research & Development 
The government’s commitment towards research and development (R&D) has 
played a vital role in industrialization process in most of the East-Asian NICs.    Due 
to non-availability of data this was not examined in the statistical analysis in 
Chapter Six.  This is an area where little research has been done in Sri Lanka.40 
However, this section will make an attempt to examine the nature and the extent of 
the past R&D commitment in Sri Lanka with available information to ensure the 
completeness of this analysis. 
 
Table 7.17 
           R&D Expenditure: Sri Lanka, South Korea and Taiwan  
  % of GNP 
Sri Lanka:a                 1975 
                          1983 
0.20 
0.18 
Taiwan:             1970 
                               1978 
n.a 
0.66 
South Korea:b    1970 
                          1976 
0.39 
0.44 
  a/  R&D as % of GDP;   b/ the corresponding figure for 1981 is 0.65 (Wilmott and Thrope. 1992);  n.a: not available 
 Source: Wignaraja, G. 1998,  Trade Liberalization in Sri Lanka: Exports, Technology and  
             Industrial Policy, London, Macmillan. (p.140) 
. 
As Table 7.17 shows, Sri Lanka’s R&D commitments in the post-1977 are far 
behind those of South Korea and Taiwan in their pre-NIC years.  There is an 
argument that Sri Lanka did not have a formal R&D policy until the mid 1980s 
(Wignaraja, 1994).  Therefore, there is a lack of science and technology institutions 
which can play a vital role in supporting the operation of complex technologies.  In 
1977, there were only three institutions41 which conducted applied R&D work on 
imported technologies and diffused them to local firms.  As he finds, “their 
contribution to economic development was restricted not only due to their slow and 
bureaucratic approach but also due to lack of finance, equipment, and manpower to 
                                                          
40 This study relies on a few studies such as Thornstrom (1986) and Wignaraja (1994) who has undertaken some work in this 
area. 
41 The Ceylon Institute of Science and Industrial Research, The Industrial development Board, and the National Engineering 
Research and Development Centre. 
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perform R&D” (Wignaraja, 1994, p.210). As he further argues, “they were unable to 
provide simple technological services such as quality control, equipment 
maintenance, process adaptation and product design modification, which were the 
major contributory factors for high level of R&D activities in South Korea and 
Taiwan”(Wignaraja, 1994, p.210).  
 
Table 7.18 
     R&D Expenditure of Sri Lanka: 1960-83 
Year R & D Expenditure (Rs Mn) R&D (Constant prices) 
as % of GDP Current prices Constant Prices 
1959/60 18.8 18.2 0.29 
1965/66 19.8 17.6 0.23 
1970/71 21.5 15.6 0.18 
1975/76 45.1 22.7 0.21 
       1983 162.6 28.9 0.14 
Source: Thornstrom (1986) 
 
Table 7.18 above indicates Sri Lanka’s R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
over the period 1960-1983.   It appears that the share of R&D expenditure in GDP in 
1983 is significantly below that of 1960.  On the findings of a national survey on 
R&D  in Sri Lanka in 1996, Fernando and Amaradasa (1998) estimated this ratio to 
be 0.13 in 1993 and 0.18 per cent in 1996. According to Thornstrom (1986, p.236), 
the average ratios for the developing countries and the developed countries in 1980 
were 0.43 per cent, and  2.3 per cent respectively.  This study emphasizes the 
importance of increasing Sri Lanka’s R&D expenditure at least up to 1 per cent.  
According to Wignaraja (1994), the number of patents granted to domestic 
entrepreneurs (which is a direct output of R&D activities) in Sri Lanka had 
increased only modestly from 9 in 1979 to 18  in 1985.  He compares this with 
2,581 in South Korea and 5,944 in Taiwan and emphasizes the need for Sri Lanka to 
increase its R&D expenditure.  However, the problem is whether Sri Lanka has an 
effective human resource base especially in science and technology to absorb any 
increase in R&D expenditure.   According to Karunanayake (2000), in 1984 the 
number of full-time equivalent R&D scientists in Sri Lanka was 79 per million 
people, which is far below the average (125) for developing countries.42 This really 
                                                          
42 The corresponding figure for developed countries was around 3000 (Karunanayake, 2000, p.236).  
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indicates the need for some drastic measures to improve the quality of manpower 
available for R&D activities.  
 
What actions has Sri Lanka taken to upgrade the manpower and the condition of 
science and technology in the economy since 1977?  One major step was the setting 
up of the Institute of Fundamental Studies43 (IFS) by the government.   The major 
objective of this institution was to promote studies in a wider area of subjects such 
as mathematics, physics, chemistry, life sciences, social sciences, and philosophy.  
However, the realization of this objective has been somewhat restricted due to some 
administrative problems such as lack of funds and understaffing, the latter being due 
to lack of trained and experienced scientists to lead research groups (Karunanayake, 
2000, p.236). Another positive move was the appointment of the Science Advisor to 
the President in the early 1980s to assist the political leadership in science and 
technology related policies.  In fact, formulation of an appropriate science and 
technology policy became mandatory at this time in order to keep pace with rapidly 
growing economies in the region.  This eventually led to the Sessional Paper No. 6 
of 1986, titled National Science and Technology Policy for Sri Lanka which was a 
concerted effort of some 125 prominent scientists who participated in the 
deliberations of nine committees on national science and technology policy 
(Karunanayake, 2000) The policies covered all the vital areas for economic 
development such as agriculture, forestry and fisheries, industry, environment, 
information technology and electronics, energy, health and nutrition, education and 
social infrastructure. 
 
Has the above policies worked as expected?   Lack of data prevents this study from 
carrying out a detailed analysis in this area.  One method could be to examine the 
annual contribution of Sri Lankan universities towards the generation of 
professionals in the field of science.  Table 7.19 below presents the output of 
postgraduates in Science from All Universities of Sri Lanka for the 1992-1994 
period.  It is evident that the annual numbers of postgraduate degrees completed in 
                                                          
43 This was established under the Act No. 55 of 1981. 
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the Sri Lankan universities are not adequate for rapid growth and development,44 
especially given the fact that in 1984 the number of full-time R&D scientists in Sri 
Lanka was 79 per million people compared to the LDCs’ average of 125 
(Karunanayake, 2000, 236). This can be a partial explanation for the inadequate 
expansion of R&D in Sri Lanka.     It can be concluded that Sri Lanka has a long 
way to go in R&D to achieve NIC status.  It is clear that any increase in R&D 
activity should first be closely linked with a well-defined science and technology 
policy.  This should also be supported by, as Kraunanayake (2000, p.236) 
recommends “a strategic plan of action for human resource development,” and 
“medium and long-term programmers for national development.” 
 
                                                 Table 7.19 
   Annual University Science Postgraduates in Sri Lanka: 1992-94 
Field & Type of Course 1992 1993 1994 
Agriculture (All fields) 26 20 27 
MSC 9 8 12 
Mphil 17 11 14 
PhD 0 11 1 
Medical/Veterinary (All fields) 4 8 2 
MSC 0 0 2 
Mphil 3 1 0 
                       PhD 1 7 0 
Natural Sciences 61 27 45 
MSC 43 10 36 
 Mphil 15 12 5 
PhD 3 7 4 
Total (in all fields) 91 55 74 
        Source: University Grants Commission (1995) 
 
The above discussion indicates that R&D performance in Sri Lanka has not 
improved during the post 1977 period.  It is useful however to see why there was no 
increased demand from industries for R&D activities. The answer lies in the Sri 
Lanka’s approach to industrialization from the outset of reforms in 1977.  There was 
no pressure for firms to achieve targets, or upgrade and diversify their production 
lines, as was the case in East Asia. As such, little progress was made in innovations 
as evident from moderate increases in new patient rights, and little industrial 
upgrading into more complex activities occurred in Sri Lanka. 
                                                          





The statistical analysis in Chapter Six showed that the government procurement 
represented by government recurrent expenditure on goods and services was a 
strong contributory factor to Sri Lanka’s GDP during the 1978-2000 period.  Sri 
Lanka is not a signatory to the agreement on government procurement under the 
Tokyo Round Negotiations of the GATT (World Trade Organization, 1995), and 
therefore can favour local producers by making arrangements to purchase certain 
goods and services required for the public service.  Theoretically, therefore the 
findings of the test can be taken as a true representation of the policy.  In fact, this 
was practiced during the IS regime prior to 1977.  However, there is no information 
to see how far Sri Lanka has continued this policy after 1977.  What is known is that 
after the reforms in 1977, the government policy was to use  ‘open tender system’ 
for its supplies.45  The tender board system is supposed to encourage open 
competitive bidding, which upholds the free market principles to a larger extent.  
 
There is little research work in this area in Sri Lanka. According to Wignaraja 
(1998, p.104) however, there is evidence of “a bias towards public procurement of 
imported items, partly due to tied aid programmes.” This cannot however be taken 
as a serious policy measure of the government with long-term objective.  Under the 
CIP framework however, this strategy has an important role in promoting small-
scale local industries. By not using this policy extensively, Sri Lanka has denied 
genuine, small-scale, local industrialist who cannot face competition the opportunity 
to improve their economic activities.   
 
Summary  
The forgoing section analysed in detail the nature and magnitude of Sri Lanka’s 
industry policy measures, being part of the CIP approach emphasized in the 
conceptual framework in Chapter Five, together with their associated outcomes 
during the post 1977 period.  It was clear that Sri Lanka did not have a declared 
program to target specific industries. The few industries which emerged as leading 
manufacturers/exporters were a result of some other factors such as assurance of 
                                                          
45 The tender procedures are governed by the Financial Regulations administered by the Ministry of Finance. 
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overseas markets, and accessibility to FDI under the freer environment. Unlike 
South Korea and Taiwan, Sri Lanka failed to take the advantage of the computer and 
software boom of the 1980s and early 1990s.  There is also no evidence that Sri 
Lanka used credit direction to promote industries as occurred in South Korea and 
Taiwan.  Although there is evidence that Sri Lanka had made low cost credit 
available to certain economic activities from time to time, such ad hoc measures are 
not comparable with well-planed, long-term policy of credit allocation used by the 
East Asian NICs.  There has been substantial improvement in infrastructure 
development during the post reform period, but there is still an unfinished agenda in 
this regard. The areas such as roads, railways, ports, electricity, and 
telecommunication need further expansion. The EPZs have made significant 
contributions towards manufacturing production and exports, and employment. 
However, this policy has failed to diversify industries, as a large proportion of these 
industries remain concentrated on a few products. The high dependence on FDI, the 
lack of technology transfers, and the poor linkages with local firms are some of the 
problem areas associated with this strategy.  As regards human resource policy, 
except for some improvements in general education, Sri Lanka’s post-1977 policy 
has failed to upgrade specific skills and knowledge, which are essential for 
innovation and modernization.   Similarly, the R&D commitments in the economy 
have been insignificant. There was no long-term R&D policy in Sri Lanka until 
recently.   There is no evidence of government procurement in Sri Lanka after 1977.  
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the contribution from industry policy to Sri 
Lanka’s industrialization process since 1977 has not been adequate to achieve the 
NIC status. 
 
7.6 Review of Trade Policy 
The research proposition 2 in the Conceptual Framework asserted “liberal trade 
policy is conducive to economic growth as  the world demand is the principal 
determinant of growth for a small open economy.”  The validity of this proposition 
for Sri Lanka was examined in the statistical test in Chapter Six.  Similar to industry 
policy analysis, the tests indicated mixed results, and hence were not conclusive.    
This section will therefore undertake a detail analysis of Sri Lanka’s trade policy 
variables to fulfil that task. It will accordingly review four policy areas viz. tariff 
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policy, import/export controls, exchange rate policy, and FDI.   Where comparable 
data is available, this analysis will compare Sri Lanka’s post-1977 policy experience 
with those of South Korea and Taiwan during their pre-NIC period. 
 
Tariff Policy 
Import duties which were mainly used in the past as a reliable source of government 
revenue and a means of protecting local industries, were revised from time to time 
by the Presidential Tariff Commission (PTC) with the objective of liberalizing the 
economy.  After the 1978 reforms, a major step in rationalizing tariffs was taken in 
1985 where the maximum nominal rate was reduced from 100 per cent to 60 per 
cent.  In 1992, a four-band tariff structure with rates of 50 per cent, 35 per cent, 20 
per cent and 10 per cent was implemented following the PTC recommendations 
thereon.  In 1993, the maximum nominal tariff was reduced to 45 per cent while 
liberalizing items under import controls. The 1995 budget introduced three-band 
tariff system, 35 per cent, 20 per cent, and 10 per cent, with the aim of moving to a 
uniform single tariff in the near future.  In the 2000 budget the tariff structure was 
further consolidated to a two-band structure of 10 and 25 per cent, keeping a few 
agricultural products under 35 per cent,46 with the objective of gradually eliminating 
the concessionary rate of 5 per cent applied on industrial raw material and 
machinery not manufactured in Sri Lanka. 
                                         
  Table 7.20 
                Average Tariff Rates of Sri Lanka and South Korea 
 Average Tariff Rates (%) 
Sri Lankaa:    1978 
                      1988 
                      1989-93 






                     1970-80 
11.2 
 6.6 
           a/ Compiled by Author  
        Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Reports, (Various Issues); Krueger, 1997 (p.197).  
 
One of the simplest means to examine the extent of trade policy reforms is to 
examine the average tariff rates (based on import duties as a percentage of total 
value of imports) during the period under review.  As Table 7.20 above indicates, 
                                                          
46  Rice, big onion, green gram, and cowpea remained at the level of 35% as a temporary measure to allow the domestic 
producers to adjust to a lower tariff regime over the medium term (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2000, p.177). 
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Sri Lanka’s average tariff rate shows an initial increase in the 1980s and early 
1990s, but has gradually decreased below the pre-reform level.47 This indicates that 
Sri Lanka had achieved a significant progress in liberalizing its trade by the turn of 
the new millennium. However, it is still above the pre-NIC level of South Korea. 
 
The above trend is in line with the finding of Athukorala and Rajapathirana (2000) 
who did some extensive work on this area show that the effective import duty rate48 
increased from 14 per cent during the 1978-80 period to 18 per cent by the mid-
1980s and then declined continuously thereafter until it reached 8 per cent in 1995 
(Appendix Table A-18).  All the categories of imports (i.e. consumer, intermediate, 
and investment goods) have experienced a consistent decline in duty incidence 
during the past ten years, but intermediate imports records the sharpest decline.   
The share of dutiable imports in total imports, however, stayed over 50 per cent until 
1991, and then declined continuously reaching 39.5 per cent by 1995. They attribute 
this decline to the expansion of manufacturing exports, as all inputs used in export 
production in the EPZs (and the bonded warehouses) were duty free.    
    
Table 7.21 
    Estimates of Sri Lanka’s Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection: 1981 and 1994 





ERP NRP NTI 
31 Food, beverage, & tobacco 72 68 47 32 
32 Textiles, apparel & leather 78 84 46 22 
33 Wood and wood products 79 52 37 14 
34 Paper, paper products, & printing n.a. 106 46 17 
35 Chemicals, petroleum, rubber & plastics 56 69 42 21 
36 Non-metallic mineral products n.a. 59 35 11 
37 Basic metal products  28 104 41 12 
38 Fabricated metal, machinery & equipment 107 95 45 14 
39 Other manufacturing n.a. 115 50 21 
 Total manufacturing 90 78 43 19 
NRP (Nominal rate of protection) is the difference between the domestic price and the border price as a 
percentage of the former;  ERP (effective rate of protection) is the difference between value-added made 
possible due to protection and value-added at border price as a percentage of the former;  NTI shows the 
average tariff rates (nominal protection) for inputs. 
Source: Ministry of Finance & Planning, 1994, Report of the Presidential Commission on Tariffs & 
Trade, Colombo. 
 
                                                          
47 See Appendix Table A-27 for detail. 
48 Total duty collection as a percentage of total imports.  
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Another indicator of the level of trade barriers in the economy is the effective rate of 
protection (ERP).49  There have been several studies which have estimated ERP for 
industry in Sri Lanka (Cuthbertson and Khan, 1981; Presidential Commission on 
Tariffs & Trade (PCTT), 1994). Table 7.21 above is based on the 1994 PCTT report.  
As it shows, there is a high degree of variation in ERP across sub-sectors ranging 
from 52 per cent for the wood and wood products category to 115 per cent for the 
other manufacturing (which is mainly final consumer goods) in 1994.  Another main 
feature has been that the nominal protection for inputs (NTI) was substantially 
below that for goods produced (NRP).  For instance, the average NRP for total 
manufacturing was 50 per cent, and this was 126 per cent higher than the average 
NTI (which was 21 per cent).   This indicates the cascading nature of the system 
(Asian Development Bank, 1995, p.39).  Finally, although ERP for total 
manufacturing has declined to 78 per cent in 1994, from 90 per cent in 1981, it is 
still high for a country that has been eliminating trade barriers since 1978.50  
 
However, the above estimates by the PCTT  overstate effective protection for two 
reasons (Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2000, p.48). One is that, those estimates 
were based on data on manufacturing output and cost structure collected through a 
survey on non-FTZ firms in 1981. The PCTT has ignored the effect of rapid 
expansion of FTZ firms and the extension of FTZ incentives to all export-oriented 
firms in 1990s.  The other reason is that the tariff rates used in the PCTT estimates 
are gazetted rates, and given the various tariff exemptions to export production, such 
data overstate the actual tariff incidence.  Therefore, they (Athukorala and 
Rajapathirana) compare the domestic market price of manufactured goods with the 
world market price in terms of a relative price index, as a more logical way of 
analyzing the price effects of trade policy reforms in Sri Lanka over the years.51 
Their study shows that domestic prices were converging steadily towards world 
                                                          
49 ERP is defined as the difference between value-added made possible due to protection and value-added at border price as a 
percentage of the former. 
 
50 This very high compared to South Korea’s ERP of 24.1 in 1978 (Kim, 1995, p.105). 
51 They conducted this study on manufactured products under 3 groups:  total manufactured goods, textiles and apparels; and 
manufactured goods other than textiles and apparel.  The domestic price was measured using the wholesale price index.  The 
world price index for the above 3 groups was constructed by taking the trade-weighted average of the two-digit ISIC producer 
price indices of Sri Lanka’s 10 leading trading partners, and aggregating those 10 indices using these countries share in Sri 
Lanka’s total trade. Convergence of the domestic price index towards 100 indicates a reduction in trade protection. 
(Unfortunately no adequate information is available in their study as to how this was conducted). 
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prices over these years.  This indicates that the level of effective protection has 
diminished. 
 
There are criticisms that the exports were highly import-sensitive (Athukorala and 
Bandara, 1982, Lal and Rajapathirana, 1988).  In certain industries as much as 70 
per cent of inputs were imported, and expected foreign exchange saving was 
negligible.   There were therefore, suggestions for the implementation of strategic 
trade policy to increase the domestic value added components of exports from FTZs 
under the outward-oriented strategy (Lall et al., 1996; Wignaraja, 1998).  Although 
the proponents of free trade argue that Sri Lanka should specialize in the production 
and exports to the global market of low-tech export goods in which it has 
comparative advantage, the specialization in such goods, does not help transfer firm 
specific assets or R&D and the technological spill overs associated with North-
South trade (Coe, et al., 1977).  As Karunarathna (2000) believes, regardless of such 
short-run gains, in the long run it could lock the economy into perilous state of 
technological dependency and regress.  Such an outcome could contribute to the 
divergence rather than a catching up with the per capita incomes of the Asian NICs.    
 
Import/Export Controls 
During the post-1977 period, Sri Lanka has shown a significant improvement in 
eliminating import and export controls. Removal of import licensing on certain 
agricultural items such as potatoes, onion, and chillies in 1996 was a major step.  
Imports of these items were under license for several decades to protect local 
farmers. In 2000, further changes were introduced by removing licensing 
requirements on wheat, Mezlin, wheat flour, maize, and certain kind of preparations 
used for animal feed. Thus, by 2000, only a few items were under license control 
mostly for health and national security reasons. The import of drugs is subject to the 
approval of the Drugs and Cosmetic Devices Committee of the Ministry of Health, 
while import of firearms and ammunition is controlled by the Ministry of Defence. 
Only the following four categories of exports remained under licensing on the 
ground of the environmental protection and the preservation of antiques: coral 
chunks and shells, wood and articles of wood, ivory and ivory products, and 
passenger motor vehicles registered in Sri Lanka prior to 1945 (Central Bank of Sri 
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Lanka, 2000).  Accordingly, Sri Lanka has made a substantial progress during the 
past period over two decades in reducing trade barriers, particularly quantitative 
restrictions.   
 
Exchange Rate  
As was discussed in Chapter Three, the 1977 economic reforms included 
significant depreciation of real exchange rate improving the overall profitability of 
tradable production.  However, this achievement was soon negated by rapid 
increases in the domestic price level generated by the public investment program 
and high deficit financing.  After 1982, the Central Bank limited its quotations only 
to the intervention currency (the US dollar), while allowing the commercial banks 
to determine the cross rates for other currencies (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2000, 
p.7) with a view to anchor inflation.  The Export Development Board (EDB) used 
other measures such as financial incentives to encourage exports as the exchange 
rate policy was not conducive for exports. Considering the long-term sustainability, 
this was not a successful strategy for export promotion. 
 
In 1990, after a long period of intense political unrest, steps were taken to contain 
the budget deficit while maintaining a more realistic exchange rate under a 
crawling-peg system. Thus, the practice of limiting Central Bank quotes to the 
intervention currency, the US dollar, which commenced in 1982 was discontinued in 
1990 by allowing the commercial banks to determine the cross rates for other 
currencies based on market conditions.  Since then, the Central Bank commenced 
announcing the buying and selling rates of the US$ at the beginning of each day.  
The margin between the buying and selling rates was gradually increased from 1 per 
cent in 1992, to 2 per cent in 1995.  This allowed Sri Lanka’s exchange rate to be 
determined by market forces to a large extent with some intervention to avoid sharp 
fluctuations.    
 
The continuous depreciation of the Sri Lanka rupee as dictated by market forces, 
probably prevented the Sri Lankan economy being hurt by the East Asian crisis 
during 1997-1999.  The small but continuous adjustments that took place in the 
exchange rate throughout the 1990s made it possible to insulate the economy from 
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the effects of Asian financial crisis. However, the world recession and its impact on 
trade-dependent economies, coupled with severe terrorist attacks and internal 
political instability resulted in the Sri Lankan economy coming closer to a foreign 
exchange crisis in late 1999 when its reserves dropped very low.  The increased 
balance of payments deficit largely due to high oil prices and security related 
additional imports resulted in a gradual reduction in the official reserves. Sri 
Lanka’s trading partners, who suffered the impact of the Asian crisis had 
depreciated their currencies and had gained a competitive advantage. This made the 
maintenance of the crawling band exchange rate regime difficult and the Rupee 
came under pressure by late 1999. Domestic interest rates were raised and 
interventions were made in the foreign exchange market to defend the Rupee by 
allowing it to depreciate within a narrow band.  This band was widened from 2 to 5 
per cent and again to 6.8 per cent in 2000 (Jayawardena, 2000). 
 
Table 7.22 
  Real Exchange Rates Indices for Exports, Imports, and Terms of Trade  
Of Sri Lanka 1978-1995 
Year RER (X) RER(M) RER(T) 
1978 94.1 117.62 107.92 
1979 94.5 116.9 107.36 
1980 90.00 109.36 102.55 
1981 91.73 109.08 103.71 
1982 89.64 103.06 99.00 
1983 89.3 102.36 98.54 
1984 82.95 91.78 88.68 
1985 88.41 92.38 90.91 
1986 92.76 95.81 94.62 
1987 98.21 101.24 99.71 
1988 98.57 103.67 101.3 
1989 101.07 106.47 104.19 
1990 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1991 95.82 95.48 96.01 
1992 95.48 95.7 96.25 
1993 95.36 98.19 97.92 
1994 93.81 97.78 97.57 
1995 97.01 104.84 103.62 
   RER(X): Real exchange rate for exports; RER(M): Real exchange rate for imports; RER(T): Real exchange    
   Rate for total trade 
Source: Athukorala, P. and Rajapathirana, S. 2000, Liberalization and Industrial Transformation: Sri 




Athukorala and Rajapathirana (2000) have constructed a series of real exchange rate 
indices to analyze the cumulative effect of trade reforms and associated 
macroeconomics developments discussed above (Table 7.22).52  As is shown, 
during the years of massive fiscal expansions such as the early 1980s, the real 
exchange rate appreciated eroding the relative profitability of the manufacturing 
exports.   
 
In concluding this section, it is emphasized that Sri Lanka’s experience shows that 
adjusting the exchange rate without the backing of prudent monetary and fiscal 
policy measures is not conducive to exports, as expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As discussed under 
macroeconomic policy earlier, the ability to capture the full benefits of economic 
reforms depends on the existence of favourable macroeconomic environment and 
political stability. 
 
Foreign Investment  
Contrary to a priory expectation, the statistical analysis in Chapter Six indicated a 
negative relationship between FDI and growth in Sri Lanka.  This section however, 
further examined in detail what relevance FDI has for Sri Lanka’s industrialization 
process since 1977, and why has not FDI policy worked as did in the East Asian 
NICs during their transition to NIC. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Sri Lanka had an ambitious program to promote FDI 
since the 1977policy reforms.  Its investment promotion program under the Greater 
Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC)53 included measures such as foreign 
ownership of businesses; tax holidays; duty exemption on imported inputs; supply 
of industrial services at subsidized rates; and access to foreign credit at world 
interest rates.  Among other measures were Investment Protection Agreements with 
the major investing countries, abolishing restrictions on the repatriation of profit, 
proceeds from sales or liquidation of investment by foreign companies operating in 
                                                          
52   In their calculation, the nominal exchange rate has been defined as the domestic currency price of foreign currency.  An 
increase in the index therefore should be taken as real depreciation or improvement in international competitiveness.  
53 The GCEC changed its name as the Board of Investment (BOI) in 1992. 
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Sri Lanka, and providing guarantees against nationalization of foreign assets without 
compensation under Article 157 of the new Constitution of Sri Lanka adopted in 
1978 (Athukorala, 2000).  
 
Table 7.23 shows the number of foreign investment projects approved and operated 
under the GCEC region each year during the 1978-85 period together with their 
contribution to employment and export earnings.  The foreign investment has 
increased steadily over the period except for a few years during the 1984-88 period, 
which was due to escalation of civil unrest especially in the south of the country.  
After a short-lived recovery period during 1990-1994, there can be a marked decline 
in FDI following the change of political leadership in 1994.  However, in terms of 
international comparison, Sri Lanka’s performance attracting FDI is impressive as it 
was one of the few countries in the World Bank’s low income group whose share in 
the total world investment flows to developing countries increased during the 1980-
95 period (Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2000). 
  
Table 7. 23 
Foreign Direct Investment in Sri Lanka: 1978-1995 
Year 

















1978 30 208 55 30 5876 n.a 
1979 13 525 84 42 10538 152 
1980 25 943 74 65 19727 529 
1981 9 312 63 69 24926 1163 
1982 12 1976 86 77 28705 1153 
1983 10 948 72 84 32725 2419 
1984 13 379 63 95 35786 3537 
1985 7 135 67 96 33586 3827 
1986 7 91 63 102 45047 5395 
1987 12 359 77 112 50743 7534 
1988 26 950 64 133 54626 9544 
1989 14 1314 82 145 61429 11852 
1990 16 831 83 147 71146 17525 
1991 52 3000 89 195 85279 22088 
1992 154 16071 64 347 104220 44494 
1993 327 9095 38 662 122165 76596 
1994 268 23060 54 902 134572 88171 
1995 35 4891 35 936 145775 19112 




How has FDI contributed to the expansion of manufacturing exports? A study by 
Athukorala and Rajapathirana (2000) shows that the bulk of foreign investment 
approved by the GCEC (and the BOI after 1992) has gone into production of 
standardized consumer goods led by the textiles, garment and leather industry 
(Appendix Table A-22). The high concentration of FDI in the textiles and garments 
industry has been attributed to the availability of a quota under MFA and Sri 
Lanka’s attractiveness as a low cost export base in terms of both the availability of 
cheap, trainable labour and its investment climate. As the above study found, over 
the years, industries such as polishing gem stones and diamonds and producing 
artist’s brushes, surf sail, precision moulds, bolts and fasteners, costume, jewellery, 
artificial flowers, steel enclosures, control/relay panels, tobacco processing and 
rubber products have attracted foreign investment.  In view of the low-import 
content in the input structure of these industries, they could be further promoted 
through a suitable industry policy.  Overall, however, both the share of foreign firms 
in total exports of manufacturers, and the contribution of foreign firms to the total 
increments in manufactured exports has increased significantly since 1977 (Table 
7.24).   
 
Table 7.24 









Share in Total 
Merchandised Exports  % 
All foreign firms 1  % FTZ Firms 
(%) 
1975-77 24.8 4.0 23.2 n.a 
1978-80 102.7 10.4 30.2 n.a 
1981-83 234.9 22.1 43.7 30.6 
1984-86 421.2 31.9 47.4 35.5 
1987-89 653.5 44.2 58.2 43.5 
1990-92 1083.1 56.6 65.8 47.6 
1993-95 2280.9 71.8 76.3 68.5 
  1. Combined export share of FTZ and non-FTZ foreign firms.    ( n.a:  not applicable) 
 Source: Athukorala,  P. and Rajapathirana, S. 2000, Liberalization and Industrial Transformation: Sri Lanka in 
International Perspective, Oxford University Press, New Delhi  (p. 117). 
 
Until 1990, there was no major change in the policy towards foreign investment 
outside of the FTZs. ‘Majority local ownership’ continued to be the general rule for 
approving such projects. Even though more liberal ownership criteria (even up to 
100 per cent foreign ownership) were applied in approving export-oriented firms, 
these firms were not eligible for the lucrative incentives offered to FTZ firms. The 
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year 1990 witnessed a review of Sri Lanka’s foreign investment policy under its new 
Investment Policy Statement of 1990, which introduced further changes to give more 
outward orientation to the economy. The major changes included the abolition of 
various restrictions on the ownership structures of joint-venture projects outside 
EPZs, and the providing of free-trade-zone status to export-oriented foreign ventures 
in all parts of the country (Athukorala, 2000).    
 
Table 7.25 below shows the composition of the sectoral distribution of FDI in Sri 
Lanka during the 1978-92 period. As can be seen, 86 per cent of the total FDI during 
the 1978-86 period has been concentrated in low skill manufacturing activities.  
Even during the 1987-92 period, this situation has not improved.   In Taiwan on the 
other hand, 78 per cent of FDI during the 1952-88 was on high skill activities such 
as electronics (37 per cent), and chemicals (19 per cent) (Dhalman and Sananikone, 
1990, p.72, in Wignaraja, 1998) while South Korea also show a higher share (77 per 
cent) of FDI in skill activities54 (Mitchell, 1988, p.93).  
 
                Table 7.25 
             FDI in Sri Lanka’s Manufacturing Industries: 1978-921 
Industry 1978-86 1987-92 
No of 
Projects 
Cumulative Inflows No of 
Projects 
Cumulative Inflows 
Rs Mn.    %  Share Rs Mn.   %  Share 
Food, beverage, & tobacco 5 18.5 0.7 16 204 1.8 
Textiles & apparel  38 957.8 35.4 51 5043 44.6 
Wood and wood products 1 3.0 0.1 2 134 1.2 
Paper & paper products 1 25.0 0.9 1 46 0.4 
Chemicals & petroleum 15 240.4 8.9 23 1524 13.5 
Non-metallic minerals 9 119.6 4.4 18 919 8.1 
Machinery & equipment 7 143.0 5.3 6 296 2.6 
Other manufacturing 20 1197.6 44.3 65 3153 27.9 
Total manufacturing 96 2705.3 100 182 11319 100.0 
Low Skill 74 2321.9 85.8 153 9499.0 83.9 
High Skill 22 383.5 14.2 29 1820.0 16.1 
1. FDI realized by GCEC and FIAC 
Source: Wignaraja, G. 1998, Trade Liberalization in Sri Lanka: Exports, Technology and Industrial Policy, 
London, Macmillan. (p.97). 
 
Although FDI in low skill activities is helpful for LDCs to increase their exports, 
and learn “entrepreneurial and technological skills by local firms,” to become a NIC, 
it is essential for them to upgrade “FDI from low to high skill activities” (Wignaraja, 
1988, p.98). The reasons for this are the increased competition among low wage 
                                                          
54 i.e. 77 per cent of cumulative FDI was for skill industries (chemicals 26 per cent, and electronics 24.6 per cent) by 1985.  
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LDCs such as China, India, and Bangladesh for such export-oriented, low skill FDI, 
and the ‘footloose’ nature of such investment.  Failure to upgrade FDI from low to 
high skill activities in LDCs rests on four factors (Wignaraja, 1988, p.98): (a) 
political instability, (b) lack of “industrial skills and technology infrastructure,” (c) 
“passive non-selective approach to attracting FDI,” and (d) inadequate physical 
infrastructure. 
 
Finally, it is worth comparing Sri Lanka’s position with South Korea and Taiwan in 
attracting FDI.  As Table 7.26 indicates, although the liberal policy regime has been 
conducive for foreign investment, it appears that Sri Lanka has failed to attract 
large-scale foreign investment over the years, unlike South Korea and Taiwan 
during their pre-NIC years. There are several reasons for this (Kelegama, 1995): (a) 
political instability due to on-going civil unrest, (b) macro-economic instability due 
to ad hoc policy making and large budget deficits (c) infrastructure deficiencies (d) 
the lack of technical skills, and (e) the lack of cooperation by local entrepreneurs in 
joint ventures due to their differences in objectives. The future planners need to 
address the above issues in order to attract large-scale foreign investment to achieve 
a high level of growth and industrialization. 
 
      Table 7.26 
  Foreign Direct Investment Inflows: Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Korea  
 Cumulative Inflow 
(US$ Mn.) 
Average Annual Inflow 
(% of GDI) 
Sri Lanka:      1978-92                     655.6 2.8 
Taiwan:          1971-77 1151.5 5.6 
South Korea:  1971-77 552.0 1.8 
Source: Wignaraja, G. 1998, Trade Liberalization in Sri Lanka: Exports, Technology 
               and Industrial   Policy, London, Macmillan (p.96). 
 
In concluding this section, it is worth inquiring as to what extent has the FDI policy 
contributed to the industrialization objective of Sri Lanka during the post-1977 
period.  As witnessed in the foregoing discussion, FDI has played a vital role in 
areas such as employment creation, and export earnings. However, it has not been 
able to generate the external effects such as diffusion of technology, transfer of 
managerial skills, or the creation of linkages as theory predicted. Unlike in the East 
Asian NICs, increased foreign investment in Sri Lanka was largely an outcome of 
the availability of quota on textiles and garments, and low cost labour.  A valuable 
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lesson from Taiwan and South Korea is that foreign investment should be 
encouraged in areas where domestic workers and entrepreneurs can gain the above 
benefits. 
 
As a significant move, the Global Competitiveness Report included Sri Lanka 
among the 75 most competitive nations in 2001 for first time (Center for 
International Development, 2002).  Sri Lanka’s inclusion indicates the international 
recognition that its economy has integrated into the world economy. Sri Lanka 
ranked 57th on the Current Competitiveness Index, and  61st on the Growth 
Competitiveness Index. In the former, Sri Lanka was the third from the lowest 
ranked Asian economy.  The results suggest not only Sri Lanka’s medium term 
growth performance is below its level of development, but also Sri Lanka needs to 




The foregoing discussion explored the nature and magnitude of the trade policy 
measures as components of the CIP model developed in Chapter Five.  It was seen 
that Sri Lanka has made a significant progress in terms of tariff and QR reforms.    
Sri Lanka’s exchange rate management however, has not been conducive for 
growth.  The periodic appreciation of the real exchange rate has somewhat crowded 
out the competitiveness of exports Sri Lanka has managed to create through other 
trade policy.  This highlights the need to have a prudent macroeconomic policy. Sri 
Lanka has displayed substantial commitment to attract FDI by removing barriers to 
foreign capital mobility and providing institutional supports such as EPZs.  The 
progress achieved is satisfactory in terms of manufacturing output, export, and 
employment.  However, FDI has failed to facilitate the much-expected transfer of 
technology to, or create linkages with local firms.  Overall, as regards 
competitiveness and export promotion, the trade policy has been very useful. 
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7.7 Evaluation  
This chapter investigated why did Sri Lanka fail to achieve a level of industrial 
development which could have placed itself among NICs by undertaking a detailed 
review of policy during the post-reform period with particular reference to the 
research propositions made in Chapter Five. Every attempt was made to compare Sri 
Lankan experience with that of South Korea and Taiwan with particular reference to 
their pre-NIC period  whenever appropriate data was available. 
 
The chapter first assessed Sri Lanka’s position in terms of NIC status using some 
quantitative/qualitative criteria. It was found that Sri Lanka is yet to fulfil the 
specified criteria to achieve NIC status. Second, it observed how Sri Lanka has 
performed in fulfilling the two main pre-conditions for NIC status: developmental 
state; and macroeconomic stability and associated saving-investment behaviour 
(Proposition 5 and 6).  As observed, Sri Lanka had the political stability and 
division of labour between private and public sectors, but it failed to give strong 
leadership or create an efficient public service essential for rapid development.  It 
was therefore asserted that Sri Lanka has exhibited certain features of 
developmental state, but requires further improvement in this regard in order to 
become a NIC. 
 
It was observed that the nature of the fiscal policy during the post-reform period was 
not conducive for long-term growth prospects in Sri Lanka. The lack of fiscal 
discipline has impacted on the implementation of monetary policy as well.  
Excessive domestic borrowings by the government have crowded out private 
investment due to high interest rates.    It has overlooked the need of a rising level of 
government revenue and foreign exchange earnings to support strong economic 
growth.  Fiscal discipline on those lines would have reduced the debt burden and 
created a supportive environment for private investment.  It was very clear that Sri 
Lanka failed to fulfil this important necessary condition from the very outset of the 
reforms.  As regards monetary policy, although the Central Bank’s interest rates 
were low, the market interest rates remained high. This reflected the high 
inflationary expectations in the economy, which was a result of the long period of 
high inflation in the past. What Sri Lanka needed was a low level of inflation for 
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some time so that public expectations are gradually changed. In the labour front 
however, there were some positive signs.  Sri Lanka has taken some positive steps 
towards creating a relatively flexible labour market.  It needs, however, to create an 
environment where there is an increase in the demand for labour.  Overall, the 
analysis argued that Sri Lanka’s macroeconomic environment was quite in contrast 
to what East Asian NICs had during their transition to NIC status. 
 
The chapter also examined the saving and investment activities in the economy 
during the post-reform period.  It was noted that Sri Lanka’s private investment has 
somewhat improved but its saving was far below the NIC standard. This has some 
roots in fiscal imbalance of the economy as large fiscal deficits have crowded out 
resources form the private sector.  Sri Lanka’s low level of efficiency of capital (as 
measured by ICOR) was found to be another cause of the lower investment. The low 
efficiency of capital was attributed to inadequacy of infrastructure in the economy. 
This again is an issue to be resolved through fiscal policy.   Sri Lanka’s fiscal policy 
has not managed to break this vicious circle.  Overall, Sri Lanka’s saving and 
investment performance during the post reform period has not been up to the NIC 
standard.  This justifies that macroeconomic management is a top priority for Sri 
Lanka.    
 
The chapter analysed in detail the nature and magnitude of Sri Lanka’s industry 
policy measures, being part of the CIP approach emphasized in the conceptual 
framework in Chapter Five, together with their associated outcomes during the post 
1977 period (Proposition 3).   The analysis began with the sector targeting policy. 
There was no clear evidence that Sri Lanka had a declared program to target specific 
industries. The study argued that industries which emerged as leading manufacturers 
(e.g. textiles and apparels) were a not a result of sector targeting.  They emerged as 
leading industries due to some other factors such as assurance of overseas markets, 
accessibility to FDI, and the conglomeration effects of EPZs in a freer environment. 
It was emphasized that if Sri Lanka had a sector targeting policy it could have taken 
advantage of the computer and software boom in the past.  There was also no 
evidence that Sri Lanka used credit direction policy to promote industries, as did the 
East Asian NICs.  Sri Lanka however provided low cost credits to certain sectors 
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from time to time, but such arrangements a not comparable with the East Asian-
style, long-term credit allocations.  There has been substantial improvement in 
infrastructure development during the post-reform period, but Sri Lanka’s 
infrastructure profile is still not up to the NIC’s standard.  Areas such as roads, 
railways, ports, electricity, and telecommunication need significant improvements.  
The EPZs have made significant contributions towards industrial development and 
employment creation. However, unlike the East Asian NICs, Sri Lanka has not 
gained enough from these EPZs by way of diffusion of technology, managerial 
skills, or linkages with local firms. Manufacturing took place only in simple 
activities such as garments and apparels. Foreign investment played a leading role in 
this regard.  Factors such as low-labour cost, unused quotas under the MFA, the 
availability of resources, and the attractive incentive regime has encouraged foreign 
investment in such simple, low skilled activities.  However, there is little evidence 
that Sri Lanka achieved any progress in any complex activities. 
 
 As regards human resources policy, Sri Lanka has failed to enhance specific skills 
and knowledge essential for innovation and modernization during the post-1977 
period, except for some improvements in general education.   On the R&D front 
also, the government commitments were nowhere near those achieved by Taiwan 
and South Korea during their pre-NIC period. It was also stressed that there has been 
no long-term R&D policy in Sri Lanka until recently.   Lastly, there was no evidence 
of   a targeted government procurement policy in Sri Lanka after 1977.  Thus, the 
analysis justifies why Sri Lanka’s industry policy did not contribute to a level of 
industrialization required to become a NIC as postulated in the research proposition 
3. 
 
In the final section, a detailed investigation of Sri Lanka’s trade policy was 
examined.  It was observed that Sri Lanka has made a significant progress in terms 
of tariff and QR reforms, but lacked the foresight in exchange rate management 
unlike its East Asian counterparts. For most of the period after 1977, it failed to 
maintain its real exchange rate at a level which is favourable to exporters.  The 
effect of domestic inflation was, however, mainly responsible for this.  As regards 
openness to foreign capital, on the other hand, Sri Lanka has shown satisfactory 
 240 
results in attracting FDI by removing barriers to foreign capital mobility and 
providing institutional supports such as EPZs.  However, compared with the FDI 
experience of South Korea and Taiwan in their pre-NIC period, Sri Lanka’s FDI 
performance are moderate. Moreover, the foreign capital inflows have not 
adequately facilitated the much-expected transfer of technology or creation of 
linkages with local firms.  As far as competitiveness and exports trade are 
concerned, the trade policy has contributed reasonably well in Sri Lanka.  The 
discussion justified why Sri Lanka’s trade policy did not contribute to a level of 
industrialization required to become a NIC as postulated in the research proposition 
2. 
 
7.8 Concluding Remarks 
The forgoing discussion stressed that the macroeconomic instability coupled with 
the on going civil war has dampened the positive effects of economic reforms. 
Although there was a higher growth rate under a freer regime during the post 1977 
period as against pre-1977 period, Sri Lanka is still on a very long learning curve as 
far as NIC status is concerned.  Having studied the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Sri Lanka’s past policy approach, what Sri Lanka requires now is a suitable policy 
strategy which would place it on an appropriate path to become a NIC.  This is the 




CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
8.1 Conclusions 
The thesis undertook a detailed investigation of the extent to which the development 
experience of the two East Asian NICs, South Korea and Taiwan, is relevant to Sri Lanka. It 
also evaluated Sri Lanka’s position in terms of NIC status.  With this process, it was 
intended to achieve five objectives outlined in Chapter One. In order to facilitate this 
analysis, seven research propositions were developed in the light of the discussion in the 
conceptual framework in Chapter Five. 
 
 The first objective was ‘to review the policy evolution in Sri Lanka since independence, and 
identify the associated changes in growth of real GDP, and other major macroeconomic 
variables.’ This was a prerequisite for the evaluation of Sri Lanka’s position in relation to 
the two East Asian NICs under consideration, and the detailed policy analysis to follow.  
This was achieved in Chapter Three where it was concluded that, although the economic 
reforms introduced in 1977 and after were in the right direction, they were not sufficient for 
Sri Lanka to achieve NIC status.  Based on this analysis and the two country studies in 
Chapter Four, the proposition 1 in Chapter Five asserted ‘Sri Lanka has not managed to 
achieve the level of economic progress required to be considered as a NIC despite 
significant economic reforms after 1977.’  This proposition was supported by the statistical 
analysis in Chapter Six where it concluded1 ‘…although the type of policies Sri Lanka has 
been pursuing since 1978 are appropriate, they are not sufficient to take Sri Lanka off to a 
level to be considered as a NIC.’ 
 
 The second objective was ‘to investigate whether there has been any structural change in 
the economy after the 1977 economic reforms.’  This was investigated in Chapter Six using 
a stability test on time series data for the period 1960-2000.  It concluded that there has been 
a structural change in the Sri Lankan economy after 1977, which is also indicative that the 
                                                          
1 See p.181, Chapter Six. 
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policy development in Sri Lanka after 1977 was in the right direction. As was seen in 
Chapter Three, the policies after 1977 were more outward-oriented and market friendly 
compared to the inward-looking policies before 1977.  
 
The third objective was ‘to estimate a regression equation incorporating both trade policy 
and industry policy variables to identify the major sources of growth for Sri Lanka during 
the post-1977 period.’  This was deemed necessary in order to analyze Sri Lanka’s trade and 
industry policy performance during the post-1977 period with a view to assessing whether it 
is on an appropriate path to NIC status. The following two research propositions formed the 
framework for this analysis: ‘liberal trade policy is conducive to economic growth as the 
world demand is the principal determinant of growth for a small open economy’ 
(Proposition 2); and ‘industry policy is conducive to growth as it is an essential complement 
to trade policy’ (Proposition 3). 
 
Chapter Six fulfilled the above objective by way of a regression analysis. It was noted that 
only a few of the variables that were considered in the model showed some positive 
contribution to growth.  Export emerged as a significant contributory factor to the growth in 
the trade policy equation estimated.  Government procurements and human capital 
development are the two variables that have contributed significantly to economic growth in 
the industry policy equation.  Overall, however, it was found that although the type of 
policies Sri Lanka has been pursuing since 1978 were appropriate, they were not sufficient 
to take Sri Lanka to a level to be considered as a NIC.  This study could not use a more 
elaborate model in view of the methodological and data limitations and hence, it was 
concluded that other approaches were required to analyse Sri Lanka’s growth performance 
in terms of the NIC standard, especially in view of the complexity and interrelatedness of 
the different types of policy variables and institutional factors illustrated in the conceptual 
framework. Chapter Six, thus, emphasised the need for more elaborate policy analysis in 
order to evaluate Sri Lanka’s performance in relation to East Asian experience.  
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The fourth objective of this thesis was ‘to analyze Sri Lanka’s trade and industry policy 
performance during the post-1977 period with a view to see how far it is on the path to NIC 
status.’  The research proposition 4, ‘a competitive industry policy based on both trade and 
industry policy will provide a better impact on economic growth in Sri Lanka than either 
policy used in isolation’ provided the framework for this analysis.  This objective was 
achieved in Chapter Seven by undertaking a detailed analysis of Sri Lanka’s policy in 
comparison with those of the two East Asian NICs under consideration.  By doing so, it also 
fulfilled an important task of this research as prescribed in Chapter Six.  
 
In Chapter Seven, Sri Lanka’s position was first assessed in terms of the NIC standard using 
some quantifiable criteria.  Sri Lanka’s per capita GNP, its manufacturing share in the GDP, 
and the Human Development Index were found to be below the required level for the NIC 
status.  From all the variables analysed, only the domestic saving ratio was at the required 
level.  Thus, it was concluded that Sri Lanka needed to develop a different approach in order 
to achieve NIC status on these criteria.  
 
Secondly, Sri Lanka’s progress in fulfilling the two main pre-conditions for NIC status was 
assessed as stipulated in research proposition 5: ‘to achieve rapid industrialization aiming at 
NIC status, the government needs to accept the role of a developmental state;’ and research 
proposition 6:‘it is imperative that Sri Lanka maintains a supportive macroeconomic 
environment evidenced by lower inflation, and realistic interest rates and exchange rates to 
ensure that trade and industry policy work effectively.’  It was found that Sri Lanka is yet to 
fulfil these two pre-conditions. Sri Lanka has exhibited certain features of a developmental 
state, but requires further improvement in this regard in order to become a NIC.  It had the 
political stability that was vital for investment and growth, but has failed to create an 
efficient bureaucracy that was free from political influence. It also lacks evidence to show 
East Asian-type division of labour between state and private sector.  The government’s 
commitment to education and social equity as measured by such indicators as the share of 
educational expenditure in GDP, the share of social security outlays in GDP, and the share 
of income tax in total revenue has increased, but still below the NIC level.2 Therefore, it 
                                                          
2 The Gini coefficient, on the other hand, has increased indicating an increase in income inequality after 1977. 
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was concluded that Sri Lanka has an unfinished agenda in terms of developmental state 
requirements. 
 
Regarding the precondition of macroeconomic stability, it was also observed that the nature 
of the fiscal policy during the post-reform period was not conducive for long-term growth 
prospects in Sri Lanka. The main reason for this has been the chronic budget deficits that 
resulted from higher government expenditure and poor revenue performance.  This lack of 
fiscal discipline has also impacted on the implementation of monetary policy. Overall, the 
analysis argued that Sri Lanka’s macroeconomic environment was not conducive to 
industrialization during the post 1977 period.   
 
The nature and magnitude of Sri Lanka’s trade and industry policy measures were analysed 
in further detail in Chapter Seven together with their associated outcomes during the post-
1977 period. These are the essential parts of the CIP approach developed in the conceptual 
framework in Chapter Five.  The following key areas were identified where Sri Lanka had 
significant policy deficiencies in comparison to South Korea and Taiwan: 
(a) There was no proper sector targeting policy at any time in the past.  This resulted in 
missed opportunities (such as computer and software boom) in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and a failure to expand industrial development beyond a few low-value-added 
industries such as textile and apparel; 
(b) There was no evidence that Sri Lanka had a strong commitment to direct credits to 
particular industry or /sector as had in East Asian NICs, which would have benefited 
industries/sectors discussed in (a) above; 
(c) Although there has been substantial improvement in infrastructure development 
during the post-reform period, its infrastructure profile is still not up to the NIC’s 
standard; 
(d) The EPZs have made significant contributions towards industrial output and 
employment, but they have failed to generate external effects by way of diffusion of 
technology, managerial skills, or linkages with local firms; 
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(e) Sri Lanka has failed to enhance specific skills and knowledge essential for 
innovation and modernization during the post-1977 period, except for some 
improvements in general education;  
(f) Not only did Sri Lanka lack a long-term R&D policy, its current R&D commitments 
are insufficient in terms of the NIC standard; 
(g) Although Sri Lanka has shown tremendous progress in reducing tariffs across the 
board, it rarely used trade policy to promote targeted sectors as occurred in South 
Korea and Taiwan; 
(h) Sri Lanka has shown satisfactory results in attracting FDI by removing barriers to 
foreign capital mobility and providing institutional supports such as EPZs; but 
compared with the FDI experience of South Korea and Taiwan in their pre-NIC 
period, Sri Lanka’s FDI performance are moderate; 
 
The discussion accordingly explained why the commitment to trade and industry policy in 
Sri Lanka to date has not resulted in the level of industrialization required to become a NIC 
as postulated in the research propositions 2 and 3.  The lack of vision and commitment by 
the political leadership, macroeconomic instability, and inappropriate policy choices have 
been contributing factors to this.  However, as highlighted in Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five, it should be noted that the geo-economic context in which LDCs such as Sri Lanka 
have been operating since 1980 is significantly different from that in which the above two 
East Asian NICs operated during their transitional period to NIC status.   
 
The fifth and the last objective of the thesis was ‘to recommend a policy strategy based on 
the experience of the above two East Asian NICs, which will improve the development path 
to NIC status for Sri Lanka’. The policy strategy for this is based on proposition 7: ‘Sri 
Lanka can customize a development strategy based on trade and industry policies used by 
Taiwan and South Korea both before and after 1980 for rapid industrialization aiming at 
NIC status.’ The second part of this chapter is dedicated to achieve that task.  
 
The overall conclusion of this thesis is that Sri Lanka is still a developing country, and it has 
a long way to go to reach the NIC status.  However, by applying a more appropriate CIP 
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policy strategy based on the recommendations in this chapter, it will be able to converge 
into a more dynamic growth path that will undoubtedly lead it to become a NIC in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
8.2 Road Map for NIC Status 
As discussed above, Sri Lanka can use a competitive industry policy as a major element of 
its economic policy to achieve NIC status.  It is expected that using the measures prescribed 
here, Sri Lanka can converge into an appropriate path leading to NIC status.  However, it is 
important that a realistic strategy be developed given Sri Lanka's limited resources.  The key 
components of this strategy are illustrated by way of a Road Map in Figure 8.1.  
 
8.2.1 Necessary Conditions 
As emphasized throughout the study, the success of the policy strategy to be presented here 
depends on how far Sri Lanka can fulfil two preconditions, macroeconomic stability, and 
the developmental state.  It is noted here that without fulfilling these fundamental 
requirements, this policy strategy would not be effective.3 
 
Macroeconomic Stability 
Sri Lanka’s chronic macroeconomic instability is due to the high level of annual fiscal 
deficits.4   Sri Lanka needs to bring down the share of budget deficit in the GDP during the 
next decade to at least 5 per cent in order to ensure the macroeconomic stability, which is 
necessary for high investment and growth. The following were the main factors responsible 
for high fiscal deficits in Sri Lanka: 
(a) Defence & security related expenditure; 
(b) High recurrent expenditure; and  
(c) Low level of government revenue. 
 
 
                                                          
3 In the above road map diagram (Figure 8.1), the pre-conditions (macroeconomic stability and developmental state) are shown first as 
they are considered high priority areas after the policy analysis in Chapter Seven. 
4 The average annual budget deficit as a share of GDP during the 1981-91 decade was 12.7 per cent.  The corresponding figures for South 
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The factor (a) is related to the current civil conflict in the North and East of Sri Lanka. If Sri 
Lanka is to achieve NIC status, it is imperative that it achieves political stability quickly.5 
Not only does peace give the government more freedom in its fiscal affairs, but also it is 
vital for the revival of normal economic activities and investment.  This study cannot 
foresee Sri Lanka achieving NIC  status without achieving political stability first.6  Even if 
Sri Lanka achieved peace, the maintaining of a low budget deficit during the next two 
decades would still be a daunting task in view of the severity of the causes (b) and (c) 
above. 
 
Higher recurrent expenditure is mainly due to high interest payments and the high cost of 
the public service.  The former is related to high public debt which in turn is the result of 
high fiscal deficits.  This situation becomes particularly vulnerable when the exchange rate 
depreciates, as has often been the case in the past. There is no immediate solution to this 
‘vicious circle’ other than attempting to keep fiscal deficits under control in the medium 
term by reducing defence and other recurrent outlays.   
 
In order to reduce the high cost of public services, measures such as restructuring of the 
public service, closing down redundant public agencies, and enhancing the efficiency of 
civil service can be recommended.  The success of such measures depends on the ability of 
the government to implement such reforms. 
 
There are several reasons for the low level of government revenue:  lower profits from 
public enterprises, including sluggish growth in excise taxes, and low customs duty after 
tariff reforms.  The dilemma is how to raise revenue while introducing reforms encouraging 
private initiative in the economy. Privatization of such loss-making public enterprises can 
be a remedy.  Currently, there is a separate government agency to undertake such reforms in 
                                                          
5 According to a study which has quantified the effect of war on the Sri Lankan economy, the total accumulated economic cost of the 
conflict during the 1983-1996 period has been estimated at Rs.1135 billion at 1996 prices which is twice Sri Lanka’s 1996 GDP 
(Arunatilake and Jayasuriya, 2001).   
6 In December 2001, the UNP led United National Front government singed a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, the organization which 
has been carrying out a armed struggle since early-1980s for a political solution for the minority Tamils live in the northern and eastern Sri 
Lanka.  At the time of writing this thesis, several rounds of peace talks have been held, and there is expectation that a permanent solution 
will be reached in the near future. 
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Sri Lanka.7  The success or otherwise of this task will primarily depend on the commitment 
of the political leadership for such changes.  
 
Macroeconomic stability is essential to encourage a high rate of investment in the economy.  
One of the main determinants of investment is its productivity indicated by ICOR.8 To 
achieve a higher growth rate Sri Lanka needs to maintain a very low ICOR.  As seen in the 
previous chapter, Sri Lanka’s current ICOR is very high compared to Asian NICs. This can 
be lowered through measures such as technological modernization, and development of 
technical skill levels of labour, which require additional funds.  
 
To finance a high rate of investment, a country needs to have a high rate of saving 
(Agarawal et. al, 2000). A country can derive savings in three ways:  domestic savings; 
national savings (i.e. domestic savings plus factor income from abroad and transfer 
payments), and foreign savings (i.e. foreign aid, borrowing, and FDI).  In order to maintain 
a higher investment rate, it is necessary that Sri Lanka explore how it can expand savings 
from all these sources over the years.9  The main determinant of domestic savings in Sri 
Lanka is not the interest rate, but the level of income (Shanmugalingum, 1993, as quoted in 
Kelegama, 1995).  Currently, the marginal propensity to save in the Sri Lankan economy is 
around 10 per cent (Kelegama, 1995).  The extent to which this ratio can be increased in the 
short-term is limited.  To increase savings, Sri Lanka should therefore look for other sources 
such as factor income from abroad, transfer payments, and foreign savings. 
 
As shown in Appendix Table A-15, gross national savings have always exceeded gross 
domestic savings after 1977.  This is mainly due to increased inward remittances by Sri 
Lankan expatriates.  Although it can be expected that this trend will continue, it is unlikely 
that it will significantly increase in the future.  This leaves Sri Lanka with foreign savings as 
the only available source for future growth.   
 
                                                          
7 The Public Enterprises Reform Committee (PERC) was established in 1996 to streamline the privatization process in Sri Lanka. 
8 As explained in Chapter Seven, a lower ICOR means a higher return on investment. 
9 As Appendix Table A-15 indicates, the current domestic saving ratio is 17.3 per cent of GDP. 
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In view of the above implications, the government’s budgetary management is vital for 
macroeconomic stability.  Without this, the CIP-based policy strategy prescribed in the next 
section would not be viable.  However, containing the budget deficit within limits is not an 
easy task especially in the short-run.  This makes it mandatory for this study to come up 
with a workable long-term fiscal strategy for the economy.  Sri Lanka’s current budget 
deficit as a share of GDP is 10.9 per cent.10 The aim during the short-term (2003-2007) 
should be to bring it down initially to a level of 7.5 percent.  It is mandatary however, to 
bring this down to at least 5 per cent in the medium/long run (2008 onwards).  This gradual 
approach can make the implementation of the policy strategy more viable and credible.   
 
Developmental State 
Political leadership has an important role to play in enhancing the public sector efficiency 
by taking strict action to curb corruption, nepotism, and misuse of power, all of which have 
a very high economic cost.   Although there are no studies showing the cost associated with 
public sector inefficiency in Sri Lanka, the need to introduce reforms to the public sector 
has been emphasised by the IMF in its annual aid meetings.   According to a survey by 
Malik (1999), three-fourths in Sri Lanka has expressed their dissatisfaction with the political 
system.11  The survey points out that “[T]he low confidence in the political system and the 
rising fears (awareness) of political corruption point towards a more fundamental issue- that 
of gradual weakening of state institutions” (p. 2).  This highlights the needs to reform the 
public sector. One of the fundamental requirements is the creation of a competent 
bureaucracy and insulating it from vested interests, which are growth deterring.   This 
should be supported by reforms to public administration. 
 
In summary, to ensure an ideal type ‘developmental state’ at least the following 
requirements need to be met: 
• Political stability and strong leadership; 
• Establishment of ‘rule of law;’ 
                                                          
10 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2001, p. 19 (Table 1.5). 
11  The South Asia wide Citizens’ Survey on governance was carried out in five South Asian Countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. 
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• A system of government where public service (which includes both general 
administrators and technocrats) is free from political influences; 
• Division of labour between state and the private sector whereby the state involvement in 
the private sector affairs is limited only to the setting of long-term goals, and making 
guidelines to ensure the private sector achieves the targets;  
• Increased commitments to education while ensuring social equity; 
• State’s preference for policies and interventions should be based on price mechanisms.  
These elements are essential preconditions for implementing the following CIP 
recommendations.  They can be viewed as key elements of a broader economic strategy, but 
it is outside the scope of this study to develop this further.  
 
8.2.2 CIP Recommendations 
The strategy is based on the premise that Sri Lanka can achieve industrial development 
using competitive industry policy.  This section discusses both specific policies earmarked 
for some selected industries, and some general polices to further improve resource 
allocation in the overall economy.  Once the expected competitive advantages are created in 
the selected industries, the measures prescribed herein should be gradually removed.   
 
Sectors-specific Policy 
The study recommends the selection of following industries as leading industries in the 
coming years, and the use of CIP measures such as directed credits, R&D policy, FDI, and 
EPZs/Industrial estates to promote them. 
• Textiles and apparel; 
• Processed food;  
• Rubber products; 
• IT related products;12  
• Light machinery; 
• Other: Gem polishing & Jewelry;  Precision moulds; Artists’ brushes 
 
                                                          
12 This includes electrical and electronic products and telecommunication products including related software. 
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It is pertinent here to show the rationale for the selection of above industries. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, textiles and apparel has been the current leading industry in the Sri 
Lankan economy. It was also noted that to remain competitive beyond 2005, this industry 
needs improvement, particularly the following: to find new markets; to introduce new 
technology; to use new management techniques; and to adopt to the fast growing fashion 
and styles.  To meet these needs, this study considers that it is vital for the government to 
selectively promote this industry further, especially through measures such as FDI and 
R&D. 
 
The food, beverages and tobacco category was Sri Lanka’s leading industry group in terms 
of net value-addition until recently.13 Among this category, the contribution from the group 
of food products to total value-added and employment has almost doubled from the pre-
reform period to the early 1990s. Availability of domestic resources and low cost labour, 
and the simplicity of production processes involved were the major considerations in this 
selection. Rubber products were selected as Sri Lanka already has the necessary resources 
and technology in this sector as a leading natural rubber producer in the world.  Coupled 
with the availability of low skilled workers, this industry can be further expanded using 
selective policies such as FDI, FTZs, and R&D.  Following Taiwan, light machinery such as 
agricultural machinery, bicycles and similar products can be promoted initially targeting the 
domestic market in order to give them a kick-start, until they gain international 
competitiveness.   
 
The other key area to promote is the IT related industries. They are both technology-
intensive, and knowledge-based industries in which Sri Lanka can create competitive 
advantage especially in view of the following factors: (a) availability of a well-educated, 
trainable labour force at competitive wage rates; (b) availability of certain high-quality raw 
material for IT related products,14 and (c) availability of attractive incentives. 
 
                                                          
13 See also Appendix Table A-13. 
14 Sri Lanka has extensive mineral deposits such as clay, mineral sand, and graphite (Wignaraja, 1998, p.94) which are useful in IT based 
industries. 
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As seen in the previous chapter, some products such as gem polishing and jewellery, 
precision tools, and artists’ brushes have recently emerged as promising industries.  One 
advantage of such ‘niche products’ is that the competition is limited for them in the world 
market. Sri Lanka has the advantage of availability of resources and technology for such 
industries.   
 
It is also important to consider the suitable scale of operation for the targeted industries.  A 
preferable option is to ensure the emergence of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) 
as front-runners in the economy. Compared to big firms, they not only provide more 
employment opportunities, but also are financially less risky.15  High interest rates, the lack 
of long-term capital, the lack of a credit guarantee system, and poor credit analysis and 
management by the banks are some of the major constraints to the growth of SMEs in Sri 
Lanka in the past (Ministry of Industries, 1999, p.18). These constraints can be overcome by 
using policies such as directed credit and FDI.16  Taiwan’s experience, especially in the 
wake of Asian Financial crisis, indicates that this is the appropriate policy for Sri Lanka. 
 
Directed credit was not a popular strategy in Sri Lankan policy reforms in the past.   
Commercial banks usually favour the well-established firms when giving credit due to 
asymmetric information.  Such market failure warrants government intervention in credit 
allocation to emerging industries as Stiglitz (1993) has noted.  
 
South Korea and Taiwan used directed credits to promote capital formation in selected 
industries based on certain criteria such as: (a) the strategic importance of the industry to the 
economy; (b) export potential of the industry; and (c) the nature of technology used.  Their 
directed credit policy emphasized the faster growth of strategic high-tech exports and the 
increased imports of machinery and related capital goods.  Especially Taiwan’s more 
moderate approach in credit direction is recommended for Sri Lanka.17   
                                                          
15 This is practical in view of the fact that SMEs account for nearly 90 per cent of industrial establishments and 70 per cent of 
employment in the manufacturing sector of Sri Lanka (Ministry of Industries, 1999). 
16 It could be the case that foreign investors may not be interested in small firms. In such cases, it should be ensured that industries which 
require large amount of FDI are at least of medium scale.  
17 South Korea had a much larger directed credit program to promote its heavy and chemical industries.  It was a major cause of the 
financial crises in late 1990s.  The Taiwan’s experience showed that credit allocation in moderate amounts especially to SMEs is not 
harmful for financial development. 
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The directed credit can be intended to help exporters and capital formation of the industries 
selected in the previous section.  The following measures are recommended:     
• provision of concessionary loans at subsidized interest rates;  
• provision of a credit guarantee system.   
 
Care should be taken to minimise the possible distortions that can arise in the overall 
resource allocation in the economy as a result of such assistance.   The experience of East 
Asian countries provides a norm in this regard that “directed credit in moderate amounts, up 
to 20 to 25 per cent of total credits, and at low interest rate subsidies (say up to 2 per cent) 
may not significantly harm financial development" (Agrawal et al., 2000, p.77).  It is 
important to ensure that such assistance for above industries should be temporary, and 
subject to periodic performance evaluation. 
 
The other strategy to address the financial constraint of the selected industries is FDI.  It is 
also an effective way to facilitate acquisition of technology by the targeted industries from 
MNCs.   As seen in Table 7.24, Sri Lanka‘s ability to attract FDI was very poor compared 
with the East Asian NICs despite various fiscal, monetary, and institutional assistance to 
encourage FDI after 1978. Currently there is a strong competition among other LDCs in the 
region such as Bangladesh, China, and India for FDI (Wignaraja, 1998).  This makes it hard 
for Sri Lanka to attract FDI for the selected industries.   How can Sri Lanka attract more 
foreign investment than other countries?  The key is to create competitive advantage in the 
targeted industries using CIP measure, following the East Asian NICs.  The following 
measures would be more effective in this regard:  
• Developing high quality infrastructure to meet specific industry needs; and 
• Creation of a skilled labour force in the selected areas.18 
 
                                                          
18 Strategies to improve infrastructure, and skills of labour will be discussed under the general policy in the next section.  
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One measure to eliminate the current impediments to FDI is to grant tax concessions for 
MNCs for the following tasks relating to selected industries: 
• To promote subcontracting; and 
• To diffuse technology to local SMEs.  
 
Subcontracting can be expected to improve the efficiency in the economy in three ways 
(Ministry of Industries, 1999): by improving the operation rate of equipment; by enhancing 
the labour equipment ratio; and by increasing the ‘local content’ ratio of input for the 
production.  
 
Diffusion of technology from MNCs to local firms does not occur automatically. The local 
firms need to have closer links with MNCs. Since Taiwan used FDI effectively to encourage 
diffusion of technology to SMEs, the following measures will also be useful:  
• Assisting SMEs to locate, purchase, diffuse and adopt new foreign technologies; and  
• Government itself entering into joint ventures with MNCs in the above targeted 
industries.19 
 
Tax concessions improve the value of FDI, but to make Sri Lanka more attractive it needs to 
show foreign investors that there are greater prospects of profits and markets for them by 
investing in Sri Lankan industries.  This requires adequate institutional support. Sri Lanka 
already has institutions such as the Export Development Board and the Board of Investment 
of Sri Lanka to facilitate FDI activities.  These institutions currently perform the following 
responsibilities for the industrial sector in general: (a) encourage cooperation between local 
investors and foreign investors in joint ventures by providing information, legal advice and 
market survey; (b) encourage local entrepreneurs to take part in such joint ventures using 
tax holidays and subsidiary credits; and (c) disseminate information from their investment. 
Their policies need to be redefined in order to give priority to the selected industries when 
rendering these services.  
 
                                                          
19 For instance, the Taiwanese government entered into joint ventures with MNCs in areas such as semiconductors and aerospace in 
Taiwan.  
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As was seen in Chapter Seven, the majority of FDI in Sri Lanka in the past has taken place 
in low skill industries.  Given the similarity of resource endowments among LDCs, there is 
a greater need for Sri Lanka to move into the high skill industries such as electric and 
electronic components. To facilitate this, Sri Lanka should address the following two major 
issues:  
• Improvement of physical infrastructure; and 
• Upgrading of skills of labour force. 
The strategies to address these two issues are discussed in detail in the next section.  
  
It should be noted that using tax policy to promote FDI as suggested above could affect the 
objective of containing the budget deficit.  This emphasizes the need to adhere to the 
medium-term fiscal strategy discussed under pre-conditions in the previous section. 
 
The next important requirement to promote the selected industries is to assist them in R&D 
activities. As witnessed in the previous chapter, Sri Lanka’s current level of R&D 
commitment is not adequate to be qualified as a prospective NIC.  Some of the R&D 
lessons from South Korea and Taiwan, which are relevant to Sri Lanka, are as follows: 
• Encourage local firms to purchase latest equipment through tariff concessions and 
subsidised credits; 
• Assist local firms to tender for major technology contracts by providing 
sureties/guarantees;  
• Encourage firms to hire foreign experts to help resolve technical problems; and  
• Maximize the participation of local consultants in engineering contracts to develop basic 
process capabilities.  
 
Apart from the above, the private R&D initiatives should be promoted by the following 
incentives and assistance policies:  
• Increase tax credits for R&D expenditure;  
• Provision of tax concession for local firms who introduce advance technology;  
• Setting up research institutes for major industries;  
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• Revise tax policy to introduce measures such as tax-exempt technology development 
reserve (TDR) funds, and ‘accelerated depreciation’ for investment in R&D;  
• Abolish import duty on research equipment. 
The above measures can be initially limited to the targeted sectors discussed above, and 
thereby avoid extra pressure on fiscal position. 
 
Export Processing Zones are an effective way to promote target industries especially as a 
solution to the lack of high quality infrastructure and other utilities for a range of industries. 
Sri Lanka has been using this strategy since 1978. However, the presence of local firms in 
the EPZs is not satisfactory.20 As an alternative therefore, industrial parks (or estates) which 
were an integral part of the East Asian industrialization, can be used in Sri Lanka to 
promote the targeted industries.   Sri Lanka had industrial parks even before 1977.  The 
activities of industrial estates are currently governed by the Board of Investment of Sri 
Lanka (BOI) as the main governing body.21   This strategy can further be expanded to 
accommodate the targeted sectors discussed above. Industrial estates are a useful means to 
improve competitiveness of local SMEs.   
 
For this strategy to help promote the selected local industries, further investment in 
economic and social infrastructure is crucial. There are some important issues that the 
policy makers need to consider in the future: (a) the lack of proper road network and 
adequate transport facilities; (b) the lack of energy; (c) inadequacy of training facilities; (d) 
the lack of proper means of waste disposal; and (e) insufficiency of skilled workforce.  The 
problem is how to find additional financial resources for this without exerting extra pressure 
on the annual budget.  Among the alternatives are linking these projects to foreign aid, or 
seeking private sector partnerships in infrastructure investment in the selected areas.  
 
                                                          
20 By 1992 there were only 18 fully locally owned firms among 125 firms operating in the three EPZs. In many countries that have used 
this strategy, there has been a significant presence of local enterprises in EPZs.  (Warr, 1990; Kaplinsky, 1989).    
21 The BOI provides infrastructure facilities in all the industrial estates under its purview. Some of these infrastructure facilities are 
provided through the co-ordination of public service agencies such as the Road Development Authority, National Water Supply and 
Drainage Board, Ceylon Electricity Board & Sri Lanka Telecom Ltd. Other facilities such as banks, post offices, and freight forwarding 
are also provided in and around the industrial estates. The Industrial Development Board, and the Ministry of Industrial Development 
administer the small-scale industrial estates (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2000).   
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General Policies 
This section discusses what Sri Lanka should do in general to improve overall economic 
activities including the other industries.  Two priority areas of policy are infrastructure 
development and human resource development.  Apart from that, policies should also 
address issues relating to trade policy, especially tariffs and exchange rate.    
 
Improving the quantity and quality of infrastructure in the economy is a priority. It is one of 
the key requirements to enhance private initiative in the overall economy. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, despite dramatic increases in public investment outlays over the past 
20 years, Sri Lanka’s infrastructure profile is still not up to the NIC status, and this is the 
main reason as to why Sri Lanka has a high ICOR on investment.22  Improvements are 
necessary therefore in roads, telecommunication, and other public utilities.   
 
At a time when knowledge-based industries grow fast internationally and, given the 
comparative advantage Sri Lanka has in this sector, the government has a great 
responsibility to enhance the infrastructure facilities required for their growth. As seen in 
Chapter Seven, the current level of telecommunication facilities is not up to the required 
level. 
 
The expansion of infrastructure was somewhat restricted by the unfavourable fiscal situation 
over the past few decades. Can Sri Lanka achieve a favourable fiscal balance in the future? 
The answer to this question depends on how strong the government would be in the East 
Asian sense. A strong political leadership that is committed to implement public sector 
reforms on the one hand, while finding a lasting solution for the ongoing civil unrest on the 
other, is required.  Such measures would ensure that much needed public funds are diverted 
to capital projects enhancing the productive capacity of the economy.   
 
Although the strategies such as BOO-BOOT are in operation, there is no satisfactory 
response from private sector so far to initiate investment projects in Sri Lanka (Kelegama, 
                                                          
22 ICOR (Incremental capital-output ratio) is the rate of investment required to produce 1 per cent increase in output. According to 
Kelegama (1995), Sri Lanka’s ICOR in mid 1990s was about 5.0 per cent, which is high for a prospective NIC (see Chapter Seven, Table 
7.6 for a comparison with South Korea and Taiwan). 
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1995). “Weak regulatory framework, lack of efficient procurement procedure, and 
uncertainty are the main reasons for this” (Jayawardena, 2002, p.4). Infrastructure 
development therefore still remains a responsibility of the government.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, not only is the current supply of electricity, gas, and 
water in the economy insufficient for the economy’s need, but also the demand for power 
increases by over 10 per cent annually.  Since there is no private participation in the supply 
of utility services in Sri Lanka, some reforms are required in this area as well. This study 
considers the following measures would be helpful in solving power shortages: 
• Implementation of new power generation projects (such as coal-powered plants), 
• Reduce state’s monopoly power in the supply of energy in the economy by encouraging 
competition, and 
• Liaison and negotiation with the environmentalists to overcome the opposition to new 
projects.23 
 
The next important task in the road to NIC status is to improve the level of skilled labour. 
Sri Lanka’s human resources development policy should aim at both improving the quality 
of education and training and enhancing the efficacy of the labour market. The former is 
expected to influence the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector in two ways: by 
enhancing the productivity of labour by increasing its capacity to absorb new techniques 
and assimilate new skills; and by facilitating the formation of entrepreneurial skills in the 
work force.   
 
The education system can be used to facilitate the formation of these attributes in the 
workforce.  In Taiwan and South Korea, formal education played an important role in 
developing the managerial skills of people. Similar to these countries, Sri Lanka also had a 
unique position among LDCs in terms of educational achievement of its people for many 
decades. However, formal education alone is not sufficient for industrial development.  
There are some policy lessons Sri Lanka can learn from the East Asian experience. They 
                                                          
23 There have been several instances where the government had to give up power generation projects based on coal in the past due to the 
strong opposition by the public on environmental grounds. 
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have proved that although formal education is the most important determinant of human 
resource development, there are some other factors such as on the job training, research, and 
induction of foreign skills that also contribute (Agrawal, et. al, 2000). As  Lall (1990, p27) 
points out, “while all kinds of education are important…their significance depends on the 
level of industrial development.” This indicates that constant revision of training and 
development programmes is also required to match the current needs of the economy.   
 
In order to create a sophisticated and efficient industrial sector, Sri Lanka needs to make a 
greater emphasis on training in science and engineering while promoting vocational and on-
the-job training.  One indicator of the level of scientific and engineering training in an 
economy is the number of students enrolled in technical fields at the tertiary level as a 
percentage of the total enrolment at that level. As seen in Chapter Seven, Sri Lanka was far 
behind the East Asian counterparts in this regard.  Therefore, the government has an 
important role in enhancing the ‘quality’ of human capital if Sri Lanka is to achieve NIC 
status.   To improve the skill level of the workforce, the following specific policies from the 
East Asian NICs are recommended: 
• Establish special funds for skill development in trade related occupations, financed by a 
levy on wages and salaries;   
• Expand facilities in universities/technical colleges to enhance skills required in 
emerging industries; and  
• Promotion of productivity awareness among general public through educational 
programs and workshops. 
 
Human resource policy is incomplete without enhancing the efficacy of the labour market. 
Following the tightening of labour laws in 1980s, the labour union rights have been 
somewhat restricted and government control has increased in Sri Lanka.  However, this has 
not been sufficient to increase the labour market flexibility. One important lesson from East 
Asia is to ensure that there is no pressure for the employers to increase real wages especially 
in the absence of an increase of productivity. Labour market reforms are important in order 
to maintain Sri Lanka’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing. The East 
Asian labour laws were generally supportive of efficient and flexible use of labour 
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(Agrawal, 2000, p.94). The following policy lessons of East Asian NICs can be of help to 
enhance the labour market flexibility:  
• Relax labour laws/procedures allowing firms to retrench workers where necessary; 
• Introduce merit-based promotion, and performance bonuses; 
• Restrict the number of trade unions per enterprise; 
• Create incentives for skill development, and cooperation in productivity improvement 
by training or through joint venture arrangement. 
 
A strategy to reduce the scale of skilled out-migration, which would also help remedy the 
poor level of R&D activities, should also be considered. The following measures would be 
useful especially in respect of public sector professionals: 
• Increased remunerations for the professionals/ skilled workers;  
• A reward system for achievements/innovations;  
• A merit-based promotion schemes in place of the current ‘seniority based’ scheme; and 
• Institutional reforms such as establishment of independence public service commission, 
and revival of ‘rule of law’ in every aspect of government business.  
 
Finally, it is important to discuss the role of trade policy in directing Sri Lanka towards NIC 
status. Currently there are various means to stimulate exports in general.   Sri Lanka has 
been providing fiscal, financial, and institutional incentives for its export sector since 1978.  
These include the duty rebate scheme, the manufacture-in-bond scheme, and the duty free 
clearance of machinery scheme.  It is recommended that Sri Lanka continue those incentives 
to exporters in order to increase its share of manufacturing output in the GDP.24 
 
What is the suitable policy on imports?  As seen in the previous policy analysis, Sri Lanka’s 
recent average tariff rate was below 7 per cent.  In the 2000 budget, tariff structure was 
further simplified by introducing a two-band system to reduce the cascade effect of the 
tariff.  Moreover, Sri Lanka’s level of effective protection (ERP) has declined significantly 
over the years.  Thus, it has shown a tremendous progress in terms of trade liberalization.  
                                                          
24 Current leading industries such as textiles and apparel, and plantation-based industries such as tea, rubber, and coconut are mainly 
benefited from these policies.  The study does not undermine the important role these industries play in the economy in terms of their 
contribution to GDP, export earnings, and employment generation.   
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As trade theory suggests, such policies will promote industrialization by lowering the price 
of intermediary inputs, and by enhancing the efficiency of the domestic firms.  
 
Following the development path of South Korea and Taiwan however, Sri Lanka should use 
its tariff policy to target those industries identified earlier.  As a lesson form the NICs, any 
special tariff protection given to those industries should be temporary until they capture 
competitive advantage in such activities.  
 
Over the years, Sri Lanka has gradually liberalized most import and export controls. As seen 
in the previous chapter, currently only four categories of exports remain under license.  
Most of them are on the grounds of protection of environment and preservation of antiques, 
while certain others are due to ‘non-trade’ factors such as public health, public morals, and 
national security.  Therefore there is only a little more which Sri Lanka has to do as far as 
liberalization of QRs are concerned.  When using trade policy to support the targeted sectors 
identified earlier, tariffs will be more effective and efficient than QRs.     
 
Sri Lanka’s past exchange rate regimes have not been conducive to economic growth in 
general. The key determinant of a country’s international competitiveness in exports is the 
real exchange rate (Edwards, 1989). Both Taiwan and South Korea used their exchange rate 
policy to protect the tradable sector (Cordon, 1994). This was achieved by moderating the 
exchange rate movement as and when required. The primary cause for a real appreciation of 
exchange rate is domestic inflation.  An overvalued exchange rate can distort incentives for 
manufacturing industries in such a way that non-tradable sector becomes more profitable 
than tradable sector. Sri Lankan monetary authorities should monitor the movements of real 
exchange rate carefully. Containing domestic inflation is the key factor here.  A major 
determinant of persistent inflation in Sri Lanka in the past was the fiscal imbalance.  One 
lesson from East Asia is to contain the fiscal deficit within targets set for the medium term.  
The policy measures to achieve this were already discussed under necessary conditions 
earlier in this chapter.  
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8.3 Prospects for Further Studies 
Despite the theoretical complexity associated with the subject area, this study made a 
remarkable attempt to address the development problem of Sri Lanka, particularly the 
growth problem, using the East Asian development model.  The main focus of the study was 
on the relationship between trade and industry policy and economic growth in these three 
countries. 
 
The ability of this thesis to use advanced quantitative analytical tools was limited due to 
several reasons: the vastness of the scope of the subject area; the complexity of the social, 
economic, and political factors of the three countries involved; and the non-availability of 
suitable quantitative data.  This appears to be one reason why there is little quantitative 
research work on the relevance or otherwise of the East Asian NICs development model to 
other LDCs.  A major part of the analytical work of this research, therefore, had to be 
conducted by way of elaborate policy analysis.   
 
The study addressed the issues relating to industrialization and economic growth of Sri 
Lanka. To contain it within manageable limits, however, it did not address issues relating to 
other areas such as agriculture, environment, social equity, and poverty.  It focused on what 
was considered the most essential elements in achieving economic growth in Sri Lanka. 
Once the economy maintains a satisfactory growth rate, resources can be directed to 
improving these other important aspects of economic and social development.     
 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter developed a policy strategy based on competitive industry policy to achieve 
NIC status for Sri Lanka in the foreseeable future. It emphasized the importance of 
macroeconomic stability for the CIP strategy to work effectively. As seen, there is a big 
challenge for Sri Lanka to maintain the macroeconomic stability, to increase savings and 
investment, and to achieve rapid growth. In view of the higher position Sri Lanka currently 
maintains in terms of human development indicators, it is in a better position to become a 
NIC than many other developing nations. A strategy based on a competitive industry policy 
can help Sri Lanka maintain the level of GDP growth required to become a NIC.  When the 
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economy begins to take-off in response to the CIP-strategy, more foreign resources could be 
expected to flow in gradually taking the pressure off the government budget. However, 
whether Sri Lanka would be able to achieve the NIC status with this strategy largely 
depends on factors such as the commitment of the government to the development problem, 
the role of the private sector, and the socio-political environment within which these two 
entities will interact. 
 
Finally, although there are several plausible explanations to the superior performance of the 
East Asian NICs, the question as to whether their model can be replicated in a different 
socio-cultural and political environment is still to be resolved. The bottom line of this thesis 
is, therefore, not so much about the applicability or otherwise of the specific policy 
instruments that the East Asian NICs used in achieving their economic development.   It is 
their insight in developing economic strategies to suit their own needs and circumstances 
which is important for other LDCs.   The East Asian competitive industry policy model may 
not be replicable, but it provides us with many important policy lessons. This thesis 
therefore asserts that an economic strategy based on a competitive industry policy will be 
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  Sri Lanka’s GDP and its Growth: 1960-2000 
(At 1996 Factor Cost Prices) 
Year GDP 
(Rs. Million) 
GDP Growth Rate 
(%) 
1960 148,519  
1961 151,642 2.1 
1962 158,563 4.6 
1963 163,013 2.8 
1964 173,503 6.4 
1965 177,445 2.3 
1966 184,222 3.8 
1967 193,651 5.1 
1968 209,622 8.2 
1969 219,753 4.8 
1970 229,186 4.3 
1971 229,566 0.2 
1972 236,902 3.2 
1973 245,716 3.7 
1974 253,484 3.2 
1975 260,469 2.8 
1976 268,204 3.0 
1977 279,430 4.2 
1978 302,426 8.2 
1979 321,543 6.3 
1980 340,209 5.8 
1981 359,862 5.8 
1982 378,113 5.1 
1983 396,867 5.0 
1984 416,915 5.1 
1985 437,582 5.0 
1986 456,316 4.3 
1987 462,950 1.5 
1988 475,442 2.7 
1989 486,141 2.3 
1990 516,153 6.2 
1991 539,955 4.6 
1992 563,062 4.3 
1993 602,172 6.9 
1994 636,061 5.6 
1995 670,742 5.5 
1996 695,934 3.8 
1997 739,763 6.3 
1998 774,796 4.7 
1999 808,340 4.3 
2000 857,035 6.0 









Composition of GDP in Sri Lanka: 1970-2000 
At 1996 Factor Cost Prices (%) 
Year Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction Services GDP 
1970 37.8 0.4 13.6 10.3 44.5 100.0 
1971 36.8 0.4 14.1 9.8 44.9 100.0 
1972 36.8 0.4 13.9 8.7 45.6 100.0 
1973 35.2 1.8 13.1 8.6 45.3 100.0 
1974 36.1 1.1 12.1 8.9 46.8 100.0 
1975 34.3 1.4 12.3 7.9 47.8 100.0 
1976 33.7 2.0 12.6 8.1 46.9 100.0 
1977 35.7 1.8 12.0 7.0 47.1 100.0 
1978 34.8 2.0 11.9 8.3 46.8 100.0 
1979 33.4 1.9 11.7 9.5 47.5 100.0 
1980 32.5 1.9 11.2 9.9 48.5 100.0 
1981 32.9 1.9 11.1 9.1 48.8 100.0 
1982 32.1 1.9 11.1 8.5 49.7 100.0 
1983 32.1 1.9 10.7 8.2 50.5 100.0 
1984 30.5 1.9 11.4 7.8 51.4 100.0 
1985 31.5 1.8 11.4 7.4 50.9 100.0 
1986 31.0 1.8 11.9 7.2 50.9 100.0 
1987 28.8 2.1 12.5 7.3 51.5 100.0 
1988 28.6 2.3 12.7 7.2 51.2 100.0 
1989 27.7 2.3 13.0 7.1 51.7 100.0 
1990 28.3 2.4 13.4 6.8 50.8 100.0 
1991 27.5 2.1 13.7 6.7 51.6 100.0 
1992 26.0 1.9 14.3 7.0 52.1 100.0 
1993 25.5 1.9 14.8 7.0 51.8 100.0 
1994 24.9 1.9 15.2 7.0 51.6 100.0 
1995 24.4 1.9 15.8 7.0 51.4 100.0 
1996 22.4 2.0 16.2 6.9 52.4 100.0 
1997 21.7 2.0 16.6 6.9 52.8 100.0 
1998 21.3 1.8 16.9 7.0 53.1 100.0 
1999 21.3 1.8 16.9 7.1 53.0 100.0 
2000 20.5 1.7 17.4 7.0 53.4 100.0 




















1960 1.0  9.6  
1961 1.1 12.6 9.7 0.9 
1962 1.1 -1.9 9.8 0.9 
1963 1.2 7.4 9.4 -4.6 
1964 1.1 -4.0 9.4 0.7 
1965 1.0 -9.0 9.2 -2.0 
1966 1.2 18.0 9.6 4.0 
1967 1.4 15.2 10.2 6.4 
1968 1.7 23.4 10.9 7.2 
1969 2.3 32.6 11.8 8.0 
1970 2.6 14.9 12.0 1.1 
1971 2.4 -7.4 12.0 0.3 
1972 2.6 10.0 12.2 1.5 
1973 2.5 -4.2 14.7 21.1 
1974 3.7 47.7 13.9 -5.6 
1975 4.1 10.8 16.8 21.1 
1976 4.9 18.3 15.3 -9.0 
1977 5.3 7.4 17.1 11.3 
1978 8.6 62.7 18.6 9.3 
1979 13.5 58.1 22.3 19.7 
1980 22.5 66.1 30.3 35.7 
1981 23.6 5.1 36.0 19.0 
1982 30.5 29.3 44.2 22.7 
1983 35.1 15.1 44.9 1.6 
1984 39.7 13.0 49.8 11.0 
1985 38.7 -2.6 51.1 2.6 
1986 42.5 9.8 51.3 0.4 
1987 45.9 8.1 55.7 8.6 
1988 50.6 10.2 66.0 18.3 
1989 54.7 8.2 76.5 15.9 
1990 71.5 30.6 98.2 28.5 
1991 85.2 19.2 108.8 10.7 
1992 103.2 21.2 126.6 16.3 
1993 127.7 23.7 140.0 10.6 
1994 156.5 22.6 157.2 12.3 
1995 171.8 9.8 171.8 9.3 
1996 186.3 8.4 181.3 5.5 
1997 217.1 16.6 203.8 12.4 
1998 257.3 18.5 209.7 2.9 
1999 299.9 16.5 229.7 9.5 
2000 350.0 16.7 260.2 13.3 
* 1995 Prices 
Sources: Compiled by Author using data in Annual Reports,  
  Central Bank of Sri Lanka (Various Issues)
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  Table A- 4  
    Sri Lanka’s Balance of Payments: 1955-1994 




Net Capital Basic 
Balance 
1955 415 -92 323 -42 281 
1956 196 -114 82 -40 42 
1957 -95 -100 -195 19 -176 
1958 -89 -64 -153 8 -145 
1959 -185 -23 -208 9 -199 
1960 -210 -10 -220 22 -198 
1961 -87 -7 -94 11 -83 
1962 -143 3 -140 38 -102 
1963 -161 -7 -168 80 -88 
1964 -193 33 -160 8 -152 
1965 -13 72 59 34 93 
1966 -344 54 -290 137 -153 
1967 -335 47 -288 160 -128 
1968 -380 25 -355 224 -131 
1969 -746 -51 -797 275 -522 
1970 -316 -34 -350 184 -166 
1971 -287 71 -216 404 188 
1972 -255 59 -196 292 96 
1973 -298 137 -161 190 29 
1974 -1263 356 -907 298 -609 
1975 -1421 649 -772 559 -213 
1976 -710 661 -49 610 561 
1977 350 916 1266 563 1829 
1978 -2393 1361 -1032 2640 1608 
1979 -7288 3732 -3556 3000 -556 
1980 -16312 5400 -10912 6000 -4912 
1981 -15616 7118 -8498 7000 -1498 
1982 -20403 8559 -11844 10000 -1844 
1983 -20168 9046 -11122 10000 -1122 
1984 -11850 10450 -1400 8000 6600 
1985 -19801 8393 -11408 8942 -2466 
1986 -21390 9482 -11908 9471 -2437 
1987 -20005 9912 -10093 7841 -2252 
1988 -24268 11891 -12377 7834 -4543 
1989 -24050 12982 -11068 7009 -4059 
1990 -28145 17755 -10390 15856 5466 
1991 -41252 21257 -19995 22477 2482 
1992 -45785 26850 -18935 17971 -964 
1993 -55486 74311 18825 30684 49509 
1994 -77644 39877 -37767 33791 -3976 
      










Sri Lanka’s Terms of Trade: 1960 -1978 (1967=100) 













1955 400 86 134 311 98 83 149 
1956 372 81 125 331 109 83 162 
1957 351 79 120 371 116 88 151 
1958 341 84 118 360 118 81 136 
1959 372 82 122 411 136 83 145 
1960 377 87 122 421 133 83 148 
1961 360 90 112 377 107 82 136 
1962 370 97 109 400 108 77 142 
1963 360 93 109 393 93 85 129 
1964 371 102 111 412 114 105 105 
1965 410 105 113 404 86 100 112 
1966 352 96 107 423 118 98 109 
1967 347 100 100 418 100 100 100 
1968 352 103 117 475 101 126 93 
1969 322 98 117 536 108 134 88 
1970 342 102 118 471 102 140 84 
1971 n.a 99 117 n.a 90 150 78 
1972  - 97 118 - 88 158 75 
1973 - 98 137 - 79 209 65 
1974 - 85 213 - 56 370 58 
1975 - 102 199 - 69 433 46 
1976 - 97 239 - 75 383 62 
1977 - 89 382 - 97 471 81 
1978 - 95 698 - 132 877 80 




  Population Trends of Sri Lanka: 1945-1993 






Increase  (%) 
1945 35.9 21.5 1.4 
1946 37.4 19.8 1.8 
1947 38.6 14.0 2.5 
1948 39.7 13.0 2.7 
1949 39.1 12.2 2.7 
1950 39.7 12.4 2.7 
1951 39.8 12.7 2.7 
1952 39.8 11.8 2.7 
1953 38.7 10.7 2.8 
1954 35.7 10.2 2.5 
1955 37.3 10.8 2.6 
1956 36.4 9.8 2.7 
1957 36.5 10.1 2.6 
1958 35.8 9.7 2.6 
1959 37.0 9.1 2.8 
1960 36.6 8.6 2.8 
1961 35.8 8.0 2.8 
1962 35.5 8.5 2.7 
1963 34.1 8.5 2.4 
1964 33.2 8.8 2.4 
1965 33.1 8.2 2.5 
1966 32.3 8.3 2.4 
1967 31.6 7.5 2.4 
1968 32.0 7.9 2.4 
1969 30.4 8.3 2.2 
1970 29.4 7.5 2.2 
1971 30.4 7.7 1.4 
1972 30.0 8.1 1.3 
1973 28.0 7.7 1.8 
1974 27.5 9.0 1.5 
1975 27.8 8.5 1.6 
1976 27.8 7.8 1.6 
1977 27.9 7.4 1.6 
1978 28.5 6.6 1.8 
1979 28.9 6.5 2.0 
1980 28.4 6.2 1.9 
1981 28.2 5.9 0.7 
1982 26.9 6.1 2.3 
1983 26.3 6.2 1.5 
1984 25.1 6.5 1.2 
1985 24.6 6.2 1.5 
1986 22.4 6.0 1.8 
1987 21.8 6.0 1.5 
1988 20.7 5.8 1.4 
1989 21.6 6.3 1.4 
1990 20.1 5.8 1.1 
1991 21.6 5.5 1.5 
1992 20.1 5.6 0.9 
1993 19.9 5.3 1.3 
Source: Administration Report of the Register General 1965; Statistical Pocket Book of Sri Lanka 1973 (in 
Balakrishnan, N.  and H.M. Gunasekara, 1977, A Review of Demographic Trends in De Silva, K.M. (ed)  Sri 
Lanka: A Survey,  Honolulu. p.112.); Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 
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 Table A- 7 
                Consumer Price Index of Sri Lanka: 1952-2000 
Year CPI Change % 
1952 100.0 - 
1953 101.6 1.6 
1954 101.1 -0.5 
1955 100.5 -.0.6 
1956 100.2 -0.3 
1957 102.8 2.6 
1958 105.0 2.1 
1959 105.2 0.2 
1960 103.5 -1.6 
1961 104.8 1.3 
1962 106.3 1.4 
1963 108.8 2.4 
1964 112.2 3.1 
1965 112.5 0.3 
1966 112.3 -0.2 
1967 114.8 2.2 
1968 121.5 5.8 
1969 130.5 7.4 
1970 138.2 5.9 
1971 141.9 2.7 
1972 150.9 6.3 
1973 165.4 9.6 
1974 185.8 12.3 
1975 198.3 6.7 
1976 200.7 1.2 
1977 203.2 1.2 
1978 227.8 12.1 
1979 252.3 10.8 
1980 318.2 26.1 
1981 375.4 18.0 
1982 416.1 10.8 
1983 474.2 14.0 
1984 553.1 16.6 
1985 561.2 1.5 
1986 606.0 8.0 
1987 652.8 7.7 
1988 744.1 14.0 
1989 830.2 11.6 
1990 1008.6 21.5 
1991 1131.5 12.2 
1992 1260.6 11.4 
1993 1408.4 11.7 
1994 1527.4 8.4 
1995 1644.6 7.7 
1996 1906.7 15.9 
1997 2089.1 9.6 
1998 2284.9 9.4 
1999 2392.1 4.7 
2000 2539.8 6.2 













Table A- 8 
Income Distribution of Sri Lanka: 1953-1997 
Selected Years 
Deciles % of Total Income Received 
1953 1963 1973 1978-79 1981-82 1996-97 
Highest tenth 42.49 39.24 29.98 38.73 41.93 37.28 
Second tenth 14.16 16.01 15.91 15.36 14.87 15.68 
Third tenth 10.39 11.46 12.65 11.36 10.68 11.55 
Fourth tenth 7.94 8.98 10.56 9.10 8.54 9.12 
Fifth tenth 6.31 6.82 8.75 7.37 6.86 7.44 
Sixth tenth 5.71 5.55 7.10 5.93 5.53 6.10 
Seventh tenth 4.37 4.57 5.70 4.80 4.53 4.93 
Eighth tenth 3.56 3.56 4.38 3.57 3.41 3.86 
Ninth tenth 3.56 2.70 3.17 2.57 2.45 2.77 
Lowest tenth 1.51 1.17 1.80 1.19 1.17 1.27 
Gini coefficient 0.50 0.49 0.41 0.50 0.52 0.48 










                                                                  Table A-9 












1948 Labour Commissioner’s Annual Reports a/ 320 11.9 
1954 Labour Commissioner’s Annual Reports  388 12.6 
1958 Labour Commissioner’s Annual Reports  418 12.5 
1960 E.U.& U Survey - DCS b 340 10.5 
1963 Survey of Consumer Finance (CBSLc) 457 13.8 
1968 Labour Force Survey-  DCS 464 13.4 
1969 Socio-economic Survey: 1968/69 - CBSL 558 14.3 
1971 Census of Population- DCS 839 18.7 
1973 Survey of Labour Force –DCS 1073 24.0 
1975 Land & Labour Utilization Survey - DCS 984 19.7 
1979 Consumer Finance & Socio Economic Survey 1978/79 (CBSLc) 874 14.8 
1981 Census of Population- DCS 859 17.9 
1981 Labour Force & Socio Economic Survey 1980/81- DCS 857 15.3 
1986 Labour Force & Socio Economic Survey 1985/86- DCS 840 14.1 
1990 Quarterly Labour Force Survey-  DCS 954 15.9 
1992 Quarterly Labour Force Survey-  DCS 846 14.2 
1994 Quarterly Labour Force Survey- DCS 798 13.1 
1996 Quarterly Labour Force Survey- DCS 705 11.3 
1998 Quarterly Labour Force Survey- DCS 629 9.5 
          Source: a/ Snodgrass, 1966, p299  
      b/ Employment, Unemployment & Underemployment Survey, Department of Census &     
          Statistics 
     c/ Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annul Reports (Various Years) 
 : 












                                                   Table A-10  
     Capacity Utilization of Sri Lanka’s Manufacturing Industries:  1974-1996 
    (Period averages %) 
Industry 1974/77 1978/81 1982/85 1994/96 
Food beverage & tobacco 69.6 69.5 76.8 92.0 
Textile, apparel & leather products 52.3 71.5 96.8 83.3 
Wood & wood products 49.4 83.6 91.5 79.6 
Paper & paper products 58.5 71.8 67.3 90.0 
Chemical, petroleum, rubber & plastic products 49.4 71.8 67.0 66.6 
Non metallic mineral products 68.3 80.5 76.8 87.0 
Basic metal products 39.2 61.5 30.0 45.6 
Fabricated metal, machinery & transport 
equipment 
48.9 62.5 84.3 89.6 
Overall industry average 54.6 72.3 74.8 83.3 














 Table A -11   
       Changes in Composition of Sri Lanka's Exports: 1978 and 2000 
Category 1978   2000   
  
   Value  
(Rs Million) 
% 
 of Total 
   Value  
(Rs Million) 
% 
 of Total 
1. Agriculture Exports 10416 79.0 76270 18.2 
   Tea 6401 48.5 53133 12.6 
   Rubber 2021 15.3 2179 0.5 
   Coconut Products 1271 9.6 9174 2.2 
   Minor Agriculture. Crops 723 5.5 11784 2.8 
2. Industrial Exports 1849 14.0 325931 77.6 
   Textile and Garments 481 3.6 226930 54.0 
   Petroleum Products 945 7.2 7414 1.8 
   Other 423 3.2 91587 21.8 
3. Mineral Exports 626 4.7 7352 1.8 
   Gems 531 4.0 7091 1.7 
   Other 95 0.7 261 0.1 
4. Unclassified 302 2.3 10560 2.5 
5. Total Exports 13193 100 420113 100.0 





 Table A-12       
                                       Value of Industrial Production in Sri Lanka  (at Current Prices) 1977-2000     
Category 1977 1980 1982 1985 1990 1993 1996 2000 
   (Rs. In Million)       
Food, beverage, tobacco 2,295 3,899 5,246 10,497 21955 39709 68209 105671 
Textile, apparel & leather 698 1,923 3,863 9,505 27930 70057 117539 215686 
Wood and wood products 127 289 361 705 721 1230 2171 3084 
Paper and paper products 270 476 725 1,187 1880 3438 5069 6518 
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic Products 2,469 9,416 13,099 13,104 21215 28876 46936 74670 
Non-metallic mineral products 411 1,156 1,370 1,854 7554 12351 18997 28198 
Basic metal products  132 478 262 123 1006 1497 2248 3378 
Fabricated metal, machinery and transport equipment 571 620 904 1,592 4199 5915 8807 15678 
Products not elsewhere specified 34 54 74 125 296 3402 6183 9839 
Total 7007 18311 25904 38692 86756 166475 276159 462722 
    (% of Total)      
Food, beverage, tobacco 32.8 21.3 20.3 27.1 25.3 23.9 24.7 22.8 
Textile, apparel & leather 10.0 10.5 14.9 24.6 32.2 42.1 42.6 46.6 
Wood and wood products 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Paper and paper products 3.9 2.6 2.8 3.1 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.4 
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber &Plastic products 35.2 51.4 50.6 33.9 24.5 17.3 17.0 16.1 
Non-metallic mineral products 5.9 6.3 5.3 4.8 8.7 7.4 6.9 6.1 
Basic metal products  1.9 2.6 1.0 0.3 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Fabricated metal, Machinery and transport equipment 8.1 3.4 3.5 4.1 4.8 3.6 3.2 3.4 
Products not elsewhere specified 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.0 2.2 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report (various Issues)         






 Table A-12a       
                                                Value added in Industries in Sri Lanka (at Current Prices): 1977-2000      
Category 1977 1980 1982 1985 1990 1993 1996 2000 
   (Rs.Million)       
Food, beverage, tobacco Products 955 1,795 2,259 6,166 12065 21704 32891 49031 
Textile, apparel & leather 269 382 488 2,594 7167 18994 31184 69451 
Wood and wood products 77 165 134 420 485 831 1250 1554 
Paper and paper products 119 305 257 543 1019 1912 2580 2808 
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic Products 770 1,249 1,927 1,402 2428 4723 8957 17771 
Non-metallic mineral products 251 608 862 1,089 4742 7163 10537 14240 
Basic metal products  29 80 14 38 194 279 450 959 
Fabricated metal, machinery and transport equipment 204 297 790 1,055 2746 3608 4809 7714 
Products not elsewhere specified 14 12 29 59 138 1532 2763 3965 
Total 2688 4893 6760 13366 30984 60746 95421 167493 
    (% of Total)       
Food, beverage, tobacco 35.5 36.7 33.4 46.1 38.9 35.7 34.5 29.3 
Textile, apparel & leather 10.0 7.8 7.2 19.4 23.1 31.3 32.7 41.5 
Wood and wood products 2.9 3.4 2.0 3.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 0.9 
Paper and paper products 4.4 6.2 3.8 4.1 3.3 3.1 2.7 1.7 
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber &Plastic products 28.6 25.5 28.5 10.5 7.8 7.8 9.4 10.6 
Non-metallic mineral products 9.3 12.4 12.8 8.1 15.3 11.8 11.0 8.5 
Basic metal products  1.1 1.6 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Fabricated metal, Machinery and transport equipment 7.6 6.1 11.7 7.9 8.9 5.9 5.0 4.6 
Products not elsewhere specified 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.5 2.9 2.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 






  Table A-13      
Composition of Value-added & Employment in Private Sector Manufacturing1 in Sri Lanka: Selected Years  
ISIC Industry   Production   Employment 
    1974 1981 1993 1974 1981 1993 
311-12 Food 7.01 8.08 15.75 5.74 5.35 11.14 
313 Beverages 2.59 1.43 2.07 2.64 1.12 0.86 
314 Tobacco 23.65 19.01 11.62 2.11 2.59 3.21 
321 Textiles 15.82 8.89 8.41 25.22 23.96 12.27 
322 Clothing 5.35 21.64 25.27 11.34 29.31 46.70 
323 Leather goods 0.74 0.46 1.17 0.77 0.44 1.38 
324 Footwear 1.86 1.19 2.18 2.39 1.24 2.25 
331 Wood products 0.20 0.25 0.15 0.41 0.67 0.64 
332 Furniture 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.54 0.87 0.43 
341 Paper & paper products 3.08 1.32 1.01 3.32 1.38 0.65 
342 Printing 0.01 1.21 0.99 0.00 1.65 1.87 
351 Industrial chemicals 1.63 0.86 0.98 0.62 0.50 0.82 
352 Other chemicals 9.40 10.84 6.85 5.85 5.63 2.95 
355 Rubber goods 2.68 6.61 5.55 4.12 6.06 5.55 
356 Plastic goods 2.66 3.03 1.88 2.18 2.76 3.25 
361 Pottery 0.03 0.85 0.64 0.10 0.99 1.25 
362 Glass 0.84 0.92 0.13 2.09 0.77 0.19 
369 Non-metallic mineral products 0.25 0.55 2.47 2.56 1.43 1.56 
371-72 Basic Metal products 0.46 0.51 0.52 0.88 0.23 0.17 
381 Fabricated metal products 4.49 2.80 1.02 6.93 3.71 1.18 
382 Machinery 5.66 1.45 2.12 10.40 2.38 1.41 
383 Electrical 6.04 4.04 1.57 1.04 2.65 1.85 
384 Transport equipment 2.17 0.63 2.20 3.91 1.17 2.40 
390 Other manufacturing 2 0.73 1.47 5.31 0.88 2.05 1.97 
1. Excluding petroleum refining; 2. Jewelry, sports goods and toys    
(Figures for each year may not add up to 100 because of rounding)      





       







Table A-14    
     Sri Lanka’s Government Expenditure a/1977-2000  
    Rs. Million   As a % of GDP   
Year Capital  b/ Recurrent Total Capital  Recurrent Total 
1977 2665  6148  8813  7.3 16.9 24.2 
1978 7280  10408  17688  17.1 24.4 41.5 
1979 8367  10825  19192  16.0 20.7 36.6 
1980 16069  12319  28388  24.2 18.5 42.7 
1981 13365  14649  28014  15.7 17.2 33.0 
1982 15171  18341  33512  15.3 18.5 33.8 
1983 17635  22002  39637  14.5 18.1 32.6 
1984 23207  24630  47837  15.1 16.0 31.1 
1985 22589  32645  55234  13.9 20.1 34.0 
1986 25227  33966  59193  14.1 18.9 33.0 
1987 24334  39560  63894  12.4 20.1 32.5 
1988 30400 46132 76532  13.7 20.8 34.5 
1989 25280 56884 82164  10.0 22.6 32.6 
1990 28043 71771 99814  8.7 22.3 31.0 
1991 36613 83756 120369  9.8 22.5 32.3 
1992 30186 89639 119825  7.1 21.1 28.2 
1993 39371 102288 141659  7.9 20.5 28.4 
1994 43680 127084 170764  7.5 21.9 29.5 
1995 49325 154159 203484  7.4 23.1 30.5 
1996 43512 175148 218660  5.7 22.8 28.5 
1997 50348 184749 235097  5.7 20.8 26.4 
1998 68531 199648 268179  6.8 19.7 26.5 
1999 71888 207271 279159  6.5 18.7 25.1 
2000 81543 254279 335822  6.5 20.3 26.7 
a/ based on economic classification;  b/ Includes net lending 







 Table A-15  
          Sri Lanka's Saving Ratios: 1977-2000 
 (% of GDP)  
Year Domestic National 
1977 18.1 17.7 
1978 15.2 15.5 
1979 13.8 14.8 
1980 11.2 14.0 
1981 11.7 14.3 
1982 11.9 15.4 
1983 13.8 16.4 
1984 19.9 22.2 
1985 11.9 14.2 
1986 12.0 14.5 
1987 12.8 15.3 
1988 12.0 14.2 
1989 12.2 14.6 
1990 14.3 16.8 
1991 12.8 15.2 
1992 15.0 17.9 
1993 16.0 20.2 
1994 15.2 19.1 
1995 15.3 19.5 
1996 15.3 19.0 
1997 17.3 21.5 
1998 19.1 23.4 
1999 19.5 23.5 
2000 17.3 21.4 







 Table A-16   
Private and Public Investment of Sri Lanka: 1977-2000 
   (As a % of GDP)    
Year Private Public Total 
1977 9.3 5.1 14.4 
1978 13.7 6.4 20.0 
1979 18.7 7.1 25.8 
1980 25.2 8.6 33.8 
1981 23.1 4.7 27.8 
1982 25.8 5.0 30.8 
1983 24.0 4.9 28.9 
1984 21.3 4.6 25.8 
1985 19.0 4.8 23.8 
1986 18.3 5.3 23.7 
1987 17.7 5.7 23.3 
1988 16.9 5.9 22.8 
1989 16.0 5.7 21.7 
1990 18.3 3.9 22.2 
1991 18.6 4.3 22.9 
1992 21.1 3.2 24.3 
1993 21.4 4.2 25.6 
1994 24.0 3.0 27.0 
1995 22.2 3.5 25.7 
1996 21.2 3.1 24.2 
1997 21.0 3.4 24.4 
1998 21.9 3.4 25.2 
1999 23.8 3.3 27.1 
2000 24.8 3.2 28.0 







                 Table A-17    
      Sri Lanka’s Recurrent Expenditure 1970-2000  








1970 3.0 5.4 1.0 10.1 19.5 
1971 3.6 5.3 1.1 11.2 21.2 
1972 3.8 5.2 1.0 12.2 22.2 
1973 3.1 4.7 0.9 12.3 21.0 
1974 3.5 3.8 0.7 10.9 19.0 
1975 3.4 3.8 0.6 11.5 19.4 
1976 3.3 9.8 1.2 4.1 18.4 
1977 3.0 9.7 1.1 3.1 16.9 
1978 4.2 12.7 3.2 4.3 24.4 
1979 4.2 10.4 2.6 3.5 20.7 
1980 3.7 8.4 3.3 3.0 18.5 
1981 2.9 6.8 2.5 5.1 17.2 
1982 3.1 6.8 2.7 5.8 18.5 
1983 2.9 6.4 2.5 6.3 18.1 
1984 2.8 5.8 2.2 5.2           16.0 
.1985 5.4 6.4 1.6 6.8 20.1 
1986 4.8 6.1 2.2 5.8 18.9 
1987 5.6 6.5 1.5 6.5 20.1 
1988 6.0 6.9 1.8 6.0 20.8 
1989 5.8 7.8 1.5 7.5 22.6 
1990 5.6 7.6 1.6 7.6 22.3 
1991 5.3 8.5 1.1 7.6 22.5 
1992 5.7 7.7 0.9 6.7 21.1 
1993 5.5 7.5 0.9 6.6 20.5 
1994 5.3 8.2 1.1 7.4 21.9 
1995 7.2 8.6 1.2 6.1 23.1 
1996 6.9 7.7 1.1 6.9 22.8 
1997 6.6 6.7 0.8 6.6 20.8 
1998 6.5 6.2 1.0 5.8 19.6 
1999 5.7 6.0 0.9 6.1 18.7 
2000 6.6 6.1 1.0 6.6 20.2 




Table A- 18 
                           Import Duty Rates and Share of Dutiable Imports: 1978-95 (Percentages %) 
 



















1978 46.2 26.2 27.7 9.2 16.2 17.0 13.8 71.8 
1979 42.3 28.3 29.5 14.3 16.5 13.8 14.4 66.0 
1980 39.5 28.9 31.6 8.9 21.0 14.2 13.6 62.8 
1981 34.8 35.2 30.0 10.5 19.4 17.1 15.7 63.0 
1982 29.1 31.7 39.2 13.9 16.5 12.3 13.9 52.2 
1983 33.8 31.1 35.1 13.9 19.8 14.7 15.9 63.0 
1984 30.5 36.0 33.5 19.0 20.2 17.7 18.4 77.0 
1985 36.4 37.1 26.5 24.5 27.5 17.6 21.3 66.6 
1986 41.2 35.5 23.4 25.0 9.6 16.9 16.0 62.9 
1987 27.1 50.7 22.2 22.9 8.8 15.6 14.5 58.9 
1988 28.1 52.4 19.5 20.5 8.2 15.7 13.8 64.4 
1989 30.0 52.8 17.2 18.3 8.7 19.2 14.2 59.6 
1990 30.5 44.4 25.1 12.5 9.1 18.6 12.3 52.9 
1991 28.5 45.3 26.2 16.2 8.0 17.0 12.4 51.5 
1992 23.3 49.7 27.0 23.2 7.9 17.5 14.3 45.8 
1993 21.1 50.4 28.6 20.0 5.5 15.7 11.1 40.1 
1994 21.0 48.1 30.9 13.7 5.2 14.6 9.1 36.5 
1995 21.0 53.7 25.4 11.7 4.7 10.2 7.9 39.5 
   * Import duty (including surcharges and cesses) as a % of total imports    
  ** Total dutiable imports as a share of total imports     








Main Financial Institutions in Sri Lanka 
Type Details 
Central Bank Central Bank of Sri Lanka (1949) 
Commercial Banks Bank of Ceylon (1938) 
People’s Bank (1961) 
Commercial Bank of Ceylon  (1964) 
Hatton National Bank (1970) 
Sampath Bank, (1990) 
Seylan Bank 
Foreign Banks 
Development Banks Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon (1956) 
National Development Bank of Sri Lanka (1979) 
Housing Development Finance Corporation of Sri Lanka (HDFC) (1993) 
Pramuka Savings and Development Bank Ltd. (2000) 
Savings Banks National Savings Bank (1972) 
Rural Banks Rural Banks operated by cooperatives in association with the People’s Bank 
Regional Rural Development Bank (Operated by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
Finance Companies Private finance companies 
Insurance Companies Insurance Corporation of Sri Lanka (1961) 
Sri Lanka Export Credit Insurance Corporation (1979) 
National Insurance Corporation (1980) 
Merchant Banks The Merchant Bank of Sri Lanka Ltd. (1982) 
The People’s Merchant Bank (1983) 
Housing Finance Institutions State Mortgage and Investment Bank (1979) 
Housing Development Finance Corporation of Sri Lanka (1983) 
National Housing Development Authority (1981) 
Provident Funds Employee’s Provident Fund (1958) 
Employee’s Trust Fund (1981) 
Equity Institutions Colombo Stock Exchange Ltd. (1982) 
Capital development and Investment Company (1983) 
 (In brackets is the year commenced operation)  
Source: (1) Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report (Various Issues); 
Lee, J., 1987, Improving Domestic Resource Mobilization through Financial   Development:  Sri Lanka, Asian 









  Table A-20           
 Loans & Advances of Commercial Banks in Sri Lanka: 1977-2000      
Purpose 1977 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
   (Rs Million)          
Commercial* 2823 28512 31924 37285 37925 52866 60611 64550 80530 88603 99172 102934 109749 
Industrial 1387 11508 13321 14718 15189 15658 16536 17623 21651 23257 23154 25311 33315 
Financial 132 1209 1675 2338 2891 4327 5783 6518 7908 8322 7614 11305 11953 
Consumption 216 1166 1523 2155 2939 5312 6552 10961 13846 16314 19484 23308 28999 
Agricultural 1018 5831 6581 9636 12012 11838 8950 10517 11618 10691 11755 13075 16676 
Housing/Property 212 4783 6067 8296 10393 13508 14283 19540 22180 24064 25099 31249 35707 
Other 134 4560 5385 6415 7821 12133 15545 18257 26213 25004 30448 34152 38752 
Total 5922 57569 66476 80843 89170 115642 128260 147966 183946 196255 216726 241334 275151 
   ( % of Total)          
Commercial* 47.7 49.5 48.0 46.1 42.5 45.7 47.3 43.6 43.8 45.1 45.8 42.7 39.9 
Industrial 23.4 20.0 20.0 18.2 17.0 13.5 12.9 11.9 11.8 11.9 10.7 10.5 12.1 
Financial 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 3.5 4.7 4.3 
Consumption 3.6 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.3 4.6 5.1 7.4 7.5 8.3 9.0 9.7 10.5 
Agricultural 17.2 10.1 9.9 11.9 13.5 10.2 7.0 7.1 6.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 6.1 
Housing/Property 3.6 8.3 9.1 10.3 11.7 11.7 11.1 13.2 12.1 12.3 11.6 12.9 13.0 
Other 2.3 7.9 8.1 7.9 8.8 10.5 12.1 12.3 14.3 12.7 14.0 14.2 14.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 










                                      Table A-21 
Foreign Savings of Sri Lanka: 1990-2000  
Item 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
 Rs. Million     
Investment 71455 103239 156510 186264 255889 351139 
Domestic Savings 46091 63845 88149 117691 194735 217767 
Net foreign factor income  -6685 -7821 -8310 -11258 -11556 -22967 
Net private transfers 14518 20253 30989 39242 54785 73810 
National Savings 53924 76277 110828 145675 237964 268610 
Savings Investment Gap -17531 -26962 -45682 -40589 -17925 -82529 
Financing the Gap 17531 26962 45682 40589 17925 82529 
   Foreign Aid 7256 8153 8479 7995 7352 5300 
   FDI 1684 6437 9149 6959 11859 13471 
   Borrowings  9934 17013 41953 15950 19085 42734 
   Other -1343 -4641 -13899 9685 -20371 21024 
GDP 321784 425283 579084 768128 1017986 1255536 
 % of GDP      
Investment 22.2 24.3 27.0 24.2 25.1 28.0 
Domestic Savings 14.3 15.0 15.2 15.3 19.1 17.3 
Net foreign factor income  -2.1 -1.8 -1.4 -1.5 -1.1 -1.8 
Net private transfers 4.5 4.8 5.4 5.1 5.4 5.9 
National Savings 16.8 17.9 19.1 19.0 23.4 21.4 
Savings Investment Gap -5.4 -6.3 -7.9 -5.3 -1.8 -6.6 
Financing the Gap 5.4 6.3 7.9 5.3 1.8 6.6 
   Foreign Aid 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.7 0.4 
   FDI 0.5 1.5 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.1 
   Borrowings  3.1 4.0 7.2 2.1 1.9 3.4 
   Other -0.4 -1.1 -2.4 1.3 -2.0 1.7 





 Table A-22    
Sectoral distribution of Export-oriented Foreign Manufacturing Firms1 1982 and 1995  
  1982   1985    










1. Resource-based products: 4 3.3 58 11.5  
     Processed food 2 - - 15 -  
    Tobacco - - 2 5.2  
    Rubber Products3 1 2.8 16 3.2  
    Ceramic/granite products 1 0.2 10 2.3  
    Coir products 1 0.3 8 0.6  
    Gem cutting - - 7 0.2  
2. Standardized consumer goods: 27 94.9 155 79.6  
    Handlooms & textiles products - - 8 8.1  
    Knitting mills 3 1.1 10 9.5  
    Garments 18 85.8 63 41.8  
    Leather goods 1 - 7 3  
    Plastic goods 1 0.4 16 2.8  
    Footwear 2 1 6 2.5  
    Sport goods - - 31 2.8  
    Diament cutting & Jewellery 2 6.6 17 8.9  
    Other - - 7 1.2  
3. Component production and assembly 3 1.8 32 8.9  
    Electronics and electrical products 1 1.6 19 4.2  
    Other4 2 0.2 13 4.7  
 Total  34 100 303 100  
 US $ millions  129  2090  
Notes:      
1. Firms approved under FTZ provisions which were in operation at the end of the given year.  
2. Fruit canning, cashew nut oil, spice oil, and tea bags     
3. Rubber bands gloves, and heavy-duty tyres      
4. Parts of winces and cranes, steel fasteners, precision mould, steel mould and dies, and motor vehicle spare parts 
















    Table A- 23                
  Sri Lanka's Defence Expenditure: 1980-2000             
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
As a % of GDP                      
Total Defence Expenditure 1.35 1.16 1.11 1.43 2.14 3.6 3.43 4.56 3.57 3.1 4.15 4.01 4.25 4.16 4.57 6.52 5.75 4.73 4.23 4.4 5.64 
     Defence 0.69 0.56 0.53 0.81 1.31 2.84 2.42 3.05 2.13 1.62 2.09 2.77 3.03 3.08 3.35 5.42 4.86 3.83 3.36 3.43 4.61 
     Public Order and Safety 0.66 0.6 0.57 0.62 0.83 0.76 1 1.51 1.44 1.48 2.05 1.24 1.22 1.07 1.21 1.1 0.89 0.9 0.87 0.97 1.03 
As a % of Deficit                       
Total Defence Expenditure 5.86 7.46 6.36 10.6 23.9 30.8 28 41.3 22.8 27.7 41.9 33.8 53.1 48 43.5 64.2 61 60 60.6 58.7 56.8 
     Defence 2.98 3.62 3.06 6.04 14.6 24.3 19.8 27.6 13.6 14.5 21.1 23.3 37.8 35.6 32 53.4 51.6 48.6 48.1 45.8 46.5 
     Public Order and Safety 2.88 3.84 3.29 4.6 9.23 6.53 8.19 13.7 9.16 13.3 20.7 10.5 15.3 12.4 11.6 10.8 9.42 11.4 12.5 12.9 10.4 
Memo;                      
Budget deficit as % of GDP 23.1 15.6 17.4 13.4 8.96 11.7 12.2 11.1 15.7 11.2 9.9 11.9 8 8.67 10.5 10.2 9.41 7.89 9.18 7.5 9.92 








                                   Table A-24      
 Sri Lanka's Wage Rate Indices 1978-2000 (1978 December = 100)   
    Nominal Wage  Rate index     Real Wage  Rate index   
Year Agriculture Industry Services Total Agriculture Industry Services Total 
1980 153.6 138.8 130.5 147.3 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1981 153.9 151.0 146.4 152.2 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1982 181.2 161.1 169.7 175.8 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1983 198.7 163.1 177.8 188.8 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1984 250.3 183.3 190.7 228.8 108.0 79.3 82.6 98.8 
1985 273.5 203.9 190.7 247.9 116.6 86.9 81.3 105.8 
1986 288.1 224.3 190.7 261.3 113.8 88.6 75.3 103.2 
1987 302.3 256.3 196.6 277.7 110.8 93.9 72.0 101.8 
1988 378.4 271.7 229.5 355.8 121.6 87.4 73.8 107.9 
1989 435.9 334.9 245.9 388.1 125.7 96.6 71.0 112.0 
1990 517.2 379.5 267.8 453.5 122.7 89.9 63.5 107.6 
1991 577.7 459.6 336.5 518.8 122.2 97.1 71.1 109.7 
1992 664.1 510.8 365.9 590.0 126.1 97.1 69.6 112.0 
1993 803.4 528.7 365.9 685.8 136.6 89.8 62.2 116.6 
1994 821.5 555.8 431.4 712.4 128.8 87.2 67.6 111.7 
1995 830.9 651.6 456.7 740.3 121.1 94.8 66.5 107.8 
1996 907.9 682.8 487.2 801.7 113.9 85.9 61.3 100.7 
1997 971.8 710.8 506.4 849.1 111.4 81.4 55.9 97.3 
1998 1097.7 807.7 559.7 953.3 115.0 84.6 53.0 99.9 
1999 1116.0 829.2 559.7 977.6 111.7 83.0 56.0 97.8 
2000 1142.7 857.2 559.7 1000.4 107.7 80.8 52.8 94.3 










                           Government Fiscal Operations: 1977-2000a 
Year Revenue 
Expenditure Budget  
Deficit/ 
Surplus 
As a % of GDP 
Current Capital b Total Revenue Expenditure 
Budget  
Deficit c 
1977 6686 6148 2665 8813 -2127 18.4 24.2 -5.8 
1978 11688 10408 7280 17688 -6000 27.4 41.5 -14.1 
1979 11966 10825 8367 19192 -7226 22.8 36.6 -13.8 
1980 13022 12319 16069 28388 -15366 19.6 42.7 -23.1 
1981 14775 14649 13365 28014 -13239 17.4 33.0 -15.6 
1982 16210 18341 15171 33512 -17302 16.3 33.8 -17.4 
1983 23317 22002 17635 39637 -16320 19.2 32.6 -13.4 
1984 34061 24630 23207 47837 -13776 22.2 31.1 -9.0 
1985 36249 32645 22589 55234 -18985 22.3 34.0 -11.7 
1986 37238 33966 25227 59193 -21955 20.7 33.0 -12.2 
1987 42145 39560 24334 63894 -21749 21.4 32.5 -11.1 
1988 41749 46132 30400 76532 -34783 18.8 34.5 -15.7 
1989 53979 56884 25280 82164 -28185 21.4 32.6 -11.2 
1990 67964 71771 28043 99814 -31850 21.1 31.0 -9.9 
1991 76179 83756 36613 120369 -44190 20.5 32.3 -11.9 
1992 85781 89639 30186 119825 -34044 20.2 28.2 -8.0 
1993 98339 102288 39371 141659 -43320 19.7 28.4 -8.7 
1994 110038 127084 43680 170764 -60726 19.0 29.5 -10.5 
1995 136258 154159 49325 203484 -67226 20.4 30.5 -10.1 
1996 146279 175148 43512 218660 -72381 19.0 28.5 -9.4 
1997 165036 184749 50348 235097 -70061 18.5 26.4 -7.9 
1998 175032 199648 68531 268179 -93147 17.3 26.5 -9.2 
1999 195905 207271 71888 279159 -83254 17.6 25.1 -7.5 
2000 211282 254279 81543 335822 -124540 16.8 26.7 -9.9 
          a/ Data are based on economic format. b/ includes net lending; c/ before grant 
 











Trends in Money Supply, GDP, Prices, and Interest Rate in Sri Lanka 
1978-2000 (Annual Growth Rates (%)) 
Year Money Supply a GDP CCPI Interest Rate b Domestic credit 
1978 25.0 8.2 12.1 14-15 21.6 
1979 38.2 6.3 10.8 14-15 40.2 
1980 31.9 5.8 26.1 20-22 72.3 
1981 23.1 5.8 18.0 20-22 31.6 
1982 24.8 5.1 10.8 15-22 24.9 
1983 22.1 5.0 14.0 16-22 16.2 
1984 16.6 5.1 16.6 14-23 1.3 
1985 11.5 5.0 1.5 12-22 18.6 
1986 5.1 4.3 8.0 8.5-17 8.2 
1987 14.7 1.5 7.7 8.5-14 17.9 
1988 16.5 2.7 14.0 8.5-15 15.6 
1989 12.5 2.3 11.6 11-20 14.8 
1990 19.1 6.2 21.5 11-21 13.3 
1991 23.2 4.6 12.2 10-20 10.2 
1992 16.5 4.3 11.4 13.5-20 12.7 
1993 23.4 6.9 11.7 13.5-17 4.6 
1994 19.7 5.6 8.4 10-17 15.3 
1995 19.2 5.5 7.7 10-17 28.8 
1996 10.8 3.8 15.9 12-18 12.7 
1997 13.9 6.3 9.6 8.5-15 8.1 
1998 9.7 4.7 9.4 9-13 14.3 
1999 13.2 4.3 4.7 9-13 20.1 
2000 13.0 6.0 6.2 9-15 25.4 
a/ Broad money (M2) that includes currency, demand deposit, time and savings deposit held by public 
 
b/ One-year deposit rate 
 













                          Average Tariff Rates of Sri Lanka: 1977-2000 
Year Import Duty  
(Rs Mn) 




1977 518 6007 8.6 
1978 1469 14663 10.0 
1988 10671 71030 15.0 
1989 14923 80225 18.6 
1990 16792 107729 15.6 
1991 18617 126643 14.7 
1992 20819 153555 13.6 
1993 20762 193550 10.7 
1994 22598 235576 9.6 
1995 24365 272200 9.0 
1996 25458 301075 8.5 
1997 26739 346026 7.7 
1998 28154 380138 7.4 
1999 27720 421888 6.6 













 Table B-1  
South Korea's Bank Interest Rates on Exports & Commercial Loans 






1962 April 12.8 16.4 
1962 December 9.1 15.7 
1963 May 8.0 15.7 
1964 March 8.0 16.0 
1965 Sep. 6.5 26.0 
1967 June 6.0 26.0 
1973 May 7.0 15.5 
1974 January 9.0 15.5 
1976 August 8.0 18.0 
1980 January 12.0 25.3 





      Table B-2       
    Korea's Top Ten Exports: Selected Years    


















Iron ore 5.3 13.0 Textiles & garments 341.1 40.8 Textiles 5014 28.6 Electronic products 20157 28.0  
Tungsten 5.1 12.6 Plywood 91.9 11.0 Electronic products 2004 11.4 Textiles & garments 15478 11.0  
Raw silk 2.7 6.7 Wigs 90.1 10.8 Steel products 1854 10.6 Steel products 4509 10.8  
Anthracite 2.4 5.9 Iron ore 49.3 5.9 Footwear 904 5.2 Ships 4124 5.9  
Squid 2.3 5.5 Electronic products 29.2 3.5 Ships 618 3.5 Footwear 3836 3.5  
Other Fish 1.9 4.5 Confectionary 19.5 2.3 Synthetic resin 571 3.3 Chemical products 2989 2.3  
Graphite 1.7 4.2 Footwear 17.3 2.1 Metal products 433 2.5 General machinery 2338 3.3  
Plywood 1.4 3.3 Tobacco & products 13.5 1.6 Plywood 352 2.0 Automobiles 2315 1.6  
Grain 1.4 3.3 Steel products 13.4 1.5 Deep sea fish 352 2.0 Fishing products 1643 1.5  
Animal fur 1.2 3.0 Metal products 12.2 1.5 Electric products 324 1.9 Petroleum products 1451 1.5  
Total 25.4 62.0 Total 660.6 77.1 Total 12426 77.1 Total 58840 77.1  
Total Exports 40.9 100.0 Total Exports 835.2 100.0 Total Exports 17505 100.0 Total Exports 71870 100.0  
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association, Trade Year Book, Various issues, as quoted in Sakong, I., 1993, Korea in the World Economy, Institute for International Economics,  










      Table B-3     
Public Sector Share of Gross Domestic Investment 1963-79   
 (Billions of current won)     
Year 
         (1) 
Gross Domestic 
Investment 
        (2) 
Public sector 
Investment * 
      (3) 
(2) as a %  
of (1)   
1963 91.1 37.3 40.9   
1964 100.6 43.0 42.7   
1965 120.9 52.8 43.7   
1966 223.9 73.1 32.6   
1967 280.7 119.8 42.7   
1968 427.0 150.0 35.1   
1969 621.3 243.5 39.2   
1970 719.1 245.9 34.2   
1971 831.4 332.6 40.0   
1972 873.8 434.3 49.7   
1973 1341.0 401.0 29.9   
1974 2274.3 595.9 26.2   
1975 2881.8 1216.1 42.2   
1976 3378.2 1236.4 36.6   
1977 4645 1932.3 41.6   
1978 7137.7 2469.6 34.6   
1979 10293.5 3376.3 32.8   
1963-71 Average  379.6 144.2 39.0   
 1972-79 Average 4103.2 1457.7 36.7   
1963-79 Average  2131.8 762.3 35.8   
* This includes general government, departmental enterprises, and government Invested enterprises  









  Table B- 4   
 Contribution of Exports and Domestic Market Growth to GNP 
                                                 1961-83    
Year      Exports       Domestic market   
    %   %  
1961 1 18 4.6 82  
1963 1.5 16 7.6 84  
1965 1.9 33 3.9 67  
1968 3 27 4.8 73  
1971 2.7 29 6.7 71  
1974 1.6 20 6.4 80  
1977 4.2 41 6.1 59  
1981 2.1 34 4.1 66  
1983 6 65 3.3 35  
Source: Michell, T. 1988, From a Developing to a Newly industrialized Country:  












      Table B-5 
   Debt Equity-Asset Ratios of Manufacturing Corporations: 1985-96 
                           Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and USA 
 1985 1990 1992 1994 1996 
Korea      
     Debt equity ratio 348.4 285 318 302 317 
     Equity Asset ratio 22.2 25.9 23.8 24.8 24 
Taiwan      
     Debt equity ratio 113.64 83.4 92.9 87.2  
     Equity Asset ratio 46.81 54.5 51.8 53.4   
Japan      
     Debt equity ratio 252.4 221 216.4 209.3 153 
     Equity Asset ratio 25.7 31.2 31.6 32.3 39.4 
USA      
     Debt equity ratio 121 148.7 168.2 166 153.5 
     Equity Asset ratio 45.2 40.1 37.3 37.5 39.4 




  Table B-6  










1952 12.0 4.4    
1953 9.3 18.8 4.1   
1954 9.5 1.7 4.0   
1955 8.1 9.9 3.7   
1956 5.5 10.5 3.7   
1957 7.4 7.5 3.7   
1958 6.7 1.3 3.8   
1959 7.7 10.6 3.8   
1960 6.3 18.5 4.0   
1961 6.9 7.8 4.2   
1962 7.9 2.4 4.1   
1963 9.4 2.2 4.3   
1964 12.2 -0.2 4.2 0.321 
1965 11.1 -0.1 3.3   
1966 8.9 2.0 3.0 0.323 
1967 10.7 3.4 2.3   
1968 9.2 7.9 1.7 0.326 
1969 9.0 5.1 1.9   
1970 11.4 3.6 1.7 0.294 
1971 12.9 2.8 1.7   
1972 13.3 3.0 1.5 0.291 
1973 12.8 8.2 1.3   
1974 1.2 47.5 1.5 0.287 
1975 4.9 5.2 2.4   
1976 13.9 2.5 1.8 0.28 
1977 10.2 7.0 1.8   
1978 13.6 5.8 1.7 0.287 
1979 8.2 9.8 1.3   
1980 7.3 19.0 1.2 0.277 
1981 6.2 16.3 1.4   
1982 3.6 2.7 2.1 0.283 
1983 8.5 1.6 2.7   
1984 10.6 -0.2 2.4 0.287 
1985 5.0 -0.4 2.9   
1986 11.6 0.7 2.7 0.296 
1987 12.7 0.6 2.0   
1988 7.8 1.3 1.7 0.303 
1989 8.2 4.4 1.6   
1990 5.4 4.1 1.7 0.312 
1991 7.6 3.6 1.5   
1992 6.8 4.5 1.5 0.312 
1993 6.3 2.9 1.5   
1994 6.5 4.1 1.6 0.316 
1995 6.1 3.7 1.8 0.318 
1999 5.5 0.4 2.9 n.a. 
Source: Thorbecke et al (eds) Taiwan’s Development Experience:  Lessons on Roles of Government and Market, 












         
   Table B-7     









       Rate 
Industrial 




     Rate 
Service 




     Rate  
1952 12.0 32.2 11.8 19.7 3.3 48.1 16.1  
1954 9.5 28.0 -10.9 23.9 35.13 48.05 14.04  
1956 5.5 27.5 -0.4 24.4 10.86 48.1 6.5  
1960 6.3 28.5 15.2 26.8 5.4 44.59 1.83  
1964 12.2 22.5 13.2 26.01 17.27 51.55 9.4  
1968 9.2 18.8 4.9 30.57 15.36 50.66 7.3  
1972 13.3 12.6 3.0 38.92 19.71 48.5 11.4  
1976 13.9 10.1 8.2 42.13 21.6 47.78 8.9  
1980 7.3 7.3 -2.0 45.33 9.28 47.36 7.01  
1984 10.6 6.3 1.8 46.16 12.69 45.22 9.8  
1988 7.8 5.0 1.1 44.83 5.18 50.14 10.9  
1992 6.8 3.5 -2.8 40.11 4.28 56.44 9.2  
1995 6.1 3.0 2.4 38.88 5.79 58.16 6.4  
1999 5.5 3.0 1.0 33.0 .5.1 64.1 7.0  
Source: (1)  Yu, T., 1999, “A balance Budget, stable Prices, and Full Employment: The macroeconomic Environment for Taiwan's 
Growth”,  in Thorbecke E., and Henry Wan (eds) Taiwan’s Development Experience:  Lessons on Roles of Government and Market, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, London. (p.143);  














     Table B-8    












1978 6407 0.66 44.2 21.80 
1980 10567 0.75 35.7 34.40 
1982 16864 0.91 43.5 38.40 
1984 22444 0.99 45.7 35.60 
1986 28702 1.04 45.6 38.70 
1988 43839 1.22 44.5 42.00 
1990 71548 1.66 36.4 52.80 
1992 94828 1.78 45.4 46.50 
1994 114682 1.80 42.2 50.30 
1996 138568 1.85 n.a n.a. 












    Table B-9    










1975 0.54 74.40 25.60  
1980 0.74 63.70 36.30  
1982 0.97 49.60 50.40  
1984 1.23 27.70 72.30  
1986 1.68 23.30 76.70  
1988 1.84 21.30 78.80  
1990 1.87 19.40 80.60  
1992 2.08 17.61 82.40  
1994 2.58 15.96 84.00  
1996 2.79 22.17 77.80  








                                             Table B-10    
            Korean Manufacturing Performance 1963-88   
            (Annual Growth Rates of Production)   
Industry 1963-72 1963 1988 
Light Industry: 17.9 18.0 7.6 
   Food 14.7 17.0 8.6 
   Textiles 25.3 16.3 7.2 
   Apparel 22.1 26.7 9.1 
   Leather & Leather products 17.9 60.4 10.7 
   Paper & paper products 13.5 17.3 11.5 
   Glass & glass products 17.4 12.6 10.5 
   Furniture & 5.8 29.3 13.9 
   Non-metal products 19.2 13.0 8.5 
Chemical Industry: 17.6 18.1 8.1 
   Industrial chemical 25.7 21.5 7.9 
   Other 19.7 24.3 11.8 
   Petroleum refineries 33.1 9.5 4.2 
   Petroleum & coal products 12.1 10.9 8.1 
   Rubber Products 9.2 19.7 11.6 
   Plastic products 50.3 32.2 7.5 
Heavy Industry: 13.9 39.5 17.4 
   Iron & Steel 16.9 34.9 10.5 
   Nonferrous metal 6.2 33.8 17.6 
   Metal products 4.8 48.6 10.3 
   Machinery 9.4 25.4 18.6 
   Electrical machinery 22.4 44.7 21.8 
   Transport equipment 20.6 46.5 17.5 
   Professional goods 18.5 37.9 13.4 
Total Manufacturing 17.1 22.1 12.1 
Source: UN Industrial Year Book, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1987, and 1988;   















         Table B-11   
        Import Liberalization of Korea 1980-90 (per cent)  
Year 
Items  
Liberalized All Manufacturing Agriculture 
1980  24.9    
1981 74.7 24.9    
1982 76.6 23.7    
1983 80.4 23.7 22.6 31.4 
1984 84.8 21.9 20.6 29.6 
1985 87.7 21.3 20.3 28.8 
1986 91.6 19.9 18.7 27.1 
1987 93.6 19.3 18.2 26.4 
1988 94.7 18.1 16.9 25.2 
1989 95.5 12.7 11.2 20.6 
1990 96.3 11.4 9.7 19.9 






CIP and Economic Growth: Regression Results 
 
 













Mean Std. Deviation N
 
Correlations
1.000 .978 .914 .652
.978 1.000 .919 .700
.914 .919 1.000 .603
.652 .700 .603 1.000
. .000 .000 .000
.000 . .000 .000
.000 .000 . .001
.000 .000 .001 .
24 24 24 24
24 24 24 24
24 24 24 24

































Predictors: (Constant), FDI, RER, EXPa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), FDI, RER, EXPa. 





5.649 .808 6.993 .000
.637 .086 .948 7.381 .000 .978 .855 .330 .121 8.244
3.897E-02 .058 .077 .670 .510 .914 .148 .030 .152 6.600

















Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa
3.965 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00
2.504E-02 12.583 .00 .00 .16 .00
1.026E-02 19.656 .00 .00 .08 .81










Index (Constant) EXP RER FDI
Variance Proportions
Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Residuals Statisticsa
12.3937 13.6885 13.1109 .31497 24
-.1621 .1709 .0000 .06434 24
-2.277 1.834 .000 1.000 24





Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N

































Predictors: (Constant), FDI, RER, EXPa. 






1.000 .990 .808 .545
.990 1.000 .819 .526
.808 .819 1.000 .283
.545 .526 .283 1.000
. .000 .001 .034
.000 . .001 .040
.001 .001 . .187
.034 .040 .187 .
12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12






























Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), FDI, RER, EXPa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
Coefficientsa
5.794 .614 9.443 .000
.619 .064 .964 9.626 .000 .990 .959 .468 .236 4.243
4.294E-03 .041 .009 .105 .919 .808 .037 .005 .300 3.338

















Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa
3.987 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00
8.256E-03 21.974 .00 .00 .33 .14
5.010E-03 28.209 .01 .00 .02 .61










Index (Constant) EXP RER FDI
Variance Proportions
Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Residuals Statisticsa
13.1081 13.6828 13.3757 .18365 12
-.0347 .0482 .0000 .02549 12
-1.457 1.672 .000 1.000 12





Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N













1.000 -.502 .957 .916 .930
-.502 1.000 -.614 -.532 -.327
.957 -.614 1.000 .909 .825
.916 -.532 .909 1.000 .769
.930 -.327 .825 .769 1.000
. .007 .000 .000 .000
.007 . .001 .004 .064
.000 .001 . .000 .000
.000 .004 .000 . .000
.000 .064 .000 .000 .
23 23 23 23 23
23 23 23 23 23
23 23 23 23 23
23 23 23 23 23




































Predictors: (Constant), GDCF, CAP, EDU, RECa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), GDCF, CAP, EDU, RECa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
Coefficientsa
.512 1.085 .472 .642
1.232E-02 .070 .007 .176 .862 -.502 .042 .005 .521 1.918
.373 .078 .419 4.762 .000 .957 .747 .133 .100 9.954
.247 .078 .213 3.174 .005 .916 .599 .088 .172 5.814























4.999 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
1.082E-03 67.983 .01 .05 .02 .00 .02
1.786E-04 167.278 .03 .03 .05 .05 .68
3.892E-05 358.386 .18 .58 .87 .36 .24











Index (Constant) CAP REC EDU GDCF
Variance Proportions
Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Residuals Statisticsa
12.5857 13.6311 13.1346 .30426 23
-.0663 .0809 .0000 .03621 23
-1.804 1.632 .000 1.000 23





Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N














Mean Std. Deviation N
 
Correlations
1.000 .275 .836 .982
.275 1.000 -.013 .219
.836 -.013 1.000 .885
.982 .219 .885 1.000
. .194 .000 .000
.194 . .484 .247
.000 .484 . .000
.000 .247 .000 .
12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12



































Predictors: (Constant), FTZ, CAP, EDUa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), FTZ, CAP, EDUa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
Coefficientsa
17.620 8.276 2.129 .066
6.105E-02 .115 .037 .529 .611 .275 .184 .032 .754 1.327
-.426 .538 -.117 -.791 .452 .836 -.269 -.049 .171 5.841






















3.984 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00
1.639E-02 15.588 .00 .00 .00 .17
7.017E-05 238.261 .00 .73 .01 .00










Index (Constant) CAP EDU FTZ
Variance Proportions
Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Residuals Statisticsa
13.1276 13.6118 13.3757 .18260 12
-.0511 .0454 .0000 .03216 12
-1.359 1.293 .000 1.000 12





Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N























1.000 .988 -.502 .916 .902
.988 1.000 -.530 .865 .897
-.502 -.530 1.000 -.532 -.392
.916 .865 -.532 1.000 .844
.902 .897 -.392 .844 1.000
. .000 .007 .000 .000
.000 . .005 .000 .000
.007 .005 . .004 .032
.000 .000 .004 . .000
.000 .000 .032 .000 .
23 23 23 23 23
23 23 23 23 23
23 23 23 23 23
23 23 23 23 23




































Predictors: (Constant), RER, CAP, EDU, EXPa. 


























Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), RER, CAP, EDU, EXPa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
Coefficientsa
.435 .883 .493 .628
.598 .035 .825 17.156 .000 .988 .971 .308 .140 7.155
.115 .041 .063 2.810 .012 -.502 .552 .051 .638 1.568
.313 .045 .270 6.942 .000 .916 .853 .125 .213 4.695


















Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa
4.974 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
2.584E-02 13.874 .00 .00 .00 .00 .17
3.312E-04 122.539 .00 .22 .22 .01 .40
8.451E-05 242.594 .02 .74 .19 .40 .08











Index (Constant) EXP CAP EDU RER
Variance Proportions
Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Residuals Statisticsa
12.6316 13.6715 13.1346 .30551 23
-.0396 .0482 .0000 .02337 23
-1.647 1.757 .000 1.000 23





Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N

























1.000 .990 .275 .836 .808 .545
.990 1.000 .245 .837 .819 .526
.275 .245 1.000 -.013 .475 .080
.836 .837 -.013 1.000 .689 .504
.808 .819 .475 .689 1.000 .283
.545 .526 .080 .504 .283 1.000
. .000 .194 .000 .001 .034
.000 . .221 .000 .001 .040
.194 .221 . .484 .059 .402
.000 .000 .484 . .007 .047
.001 .001 .059 .007 . .187
.034 .040 .402 .047 .187 .
12 12 12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12 12 12







































Predictors: (Constant), FDI, CAP, EDU, RER, EXPa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), FDI, CAP, EDU, RER, EXPa. 
Dependent Variable: GDPb. 
 
Coefficientsa
1.194 6.129 .195 .852
.609 .083 .949 7.329 .000 .990 .948 .384 .164 6.109
.110 .118 .067 .929 .389 .275 .354 .049 .524 1.909
.253 .407 .070 .621 .557 .836 .246 .033 .218 4.584
-2.48E-02 .054 -.054 -.461 .661 .808 -.185 -.024 .200 4.991
























5.984 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
9.325E-03 25.332 .00 .00 .00 .00 .22 .00
6.407E-03 30.562 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .68
1.333E-04 211.894 .00 .39 .15 .00 .15 .17
3.850E-05 394.251 .01 .44 .49 .02 .45 .08












Index (Constant) EXP CAP EDU RER FDI
Variance Proportions
Dependent Variable: GDPa. 
 
Residuals Statisticsa
13.1035 13.6759 13.3757 .18388 12
-.0387 .0461 .0000 .02378 12
-1.480 1.632 .000 1.000 12





Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N











Estimation of GNP Per Capita  Required for NIC Status by Year 2020 for Sri Lanka1 
 
 
1. Estimation of GNP per capita   
 
tY = 0Y
ti)1( +  
Where, i = annual inflation rate (world), 
t = time,   
Y0 = GNP p/c at time 0 (i.e., year 2000) 
Yt = GDP p/c at time t (i.e., year 2020) 
Given, Y0   = US$4800 
i =  6.5 % (based on average world inflation during 1990-2000 period) 
t = 20, then 
16900$USYt =  
Estimated  Minimum GNP per capita for a NIC  by 2020 is therefore US$16900 
 
 
2. Growth Rate Required 
 
Given, Yt = US$16900, 
Y0 = US $ 856  (i.e., Sri Lanka’s GNP p/c in 2000) and 
    t =20  
Then,  g  =  16 %.  
Sri Lanka  needs to maintain an annual growth rate of 16 per cent during the two decades from 
2000 to become a NIC by 2020. 
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